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Abstract 
The early 1990s brought sweeping changes to the ways in which uses of the ocean are 
governed in Canada. At that time, the federal government signalled its intention to move 
away from the highly centralized fisheries management regime that it had employed in 
the past. In its place, there emerged a comprehensive new ocean management regime that 
was intended to encourage the development of other ocean industries and bring Canada's 
domestic legislation into conformity with policy discourses that had become 
institutionalized through the Rio Earth Summit and subsequent UN conferences. Most 
prominent among these are: "sustainable development," "the ecosystem approach" and an 
emphasis on the active participation of "civil society" in environmental management. 
This dissertation explores the ways in which this new policy approach has been engaged 
with and, in some cases, contested by variously positioned actors in eastern 
Newfoundland. I argue that what are ostensibly global managerial discourses are being 
reshaped within particular localities in support of very different, and often 
incommensurable, agendas. This suggests that ocean planning is not a value-neutral 
enterprise, but a politically charged conversation, the outcome of which will have 
significant and lasting ramifications for those living and working along the coast. 
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Chapter 1 The United Nations and the New Environmental Management 
On June 8th, 1992, John Crosbie, then Canada's Minister ofFisheries and Oceans, 
held a press conference at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. His primary objective was to raise concerns about 
the severely depleted state of once bountiful cod stocks off the east coast of the island of 
Newfoundland, and to emphasize the role played by both foreign and domestic 
overfishing in bringing them to that point. 1 The case embodied many of the broader 
themes of the "Rio Earth Summit," because it highlighted the complex, transboundary 
nature of many contemporary environmental problems and underscored the importance of 
developing new strategies to address them. Crosbie was part of a Canadian delegation 
that went on to become signatory to a number of multilateral policy agreements at the 
Summit, including Agenda 21, a comprehensive plan of action intended to bring about 
"sustainable development" on a global scale. 
On July 2"d, a mere twenty-four days later, Crosbie held a second press conference 
in his hometown of St. John's, the capital city of the province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador. Amid vocal protests from fishery workers, Crosbie announced the federal 
government's decision to declare a moratorium on the commercial harvesting of northern 
cod, along with several other species of groundfish.2 In total, the moratorium directly 
affected the livelihoods of more than thirty thousand fishery workers living in coastal 
communities in the province, where fishing and fish processing had long been at the 
centre of social and economic life. The unparalleled abundance of cod and other fish 
1 
species in the region had been the raison d'etre behind five hundred years of continuous 
European presence in a place otherwise known for a harsh climate and a rocky terrain, 
both of which severely constrained agricultural production. 
This short window in Crosbie's life marked a critical turning point in Canada's 
approach to managing the marine environment. In the aftermath of the cod moratorium, 
and other fisheries declines elsewhere in Canada, the federal government signalled its 
intention to move away from the highly centralized fisheries management regime that it 
had employed in the past. In its place, Fisheries and Oceans Canada (formerly known as 
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans) was tasked with developing a new 
comprehensive national ocean management regime that would focus greater attention on 
encouraging the development of other ocean industries and would bring Canada's 
domestic legislation into conformity with policy discourses that had become 
institutionalized through the Rio Earth Summit and subsequent UN conferences. Most 
prominent among these are: "sustainable development," the "ecosystem approach" and an 
emphasis on the active participation of "civil society" in environmental management. 
At the heart of this new approach is a radical redistribution of both responsibilities 
and risks. Historically, Canadian policies were characterized by a top-down approach to 
social, economic, and environmental planning, in which government departments 
assumed full responsibility for the research, management and enforcement activities 
associated with regulating uses of the marine environment. Recent reforms have brought 
about a more overtly neoliberal approach, in which citizens, communities and 
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corporations are expected to assume a more active role in managing themselves and their 
interactions with the environment. In the wake of sweeping federal cutbacks, many of the 
functions previously performed by government departments have been transferred onto 
so-called "stakeholder groups" and there has been a growing openness to the use of 
public-private partnerships as mechanisms through which to fund and implement research, 
monitoring, and enforcement programs. 
Underpinning this new vision is the stated belief that users of particular 
environments will take better care of their surroundings than distant managers possibly 
could, since they have a material interest or "stake" in them. Furthermore, it is based on 
the assumption that it is, in fact, possible to assemble a group of individuals (most of 
whom are unelected) who are capable of speaking on behalf of larger constituencies, and 
who can work together to develop a common vision for the future. The position taken 
here is that this simplistic model of society necessarily underplays the ongoing power 
struggles between and within designated stakeholder groups, and largely ignores the 
historical dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that have determined which people are and 
are not able to make legitimate claims to particular spaces, resources, and livelihoods. 
With that point in mind, the remainder of this dissertation explores the ways in 
which this new policy approach has been engaged with and, in some cases, contested by 
variously positioned actors in eastern Newfoundland. I argue that what are ostensibly 
global managerial discourses are being reshaped within particular localities in support of 
very different, and often incommensurable, agendas. Ocean planning, I conclude, is not a 
3 
value-neutral enterprise, but a politically charged conversation, the outcome of which will 
have significant and lasting ran1ifications for those living and working in coastal areas, 
both in Canada and internationally. To provide a theoretical context for this discussion, I 
will begin by examining three UN-inspired discourses that form the core of Canada's new 
approach to environmental management: "sustainable development," the "ecosystem 
approach," and "civil society," paying particular attention to the ways in which these 
discourses have been engaged with by anthropologists and other critical scholars. 
1.1 Sustainable Development 
While the term "sustainable development" did not rise to prominence until the late 
1980s, many of its core elements began to take root a full two decades earlier. In 1968, 
the United Nations passed a resolution calling for an international conference to discuss 
the ways in which industrial development has altered the relationship between human 
beings and the Earth (Bernstein 2001 ). The unprecedented economic expansion that had 
characterized the first half of the twentieth century had ushered in a wide range of new 
environmental problems in more industrialized countries, and there were growing 
concerns that unrestrained economic growth was irreparably damaging many of the 
planet's ecosystems (Conca and Dabelko 1998). These fears were supported by the 
release of the Club of Rome's widely influential report The Limits to Growth in 1972 
(Meadows eta!. 1972). The report 's authors used computer models to investigate a 
number of ongoing trends which they deemed to be worthy of global concern. They 
concluded: 
4 
If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, 
pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the 
limits to growth on this planet will be reached some time within the next 
one hundred years ... We cannot say with certainty how much longer 
mankind can postpone initiating deliberate control of his growth before he 
will have lost the chance for control . .. The most probable result will be a 
rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial 
capacity (ibid: 23). 
The group argued that the only hope was to work toward a lasting "economic and 
ecological equilibrium" designed around the satisfaction of basic needs for all people 
(1972: 24). 
In response to these concerns, the governments of a number of industrialized 
nations, including Canada, began to argue forcefully that new "global" strategies were 
necessary in order to address critical environmental problems, many of which extended 
across national borders (Elliott 1998). This idea was generally resisted by the 
governments of many of the so-called "developing countries," especially those of rapidly 
industrializing nations like China, India, and Brazil. All three expressed worries that they 
would be asked to pay the price for the sins of wealthier and more heavily industrialized 
countries by curtailing their own development aspirations. They argued that 
environmental problems should not be examined in isolation from social and economic 
concerns, and called for policies that would not significantly restrict existing financial aid 
and development practices (Bernstein 2001 ). 
Despite these disagreements, representatives of 113 national governments 
converged on Stockholm, Sweden in 1972 for the "United Nations Conference on the 
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Hwnan Environment" (UNCHE) (Haas 2002). While there were a nwnber of 
multinational environmental agreements that preceded this event, the "Stockholm 
Summit" was the first effort to discuss the health of the Earth' s ecosystems in a broad and 
systematic way and investigate the enviromnental impacts of industrial development 
(Conka and Dabelko 1998). The agreements reached at the conference were codified in 
the Stockholm Declaration, a list of twenty-six core principles that were intended to guide 
the development of national policies. It also resulted in the creation of the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP), which was designed to help bring about concrete reforms 
(ibid.). 
The 1970s and 80s gave rise to a variety of smaller multinational gatherings, 
which developed very different visions for the future of global environmental policy. In 
1974 the UNEP and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development co-
sponsored a joint symposium on "Patterns of Resource Use, Environment and 
Development Strategies" in Cocoyoc, Mexico. The meeting had a strong representation 
from "developing countries," and, accordingly, placed both economic development and 
poverty reduction issues high on the agenda. The Cocoyoc Declaration that emerged from 
the symposium advocated major structural changes and called upon wealthy countries to 
increase aid in order to improve living standards in poorer countries and better protect the 
environment from harm. The Declaration also stressed the importance of the following: 
satisfying basic human needs by redistributing resources, adopting regulations to curb the 
pattern of over-consumption in the world ' s wealthiest countries, and placing taxes on the 
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use of the "global commons" for the benefit of the world's most disadvantaged peoples 
(Bernstein 2001). 
A very different view emerged from the ongoing meetings of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), whose membership at the time 
consisted primarily of countries in Western Europe and North America, but also included 
representation from Australia, New Zealand, and Japan (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2005).3 Instead of blaming economic growth, the OECD 
countries stressed that many enviromnental problems could be linked to unrestricted 
access to natural resources and excessive population pressure in many of the world's less-
developed regions. The organization called upon govermnents to privatize common 
property resources in order to stimulate investment and to take steps to reduce birthrates 
in developing countries. Its member countries also strongly advocated the use of"market-
based," as opposed to "regulatory" approaches to address enviromnental problems. These, 
they argued, would facilitate capital investment and create economic growth, and this in 
turn would generate more wealth with which to tackle enviromnental problems as they 
emerged (Bernstein 200 1). 
This emphasis on firm property rights and market-based strategies is reflective of 
a larger commitment to neoliberalism in public policy which took hold in many of these 
countries during this period. Neoliberalism has strong affinities with classical liberalism, 
which dominated political and economic thinking in Western Europe and North America 
during the early decades of the twentieth century (Rose 1999; Cortner and Moote 1999; 
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Jessop 2002; Brown 2003; Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). At the core of these positions 
is the idea that "the optimizing efforts of self-interested entrepreneurs, efficiently 
coordinated by self-regulating markets" will produce economic growth and lead to 
widespread prosperity (Hartwick and Peet 2003: 188). 
Faith in the central tenets of classical liberalism began to be undermined by the 
tumultuous economic period that followed the First World War. Market crashes in Europe 
and North America in the 1920s and 30s respectively were taken as evidence of the 
failure of classical economic theory to generate effective social and economic policies. In 
this climate of uncertainty, many governments began to adopt Keynesian approaches, 
which emphasized the need for stronger state regulation to "steer" the market and enable 
them to satisfy key political objectives (Brown 1995; Mouffe 2000). After the Second 
World War, these ideas led to the emergence of welfare state regimes in many 
industrialized nations, which invested heavily in subsidies to healthcare, education, public 
housing, and, in some cases, environmental conservation programs (Clarke 2000). 
By the 1960s, however, Chicago School economists such as Milton Friedman 
(1962), inspired primarily by the earlier writings by Austrian economist Friedrich von 
Hayek ( 1944 ), began to argue for the withdrawal of the state from many of these arenas, 
claiming that Keynesian interventions invariably lead to inefficiency and stifle individual 
entrepreneurship (Mouffe 2000; Brown 2001 ). They took the view that state intervention 
in the economy "disturbs the natural tendency for competition, specialization, and trade 
to generate economic growth" (Hartwick and Peet 2003, 189, emphasis mine). Instead, 
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they advocated: "an outward-oriented export economy, organized entirely through 
markets, along with privatization, trade liberalization and the elimination of state budget 
deficits" (ibid: 189). In the decades that followed, these ideas stimulated policy reforms in 
many of the world's most affluent countries, which brought about a significant reduction 
in the size of many government bureaucracies, and a renewed emphasis on market-based 
approaches to progran1 development and financing (Dean and Hindness 1998; Clarke 
2000; Harvey 2001, 2007). As Pi-Sunyer has observed, "a dominant feature of ' late 
capitalist' neoliberal systems is the extent to which the interventionist, welfare-oriented 
state has lost ground and is being replaced by the globalization of economic, as well as 
social and cultural relations" (2002: 233). In spite ofthese insights, however, it is 
important to stress that the state is not a homogeneous entity with a unified agenda. 
Rather, it is better conceived of as a site of struggle, where complex networks of ideas 
and agendas converge (Schneider and Schneider 1998; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Pi-
Sunyer 2002; Roseman 2004). 
The emergence of the idea of "sustainable development" can be understood as an 
attempt to incorporate these ideas into the emerging dialogue on global environmental 
governance. While the term was first introduced in the early 1980s,4 it was not until the 
latter part ofthe decade that it began to receive widespread attention. In 1987, the idea of 
sustainable development was made the centerpiece of Our Common Future, otherwise 
known as the Brundtland Report, a highly publicized program of action that was released 
by the United Nations' World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).5 
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---------------- - ---· - - -
The report famously defined sustainable development as "development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 43). In 
opposition to the more radical conclusions of the Limits to Growth thesis, the WCED took 
the view that economic growth and environmental conservation are not inherently 
antagonistic, and should be understood as complementary. Rather than advocating the 
curtailment of growth, their report stressed that continuing global economic growth was 
entirely possible, provided greater attention was paid to the design and export of "green 
technologies" and the development of more "environmentally friendly forms of 
production and exchange, which could create economic growth while minimizing 
environmental damage" (ibid.). The wealth generated through this growth, the report 
argued, could then be used to increase assistance to "developing countries" in order to 
help alleviate poverty, which it presented as the root cause of many of the most pressing 
environmental problems, such as food, water, and energy shortages (ibid.). 
The concept of sustainable development was soon formally incorporated into the 
mandates of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade 
Organization (Bernstein 2001). In each of these cases, economic incentives were 
presented as the preferred route through which to encourage individuals and companies to 
adopt more sustainable practices. Once again, the key ideas they emphasized were: the 
establishment and/or clarification of property rights in order to encourage capital 
investment and give individuals and companies a greater sense of ownership; the 
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promotion of export-driven growth; and the use of market mechanisms, such as tax 
incentives, the "Polluter-Pays Principle"6, and tradable pollution credits in order to 
influence behaviour (ibid.).7 
This ideological commitment to the view that the market could serve as the engine 
through which to bring about a more sustainable future was also very much apparent in 
many of the agreements signed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in 1992 (Hartwick and Peet 2003). The Rio Earth Summit was 
much larger than its predecessor in Stockholm twenty years earlier. It brought together 
representatives of 178 countries, as well as more than 1400 non-government 
organizations (Bernstein 2001 ). While the WCED report was responsible for bringing the 
idea of sustainable development to the forefront of the UN's strategy for global 
environmental governance, it was not until the Rio Summit that it became fully 
institutionalized in international agreements and national policies (Elliott 1998, Tsing 
2001 ). The events leading up to the Summit led to the signing of international 
conventions on climate change and biodiversity, as well as the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, a list of twenty-seven core principles relating to 
environment and development issues. Perhaps most significant of all was the adoption of 
Agenda 21, a wide-ranging policy document that featured chapters on a variety of major 
environmental concerns (United Nations 1992a). 
The Rio Summit culminated in the establishment of the United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable Development, which was intended to drive the 
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implementation of Agenda 21 by promoting dialogue, and monitoring the progress of 
signatory countries (Haas et al. 1992). National governments were expected to develop 
strategies for implementing the new sustainable development agenda and report regularly 
to the Commission about their progress (ibid.). Countries were also asked to commit 0.7 
percent of their GNP to development aid each year, although few have lived up to this 
commitment in practice. 8 While cow1tries did not face sanctions for failing to comply, 
many countries did create new domestic policies, or modify old ones, in order to 
incorporate the principle of sustainable development into their existing national 
frameworks. 
Most of these countries reasserted their commitment to sustainable development 
at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg, South 
Africa in 2002. While the Summit produced new recommendations dealing with a range 
of issues, including renewable energy, agriculture, and ocean conservation, these 
achievements were tempered by the steadfast refusal of a group of countries, led by the 
United States, to agree to any binding targets whatsoever (Clover 2002). The position 
taken by US President George W. Bush in Johannesburg, echoed his father's now 
infamous statement at the Rio Swnmit that: "The American way of life is not up for 
negotiation." The result was that the new agreements stemming from the Johannesburg 
Summit placed an even stronger focus on privatization and market mechanisms as the 
primary vehicles through which to encourage social change. 
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Since it first burst onto the international stage in the 1980s, the concept of 
"sustainable development" has faced intense criticism. It has been accused of being all 
things to all people, by failing to provide a clear indication of what kinds of industrial 
development, if any, must be sacrificed in order to preserve the integrity of particular 
environments (Lolm1ann 1990; Redclift 1992; Stone 2003; Kottak 2004). Many have 
argued that, by focusing primarily on the potential ofthe free market to bring about 
change, the UN's conception of sustainable development has failed to adequately 
consider the roles played by free market economics, privatization and unrestrained 
economic growth in contributing to poverty and environmental degradation (Lele 1991; 
The Ecologist 1993; O' Connor 1994; 1996 Escobar 1996; Sneddon 2000; Castro 2004; 
Watts and Peet 2004). It has been called a "business as usual" approach to economic 
development (Sneddon 2000: 522), because it implies that a slightly modified version of 
the existing global economic order will be sufficient to reduce poverty and restore 
degraded environments and fails to seriously question the tremendous prosperity 
currently enjoyed by the world ' s wealthiest countries, companies, and individuals 
(Redclift 1989; Solow 1993; Norgaard 1994 ). 
In opposition to the sustainable development discourse, James O'Connor (1994, 
1996) has argued that there is an inherent contradiction between the capitalist mode of 
production and efforts to preserve the health of particular environments. He calls this the 
"Second Contradiction of Capitalism." O'Coru1or echoes Marx's (1 887) argument that 
capitalism contains the "seeds of its own destruction." Whereas Marx had seen the 
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overexploitation of labour and the overproduction of certain goods as probable causes of 
this eventual collapse, however, O'Connor highlights another problem. He argues that the 
continual pressure to produce goods at lower prices also depends upon the 
overexploitation of certain natural resources or "external physical conditions." Over time, 
the depletion or destruction of these natural resources is likely to lead to a state of 
underproduction of ce1iain commodities, as it will become impossible to satisfy consumer 
demands with the resources that remain. Harkening back to the Limits to Growth thesis, 
O'Connor's argument suggests that sustainable development is a contradiction in terms 
and the only sure way to protect the planet from irreparable harm is to develop radically 
different ways of living. 
Poststructuralist critiques have focused attention on the role of sustainable 
development discourse in legitimating established scientific and managerial patterns of 
authority and marginalizing other perspectives (Hajer 1995; Luke 1995; Escobar 1996; 
Davis 2003; Castro 2004; Watts and Peet 2004). Hajer (1995) claims that sustainable 
development discourse is an illustration of what he calls "ecological modernization." He 
argues that, since sustainable development discourse retains an unflinching faith in the 
power of economic, bureaucratic, and scientific rationality to manage and control the 
biophysical world, it cannot be understood as a radical critique of conventional 
development discourse. To the contrary, the call for more environmentally sensitive 
forms of development may actually be used to strengthen the hegemonic power of expert 
knowledge. Further to this point, Escobar (1996, 1999) has argued that the 
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institutionalization of the sustainable development concept places an even greater 
emphasis on the need for experts to dictate an appropriate course of action. He claims that 
the idea of sustainable development is based on "the problematization of global survival" 
(1996: 51). The Earth is presented as a "fragile ball," and all humans are called upon to 
do their parts to protect it. The responsibility of prescribing exactly what course of action 
must be followed in order to safeguard the health of the planet, however, remains the 
prerogative of First World professionals (Escobar 1999). Escobar (1996) has also 
observed that sustainable development discourse tends to focus solely on conserving 
those elements of the global enviromnent that are "relevant to the functioning ofthe 
(urban-industrial) system" and neglects those that are not profitable (1996: 52). This 
"economistic" perspective portrays nature solely in terms of its instrumental value. Seen 
through this lens, environmental conservation is not a moral or political imperative, but a 
means through which to exploit resources as efficiently as possible (ibid.). 
Paying particular attention to recent developments in the world's oceans, 
Steinberg (1999) has noted that the rise of sustainable development discourse has done 
little to restrict the overexploitation of the seas. To the contrary, he argues that it has 
actually facilitated the opening up of ocean environments throughout the world to a host 
of new industries by underscoring the importance of"rational" scientific resource 
management in balancing multiple uses of marine space. Steinberg observes that the rise 
of sustainable development discourse has ushered in a new image of the ocean as a 
"cornucopia of exploitable, but fragile resources." Proponents of sustainable development, 
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he argues, have tended to stress the importance of "long run planning" to ensure that 
those "economical assets" are exploited in such a way as to maximize "efficiency and 
productivity" (1999: 404-405). This, he suggests, has had the effect of silencing 
alternative voices which refuse to characterize the sea solely in economic terms. Similarly, 
Nichols (1999) takes the position that recent trends in ocean policy, including the 
promotion of sustainable development and what she calls "integrated coastal zone 
management" represent a fundamentally neoliberal approach in that they maintain that 
"economic development and conservation goals are mutually supportive under the right 
circumstances of regulation and resource privatization" (Nichols 1999: 389). 
1.2 The Ecosystem Approach 
Sustainable development discourse may indeed continue to elevate expert 
knowledge to a privileged position, but the idea has come into being alongside another 
policy discourse which appears to signal a greater willingness to acknowledge the 
limitations of previous approaches to resource management. While the idea of the 
"ecosystem approach" or "ecosystem-based management" has been applied in a number 
of different ways, it has almost always been juxtaposed against the "single species" or 
"single industry" management approaches that were characteristic of earlier periods 
(Fitzsimmons 1999; Yaffee 1999; Menzies and Butler 2006). As an alternative, 
management based on an ecosystem approach promises to focus greater attention on the 
behaviour of the system as a whole and on the complex interactions between elements in 
that system (Montuori and Purser 1996). While the ecosystem concept has a long history, 
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in both biology and anthropology, it is only in the last few decades that it has entered into 
the mainstrean1 of environmental management, spurred on in part by its inclusion in key 
UN environmental policy agreements. 
In his book Imperial Ecology, Anker (200 I) locates the emergence of ecosystem 
management in the colonial policies of the British Empire around the turn ofthe twentieth 
century. He argues that colonial administrators "urgently needed tools for understanding 
human relations to nature and society in order to set administrative economic policies for 
landscapes, population, settlement and social control" (ibid: 2).9 Anker notes, however, 
that in these early years, there was little agreement about what direction this new science 
should take. The South African school of thought, which was led by scholars such as John 
Phillips and John William Bews, was strongly influenced by that country's segregationist 
policies. They produced an ecology based on the idea that: "humans should be understood 
as evolving from different biotic communities" and they used this idea to naturalize and 
justify the existing social order (ibid: 238). The British school of thought, led by Arthur 
George Tansley, took a very different approach. Tansley theorized that the natural 
environment operated like a machine with numerous interacting parts and he stressed the 
importance of studying the entire system in an attempt to understand patterns in these 
interactions. His work, in turn, had a tremendous influence on authors such as Aldous 
Huxley and H. G. Wells, both of whom took this to mean that the natural world existed in 
a state of balance and argued that human societies should be organized in accordance 
with the "laws of nature" (ibid: 240). While the idea that nature is inherently stable and 
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ordered has a very long history in many intellectual and religious traditions, the emerging 
discipline of ecology provided it with heightened scientific legitimacy (Williams 1980; 
Scoones 1999). 
The ecosystem concept had a minimal influence on resource management 
practices in the first half of the twentieth century, but it began to take centre stage in the 
1950s and 60s (Scoones 1999). Building upon developments in mathematics and physics, 
growing attention began to be paid to the idea that biological systems tend toward states 
of relative "equilibrium" or "homeostasis" over time (McCay 1978; Kwa 1994; Scoones 
1999; Lansing 2003). Similar developments took place within ecological anthropology, as 
works by authors such as Roy Rappaport (1968), Marvin Harris (1974), and Andrew 
Vayda (1976) developed theories which explained cultural systems as functional 
adaptations to biological systems (McCay 1978; Orlove 1980; Netting 1982; Milton 
1996).10 These authors forwarded arguments about the relationship between nature and 
culture that emphasized structure and stability, often to the neglect of process and change 
(Orlove 1980; Netting 1982). 11 Nature was seen as having fairly predictable laws and 
patterns that could be understood by the natural sciences. Culture, on the other hand, was 
understood as a system through which human behaviour was regulated in such a way as 
to allow local populations to make optimal use of their surroundings, without exceeding 
the capacity of those surroundings to support them (Orlove 1980; Peet and Watts 1996). 12 
This emphasis on the balance between human and ecological systems was also clearly 
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reflected in the Club of Rome's call for world leaders to work toward a state of 
"economic and ecological equilibrium." 
Over time, faith in the stability of nature began to be undermined by the repeated 
failures of ecological systems to conform to the predictions of managers (Luhmann 1997; 
Scoones 1999; Thrift 1999; Bavington 2002; Lansing 2003; Palsson 2006). Faced with 
growing criticism, many environmental management agencies began to pay greater 
attention to the non-linear dynamics of ecosystems which made it difficult, if not 
impossible, to accurately predict their behaviour (Holling and Meffe 1996). This new way 
of thinking, which began to crystallize in the 1970s, is founded upon "an ecology of 
chaotic fluctuations, disequilibria, and instability" (Peet and Watts 1996: 12). During this 
period, "the mathematical foundations of ecology began to shift away from the study of 
equilibrium (the balance of nature), using simple differential equations, to the study of 
nonequilibrium theory with the techniques of nonlinear analysis" (Lansing 2003: 192). In 
this "new ecology," ecosystems can no longer be viewed as being easily understandable, 
predictable, and controllable (Montuori and Purser 1996; Bavington and Kay 2007). 13 
Instead, they are increasingly portrayed as complex "open" systems, which are 
continually influenced by a multiplicity of forces (Martin 1994; Scoones 1999; Ingerson 
2002). This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the case of coastal and marine 
ecosystems which are exposed to a wide variety of influences and are particularly prone 
to sudden, unexpected shifts (de la Mare 2005). 
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The growing willingness to acknowledge the inherent uncertainties that are 
brought about by these complex dynamics has brought about sweeping changes in both 
science and environmental management. A new "post-normal" science is beginning to be 
employed in situations where knowledge is incomplete but stakes are high (Ravetz 1999). 
This trend has been characterized by a growing awareness of the need to consider larger 
temporal and spatial scales and a heightened recognition ofthe importance of paying 
close attention to the unique variables at play in particular environments (Scoones 1999). 
There has also been an increasing reliance on new information technologies, particularly 
new mapping and modeling techniques, which allow for the overlaying of multiple 
sources of data (Nowotny et al. 2002; Brosius 2003). 
In place of the totalizing, "top-down" management models of the past, new 
approaches have tended to emphasize the need to incorporate the knowledge of resource 
users as a complement to conventional scientific modeling techniques (Neis 1992; Neis 
and Felt 2000; Johannes et al. 2000; Berkes et al. 2003; Murray et al. 2005; Menzies and 
Butler 2006; Haggan et al. 2007). There has also been a growing consensus that managers 
should devote more of their time and resources to trying to understand and influence the 
beliefs and attitudes of resource users in an effort to reduce the negative environmental 
impacts of human actions (Wallace eta!. 1996; Mitchell 1997; Ostrom 1990; Grey 1999; 
Coward et al. 2000; Caddy and Cochrane 2001; Drori eta!. 2003; Omrner 2007). These 
shifts have brought with them a heightened focus on the need to incorporate the insights 
of social scientists into resource management. Such fields are increasingly being viewed 
20 
------~ --~--
as having the unique expertise needed to develop methods for incorporating "local,. and 
"traditional" ecological knowledge into scientific models and to assist governments in 
brokering par1nerships with non-state actors in order to develop collaborative 
mechanisms through which to carry out scientific research and enforce conservation 
regulations (Murray et a!. 2005). 
Many of these ideas assumed a central role in the approach to ecosystem 
management that emerged in the wake of the Rio Earth Summit and subsequent UN 
policy agreements. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration appeared to usher in a new era of 
humility in the face of uncertainty, when it stressed the need for states to adopt a 
"Precautionary Approach" to environmental management. It defines this approach as 
follows: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation" (United Nations 1992b ). Instead, it suggests that action must 
sometimes be taken, even in the face ofunce11ainty. While the Rio Declaration and 
Agenda 21 went on to stress the need for "precautionary" "anticipatory" "integrated" 
"multi-species" and "multi-sectoral" approaches in environmental management, they did 
not explicitly use the terms "ecosystem approach" or "ecosystem-based management,. 
(Turrell 2004). These phrases did not become fully institutionalized in international 
environmental policy discourse until 1995, when they became a central component of the 
Conference of the Parties ofthe UN Convention on Biological Diversity, which was held 
in Jakarta, Indonesia (ibid: 15). Those present agreed that: "the conservation and 
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sustainable use of biological diversity ... should be addressed in a holistic manner;" and 
that "the present mono-species approach to modelling and assessment should be 
augmented by an ecosystem-process oriented approach, based on research of ecosystem 
processes and functions ... " (ibid: 15-16). These commitments have been subsequently 
reaffirmed in several UN agreements, including the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development Implementation Plan, which was released in 2002. 
While the acknowledgement of uncertainty that has accompanied the emergence 
of the ecosystem approach represents a departure from the hubris of previous eras, some 
have remained critical of the concept of ecosystem management, as it has been deployed 
in international policy frameworks. One major criticism of the non-equilibrium focus of 
the "new ecology" is that, by presuming that ecosystems are always in a state flux, the 
idea of ecosystem management could be used to undermine any capacity to judge whether 
one configuration is any healthier than any other. Some have argued that arguments 
drawn from this new ecology can, and often have, been used to justify a variety of new 
forms of resource exploitation. Budiansky summarizes this position as follows: 
... the idea of a risky nature is one that is hard for many people to swallow ... 
Environmentalists recoil at the notion precisely because it seems to give man 
license to transform nature at will. If what is here could just as well have been 
something completely different, then what is wrong with turning forests to deserts 
or prairies to cattle ranches or wetlands to sugarcane fields? The honest and 
uncomfortable answer is that from a scientific point of view, there is nothing at all 
wrong with these things ... (Budiansky 1995: 98). 
Several critics have also noted that, as much like advocates of "sustainable 
development," proponents of the ecosystem approach often stop short of a more radical 
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critique of managerial patterns of authority (Montuori and Pursor 1996; Scarce 2000; 
Bavington 2002; de la Mare 2005). Ingerson (2002) observes that the very notion of 
ecosystem management implies that it is possible to force "the genie of ecology back into 
the bottle of science" (2002: 6). It suggests that complex systems can be managed, 
provided that better sources of data can be incorporated into management models and 
more effective mechanisms of enforcement can be implemented. 
Borrowing from Bruno Latour (1986, 1987), Scarce (2000) points out that, even 
with this new recognition of uncertainty, the ecosystem concept must be understood as an 
attempt to extend the engineering ideal of laboratory research to the broader world. He 
notes that, far from "discovering" the ways in which systems actually work, ecosystem 
science necessarily creates the very systems it seeks to understand. Systems, he argues, 
need to be understood as social constructs, since the very acts of defining their boundaries 
and modelling their behaviour involve highly subjective processes of selection and 
omission which necessarily shape the questions that are asked and the conclusions that 
are drawn. He, furthermore, observes that the ecosystem approach depends upon the 
belief that it is possible to break down complex systems into their component parts in 
order to study them and then reassemble that knowledge in order to gain a sense of how 
those parts fit together. There is no guarantee, however, that this will produce an accurate 
picture of how nature actually operates, much less an effective mechanism through which 
to anticipate and adapt to futme events (ibid.) 
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Some have pointed out that, while the ecosystem approach acknowledges that 
complete control over biological systems may not be possible, it appears to shift the locus 
of control onto social systems (Wallace et a!. 1996; Scarce 2000; Bavington 2002). In the 
face of chronic uncertainty, hw11an beings have come to be constructed as the most 
manageable element in a vast and complex human-environment system (Bavington 2002). 
Several scholars have challenged the ecosystem concept for its tendency to downplay the 
agency of individual actors, instead portraying them as predictable cogs in a larger social-
ecological machine (Sachs 1999; Anker 2001; Bavington 2005). Anker notes that the 
term ecosystem is derived from the Greek term oikos, which referred to the household, or 
more specifically, the "mechanistic necessities" associated with running a household 
(200 1: 242). He draws upon Hannah Arendt (1958) who pointed out that this domestic 
sphere was historically distinguished from the public sphere, or the polis, which was 
associated with human freedom, creativity and engagement. Echoing Arendt, Anker 
claims that, by subsuming all human action to the realm of oikos, the ecosystem concept 
risks reducing most human actions to a deterministic "stimuli-response" system that 
appears to leave little room for ingenuity or freedom (Anker 2001: 242-243). 
1.3 Civil Society 
The growing focus on the importance of public participation in ecosystem 
management is reflective of a broader trend toward the formal involvement of"civil 
society" in contemporary regimes of governance. Faced with budgetary cutbacks and 
demands by citizens and corporations for greater input in shaping policy, many 
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government agencies have begun to embrace more "enabling" management approaches, 
which often employ techniques developed in the private sector or in international 
development planning (Miller and Rose 1990; Burchell 1991 ; Rose 1996; Shore and 
Wright 1997; Clarke and Newman 1997; Martin 1997; Bourdieu 1998; Dean 1999; 
Brown 2001; Paley 2002; Jessop 2002). This trend has also been characterized by a 
heightened effort to transfer duties once performed by the state onto non-state actors as a 
way of dispersing financial risk and political responsibility (Beck 1992; Burchell 1996; 
O'Malley 1996; Rose 1999; Ferguson and Gupta 2001; Harvey 2001; Henkel and Stirrat 
2001; Pianta 2001; Li 2007). Public servants increasingly find themselves under pressure 
to relinquish the "command and control" style of previous eras and adopt more 
collaborative approaches, based on the "empowerment" of "stakeholders" (Rahnema 
1992; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Cruikshank 1999; Cleaver 2001; Cooke and Kothari 
2001; Francis 2001; Poncelet 2001; Darcy 2002; Singh and van Houtum 2002; Smith 
2002; Mikalsen and Jentoft 2003; Nuijten 2003; Buanes et al. 2004; Hickey and Mohan 
2004; McCarthy 2005; Buscher 2007; Chakravartty 2007; Gray and Hatchard 2008; 
Kasperson 2008). Rather than insisting on complete decision-making authority, they are 
increasingly concentrating on "responsibilizing" non-state actors by attempting to train 
and motivate them to participate actively in the development and implementation of 
policy (Rose 1996, 1999). 
This process of downloading costs and responsibilities has, however, also been 
accompanied by the growth of what Strathern (2000) has called "audit cultures," in which 
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state institutions continually monitor the effectiveness of non-state actors in achieving 
pre-identified objectives. The state continues to play a vital role in steering the agenda 
and assessing the degree to which performance targets are being met, but allows for 
greater flexibility in the ways that particular goals are achieved. By controlling the nature 
and extent of public participation, determining the issues that are up for discussion, and 
defining measures of "progress," however, states are, at least in principle, able to retain a 
high degree of influence, without assuming the same degree of financial and political risk 
as was the case during the "welfare state" era. 
Similar changes have been apparent in the internal human resource management 
practices that have been adopted within many state bureaucracies in recent decades. The 
"New Public Management" movement, which took hold in many Western government 
agencies during the 1980s and 1990s, was also strongly influenced by private sector 
management techniques. It has been characterized by several core elements, including: 1) 
forcing government departments to reduce their operating costs by eliminating or 
contracting out their "non-core" functions; 2) placing a heightened focus on motivating 
employees through such things as the delegation of new forms of responsibility, the 
establishment of programs designed to strengthen "organizational culture," the 
development of flexible working hours, and the implementation of systems of 
individualized salaries and bonuses, which allow for employees to be easily rewarded or 
punished on the basis of performance; and, 3) putting a strong emphasis on the continual 
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training and re-skilling of employees (Deleuze 1990; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Savoie 
1995, 1999; Aucoin 1995; Shore and Wright 1997; Peters 1998; Kasemets 2000). 
Examining the recent focus on "civil society" within the UN system, Jaeger (2007) 
argues that this trend is indicative of a broader attempt to depoliticize global governance 
by working to "remove issues from fundan1ental political contention" and encouraging 
individuals and groups to participate directly in the process of governing themselves 
(2007: 258). He further points out that this approach is not limited to UN conferences 
dealing with the environment, but has also been very much apparent in other UN 
conferences since the early 1990s, including those dealing with questions of peace, 
development, democratization, human rights, population, and gender equity (ibid: 259). 
Jaeger and other critical scholars of these developments have built upon the 
pioneering work of Michel Foucault. Foucault took the position that power is not 
something that belongs exclusively to certain individuals and not to others. He argued 
that power is seldom absolute and typically emerges as an outcome or effect of particular 
networks of social relations (Foucault 1982). While Foucault's early writings on power 
did not take the state as their primary focus, he clarified his thoughts on the nature of state 
power in the later years of his life in an influential series of lectures that he delivered at 
the College de France in 1978 and 1979 (Gordon 1991 ). At that time, he developed the 
concept of "governmentality," which tied together his interest in examining the 
emergence of the modem state with his longstanding concern with exploring the ways in 
which subjectivity is shaped and reshaped through relations of power and knowledge 
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(Lemke 2000). Rather than restricting his use of the word of' government' to descriptions 
of state bureaucracies, however, Foucault also invoked an earlier usage of the term which 
referred to any number of actions that are intended to steer or influence the conduct of 
others (Gordon 1991). Jaeger explains: 
.. . "governmentality" has involved shifts from a separation between public 
and private forms of government (for example, in the state and the family) 
to continuity between them; from the concern with control over territory 
and law-abiding subjects to alternately disciplinary, pastoral, biopolitical 
and liberal concerns with the condition, welfare and management of the 
population; from legal regulation "from above" political subjects to 
material regulation "from within" the population and "through" living 
individuals. As a result, traditional preoccupations of sovereign power 
(decision-making authority, legislation, etc.) have been overlaid by 
concerns of (self-)discipline and surveillance on the one hand, and by 
concerns of political economy and "liberalism" (that is, societal and 
individual self-regulation) on the other (Foucault 1991 ; 1997 a, b; 2000 a,b, 
summarized in Jaeger 2007: 260). 
Foucault was particularly interested in showing how it was that state power came to be 
"governmentalized" over time. That is to say, how state practices came to depend 
increasingly on administration and persuasion to achieve particular ends, instead of 
relying primarily on the threat of force. This echoed the earlier writings of Gramsci who 
also explored the relationship between the state and civil society, particularly the former's 
dual reliance on both coercion and consent (through the incorporation of "civil society" 
into the state apparatus) in retaining hegemonic control over the populace (Gramsci 1971). 
According to Foucault, governmentality, unlike more overt forms of coercion, is 
not necessarily repressive. Rather, it can be productive, in that its primary goal is to 
manage, guide, and administer life. He contended that such interventions into the lives of 
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citizens often appear to be guided by politically neutral, 'scientific' or 'technical' 
knowledge, but this characterization obscures the ways in which particular relations of 
power serve to uphold particular "regimes of truth" while marginalizing others (ibid.). In 
this way, governmentality transforms politically charged issues into "managerial 
problems, thereby removing them from the sphere of political decision-making and 
fundamental political contention" (Jaeger 2007: 260). 
Elaborating upon Foucault's insights, a number of contemporary theorists have 
examined the particular form of governmentality that has emerged in the wake of the 
"neoliberal" reforms ofthe 1980s and 90s (Deleuze 1990; Gordon 1991; Wright 1994; 
Burchell 1996; Martin 1997; Dean and Hindness 1998; Rose 1999; Lemke 2000; Mouffe 
2000; Harvey 2001; Brown 2003). Several of these authors have pointed out that the 
common perception that neoliberalism has been characterized by a retreat of government 
is mistaken. In actual fact, government, in the Foucauldian sense of the word, has grown 
stronger through recent policy reforms. Whereas welfare state era policies were 
characterized by larger bureaucracies and greater centralized control, neoliberal 
approaches have increasingly sought to bring about government from within. 
Wendy Brown has argued that neoliberal governmentality typically involves "the 
active promotion of institutions, policies, and discourses which normatively construct 
individuals as calculating, entrepreneurial selves" who "rationally deliberate about 
alternative courses of action, make choices, and bear responsibility for the consequences 
ofthese choices" (Brown 2003: 5-6). Emily Martin has observed that neoliberal thinking 
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calls forward an idealized image of individuals as 'flexible,' 'self-actualizing' and 
'responsible' actors (Martin 1994). In this vision ofthe world, agencies ofthe state cease 
to act as "providers of services" and "bearers of risks" and must instead become 
"facilitators" or "partners" (Hansen and Svalkoff-Iversen 2002: 15). Rather than 
expecting the government to ensure their security and well-being, citizens, agencies, and 
corporations alike are expected to assume the role of a "self-reliant, self-governing, and 
self-managing ' tenant'" (Shore and Wright 1997: 33). They are granted new "rights," 
particularly rights to own, lease or manage what had once been considered state or 
common property, but they must understand that in return for these new rights, they must 
also assume new responsibilities and new risks (Harvey 1990; Jessop 2002). 
The ways in which this responsibilization process has taken shape in 
environmental management is the primary focus of Arun Agrawal's book 
Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects. Agrawal 
explores the "relationship between changing technologies of government," such as "the 
decentralization of environmental regulation to the locality .. . "' and the production of new 
"environmental identities" (2005: 6, 14). Building on Foucault, he uses the term 
"environmentality" to describe an emerging environmental governance approach which is 
characterized by a number of interrelated components. The first is the production of 
governmentalized localities, which are spaces that have been transformed into domains 
"fit for modern government" (ibid: 6). This is achieved through the application of diverse 
"strategies of knowledge and power," most notably the use of statistics and other 
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quantitative and teclmological representations of the environment which make it 
increasingly possible for managers to delegate responsibility while continuing to "govern 
at a distance" (ibid: 89). 14 The second component is the creation of regulatory 
communities. These are "new regulatory spaces within localities where social interactions 
around the environment take form" (ibid: 6-7). Included among these are such things as 
integrated management boards, stakeholder roundtables, and steering committees, all of 
which 'empower' certain individuals to participate in the management process while 
excluding others. These new institutional arrangements, in tum, play a key role in the 
third component, "the constitution of environmental subjects - people who come to think 
and act in new ways in relation to the environmental domain being governed" (ibid: 7). 
Examining the history of forest regulation in Kumaon in Northern India, Agrawal argues 
that, over time, there has been a gradual dissolution of the once firm boundary between 
state and community, as: " . . . national and state governments are striving to make rural 
populations accomplices ... in their own control" (ibid: 14). 
Also building on Foucault, several critics have noted that the recent focus on the 
participation of civil society in environmental management carries an implicit assumption 
that all perspectives can be accommodated through better information exchange. As a 
result, there has been a tendency to underemphasize more challenging questions of power, 
politics and history which have given rise to the present configuration of interests 
(Cleaver 1999, 2001; Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001). In James Ferguson's terms, 
participatory planning bodies may serve as an "anti-politics machine," strategically 
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avoiding more contentious issues about access to resources and social justice and 
focusing primarily on procedural matters (Ferguson 1990). The stated goal of 
participatory management is to move beyond fruitless confrontation and make consensus-
based decisions, but this implies that all positions are ultimately reconcilable, which is 
rarely the case in practice (McCay and Jentoft 1996; Brosius 1999, 2000; Walley 2004). 
Many scholars have expressed concerns about the ways in which participatory 
planning processes often have the effect of granting legitimacy and political status to 
developers and outside investors, while excluding others from discussions altogether, 
particularly historically rooted local residents who depend on resources or environments 
in indirect and/or nonmaterial ways, but are not considered stakeholders (Nelson and 
Wright 1995; Guijt and Shah 1998; Wilson and McCay 1998; Walley 2002; van Sittert 
2003). By presenting the environment in question as everybody's space, and sometimes 
granting new interests priority over historically established ones, the language of 
participation and community empowerment has sometimes helped to "shift resources 
away from local strategies for local livelihood and empowerment" and toward "resource 
management that serves powerful interests, corporate, military, scientific, consumer 
oriented, etc" (Brosius et al. 1998). Peet and Watts have taken this argument a step 
further and argued that participatory management is a deliberate strategy for "scaling 
back government controls over lands, forests, coasts, and genetic strains" by creating "a 
critical mediating space between state and market" (1996: 21 ). They have added that the 
form of participatory governance that has come into being alongside the discourse of 
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sustainable development has been characterized by "a displacement of regulatory power 
'upwards' to unelected and only partially responsible global governance institutions" and 
this in turn helps to "relieve pressure on nation states and provide the thin regulatory 
context for the smooth operation of global capitalism" (2004: xv). Speaking specifically 
about ocean and coastal plruming, Nichols has made the case that: "Integrated coastal 
management is a regulatory instrument intended to reorganize coastal spaces and political 
systems for the purposes of enabling investment penetration by state and international 
capital" (Nichols 1999: 390). This "decided bias in favor of more intensive state and 
international investment," she suggests, is likely to diminish the power of resident 
peoples to have meaningful control over the ways in which the coastal environment is 
used (ibid: 389). 
Others have noted that the recent incorporation of the concepts of "community" 
and "civil society" into policy discourse may be "precisely to have an organized 
counterpart with which to negotiate" ru1d a way to "keep local disruptiveness under 
control" (Heyman 2004: 494), permitting "small, well-regulated doses of dissent as a way 
of circumscribing and constraining more substantive challenges to these projects" 
(Brosius 2003: 6). Castro (2004) asserts that: 
... the participation process is not designed .. . to empower the people or to question 
the objectives of a project or progran1 but instead, to explain to the people what 
these objectives are and to ask them for the best way of achieving these objectives. 
The end destination is not in question ... The technical experts know the direction in 
which the communities are to evolve, and public participation is to steer them in 
that direction ... " (2004: 201, 208). 
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Similarly, Kasperson (2006) states that: 
... much of what now passes under the rubric of stakeholder involvement has more 
to do with assuring and legitimating the goals of sponsoring managers than 
introducing new perspectives and knowledge or empowering those who occupy the 
spectator mainstrean1 or live on the margins of community and society (2006: 321). 
While efforts to devolve certain environmental responsibilities onto civil society 
through participatory management institutions are relatively recent, the idea of using 
exclusive access rights and private property to make resource users more responsible for 
their actions has been debated by scholars of fisheries and ocean management for decades. 
Mansfield has argued convincingly that the emergence of neoliberal approaches to 
governance in fisheries and oceans policy in recent years must be placed "in the context 
of the longstanding emphasis on property and the problem of the commons" in debates 
about fisheries management, particularly the idea that "profit maximization is natural" 
and that property rights "can harness this rationality for the greater good" (2004: 314). 
Economists have long argued that privatization of common pool resources like 
fish will eliminate the problems created by "open access" because it will give resource 
users a sense of ownership of the resource and, in the case of "renewable" resources, an 
economic incentive to conserve for future use. This view lies at the core of the "Tragedy 
of the Commons" thesis. First conceptualized by Scott Gordon (1954), and later named 
and popularized by Hardin ( 1968), the thesis posits that open access regimes inevitably 
lead to overexploitation, since human beings have an innate tendency to act in their own 
best interests at the expense of the greater good. 15 
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Since the 1970s, the Tragedy of the Commons thesis has faced severe criticism 
from many social scientists (McCay 1978; McCay and Acheson 1987; Feeny et al. 1990; 
Ostrom 1990; Matthews 1993; Dyer and McGoodwin 1994; Pinkerton and Weinstein 
1995; Rogers 1995; Apostle et al. 1998; Jentoft et al. 1998; Newell and Ommer 1999; 
McCay 2001; Acheson 2003; Guest 2003; Walley 2004; St. Martin 2006). Most have 
argued that "open access" and "common property" are not the same, and have accused 
Hardin and his followers of assuming that all human beings are self-interested actors who 
will only act in the interests of the ecosystem ifthey own it or are forced to do so through 
government regulations. The result is a neo-Malthusian view that fails to take into 
accow1t the cultural constraints on resource use that have prevented many groups of 
people from overexploiting common pool resources (Ostrom 1990). Some of these critics 
have suggested that, as an alternative to privatization, governments should work to grant 
new management responsibilities to entire communities of people. This has often been 
accompanied by calls for the development of new institutional mechanisms, like "co-
management" (Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990). Many have also been critical of the 
tendency of fisheries economists to emphasize that there are too many fishers chasing too 
few fish, while failing to adequately address the dramatic differences in catching capacity 
of different fishing technologies (Cadigan 2001 ). As a result, it has been suggested that 
they have had a tendency to underplay the impact of destructive practices like bottom 
trawling in destroying fish populations and damaging marine ecosystems (House 1988: 
179) 
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The sub-discipline of maritime anthropology, which began to take shape in the 
1960s has produced a number of very detailed descriptions of the ways in which cultural 
institutions have shaped uses of the marine environment in a variety of different contexts 
(Firth 1966, Casteel and Quimby 1975; Smith 1977; Andersen 1979; Acheson 1981, 1988; 
McCay 1988, 2000, 2001; Pinkerton 1989; Feeny et al. 1990). One particularly influential 
tradition was developed by individuals working with the Institute of Social and Economic 
Research (ISER) at Memorial University ofNewfoundland, beginning in the late 1960s. 
Scholars associated with ISER typically employed ethnographic methods to study the 
cultural norms that have shaped rural fishing practices in Newfoundland and Labrador, 
and elsewhere around the North Atlantic Rim, and some also examined the ways in which 
those norms have changed over time in response to outside influences (Firestone 1967; 
Chiaramonte 1970; Nemec 1970; Andersen and Wadel 1972, Brox 1972; Faris 1972; 
Wadel 1973; McCay 1980; Zulaika 1981; Kennedy 1982). 
1.4 Overview of the Remaining Chapters 
Environmental management may be best understood as an attempt on the part of 
governing agencies to reshape the world and/or ways of living in it, in ways that facilitate 
the achievement of particular objectives (development, profitability, conservation, health, 
etc.). While the new managerial discourses discussed in this chapter have proven 
tremendously influential, it would be a mistake to assume that that they have taken the 
same forms in all places or that they have gone uncontested. Tsing (2005) has used the 
term "friction" to emphasize the meaningful role played by local cultural and historical 
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dynamics in reshaping the form taken by multilateral policy frameworks and other 
"aspirations for global connection" when they touch down in particular localities. 16 She 
broadly defines friction as: "the awkward, unequal, unstable and creative qualities of 
interconnection across difference" (2005: 4). She is very careful, however, to point out 
that friction is not merely a synonym for resistance. While the particularities of the local 
may indeed serve to impede the effectiveness of some managerial interventions, they may 
also sometimes help to enable or legitimate new approaches to governing. In her words: 
"hegemony is made and unn1ade through friction" (2005: 6). Tsing's argument 
underscores the importance of paying close attention to the importance of place and 
historical contingency in shaping the ways in which seemingly "global" discourses are 
received and in some cases reconfigured by particular people in particular places at 
particular points in time. 
The remaining chapters examine recent efforts on the part of the Canadian federal 
government to transform ocean spaces and coastal livelihoods in eastern Newfoundland 
in order to make them, in Agrawal's terms, "fit for modern government" (2005: 6). In 
particular, they examine how the reforms that have come into effect since the closure of 
the cod fishery in the early 1990s have brought about a shift away from the heavily 
centralized "high modernist" management approach (Scott 1998) that historically 
characterized the planning of ocean activities and toward a neoliberal ocean management 
regime, driven by exclusive access rights, complex systems science, and participatory 
ecosystem planning. It also focuses on ways in which this new approach has been 
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engaged with and, in some cases, challenged by various actors in their efforts to make 
claims to particular places, resources and livelihoods. 
Chapter 2 outlines the methodological approach that has guided this project. It 
focuses particular attention on the opportunities and challenges associated with using 
multi-sited etlmography as a vehicle through which to investigate complex policy issues 
which cut across multiple localities. 
Chapter 3 describes the impact that international approaches to environmental 
governance have had on ocean policies in Canada. It examines the historical emergence 
of multilateral agreements dealing with ocean policy and describes the way in which the 
Canadian approach has evolved in tandem with, and sometimes in opposition to, these 
agreements. It also explores the ongoing efforts made by federal bureaucrats to put this 
new vision into practice, including attempts to develop new mechanisms through which 
to make Canadian citizens think of themselves as members of a "maritime nation," 
regardless of whether or not they live near the ocean. 
Chapters 4 through 6 examine the transformations that have taken place in the 
Newfoundland fishery over time. Chapter 4 presents a brief history of fisheries 
management in Newfoundland, focusing mainly on the high modernist period between 
the Great Depression in the 1930s and the declaration of the cod moratorium in 1992. It 
discusses the ongoing efforts on the part of British and later Canadian and Newfoundland 
government officials to move people away from the small boat inshore fishery and 
encourage the development of an industrial fi shery employing large offshore vessels, 
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Taylorist fish processing plants, and scientific stock assessments. Finally, it explores the 
social and ecological forces that prevented this dream of a fully modem fishery from 
becoming fully realized. 
Chapter 5 looks at the changes that took place in the Newfoundland inshore 
fishery in the aftermath of the 1992 cod moratorium, examining the emergence of the 
lucrative snow crab fishery and the impact it has had on many rural areas. It also explores 
the management reforms that were made by the federal government in an effort to make 
the fishery more compatible with new governance approaches and the reactions of fishers 
to these changes. 
Chapter 6 shifts the focus to the fish processing industry. It describes some of the 
ways in which processing companies operating in Placentia Bay and elsewhere along 
Newfoundland's south coast have sought to adapt in the absence of cod and other key fish 
species. It also looks at the consequences this restructuring process has had for fish 
processing workers, most of whom find themselves without meaningful representation in 
newly emerging ocean planning bodies. 
Chapter 7 examines responses to recent policy reforms within the offshore 
petroleum industry. It discusses the strategies that have been employed by some 
individuals involved in the industry in an attempt to engage with new oceans policies and 
identifies their main concerns about potential negative impacts that these policies may 
have on their capacity to do business. It also looks at the ways in which members of the 
industry have incorporated UN-inspired discourses like sustainable development into 
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their internal operations as part of their commitment to the so-called "Corporate Social 
Responsibility" movement. 
Chapters 8 and 9 focus on specific ocean governance projects that have been 
developed in two different areas of the province. Chapter 8 looks at recent efforts to 
develop a federal Marine Protected Area (MPA) around the fishery-dependent town of 
Leading Tickles on the northeast coast ofNewfoundland. MPAs have become a widely 
promoted strategy through which to create the more community-based approach to 
conservation and management, in which citizens play a more prominent role. The chapter 
discusses the efforts of a small group of people to build local support for the initiative and 
the tensions that they encountered as a result of those efforts. 
Chapter 9 returns the focus to Placentia Bay, on Newfoundland's south coast. 
While economic activity in Placentia Bay has historically focused primarily on fishing 
and fish processing, in recent decades it has come to be used by a number of new 
industries as well. The deep-water bay remains ice-free year round and this has made it an 
attractive location for aquaculture, mineral processing, international shipping, and both 
the "upstream" and "downstream" operations of the petroleum industry. 17 The chapter 
outlines the preliminary efforts to establish a comprehensive planning framework in the 
bay in an effort to coordinate the uses of shared spaces between different groups of ocean 
users. This includes the development of the new "Smart Bay" initiative, a technologically 
driven planning project, which promises to represent the future of ocean management. I 
argue, however, that this ambitious new approach relies on abstract conceptions of nature 
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and society which necessarily oversimplify the complex interactions that are taking place 
in the bay. The result is a managerial approach that encourages new forms of industrial 
development, while effectively shutting many historic ocean users out of the process 
altogether. 
Chapter 10 concludes the dissertation by reemphasizing that new ocean planning 
discourses crumot be meaningfully studied outside of the local fields of power in which 
they operate. I return to Tsing's concept of"friction" in highlighting the varied ways in 
which these seemingly global discourses have been applied, negotiated, and contested by 
different actors in Newfoundland. I then speculate about the difficult decisions that 
anthropologists and other critical scholars will have to make if they are to engage 
meaningfully with this new management orthodoxy. 
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Chapter 2 Methodological Approach 
Since the 1940s and 50s, anthropologists have been arguing that, since "cultures" 
are neither static nor self-contained, it is critically important to study the complex 
networks which link different people, places and things together (Steward 1950; Redfield 
1953; Banton 1956, 1966; Bott 1957; Barnes 1968; Whitten and Wolfe 1973; Mitchell 
1974; Sanjek 1974; Cohen 1975; Barua 1978; Wolfe 1978, Nader 1980, Burt 1980, 
Berkowitz 1982, Stokman et al. 1984, Roseberry 1988). Among the strongest proponents 
of this way of thinking were those associated with the Manchester School of social 
anthropology, which grew out of the work of Max Gluckman. In the early 1940s, 
Gluckman (1940, 1942), who was then employed at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 
began to challenge the prevailing Malinowskian view that cultures were relatively 
discrete entities that only occasionally influenced each other (Frankenberg 1981 ). Upon 
moving to the University of Manchester, Gluckman and his contemporaries became 
interested in examining how larger social systems work to shape and influence cultural 
practices. They also sought to apply etlmographic methods to the study of complex, 
industrial societies and placed a much greater emphasis on studying social conflict than 
had their predecessors (ibid.). Scholars closely associated with the Manchester School, 
several of whom studied in sub-Saharan Africa, went on to explore a range of 
unconventional topics, such as: judicial processes (Gluckman 1955); local forms of 
political organization (Epstein 1958); trade unions (Epstein et al. 1967); and labour 
migration (van Velson 1961). 
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Some studies of factories and other social institutions in complex industrial 
societies were done by anthropologists in the 1940s and 50s, but this focus began to fade 
during the 1960s (Baritz 1960; Wright 1994). Instead, many anthropologists chose to 
focus on rural societies at the margins of capitalism, leaving the study of bureaucratic and 
corporate organizations to sociologists, economists and political scientists (Wright 1994). 
In the 1970s, however, some began to argue for a return to this underexplored terrain. In 
an influential article, Laura Nader (1972) called upon anthropologists to begin "studying 
up," by applying their distinct methodological tools in studying centres of power, such as 
corporations and government departments, instead of focusing only on less powerful 
groups. Nader's work helped to inspire renewed interest in the study of corporate and 
bureaucratic entities throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Britan and Cohen 1980; Denich 
1980; Fischer and Sirianni 1984; Perrow 1986; Schwartzman 1989; Abu-Lughod 1990; 
Ferguson 1990; Herzfeld 1991 ; Merry 1992; Schwartzman 1993; Wright 1994). This 
period also saw the emergence of ethnographic studies that looked more sympathetically 
upon the struggles faced by "street level bureaucrats" in trying to carry out wide-ranging 
mandates on limited budgets (Lipsky 1980). 
With the push toward global economic integration, the development of multi-
lateral policy agreements, and the expansion of the mass media into new areas, 
connections between places have been intensified, and more and more ethnographers and 
other cultural scholars have come to accept of the idea that "local communities" cannot 
be studied in isolation from the extra-local dynamics that affect them. In recent decades, 
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many have sought to develop new conceptual approaches in an effort to make sense of 
these complex relationships (Strathem 1991; Latour 1993; Johnson 1994; Nash 1994; 
Franklin 1995; Friedman 1995; Marcus 1995; Miller 1995; Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 
1996; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Strathern 1996; Biersack 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff 
1999; Carley 1999; Tsing 2000; Burawoy et al. 2000; Friedberg 2001 ; Riles 2001; 
Hayden 2003; Bestor 2004; Hornborg and Crumley 2006). This has been paralleled by 
similar developments in related disciplines, such as World System Theory (Wallerstein 
1979) and Global Commodity Chain analysis (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994) in 
Sociology and Actor-Network Theory in Science and Teclmology Studies (Callon 1986; 
Latour 1987, 1993; Murdoch 1995, 1997; Law 1999). 
Particularly noteworthy within anthropology are the growing numbers of "multi-
sited" ethnographies, which trace the movement of people, objects, discourses, or events 
through space and time, often focusing on the different cultural meanings that are applied 
to them in different social contexts. Marcus (1995, 1999) has argued convincingly that 
more mobile forms of ethnography are needed in order to gain a better understanding of 
the complex interrelationships that make up the contemporary world (Marcus 1995). This 
can prove extremely challenging, however, since with multi-sited research, "sites and 
relationships are not known beforehand" (1995: 1 02). Anthropologists must become 
adept at taking on different personas and applying a variety of different research 
methodologies in order to adapt to the requirements of different field settings (Marcus 
1999). 
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In the last decade, many political anthropologists have risen to the challenge of 
multi-sited ethnography. New approaches for studying policies are emerging, which are 
capable of acknowledging both the national and transnational forces that shape their 
content and the webs of relations that affect their implementation in particular settings 
(Herzfeld 1997; Shore and Wright 1997; Strathern 2000; Harper 2000; Okongwu and 
Mencher 2000; Brosius 2001; Gellner and Hirsch 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; 
Herbert-Cheshire 2003; Heyman 2004). Shore and Wright (1997) have argued that the 
task for anthropologists examining policy is not so much that of"studying up," but that of 
"studying through," by "analysing connections between levels and forms of social 
processes and action, and exploring how those processes work in different sites - local, 
national and global" (ibid: 14). They suggest that policy has become a "key Western 
institution," which contains "implicit, and sometimes explicit, models of society" and 
challenge anthropologists to read policies as "cultural texts," using their unique vantage 
point to examine how policies work to shape "the ways in which individuals construct 
themselves as subjects" (ibid: 6, 7, 1 0). Similarly, Ferguson has taken pains to show that, 
while development policies in various jurisdictions may share "important commonalities 
at the level of discourse, planning, and progran1 elements," they are not likely to produce 
"standardized effects" (1990: 260). Along with Akhil Gupta, he has suggested that there 
is an urgent need to recognize that states are not simply impersonal institutions hovering 
above society, but are "composed of bundles of social practices," which are "quite local 
in their materiality and social situatedness" (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 992). Building on 
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this idea, Heyman has pointed to the need to focus greater attention on the "interfaces" 
between political bureaucracies and "the populations where we work" (2004, 490). 
In carrying out this project, I employed a multi-sited ethnographic approach in an 
effort to gain a better understanding of the ways in which transnational discourses and 
practices, like participatory management, the ecosystem approach, and sustainable 
development, have been interpreted, applied, and contested by differently positioned 
actors with an interest in Newfoundland's marine environment. The task of carrying out 
this project has proven quite challenging, forcing me to follow rapidly changing 
developments, work in a diverse array of settings, and employ a wide variety of research 
methods. Paramount among these are: open-ended, semi-structured interviews (Bernard 
1988; Weller 1998; Babbie 2007); life history interviews (Langness and Frank 1981); 
participant observation (Dewalt and Dewalt 1998); and text-based research. The 
remainder of this section describes the main approaches used to investigate each of the 
main topical areas addressed as part of this project. 
2.1 Methodology for Investigating United Nations Environmental Policy Discourses 
The discussion of multilateral approaches to environmental and ocean policy in 
Chapters 1 and 3 was based, primarily, upon text-based research. In addition to the 
existing academic literature on UN environmental agreements, the chapters also make use 
of a variety of primary sources, including legislation, policy documents, newspaper 
articles, web pages, and conference proceedings. Most of the material on the 
incorporation of international agreements into Canadian policy in Chapter 3 was gleaned 
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from existing academic and policy documents, along with a variety of web pages, reports, 
brochures, flyers and pamphlets produced by federal agencies. Some of these sources 
were brought to my attention through interviews with federal public servants or through 
conference papers and other public presentations, while others were simply the product of 
extensive library, archival, and Internet searches. 18 
2.2 Methodology for Investigating the Development and Implementation of 
Canadian Ocean Policies 
The material in Chapter 3 that deals with the development and implementation of 
new ocean policies in Canada is derived from both text-based sources and from a series of 
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interviews), St. John's (17 interviews) and Halifax (6 interviews) between 2003 and 2004. 
For the most part, these individuals were identified through a snowball sampling 
technique, in which I would contact people that I knew I wanted to interview and then ask 
them for recommendations about who I should speak to about particular topics. In most 
cases, I would then call or email the person in question and anange to set up a face-to-
face interview. While the majority of those interviewed worked for Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada (28 interviews), I also spoke with individuals working in related departments, 
such as Environment Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Parks Canada, and the National 
Research Council who had been associated with the oceans agenda in some way (13 
interviews). Most of these interviews were carried out early on in the research process, 
and were primarily focused on obtaining historical and contextual information to guide 
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my research in Newfoundland. I did, however, try to gain an understanding of the main 
strategies employed by these individuals in their attempts to move the oceans agenda 
forward and the key obstacles and challenges they had encountered along the way. 
In most cases, interviews were conducted in the offices of the individuals in 
question. While I was pleased with the number of people who agreed to speak with me, 
most were quite busy, and I was sometimes limited to an hour or less. I tried to make the 
most of the opportunities I had by preparing extensively beforehand. In some cases, I 
opted for a more structured approach than I might have otherwise prefen-ed, so that I 
would be able to cover a broader range of issues. Thankfully, many of those individuals 
who could not find much time to participate directly were able to point me toward other 
people or documents that could help to answer my remaining questions. I was also able to 
check information provided by interviewees against each other when reconstructing 
historical events. While in Ottawa I also carried out 5 interviews with representatives of 
relevant NGOs and industry associations in an effort to gain a broader sense of the issues 
being debated on a national level. 
In addition to these interviews, I obtained as many written sources as I could find 
about the early years of creating and implementing new ocean-related legislation, 
particularly, the Oceans Act. Particularly helpful were transcripts from parliamentary 
debates and hearings that took place in the early stages of its development. I also searched 
for reviews, commentaries and editorials about the new ocean agenda that had been 
released by opposition parties, environmental NGOs, industry associations, journalists, 
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and the Commissioner of Environment and Sustainable Development. Valuable source 
material was found in several relevant journals as well; particularly Ocean and Coastal 
Management and Marine Policy, which both feature high concentrations of Canadian 
content. I was also able to locate a variety of very helpful unpublished papers on the 
Internet or through the recommendations of interviewees. 
Major conferences on ocean issues were also an excellent source of information. 
Particularly useful were the national conferences of the Ocean Management Research 
Network in Ottawa in 2002 and 2003, the Ocean Innovation Conference in St. John's in 
2003 and the Coastal Zone Canada National Conference in St. John' s in 2004. These 
conferences drew together a diverse group of academics, government employees, and 
representatives ofNGOs and industry associations from across Canada, the United States, 
and overseas who had an interest in oceans and ocean management issues. These four 
meetings were particularly fascinating, because they were sandwiched between the 
release of Canada's Oceans Strategy in 2002, and the major commitment of funding for 
moving forward with Canada' s Oceans Action Plan and other ocean-related projects in 
2005. Accordingly, this period was characterized by tremendous uncertainty about the 
future. Serious questions remained about whether the new principles espoused in the 
Oceans Act would capture the attention of the Prime Minister or be swept aside once and 
for all. In spite of our vastly different backgrounds and political persuasions, it seemed 
clear that most attendees of these conferences had at least some stake in the procurement 
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of new money for ocean-related research and development, and many were eagerly 
anticipating the next federal budget. 
All four of the conferences featured keynote lectures by members of a select 
group of people who were privy to the discussions that eventually led to the creation of 
Canada's Oceans Action Plan. Many had insider knowledge of the events unfolding in 
Ottawa and would occasionally treat the rest of us in the "oceans community" to a few 
juicy tidbits about what was to come. These conferences were an excellent source of 
information about Canada's involvement in international ocean governance, and they 
provided an opportunity for me to informally meet or reconnect with key people in the 
field. In addition to these larger and more general conferences, I was also able to attend a 
number of smaller, more specialized conferences and workshops in various locations 
across Canada. Participation in these events helped me to gain a better understanding of 
the varied approaches to implementing Canadian ocean policies at both the national and 
regional levels. 
For the most prui, public servants who consented to be interviewed indicated that 
they would prefer to not be refened to by name or by other information that would allow 
them to be easily identified. As a result, I have decided not to use proper names when 
quoting them. While I have usually indicated which government department they worked 
for, I have often purposefully left the specifics of their position within those agencies 
somewhat vague in an effmi to protect their identities. These individuals, along with all 
others who are quoted in the thesis, have been assigned pseudonyms, although some were 
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informed that they may still be recognizable to some readers due to the highly visible 
social positions they occupy. 
2.3 Methodology for Investigating the "New" Oceans Economy in St. John's 
I retained a permanent residence in St. John's, the capital city ofNewfoundland 
and Labrador, throughout the research process, and this enabled me to keep myself 
informed of the main ocean-related issues at play in the city and in the province as a 
whole. Between 2003 and 2004, I carried out a series of 11 interviews with 
representatives of the Oceans Management Branch of the regional Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada office in St. John's, which is largely responsible for the development and ongoing 
operation of new ocean management projects in the province, including those that were 
being developed in Leading Tickles and Placentia Bay, which are discussed in Chapters 8 
and 9 respectively. These interviews were designed to provide me with a better 
understanding of the projects that were underway and of the challenges they had faced in 
getting them off the ground. I also asked questions about the relationship between the 
"headquarters" office in Ottawa and the regional office in St. John ' s, and about some of 
the most pressing ocean-related issues or problems that they foresaw in the years to come. 
While in St. John's, I also spent time speaking with several provincial government 
employees (6 interviews), academics (5 interviews), representatives of industry 
associations (6 interviews), and representatives of environmental NGOs who had been 
involved with the process in some way, or were deemed particularly knowledgeable about 
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new oceans policies and their potential impact on the region by others I had spoken to ( 4 
interviews). 
The second major component of my research in St. John's dealt with the so-called 
"new oceans economy." This term is usually applied to: the offshore petroleum industry, 
the ocean technology sector, the marine biotechnology industry, and the commercial 
aquaculture industry, and is sometimes juxtaposed against the "old economy" of the 
coastal fishery. My 16 interviews with individuals working in these fields helped me to 
gain a better understanding ofhow these industries operate and assess the hopes and/or 
concerns they had about the new Oceans Act, and the move toward participatory planning 
more generally. I also asked questions about any relevant programs or philanthropic 
initiatives they had been involved in. Whenever possible, I attended conference 
presentations and public lectures that could educate me further about the ocean industries 
that were operating in the province and the issues that were of primary concern to those 
involved in them. Particularly helpful was the Coastal Zone Canada Conference in St. 
John's in 2004, which included a number of panels dealing with ocean development 
issues in the Newfoundland context. 
While I tried to follow major developments in all ocean industries, one of my 
primary foci soon became the oil and gas sector. The results of this research are discussed 
in more detail in Chapters 7 and 9. I was fo1iunate enough to gain an unusually high 
degree of access to senior people in this industry, thanks to some research that I had done 
two years earlier which had brought me into direct contact with many of them. Upon 
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completion of my MA degree in 2000 I was hired through a partnership between 
Memorial University ofNewfoundland in St. John' s and Dalhousie University in Halifax 
to work as a Public Policy Intern. One of my primary duties was to prepare a detailed 
report on all federal and provincial legislation affecting the offshore petroleum industry in 
the provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia. The preparation of the 
report required me to conduct detailed interviews with a wide variety of individuals 
working in the industry and in relevant government departments. Because of this 
experience, I already had several good contacts in a number of different organizations 
when I began my doctoral thesis research. Since most companies only have small to 
medium sized branches in St. John's, most have only one or two senior people who are 
tasked with addressing policy-related issues. 19 I was able to carry out interviews with 10 
of these individuals, as well as with a representative of the Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers (CAPP), a national industry association that has done extensive 
research on the new federal oceans agenda and its potential impact on the petroleum 
industry. The primary themes covered in these interviews were: the historical 
development and ongoing operations of the petroleum industry in Newfoundland; the 
existing and potential impact of new oceans policies on the industry; potential conflicts 
with other ocean-related interest groups; and the local and international strategies used by 
petroleum companies to improve their public image and engage with other designated 
ocean "stakeholder" groups. 
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I made a number of additional contacts when I attended a two day seminar, 
entitled "Sustainable Development: Getting it Right the First Time," that was sponsored 
by Memorial University's Oil and Gas Development Partnership in 2003. The seminar 
brought together representatives from all of the major petroleum companies operating in 
the province. It featured a series of presentations on strategies for building sustainable 
development principles into the "organizational culture" or "hard wiring" of their 
companies. Many of the presentations were delivered by prominent guest speakers who 
had worked on "sustainable development" and "corporate social responsibility" issues 
internationally. These included senior policy people from the head offices of major 
international companies, including Shell International and Halliburton Energy Services. 
The workshop also included numerous breakout sessions which sought to assess the key 
sustainable development-related issues that faced companies operating in Newfoundland. 
I also looked at a variety of organizations with a mandate to bring the oil industry 
together with other groups to discuss issues of mutual concern. I had several meetings 
with representatives of the organization One Ocean, which acts as a non-government 
liaison between the petroleum and fishing industries. Also, between 2003 and 2004, I 
regularly participated in the monthly public meetings of the Regional Advisory 
Committee (RAC) on Oil Spill Response, which includes representation from the oil 
industry and a variety of other agencies, including the Canadian Coast Guard, 
Environment Canada, Transport Canada, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, and 
Ocean Net, a St. John's-based environmental NGO. The RAC meets regularly to discuss 
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a variety of issues related to oil spills and oil spill response services in the province. 
These included both issues associated with the local industry and "mystery spills" caused 
by non-Canadian vessels travelling near the south coast of the island en route to or from 
larger ports on the US Eastern Seaboard. 
My research on the petroleum sector also drew upon a variety of published 
materials about the industry, including company brochures, archived newspaper articles, 
and documentary films that were produced by Memorial University in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, when the industry was first becoming established in the province. It also 
makes use of presentation notes, digital media, and reports provided to me by CAPP. 
2.4 Methodology for Investigating the Fishery and Other Coastal Activities in Rural 
Newfoundland 
Another part of my research in Newfoundland focused on the transformations 
taking place within the fishing industry in several parts of rural Newfoundland. Most of 
this work is discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 8. This task was made somewhat simpler 
by the fact that I had already done extensive research on the recent history of the 
Newfoundland fishery, as part of my Master's research project, including changes to the 
approach employed by the federal government in its management of the industry. I 
continued to keep current on these issues by reading academic publications, following a 
variety of different news sources, and keeping in touch with established fieldwork 
contacts. I was also assisted by my involvement in the Coasts Under Stress Research 
Project, a multidisciplinary initiative studying rural coastal communities and coastal 
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ecosystems on Canada' s east and west coasts. This experience enabled me to speak 
regularly with colleagues who shared an interest in coastal communities and fishery-
related issues. My close association with the Sustainability Node of the Ocean 
Management Research Network also introduced me to a number of key people in the 
ocean research community and this helped to inspire new ideas and approaches. 
Research on the fishing industry was carried out in multiple locations. While in St. 
John's, I attended a variety of public meetings and presentations that related to the fishery. 
These included: meetings between Fisheries and Oceans Canada and fish harvesters to 
discuss the ongoing Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review process; meetings held by the 
Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC) about the state of the cod fishery; and 
several public meetings about the new Species at Risk Act, including two heated meetings 
about whether "Atlantic Cod" should be listed as an endangered species under the Act. 
These meetings exposed me to a variety of different perspectives about what form the 
fishery of the future should take. They also allowed me to meet, and in some cases 
interview, 14 fish harvesters from different areas of the province who had been active in 
the political process. Many of these individuals were also involved in the Fish, Food and 
Allied Workers Union (FFAW), although I was not able to interview a formal 
representative who was able to speak on behalf the union as a whole. 
The remainder of the research was carried out in several different regions in 
eastern Newfoundland. This included various locations in Placentia Bay, pruiicularly the 
"Cape Shore" area on the eastern side ofthe bay (9 interviews), the "Isthmus of A val on" 
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area around the head of the bay (24 interviews) and the Burin Peninsula on the western 
side of the bay (17 interviews). Additional fieldwork was carried out in and around the 
Leading Tickles area of Notre Dame Bay (17 interviews) and on the Eastport Peninsula in 
Bonavista Bay (10 interviews). Both of these areas had Oceans Act Marine Protected 
Area (MPA) pilot projects ongoing at that time.20 The Leading Tickles case is profiled in 
detail in Chapter Nine. I also carried out 7 interviews in Conception and Trinity Bays, 
where I had done previous research. 
I endeavoured to speak with a wide cross section of people who were involved in 
some way with ocean activities or with federal ocean management programs. In particular, 
I focused on federal, provincial and municipal government workers, fish harvesters, fish 
processing plant managers and assembly line workers, regional economic development 
board officials, harbour authority representatives, and individuals representing other 
ocean-related industries or interest groups, such as aquaculture, oil refining and 
transshipment, and pleasure boating. I was also able to spend time visiting fish processing 
plants, harbour facilities, aquaculture sites, petroleum installations, and proposed MPAs. 
For the most part, the interviews I carried out aimed to: gather social and economic 
information about these regions; gain a better understanding of ocean industries operating 
there; examine the interactions between different groups; and explore the historical 
development of federal ocean management programs in the area. 
While in Placentia Bay, I made a point of attending several meetings about the 
various planning initiatives that were being proposed for the bay. These included 
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presentations made by Fisheries and Oceans Canada about the development of an 
integrated management plan to coordinate different uses of the bay. I also attended a two 
day workshop in St. Jolm's that explored a proposal to develop an "Information Seaway" 
project for the bay. The project was to draw together a variety of cutting edge 
technologies, such as ocean mapping, satellite and radar sensing, real time data transfer, 
and ecosystem modeling to create a "Smart Bay," designed to simplify the task of ocean 
management. I also interviewed representatives of the National Research Council and the 
Canadian Centre for Marine Communications at Memorial University about this project, 
as both agencies played key roles in bringing the idea forward. The results of this 
research are discussed in Chapter 9. My research was completed before the steering 
committee for the proposed integrated management plan could be fully assembled and 
before any formal planning meetings had taken place. Thus, some of the arguments I 
make and the quotations that I have included speak more to the ideas of sustainable 
development, the ecosystem approach and integrated management in general than they do 
to the particular form that it is taking in this case. Finally, Chapter 10 serves as the 
concluding chapter, but also includes some original fieldwork material that was taken 
from the first public to introduce area "stakeholders" to the planning initiatives that were 
taking shape in Placentia Bay. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated that a diverse collection of methodological 
approaches have proven necessary in order to tackle a topic, which incorporates a number 
58 
of different spatial and temporal scales, but has also shown that these methods often 
introduce new challenges for anthropology. The next chapter makes use of several of 
these techniques in discussing the evolution of ocean policy discourses on the 
international stage and the way in which it came to influence the approach taken in 
Canada. 
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Chapter 3 Putting Oceans on the Map: Coastal and Marine Planning on the 
(lnter)National Stage 
This chapter describes the ways in which the new policy discourses that emerged 
from the Rio Earth Summit and subsequent UN conferences have been incorporated into 
ongoing international negotiations seeking to determine the legal status of the oceans. It 
then examines how this history has influenced the new policy approach that is being 
developed by the Canadian federal government. Finally, it discusses the factors that have 
contributed to growing support for oceans programs, and explores the nationalistic 
imagery that has been used to persuade Canadians to think of themselves as a "maritime 
nation," and build support for the new ocean governance agenda. 
3.1 Oceans on the International Stage 
While multilateral approaches to ocean policy were significantly transformed by 
the new policy discourses emerging from the United Nations Environment Program, it is 
important to recognize that international ocean governance is a unique field, with a long 
history of its own. The Rio Eruih Summit was preceded by a centuries-old tradition of 
international diplomacy concerning the uses of the oceans, and these discussions continue 
to have a strong influence on contemporary approaches (Steinberg 1999). 
The earliest "laws" governing the ocean came into effect under the influence of 
the Roman Empire. For the Romans, freedom of navigation was considered essential for 
the flow of commerce, and, accordingly, they chose to treat the ocean "generically as if it 
belonged to a separate, extra-national, legal order" (Johnston and VanderZwaag 2000: 
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142). The seas were referred to as res communis, meaning that they were the common 
property of all (ibid.). This status remained unchanged until1494 when Spain and 
Portugal signed the Treaty ofTordesillas. The Treaty, which was ratified by the Pope, 
effectively divided up ownership of all of the undiscovered lands and seas to the west of 
the Mediterranean between the two countries (Steinberg 2001). 
By the early 1600s, this movement to enclose the oceans as national property 
began to face opposition from Holland. The country's strength was trading rather than 
fishing, and its leadership saw freedom of international passage as essential in 
maintaining their interests overseas. The Dutch position was most famously articulated by 
the jurist Hugo de Groot, or Grotius, who advocated a return to the Roman system of 
mare liberum, or freedom of the seas. This view was opposed by an English jurist named 
Seldon, who upheld the rights of states to enclose the world's oceans and coasts as 
property. This sparked what came to be known as the "Battle of the Books," a debate that 
would continue, in a variety of forms, for centuries to come (Borgese 1983; Steinberg 
2001). 
Prior to the twentieth century, the world's oceans continued to be viewed 
primarily as the canvas upon which international commerce was played out. They were 
understood as a critical "space in between," which enabled the movement of people and 
goods and provided a source of food, but they were not seen as a potential site for new 
capital investment (Steinberg 1999). This changed after 1937, when the United States 
drilled its first offshore oil well in the Gulf of Mexico. The American government was 
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concerned that outside interests might one day seek to exploit the shallow gulfs rich 
reserves and it was decided that unilateral action was required to prevent this from 
happening (ibid.). In 1945, President Harry Truman signed two proclan1ations which 
extended American jurisdiction over the entire continental shelf. While Truman claimed 
the extension was primarily for national defence purposes, few analysts doubt that 
economic motives were a driving force as well (Wertenbaker 1983). 
This move to enclose the oceans under national jurisdiction was soon followed by 
a number of other countries. Fearing that the rich fisheries off its coast were being 
overexploited by European vessels, the government of Argentina unilaterally extended its 
sovereignty to include its entire continental shelf in 1946. It was followed by the 
governments of Chile and Peru in 1947 and Ecuador in 1950. All four countries also 
declared exclusive rights to all fisheries within 200 nautical miles of their coastlines 
(Mandel 2003). These extensions were made official by the Santiago Declaration of 1952 
(Caddy and Cochrane 2001). This move to enclose the seas persisted over the next three 
decades. Between 1967 and 1973 alone, eighty-one countries made claims to extend their 
maritime jurisdictions (Wertenbaker 1983). These actions were often met with 
considerable resistance from major fishing nations and sometimes led to open conflict, as 
was the case in the much publicized "Cod Wars" between Iceland and Britain between 
the late 1950s and the early 1970s (Swing 2003). 
By the mid 1960s, the prospect of seabed mining was also coming to be seen as a 
realistic possibility, as new technologies were making it possible for mineral resources, 
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including manganese, iron, cobalt, copper, zinc, gold and silver, to be extracted from the 
ocean floor (Mandel 2003; Swing 2003; El Akkad 2006).21 While few of these ventures 
were deemed profitable at the time, secure tenure over continental shelves was viewed as 
essential to taking advantage of these resources in the future, and there were growing 
calls for a new international legal regime which would allow for the national 
appropriation of marine resources (Mandel 2003). 
These developments gave rise to four decades of international conferences 
seeking to clarify the legal status of the world's oceans. The first United Nations 
Conference on the Law ofthe Sea (UNCLOS) was held in Geneva in 1958, but it 
ultimately failed to reach consensus. A second attempt was made in 1960, but 
negotiations again broke down. A compromise was finally reached on the third attempt. 
UNCLOS III, as it came to be known, was finally ratified in 1983. It was a product of a 
series of hard fought negotiations that were held in various locations between 1973 and 
1982 (Wertenbaker 1983, Hage 1984). 
The UNCLOS III agreement (henceforth referred to simply as UNCLOS) was 
conceived as a kind of "constitution of the oceans" and, accordingly was very wide 
ranging in scope (Johnston and VanderZwaag 2000: 142). The agreement developed 
mechanisms for resolving disputes between countries, formalized rules surrounding 
freedom of navigation, gave guaranteed access to ports for landlocked states and 
introduced some measures to combat marine pollution and regulate fishing (Sanger 1987, 
2002; Johnston and VanderZwaag 2000; Fagan 2003). Even more significantly, however, 
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it defined several distinct maritime zones and specified the rights of coastal states within 
each of them. The territorial sea extends to a distance of 12 nautical miles from shore. 
Anything within that space is considered "internal waters." In this zone, the state has full 
jurisdiction over the surface of the water, the water column, the sea bed, and the subsoil 
and may apply all of its relevant national legislation in these areas. The contiguous sea 
extends between 12 and 24 nautical miles from shore. In this area, the state does not have 
control over vessel movements on the surface of the water, but can apply its criminal, 
fiscal, immigration, sanitary and customary laws (Steinberg 2001 ). It also retains full 
jurisdiction over the water column and the seabed and subsoil. The exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles from shore. Within this area, the 
state has sole responsibility for exploiting and managing the living and non-living 
resources of the waters, seabed and subsoil. It also has the exclusive right to carry out 
marine scientific research, protect the marine environment, and apply its domestic 
legislation on any artificial islands, installations or structures inside the EEZ (French 
1984). With this provision, most ofthe world's known offshore petroleum and mineral 
resources and about 90 percent of the world's fish stocks would be brought under the 
exclusive control of national governments (ibid.).22 
UNCLOS also developed a new legal regime for exploiting seabed and sub-sea 
resources beyond the EEZ. A controversial component of the agreement was "Article 
76," which provides an opp01tunity for the 32 countries whose continental shelves extend 
beyond 200 nautical miles to extend their exclusive jurisdiction beyond the exclusive 
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economic zone to a maximum distance of"350 miles, or a line 100 miles beyond the 
2500 metre depth line" (French 1984). With this extension would come new 
responsibilities for resource management and environmental protection in these areas 
(ibid.). It would also enable these countries to develop and profit from some seabed and 
subsoil resources found in this area, including all petrolewn and mineral resources23 and 
"sedentary biological resources" on the seabed, such as fisheries for "non-migratory" fish 
or shellfish species.24 
This latter provision would also likely apply to genetic and other organic 
resources for use in the bioteclmology, pharmaceutical, and neutraceutical industries, 
although the wealth to be gained from these resources was not anticipated by the original 
agreement. Interest and capital investment in marine biotechnology have soared in recent 
years, as applied researchers have begun to investigate the immense biodiversity ofthe 
ocean. There is speculation that marine biotechnology may soon offer clues about how to 
treat such diverse ailments as cancer, malaria and HIV (Moore 2005, Helmreich 2008). 
There have already been more than 15,000 products developed from marine microbes, 
algae and invertebrates and nwnerous patents have been registered (Moore 2005). It now 
appears that genetic and pharmaceutical resources may prove to be far more lucrative 
than seabed mining ever will (Reuters 2005). 
Countries that ratify the UNCLOS agreement have been invited to make claims 
under Article 76, stating what they believe their maritime boundaries should be on the 
basis of their continental margins (Koring 1995). They are then given ten years after 
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ratification to gather data to support this claim before a decision is made. The claim 
process requires countries to develop a map of their continental margins, which 
accurately document water depths, the contours of the seafloor and the depth of the 
sediment beneath it.25 This is an expensive and painstaking process, involving "undersea 
probes, small submarines and echo sounders" and "hydrophonic gear on boats going only 
slightly faster than a person can walk" (Stonehouse 2003). 
While Article 76 promises to bring great economic returns to "wide margined 
states," this windfall is not without its cost. UNCLOS declares that seabed and sub-sea 
resources lying outside of the EEZ are the "common heritage of mankind," and will be 
subjected to a royalty sharing regime. All developments in these areas will be taxed and 
the wealth generated from this taxation will be redistributed to the UN's least affluent 
member states (Swing 2003)?6 
In order for the UNCLOS agreement to become active, it required the signature of 
60 countries, which it received in November of 1994 (Holland and Bernal2002).27 While 
this ushered in a new found optimism about the prospect of increasing the pace of 
industrial development in the world's oceans, this was tempered by a growing awareness 
that the "health" of ocean ecosystems has already been severely impacted upon by 
existing practices. New studies were warning of serious environmental problems that 
were being brought about by overfishing and pollution from ocean and land-based 
industries (Pru·fit 1995). 
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Once believed to be inexhaustible resources, many of the world's commercial 
fisheries are now in a perilous state. In 2002, the United Nations Environment Program 
reported that almost one third of all of the world's wild fish stocks are ranked as 
"depleted," "overexploited" or " recovering" (United Nations Environment Program 2002). 
A subsequent study by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization found that 
78 percent of the world's fish stocks have been placed in serious jeopardy and may be 
unable to reproduce themselves (Goodspeed 2005). Recent evidence has shown that large 
predator species have been particularly hard hit (Myers and Worm 2003). This has 
contributed to a pattern of"fishing down the food web," as harvesters have begw1 to 
increasingly target crustaceans and other species which had previously been heavily 
preyed upon by cod or other larger fish species (Pauly et al. 1998; Pauly and Maclean 
2003).28 While this has sometimes produced short term economic gains for fishers and 
fish processors, as has been the case in Newfoundland and Labrador, there are some 
concerns that this pattern may eventually undermine the health of many of these 
populations as well. A controversial study published in the journal Science in 2006, 
concluded that if current trends continue unchanged, all major commercial fisheries will 
collapse by the year 2048 (Worm et al. 2006). 
There are also a range of other human-induced problems affecting the world's 
oceans, including: oil pollution caused by spills and routine discharges from offshore oil 
platforms, barges, tankers and cruise ships; invasive marine species which are transported 
around the world in the ballast water of shipping vessels; contamination or "dead zones" 
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caused by industrial waste29, fertilizers, pesticides, and untreated sewage leaching into the 
ocean; marine degradation caused by the absorption of air pollution; pollution from 
hazardous military waste left in the ocean; the disruption of species migration patterns by 
oil and gas pipelines and undersea cables; changes in marine ecosystems caused by global 
warming and associated effects (water temperature fluctuations, changes in salinity levels 
due to freshwater runoff from melting polar ice caps, changes in current flows, etc.); 
habitat destruction caused by trawling, dredging, or blasting; and sonic disturbances 
caused by seismic testing (Spears 2002; Summerbayes et al. 2002). These problems have 
raised serious questions about whether oceans are capable of withstanding the pressure of 
modern capitalism (Steinberg 1999). 
The approach to ocean conservation developed at the Rio Earth Summit was an 
attempt to address many of these concerns. Although the United Nations Environment 
Program had established a Regional Seas Programme in 1974 through its "Oceans and 
Coastal Areas Program," Agenda 21 ushered in a much bolder vision (Johnston 1992). It 
offered a blueprint for new national and multinational ocean policies, which placed 
particular emphasis on the following areas: 
a. Integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas, including exclusive 
economic zones; 
b. Marine environmental protection; 
c. Sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the high seas; 
d. Sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources under national jurisdiction; 
e. Addressing critical uncertainties for the management of the marine environment and 
climate change; 
f. Strengthening international, including regional, cooperation and coordination; 
g. Sustainable development of small islands (United Nations l992a). 
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While numerous "coastal zone management" projects throughout the world were 
already placing a strong focus on user patiicipation by this time, Agenda 21 helped to 
vault the concepts of"integrated management," "participation," "civil society," and 
"stewardship" into the mainstream of global ocean policy (Van Dyke 1996; Borgese 
1999). Countries that became signatories to Agenda 21 also committed to improving 
living standards in coastal communities, although it was not accompanied by a clear 
statement about how this was to be achieved (Thorne-Miller 1993 ; Hanson 1998). 
Within five years of the conference, several countries, including Canada, the 
United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, China, and Japan 
introduced new legislation or policy fran1eworks that institutionalized many of these ideas 
(Haward and VanderZwaag 1995; Juda 2003). Many other countries followed suit in the 
years that followed. While each country's approach is somewhat distinct, many of these 
new policies bear a strong resemblance to each other, with most adopting the language of 
Agenda 21 and UNCLOS verbatim. 
In the years that followed the Rio Summit, a number of more specific follow-up 
meetings were held to further discussion about various ocean-related issues. In 2001 , the 
"Oceans and Coasts at Rio+ 10 Conference" was held in Paris, France to assess progress 
made since Rio and hold discussions on the future of global ocean management (United 
Nations 2001). These discussions were followed up with several sessions at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. The WSSD placed a 
heightened focus on oceans, featuring an event dealing with "People, Oceans, and 
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Stewardship" and a "Civil Society Global Forum on the Ocean and Fisheries." These 
meetings produced a range of new commitments, including a "Declaration on Marine and 
Inland Fisheries," which vowed to curb illegal fishing and rebuild devastated stocks to 
sustainable levels by 2015 and an agreement to develop a global network of marine 
protected areas by 2012 (United Nations 2003). The WSSD also led to the formation of a 
new "Global Forum on Oceans, Coasts and Islands," designed to bring together "ocean 
leaders from governments, intergovermnental and international organizations, non-
govermnental organizations, the private sector, ocean donors, and scientific institutions, 
to achieve the sustainable development of oceans, coasts, and islands" (United Nations 
Global Forum on Oceans, Coasts and Islands 2008). 
3.2 Canada's Approach to Oceans Governance 
While Canadian ocean policies have been strongly influenced by the UN system, 
this is not simply a case of global discourses shaping a local situation. To the contrary, a 
number of variables that were specific to the Canadian context contributed to the way in 
which this new vision was articulated, both nationally and internationally. Canadian 
businessman Maurice Strong was a longstanding Under Secretary-General to the UN and 
acted as the chairperson for both the Stockholm and Rio Summits (Bernstein 2001).30 
Canadian delegations have, furthermore, been active participants in all major United 
Nations Enviromnent Program (UNEP) summits, and the country is now a signatory to 
most relevant conventions relating to global enviromnental issues (ibid.). Canada has also 
been a key player in the development of many UN environmental agreements, including 
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several dealing with fisheries and oceans issues (Mitchell 1998). In addition to being a 
driving force behind the UNCLOS negotiations, Canada was actively involved in 
negotiations that led to the oceans chapter in Agenda 21, the United Nations Fisheries 
Agreement, the UN Biodiversity Convention, and the UN Global Program of Action for 
the Protection ofthe Marine Environment from Land-based Activities (Hanson 1998). 
Furthermore, the Grand Banks cod collapse has been specifically mentioned in most 
major UNEP reports since 1992 as evidence of the need for reform, and has been widely 
cited as being among the worst environmental catastrophes of the twentieth century.31 
In the aftermath ofthe Rio Summit, Canada undertook a major overhaul of its 
policies dealing with oceans and coasts to bring them into conformity with UN concepts. 
In 1995, the cow1try appointed its first ever Commissioner ofthe Environment and 
Sustainable Development to oversee the implementation of the country's international 
commitments, provide research and advice to departments, and work toward the 
development of a national sustainable development strategy (Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainable Development 2001 ). Later that year, the Commissioner's 
office produced "A Guide to Green Government" which was intended to assist federal 
agencies in their preparation of regular departmental "sustainable development strategies" 
(Government of Canada 1995). 
The country has also introduced several new pieces of ocean-related legislation, 
policy frameworks, and strategies which draw heavily upon UN concepts. These include: 
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1992), the Canadian Biodiversity Strategy 
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(1995), The Canadian International Development Agency's Strategy for Ocean 
Management and Development (1998), the National Marine Conservation Areas Act 
(2002), the Species at Risk Act (2002), and the National Programme of Action for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities (2002). There have 
also been amendments made to existing statutes, such as the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (1999) and the Canada Shipping Act (2001) to bring them into conformity 
with UNEP principles. Although several attempts were made by the governing Liberal 
Party to "modernize" the Fisheries Act during the 1990s, these efforts met with consistent 
opposition from unions and other fisherpersons' organizations. Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada did, however, undertake an "Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review" in 2001, which 
outlined a new strategic direction in four key areas: conservation; economic and social 
viability; access and allocation; and governance (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2001 ). 
The consequences of this new approach to fisheries management are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
Most significant of all was the development of a new Oceans Act, making Canada 
the first country in the world to adopt "comprehensive ocean management legislation" 
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2005). Previous attempts at an overarching ocean policy 
had been developed in 1973 and 1987, but both had limited impact (Vandermeulen and 
Cobb 2004; Chircop and Hildebrand 2005). Shortly after the Rio Summit, efforts began 
anew. Members of the National Advisory Board on Science and Technology's Committee 
on Oceans and Coasts were tasked with carrying out wide ranging consultations with a 
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view to eventually establishing a new and even more wide-ranging ocean policy 
framework. The committee consulted over a two-year period before tabling its final report 
"Oppmtunities from Our Oceans," in 1994. The report condemned the management 
system of the past, which resulted in the failure to better anticipate the decline of fish 
stocks, and concluded that Canada should work toward the development of a new Oceans 
Act based on a number of core principles, including: "sustainability," "stewardship," 
"wealth creation," and "risk management." It also called for a strong emphasis on science 
and technology in order to help Canada recapture its share of the global market for ocean-
related products and services (National Advisory Board on Science and Technology 
1994). 
In response to this report, the newly elected Liberal government developed Bill C-
98, which would create a new Oceans Act, and tabled it for first reading in the House of 
Commons on June 14th, 1995. The bill was reintroduced for second reading on September 
26th, before being turned over to the All-Party Committee on Fisheries and Oceans for an 
extensive review. The Government also prepared a report entitled "A Vision for Ocean 
Management" in November of that year to better articulate the proposed approach of the 
government (Berkes eta!. 2001). 
During the all party hearings that followed, the proposed legislation faced 
considerable resistance from the opposition. The October 1993 federal election that had 
swept the Liberals to power with a 177 seat majority government also resulted in the utter 
decimation of the outgoing Progressive Conservative Party, which fell from 169 seats to a 
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mere 2. In their place, two regionally focused parties made striking gains, even though 
neither ofthem had even been in existence at the time of the previous federal election, 
five years earlier. The separatist Bloc Quebecois won fifty-four seats, all located in the 
province of Quebec, and became the official opposition. The Reform Party won fifty-two 
seats, all to the west of the province of Manitoba and largely concentrated in the 
provinces of Alberta and British Columbia. While the Progressive Conservatives under 
then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney had been strong supporters of Agenda 21 ideals, 
these emerging parties had serious reservations about the new approach to ocean 
management that was being proposed. 
Both the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party opposed Bill-98, presenting it as a 
power grab by the federal govenunent and an encroachment on provincial jurisdiction 
over coastal areas above the high water mark, which had been enshrined in the 1867 
Constitution Act. There were also concerns that the bill gave too many new powers to the 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, thereby undermining the spirit of partnership that it 
purported to represent. Both parties also took issue with the power the bill proposed to 
give to the government to collect new service and licensing fees in a variety of different 
fields, including commercial shipping and fishing. The Reform Party claimed furthermore 
that the bill would simply add another layer of bureaucracy, creating new policy jobs in 
Ottawa, even as the department continued to cut back on fisheries officers and other field 
staff, making it impossible for them to adequately enforce regulations. They also 
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criticized the government for failing to take action on "unsustainable" fishing 
technologies (Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans 1995). 
Liberals who supported the bill presented it in a very different light, arguing that, 
by being the first country in the world to adopt comprehensive ocean legislation, Canada 
I 
would reassert its place as an international leader. The bill was aggressively promoted by 
the Liberal Fisheries and Oceans Minister Brian Tobin, a Newfoundland native. Tobin 
and other Liberal supporters stressed that an Oceans Act would create new efficiencies by 
bringing existing statutes and policy frameworks together and identifying ways of making 
them work more effectively. They also emphasized the role it could play in strengthening 
Canadian nationalism. In a spirited defense of the bill, Nova Scotia Liberal MP Roseanne 
Skoke argued that an Oceans Act would have the power to be a uniting force for all 
Canadians by helping them to see themselves as a maritime nation for the first time: 
It makes us all working shareholders in the development of a flexible, 
workable and ecologically sound oceans strategy for today and for the 
future, one well in keeping with Canada's motto, from sea to sea to 
sea ... this is a vision of Canada as being much more than the Rockies, the 
Laurentian Shield and the Great Plains between them, of great cities lining 
up at our southern borders; it is also a view of myriad port cities and 
coastal communities, of diverse marine activities extending economic and 
social benefit to future generations brought to us by the rolling swells and 
rippled waves of blue beginnings at the edges of our land maps (Skoke 
1995). 
Although the bill died on the order paper in 1995, it was reintroduced in April of 
1996 by Tobin's successor, Minister Fred Mifflin. Despite continued opposition, it was 
eventually passed on December 19111 and the Oceans Act came into effect after the House 
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of Commons returned to session on January 31, 1 997. The Act was very wide ranging in 
scope, consisting of a preamble and three distinct parts. The preamble outlines several 
reasons for the development of the Act: to recognize that oceans are the common heritage 
of all Canadians; to reaffirm Canada's role as a world leader; to affirm Canada's 
sovereign rights over various maritime zones; to foster an understanding of oceans, ocean 
processes, ocean resources and marine ecosystems; to foster the sustainable development 
ofthe oceans and their resources; to promote the wide application of the precautionary 
approach; to pursue opportunities for economic diversification and wealth generation; to 
promote integrated management; and to encourage the development and implementation 
of a national strategy for the management of estuarine, coastal and marine ecosystems 
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 1996). 
Part One of the Oceans Act, "Canada's Maritime Zones," laid the foundation for 
the eventual ratification ofUNCLOS. It clearly defined each of Canada's maritime zones: 
"the territorial sea," "the contiguous zone," "the exclusive economic zone" and "the 
continental shelf',32 and clarified the jurisdictional responsibilities of the federal and 
provincial levels of government in each zone (ibid.). The federal government has 
subsequently announced its intention to make a claim to those areas of its continental 
shelf which extend into international waters (Government of Canada 2006a). 
Part Two of the Oceans Act, "Oceans Management Strategy," calls upon the 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to "lead and facilitate" the development of a new ocean 
management strategy for Canada that is based on the principles of "sustainable 
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development," "integrated management," and the "precautionary approach." It also orders 
the Minister to "lead and facilitate the development and implementation of plans for the 
integrated management of all activities in or affecting estuaries, coastal waters and marine 
waters that form part of Canada ... " and to "cooperate with other ministers, boards and 
agencies" of the federal government, as well as with "provincial and territorial 
governments," "affected aboriginal organizations," "coastal communities," and other 
"persons and bodies" in bringing these plans to life. Part Two also grants the Minister the 
power to establish and regulate Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) to protect "commercial 
and non-commercial fishery resources," "marine mammals," "endangered or threatened 
species and their habitats," "unique habitats," "areas of high biological diversity or 
biological productivity," or any other area in marine area deemed to be in need of special 
protection (ibid.). 
Part Three of the Oceans Act, "Powers, Duties and Functions of the Minister," 
transfers authmity over the Canadian Coast Guard to Fisheries and Oceans Canada and 
grants the Minister responsibility for encouraging "activities necessary to foster 
understanding, management and sustainable development. .. " It also emphasizes the 
importance of delivering services in a "cost effective manner" and, to this end, it gives the 
Minister the authority to enter into pruinerships and charge service fees in order to 
compensate for any "reasonable outlays" incurred while carrying out "regulatory 
processes or approvals." Finally, it gives the authority to make regulations under the Act 
for: a) prescribing marine environmental quality requirements and standards; b) 
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regulating the powers and duties of enforcement officers; and c) implementing provisions 
of agreements made under the Act (ibid.). 
Canada's Oceans Strategy (COS), which builds directly upon the Oceans Act, was 
released in 2002, just prior to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). 
The Strategy reaffirms Canada's commitment to the principles of sustainable 
development, integrated management and the precautionary approach. It also identifies a 
variety of broad, overarching objectives for Canadian policy: understanding and 
protecting the marine environment; supporting sustainable economic opportunities; 
providing international leadership; and adopting modern ocean governance. Finally, the 
Strategy commits to a number of new UNEP inspired ideals, which are to be incorporated 
into this new governance approach, including: the integration of science with local and 
traditional knowledge in decision-making; the application of ecosystem-based 
management; and the fostering of stewardship and public awareness among Canadians 
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2002a). 
The Strategy articulates a vast new mandate for Fisheries and Oceans Canada. It 
points out that the agency's role in ocean governance must now extend beyond fisheries 
management to accommodate the other economic activities that are gaining significance 
in the waters of Canada. Some of the activities that are specified include: "oil and gas 
exploration and development, marine recreation and tourism, aquaculture, shipping and 
transp01iation, high technology instrument development, pharmaceuticals, potential 
seabed mining opportunities, marine navigation and communications, defence production, 
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and scientific and technical research" (ibid: 8). It further emphasizes that ocean 
conservation and development are not merely the responsibilities of government. Rather, 
all groups "have a duty and a shared responsibility for supporting the sustainable 
development of marine resources" (ibid.). 
Accompanying the Strategy was a more operational document, called the Policy 
and Operational Framework for Integrated Management of Estuarine, Coastal and Marine 
Environments in Canada (POF), which laid out a broad framework for making integrated 
ocean management a reality. It called for a network of Large Ocean Management Areas 
(LOMAs) which would eventually include all of Canada' s marine, coastal and estuarine 
waters. Nested within each LOMA would be smaller Coastal Management Areas (CMAs) 
and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), which would have their own steering committees, 
but would be in contact with relevant LOMA committees, as the situation required 
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2002b). 
3.3 Implementing the Oceans Agenda 
While the passing of the Oceans Act was hailed as a victory for those who had 
supported the bill, enthusiasm was tempered by the fact that the new legislation was not 
accompanied by any new federal funding. Prime Minister Jean Chretien's Liberal Party 
had run on a platform of fiscal responsibility, and promptly undertook a major program 
review after taking office. This was followed by sweeping cutbacks across a range of 
fields throughout the 1990s, including social welfare, the military, post-secondary 
education and environmental programs. In this climate of fiscal restructuring, promoters 
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of the Oceans Act had decided not to ask for any implementation money for fear that the 
bill would not pass if they did. 
This climate of fiscal restraint put the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans in a 
difficult predicament. He was legislatively bound to "lead and facilitate" the development 
of a sweeping new policy framework and doing so would directly affect the operations of 
numerous other federal and provincial departments as well as all ocean-related industries 
and coastal communities. This already challenging task was made far more difficult by 
the fact that the Department had no new financial resources through which to realize this 
vision. While the Oceans Act itself places a strong emphasis on delivering programs 
through "partnerships," the absence of any seed funding imposed serious constraints on 
what could be done. To make matters worse, just as the Oceans Act was coming into 
being in 1996, Fisheries and Oceans Canada was itself going through a major 
restructuring and downsizing process. A short time before the passing of the Act, it was 
announced that the organization's annual operating budget would be cut from 
approximately $750 million dollars to about $350 million over three to four fiscal years, 
leading to a "3000 person reduction in total manpower within the department" (Tobin 
1995: 16-17). The challenges presented by these cutbacks, and the eventual responses to 
them, were well summarized in a scientific strategic plan for the Department called 
Setting the Course for the New Millennium, that was released in 2000. The document 
states: 
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Canada's international reputation in fisheries research, hydrography, 
oceanography and aquatic environmental science has been second to none. 
In some areas, these strengths have begun to be eroded through a 
combination of budget cuts, retirements and hiring freezes (Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada 2000: 8) ... The Department cannot count on more and 
more financial resources to solve problems. It must take steps to change 
the way it does business and restore financial stability (ibid: 4). We will 
focus on the tasks we 'must do' and expend fewer resources on 
discretionary tasks (ibid: 8) ... For the past two years, the Department has 
been engaged in a profound re-examination of its culture, values and 
governance (ibid: 1) ... The nature of governance is shifting as the federal 
government moves toward a more collaborative and inclusive model based 
on shared stewardship and responsibility ... Partnering with the private 
sector, other levels of government, and universities has become a major 
priority ... " (ibid: 2) ... staff will be proactive in identifying and adapting to 
emerging issues, adept at embracing partnerships, open to new ways of 
working, such as multidisciplinary teams, and recognized for being 
flexible and open to sharing information and communicating results 
widely through a variety of mechanisms and technologies. (ibid: 10) ... We 
will share uncertainties with our clients as we jointly set priorities and 
share responsibility for our decisions (ibid: 1 0). 
This statement clearly indicates the desire of the department to devolve new 
responsibilities and risks onto ocean users in order to cope with its increasingly 
precarious financial situation and with the inherent uncertainties of attempting to 
manage the marine environment. 
In spite of sweeping cuts across the department, the oceans agenda was allocated 
some money through internal redistributions (Chircop and Hildebrand 2005). One 
interviewee at Fisheries and Oceans Canada estimated that between 1997 and 2003, the 
agency invested about $60 million to implement the Oceans Act. Another said that, in 
recent years, the budget allocated for Oceans Act implementation had tended to be 
between $1 2 and $15 million per year which, while not insignificant, represented less 
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than one half of one percent of the agency's total operating budget. A manager in one of 
the agency' s regional offices commented that, since the Oceans Act had not been 
allocated any new federal money, it did not have any business lines reserved for it within 
the departmental budget. This meant that any funding that was transferred to oceans 
programs had to be justified by showing that it was also satisfying other departmental 
commitments for which funding had been allocated. This, in turn, created some internal 
tensions within the department. 
In spite of these constraints, the first official Oceans Act pilot projects were 
launched in September of 1998, as two sites on the country's west coast were formally 
designated as "Areas oflnterest (AOI)" for Marine Protected Areas (MPA).33 By 
December of that year, a third AOI was announced on the east coast to protect the Sable 
Gully, a biologically rich deepwater canyon, about 200 km off the south coast ofNova 
Scotia. In the three years that followed, eight additional AOis were announced, including 
three small coastal projects in the province ofNewfoundland and Labrador. In 2003, the 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans designated Endeavour Hot Vents, 250 kilometres offthe 
British Columbia coast, as the first official MP A. This was followed up in 2004, when the 
Sable Gully also received formal designation and in 2005 when sites in Gilbert Bay, 
Labrador and on Newfoundland's Eastport Peninsula were officially recognized as MPAs 
as well. 
The Sable Gully MP A was unique, because it was nested within a pilot Large 
Ocean Management Area (LOMA) integrated management project that was to cover the 
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entire eastern half of the Scotian Shelf that was announced at the same time. The project 
later came to be known as Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) project 
(Rutherford et al. 2002). Following this lead, pilot integrated management plans were also 
developed for a number of sites in other parts of Canada, including: the Central Coast of 
British Columbia, the Western Arctic, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and Placentia Bay in 
Newfoundland. The Placentia Bay project is profiled in Chapter 9. 
In spite of these achievements, the implementation of the new oceans vision 
moved very slowly during this period. Although two Memoranda to Cabinet were put 
forward after the release of the Oceans Act, neither was successful in obtaining new 
federal funding. With little money available, the oceans agenda moved at a painfully slow 
pace for many of those involved. While MPA and integrated management projects 
continued to be encouraged, most remained relatively small in scope, and very few MPAs 
received official designation, even though many had been formal Areas of Interest since 
as early as 1998. 
3.4 The Dawning of a New Era 
In the two years that followed my initial fieldwork trip to Ottawa, the political 
landscape shifted considerably. This trend culminated in the major allotment of new 
federal funding for the first phase of Canada's Oceans Action Plan and several related 
ocean initiatives in the 2005 federal budget. This included new investments to: map 
Canada's continental shelf as part of its anticipated claim under Article 76 ofUNCLOS; 
improve fisheries conservation in the Northwest Atlantic; buy and operate new research 
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and enforcement vessels; prevent exotic animal diseases affecting commercial fish 
species; enhance Atlantic Salmon stocks; and strengthen the Great Lakes Action Plan 
(Harrison 2005). 
The Oceans Action Plan itself is based upon four "pillars." The first is 
international leadership, sovereignty, and security, which includes actions to: a) 
"enhance maritime security" as part of the National Security Policy; b) crack down on 
overfishing beyond Canada's EEZ, by increasing "vessel inspections" and "diplomatic 
interventions;" c) "delimit the outer limits of the continental shelf' and confirm Canada's 
"sovereign rights;" d) improve "bilateral and trilateral actions" with the United States and 
Mexico as pari of the new "Security and Prosperity Par·tnership ofNorth America;" e) 
continue working with the United States to improve ocean management in the Gulf of 
Maine; ar1d continue Canada's commitment to multilateral efforts under the "Arctic 
Marine Strategic Plan." The second pillar is integrated ocean management and 
sustainable development, which includes actions to "grow" the ocean economy by 
developing new economic opportunities in a range of different sectors. The third pillar is 
health of the oceans, which articulates a commitment to: "stronger ecosystem-based 
science," "modern teclmology to support oceans understanding and awareness," and 
"integrated planning" based on "shared ecosystem objectives,"' effective regulatory 
measures," and "protection measures." The final pillar, oceans science and technology, 
calls upon the government to support Canadian ocear1 technology firms by providing "a 
supportive environment for the development ar1d commercialization of ocean 
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technology," and using this technology to generate "business and commercial 
opportunities" both within Canada and abroad (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2005). 
Much like its predecessors, the OAP also commits to "modernize ocean 
management," by adopting "new oceans governance arrangements" and "smart 
regulation," which will facilitate the transfer of greater responsibilities onto ocean users 
(ibid.). Over the first two years, it will fund a variety of new and pre-existing projects in 
Canada's three oceans, all of which will relate back to the four pillars. Many ofthese 
projects will be located within one of the five "priority areas," identified by the Plan: 
Placentia Bay and the Grand Banks (off Newfoundland); The Scotian Shelf (off Nova 
Scotia); the Gulf of St. Lawrence (between Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador); the Beaufort Sea (in the 
Northwest Arctic); and the Pacific North Coast (off British Columbia). The OAP will also 
support the creation of a Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy, designed to honour 
Canada' s international commitment to participate in the development of a global network 
of marine protected areas (ibid.).34 
While definitive statements about the reasons for this sudden embracing of oceans 
as a national priority are well beyond the scope of this dissertation, some contributing 
forces can be identified. These include: the emergence of more "neutral" leadership; a 
heightened emphasis on maritime sovereignty and security issues; and a revived interest 
in commercialization opportunities associated with new maritime technologies. Together, 
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these developments transformed and, arguably, strengthened the nationalist discourse that 
evolved in tandem with the oceans agenda. 
3.4.1 The Emergence of New Leadership 
One of the primary reasons for the relative success of the Oceans Action Plan may 
have been that it was not driven exclusively by Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Rather, one 
of the major agents of change was Dr. Peter Harrison, a former FOC Deputy Minister 
who had relocated to the National Research Council in 2002. Several interviewees noted 
that, from this position, he was able to liaise with other federal departments more 
effectively without being encumbered by the "baggage" that continued to hamper those 
working under the FOC banner. This helped to minimize animosity and competitiveness 
between departments. Harrison's efforts were widely credited with being instrumental to 
the reconvening of a senior level Deputy Ministers ' Interdepartmental Committee on 
Oceans in 2003, after years of dormancy, and this group in turn played a critical role in 
the development of the new Oceans Action Plan. 
3.4.2 National Sovereignty Concerns 
Although Canada was heavily involved in spearheading the Law ofthe Sea talks, 
the country did not formally ratify the UNCLOS agreement until 2003 (Sanger 2002). In 
explaining this hesitation, Huebert (1996-7) cites the election of a Progressive 
Conservative governn1ent in 1984. Newly elected Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
favoured closer relations with the United States, and was unwilling to jeopardize this goal 
by becoming party to a convention which was steadfastly opposed by Canada's powerful 
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neighbour to the south (ibid.). Furthermore, there was dampening enthusiasm about the 
prospect of seabed mining in the near future, which meant that the upside of ratification 
appeared to be minimal (ibid: 12). 
Although the Liberal Party returned to power in 1993 with a promise to ratify 
UNCLOS, they waited for a full decade before following through on this commitment. A 
variety of reasons have been proposed for this delay (ibid.). For one thing, the collapse of 
the cod fishery in 1992 placed a large demand on government resources, and this helped 
to move concerns about ratifying UNCLOS to the back burner (ibid: 14 ). There was also 
a growing belief that the agreement did not adequately address several of the country's 
key strategic concerns. The main issue was that the extended offshore claims permitted 
by UNCLOS applied only to stationary seabed and sub-sea resources, and did not include 
fish (Koring 1995). Canadian officials feared that ratification of the UNCLOS agreement 
would undermine their capacity to act unilaterally to stop European Union countries from 
fishing at unsustainable levels on the ecologically sensitive "nose" and "tail" of the Grand 
Banks and on the Flemish Cap, all ofwhich lie immediately outside of Canada's 200 mile 
EEZ. These areas are believed to be critical spawning areas for many species, including 
cod. While Canada campaigned for extended jurisdiction over fish resources on its 
continental shelf, these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful (Fagan 2003). Canadian 
concerns did, however, lead to a 1993 UN conference dealing with "straddling" (or trans-
boundary) and "highly migratory" fish stocks in New York. 
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A year later, Canada sought to unilaterally grant itself authority over the entire 
continental shelf under its Coastal Fisheries Protection Act. A 1994 amendment to that 
statute gave Canada's government the authority to stop, search and, in some cases, arrest 
vessels suspected of fishing illegally beyond the 200 mile limit, if it deemed the health of 
fish stocks to be at risk (Stonehouse 2003). Although this amendment was not recognized 
by international bodies, Canada wasted little time in acting on these new powers. The 
new federal Fisheries and Oceans Minister, Brian Tobin made international headlines in 
1995, when he ordered the arrest and seizure of the Estai, a Spanish trawler that had been 
fishing on the Grand Banks, just outside of Canada's EEZ. The boat was taken into 
custody in St. John's where it was charged with illegally fishing for turbot (Day 1995; 
Chase 2003). 
Tobin's "Turbot War" theatrics played very well in the Canadian media, earning 
him the nicknames "Captain Canada" and "The Tobinator" (Tobin and Reynolds 2002). 
The Minister's actions galvanized the longstanding conviction of many in Newfoundland 
that heavy pressure from foreign fleets in the spawning areas was largely responsible for 
the collapse ofthe cod fishery. While these are widely believed to be very legitimate 
concerns, it should be noted that rhetoric about the need to "get tough" on "the 
foreigners" has also frequently been used to draw attention away from the damage caused 
by Canadian policies and practices. 
As popular as they were in eastern Canada, Tobin's antics raised the ire of many 
people in rival fishing nations who characterized them as an unacceptable violation of 
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international law. Owners ofthe Spanish vessel launched a civil action against the 
government of Canada in 1996, but the International Court of Justice decided not to hear 
the case (Chase 2003). In spite of these lingering hostilities, the "Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks," or simply "the United Nations Fishing 
Agreement" (UNFA), came into effect in 2001 (Hanson 1998). The agreement includes 
provisions for coastal states to manage, as opposed to enclose or own, straddling stocks 
which migrate across the 200 nautical mile limit (Koring 1995, Stonehouse 2003). 
Canada was among the first countries to sign the agreement when it was drafted in 1995 
(Rayfuse 2003). The European Union, whose member states were among the primary 
harvesters on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks, did not sign the agreement at this time, 
however, and Canada refused to formally ratify the UNCLOS agreement until they agreed 
to do so (Fagan 2003). 
Canada's failure to ratify UNCLOS had left the country ill equipped to defend 
against mounting challenges to its maritime sovereignty, and this was beginning to raise 
serious concerns (Huebert 2003). Perceived threats that have surfaced in recent years 
include: disputes with Russia over seabed jurisdiction in the Pacific; disputes with 
Denmark over the ownership of two small islands in the northeast Arctic and over the 
maritime boundary north of Greenland; and disputes with the United States over the 
maritime boundaries between the two countries, both in the Gulf of Maine on the east 
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coast and in the Beaufort Sea in the Northwest Arctic, an area thought to contain 
considerable petroleum resources (ibid.). There were also growing concerns, which were 
later substantiated, that the United States would push to have the Northwest Passage 
declared an International Strait, rather than part of the internal waters of Canada. 
Warming temperatures in the Arctic have fed speculation that the Passage may one day 
become more easily traversable, and could become a major international shipping 
corridor (Calamai 2005). 
These developments, combined with long simmering concerns about a range of 
other cross-boundary issues, such as Arctic environmental management, oiled seabirds 
off Canada's Atlantic Coast, and the potential riches to be gained by extending 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf helped to create a more receptive climate for 
ratifying UNCLOS in Ottawa (Hage 2003). With ratification, Canada could improve its 
capacity to address many of these issues. Some advocates argued that it would also likely 
give Canada a greater say in interpreting the ways in which various components of the 
UNCLOS agreement would be interpreted and applied in practice and in shaping any new 
regulatory regimes that may be developed in the future, to manage such things as 
biotechnology resources (Johnston 2003). 
The eventual decision of the European Union to ratify the United Nations 
Fisheries Agreement in 2003 paved the way for Canada to ratify UNCLOS, which it did 
on November 6111 ofthat year, making it the 144111 country to ratify the agreement 35 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2003). The Canadian government 
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now has until 2013 to make a claim to extend jurisdiction over its continental margin.36 
Preliminary estimates suggest that if successful, Canada could gain jurisdiction over an 
area of about 1.76 million square kilometres.37 That is approximately the size ofthe 
provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba combined (Harrison 2004). The newly 
claimed territory would be divided between the Grand Banks (about 1 million square 
kilometres) and the Western Arctic (about 0.75 million square kilometres) (Chircop and 
Marchand 2000: 4).38 These areas may very well contain significant finds of offshore oil, 
natural gas, gas hydrates, seabed minerals, and/or genetic and pharmaceutical resources 
(Chircop and Marchand 2000; Swing 2003; Harrison 2004).39 In anticipation of the 
ratification of UNCLOS, the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board has 
already issued several oil "exploration licences" and has even issued a "significant 
discovery licence" on the Flemish Cap, which lies beyond the EEZ offNewfoundland 
(ibid.). This push toward the ratification ofUNCLOS appears to have been a major 
springboard for the development and eventual funding of Phase I of "Canada's Oceans 
Action Plan" (OAP) (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2005). 
3.4.3 The Security Agenda 
Another probable factor contributing to the Canadian government' s heightened 
commitment to funding new ocean planning initiatives was the heightened interest in 
maritime security in the aftermath of the September 11 1'\ 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
United States. As part of its larger commitment to national security, the US government 
has adopted what it calls the Deliberation and Security Initiative to bring a heightened 
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level of surveillance to vessels traveling on the high seas (Hage 2003). One interviewee 
noted that the area around the east coast ofNewfoundland constitutes the one weak link 
in the American-led "security shield" surveillance system, which has a presence from 
Labrador nmthward and from Maine southward, and Canada may face greater pressure to 
help rectify this deficiency in the near future. In 2005, Canada, the United States and 
Mexico formed the Security and Prosperity Partnership ofNorth America, which 
committed the three countries to develop complementary strategies for "oceans 
stewardship" "maritime transportation" and "port security" (Security and Prosperity 
Prutnership of North America 2005). The United States passed its own Oceans Act in 
2000, and many expected that there would be ongoing efforts to bring the three nations' 
approaches into greater harmony with each other. It is possible that the heightened 
security agenda, and the associated pressure to integrate policies with the US and Mexico, 
may have also been a factor in stimulating greater interest in maritime issues among 
senior Canadian policy makers. 
3.4.4 The Commercialization of Maritime Technologies 
An additional factor that appears to have contributed to growing federal support 
for ocean plruming has been a growing interest in stimulating the development of new 
maritime teclmologies. In parallel with the extended jurisdictions brought about by 
UNCLOS, many countries have made major investments in producing new technologies 
to simplify resource development and environmental management practices. In some 
countries, the development and testing of new maritime technologies has been achieved 
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through public-private partnerships. In others, it has been contracted out almost 
exclusively to the private sector (Johnston 2003). These strategies have sometimes proven 
quite profitable, as companies have been able to successfully market new products and 
services internationally. 
The desire to help Canada play a greater role in the development, 
commercialization and export of new ocean-related technologies was at the heart of the 
Marine and Ocean Industry Teclmology Roadmap project, which released its "special 
report" to the public in 2003 (Government of Canada 2003). The Roadmap project was 
the key component of the National Research Council's reemerging oceans focus, 
although it was also financially supported by a variety of other federal agencies, including: 
Industry Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, National Resources Canada, Transport 
Canada, the Department ofNational Defence, Environment Canada, and the Canadian 
Space Agency (Harrison 2004). It was the product of a series of consultation sessions 
with a wide range of companies operating in different parts of Canada. On the basis of the 
information obtained from these workshops, the Roadmap report identified likely trends 
and technology needs in a variety of ocean industries, and sought to gain a better 
understanding of ways that the government could help Canadian companies to exploit 
untapped niches (ibid.). This focus on partnerships with the private sector and 
commercialization has remained a central component of Canada' s Oceans Action Plan, 
which has identified Placentia Bay as the site for a new Ocean Technology 
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Demonstration Platform, in which these new technologies can be developed, tested, and 
put to work in ocean planning. 
3.5 AMari usqa ad Mare: A National Vision 
Efforts to use maritime imagery to bolster Canadian nationalism have a long 
history, as evidenced by the country's longstanding motto AMari usqua ad Mare (from 
sea to sea). A clearly nationalist discourse surrounding ocean policy has been present 
since at least the mid 1990s, as part of the initial efforts to promote the idea of a Canadian 
Oceans Act. Proponents of the Oceans Act have long stressed the need to convince more 
Canadians of the importance of oceans to their country in order to create new kinds of 
subjects who see it as their civic duty to support ocean-related projects. The locus of 
political and economic power in Canada has always resided primarily in the provinces of 
Ontario and Quebec. While both provinces have small maritime borders in more remote 
areas to the north and both have major cities that are cormected to the Atlantic Ocean via 
the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence River system, many residents of these provinces have few 
if any direct experiences with Canada's oceans. Thus, a major component of Canadian 
ocean policy has consisted of attempts to market the importance ofthe country' s oceans 
to people who know little about them. As one interviewee told me, most published 
brochures have sought to appeal to what he termed an "Ontario's eye view" of oceans. 
This has often meant repeating a variety of key catch phrases designed to capture the 
attention of a largely disinterested public. Among the most commonly ariiculated 
statements were: "Canada has the longest coastline in the world;" "We live on a 'blue 
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planet' which would be better named Planet Ocean than Planet Earth;" "Canada stretches 
from sea to sea to sea;" and "We know more about the moon's backside than we do about 
the ocean's bottom." Canada's Oceans Action Plan continues this tradition, with its 
attempt to draw the attention of the reader to the unparalleled beauty and mystery of the 
briny deep beyond: 
... few Canadians have seen our sub-sea valleys, plains and mountains .. . 
Some of our country' s most magnificent vistas are found where the land 
joins the sea- coastal fjords and inlets, bays and estuaries, arctic ice fields, 
and archipelagos made up of thousands of islands and countless 
beaches ... marine wildlife, plants, animals, forests of thousand year old 
corals, and glass sponge reefs ... (Fisheries and Oceans 2005) 
These efforts to vividly describe places most Canadians can never or will never see 
suggest that promotion of the idea of Canada as a "maritime nation" is very much an 
effort to create an "imagined community" where none had existed before (Anderson 
1991 ). 
The growing emphasis on sovereignty and security concerns and the heightened 
focus on locating new opportunities for the further commercialization of the ocean in 
recent years have, however, contributed to the development of a somewhat different 
conception of nation-building than had been the case in previous years. Evidence of this 
shift was very much apparent at a variety of ocean-related conferences that I attended in 
2003 and 2004. The key component of this new approach is the idea that oceans should 
be viewed primarily as an investment opportunity rather than as a liability. Several 
plenary speakers at these conferences stressed the importance of convincing "ordinary 
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Canadians," the federal government and private industry, that money spent on oceans 
would not be wasted. Rather, it would help to "maximize" the revenue generating 
potential of the country and improve the health of marine ecosystems, and together, these 
would yield tangible long-term benefits, both financial and otherwise. 
This sentiment was reinforced in a number of interviews with senior public 
servants. Some juxtaposed this new, more optimistic portrayal of oceans against the 
common perception that money spent on ocean-related issues, particularly the support of 
beleaguered coastal communities, goes into a "bottomless pit" and only begets requests 
for more money. This perception was partly the result of the decision ofthe federal 
govenunent to provide several billions of dollars in income support and training 
opportunities to rural, coastal areas during the 1980s and 90s, to offset the economic 
impact of fisheries declines. Rather than clinging to the "old economy" of coastal 
fisheries, this emerging discourse points to the need to encourage "innovation" by 
supporting the "new economy" of offshore resource development, aquaculture, 
ecotourism, and high-end technology. Doing so, it is suggested, would help to "re-brand" 
oceans and produce "win-win" solutions. Instead of always being portrayed as a "bad 
news story" or "basket case," characterized by depleted fisheries, oil spills and 
govermnent handouts, oceans would come to be seen as a "good news story," 
characterized by vibrant economic growth, marine conservation programs, and 
widespread public participation. The "reactive" and "crisis management" approaches of 
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the past would be replaced by a "proactive" approach that uses integrated planning to 
anticipate problems before they emerge and transforms them into economic opportunities. 
A second element of this newly emerging discourse was a new twist on the old 
idea of ocean governance as nation building. Increasingly, the term "nation building" is 
being used as a double entendre. In addition to the pre-existing focus on the emotional or 
"spiritual" dimensions of nation building, new perspectives have stressed that by ratifying 
UNCLOS, Canada has given itself an opportunity to nation build in a physical sense as 
well. A former Fisheries and Oceans Canada ocean policy manager that I interviewed in 
2003 explained: 
... oceans are a good news story in the sense that this is such a good 
opportunity for Canada on so many different levels. If only it could be 
seen as such. If people could just believe in it and take it forward and sell 
it as such and say, 'My God, we're nation building!" Instead of building 
railways across the country, we're building this incredible virtual 
governance network. Also, it's an intellectual network in some ways of 
people who are actually taking care of what is ours as a nation. And we are 
also nation building literally in terms of UNCLOS and the extension of the 
200 mile limit and taking jurisdiction over the continental shelf. 
By investing both financially and emotionally in oceans, it was argued, Canadians could 
reassert sovereignty over their maritime waters, gain access to previously untapped 
natural resources, forge new funding partnerships with the private sector, promote a 
healthy ocean technology sector, and protect the marine environment all at the same time. 
Whether this persuasive new discourse was what was ultimately successful in 
convincing high ranking federal officials to support the oceans agenda is not clear. What 
seems quite evident, however, is that this new emphasis on inspiring maritime 
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nationalism has been widely embraced by many people in the oceans field, and is likely 
to form the core of future attempts to promote the importance of caring about oceans to 
Canadians. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has shown that the Oceans Act took shape at the height of the 
neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. Sweeping budget cuts along with a growing commitment 
to a new environmental management orthodoxy necessitated a reconceptualization of the 
roles played by both state and citizenry in the regulation of ocean activities. Faced with 
diminishing resources, Fisheries and Oceans Canada was increasingly forced to rely on a 
diverse array of partnerships with other governrnent and non-government agencies in 
order to carry out its new mandate. This fit seamlessly into the broader UN sustainable 
development tradition, in which the state is expected to assume more of an overseeing 
role and share more responsibilities with the private sector. 
Still, it was only with the emergence of outside leadership and the push to tie 
oceans policy more tightly to broader government priorities, such as sovereignty and 
security, and the development of new commercial opportunities in fields like ocean 
teclmology, that the oceans agenda began to achieve more widespread support.40 This 
new approach was accompanied by a growing commitment to the idea that adopting a 
"sustainable development" approach, along with the adoption of ecosystem management 
and participatory or "integrated" management could overcome the failures of the past and 
could even become a source of national unity and pride for all Canadians. 
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Before delving into the specifics of how this new approach was put to work in 
particular settings, however, it is important to first discuss the historical circumstances 
that have given rise to the present configuration of 'ocean users ' in Newfoundland. 
Accordingly, the next chapter examines the management of the Newfoundland fishery 
over time, paying particular attention to the way in which the "high modernist" ideology 
that dominated the fishery during the twentieth century transformed the relationship 
between coastal residents and the sea. 
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Chapter 4 A Cod Forsaken Place: The Rise and Fall of Fisheries Management in 
Newfoundland (1497-1992) 
This chapter summarizes the history of the Newfoundland cod fishery, from the 
time of the arrival of the first European migratory fishers circa 1500 to the closure of the 
commercial cod fishery in 1992. It focuses primarily on the way in which a "high 
modernist" ideology shaped the management of the Newfoundland fishery during the 
twentieth century, especially after Canada's declaration of a two-hundred mile exclusive 
economic zone in 1977. Under the direction of Canadian government planners, there was 
a firm division imposed between land and sea-based economic activities which had never 
existed previously. New government programs sought to reduce dependence on the 
fishery by forcibly resettling people into larger centres and encouraging the development 
of new land-based industries. They also sought to replace the traditional salt fish trade 
with a fresh and frozen fish industry, characterized by larger boats and modern fish 
processing facilities. The fishery was also subjected to a new regime of scientific fisheries 
management and central planning, the likes of which had never been seen before. The 
promise of modernization soon proved hollow, however, as economic and ecological 
forces which were not anticipated by plrumers gradually undermined their ambitious 
visions for the future. This ultimately contributed to the biological collapse of cod stocks 
in the early 1990s and the loss oftens ofthousands ofjobs across Newfoundland. 
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4.1 European Expansionism and the Growth of the Newfoundland Fishery 
On the Grand Banks, the cold waters of the Labrador Current, travelling south, 
meet the warm waters of the Gulf Stream, travelling north. This convergence of forces 
stirs up nutrients from the ocean floor, creating one of the world's richest offshore fishing 
grounds (Sider 2003). Many of the bays and coves that line the coast ofNewfoundland 
and Labrador have proven to be extremely productive as well, primarily during the spring 
and summer months, when offshore cod migrate inshore in pursuit of schools of capelin, 
their preferred food source. Legend has it that when John Cabot, a Venetian explorer 
commissioned by the British monarchy, first made landfall on the east coast ofthe island 
in 1497, codfish along the island 's shores were so abundant that crewmen aboard his 
vessel were able to harvest them in baskets lowered over the side of the boat (Pope 
1997).41 
News of Cabot's "discovery"42 spread quickly across Western Europe and, by the 
early 1500s, Portuguese, French, Spanish and Basque fishers were venturing across the 
Atlantic each summer to take part in the Newfoundland cod fishery (ibid.). For the most 
part, the catches of migratory fishing fleets were used to supply markets in Western 
Europe, although the preferred methods used to preserve the fish varied considerably 
between nations. The urban French market demanded a "wet" fishery, which involved 
preserving the cod while still at sea, by gutting them and soaking them immediately in a 
briny solution of salt and water (Turgeon 1998; Pritchard 2004). The Spanish and 
Portuguese markets, by contrast, preferred a "dry" fishery, in which cod was preserved by 
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splitting, filleting and, salting the fish and then slowly drying them on land (Turgeon 
1998). This dried "salt fish" was capable of lasting a long time before perishing and, 
accordingly, it became an important staple for the large navies that fuelled the colonial 
expansion of these two powers in Central and South America, the Caribbean, and the 
Indian Ocean. 
Despite Cabot's initial claim to the island, there was very little British 
involvement in the Newfoundland fishery until the end of the sixteenth century. The main 
reason for this is that ports in the northeast of England were already heavily involved in 
the Icelandic cod fishery, and this was sufficient to satisfy domestic demand (Pope 2004). 
It was only when increasing government controls and domestic inflation brought about a 
gradual decline in the Spanish and Portuguese fisheries in Newfow1dland that fleets based 
in Bristol and other ports in the southwest of England began to play a more significant 
role in the Newfoundland cod fishery, hoping to capitalize on the high demand for salt 
fish that existed in southern Europe. 
By the middle of the seventeenth century, France and England had become the 
two dominant players in the Newfoundland cod fishery (Pritchard 2004). The seasonal 
Newfoundland fishery proved so productive that two year-round sponsored English 
colonies were established on the island in the early 1600s, Cupids in Conception Bay 
(1610-1621) and Ferryland on the Southern Shore of the Avalon Peninsula (1621-1629). 
Both were abandoned after about a decade, however, in favour of more temperate sites in 
what is now the United States (Cell 1982, Lahey 1982).43 Despite these failed ventures, 
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the English presence on the island grew steadily during the next fifty years and, by the 
1670s, there were at least thirty seasonal English settlements scattered along the east 
coast ofNewfoundland. Most of the larger stations employed significant numbers of 
servants to help prosecute the fishery and, although the British crown had imposed a ban 
on year-round settlements on the island, it soon became common practice to leave a small 
group of servants to over-winter on the island and guard valuable coves to make sure that 
they were not taken over by another merchant operation in the following season 
(Handcock 2000). 
The French occupation ofNewfoundland was concentrated along Newfoundland's 
south and west coasts. By the 1660s, concerns that the British were gradually encroaching 
into what had historically been French territory, prompted the construction of a fortified 
year-round settlement at Plaisance (on the site of the present-day town of Placentia in 
Placentia Bay) to defend their interests in the region (The Newfoundland Herald 1988). 
Plaisance was chosen because it was in close proximity to very good fishing grounds, it 
boasted excellent beaches for drying fish, and it was surrounded by hills which made it 
easy to defend (Town of Placentia 1998). 
The eventual downfall of Plaisance was not, however, military but diplomatic in 
origin. As part of the Treaty of Utrecht, which was signed in 1713, France formally 
recognized British sovereignty over Newfoundland. It agreed to abandon all territorial 
claims in the area, including Plaisance, but was allowed to keep fishing rights along the 
north and west coasts ofthe island, from Cape Bonavista to Point Riche (Hiller 2001). 
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France was also given the right to cut wood on the Labrador Coast "for the erection of 
fishing premises and the repair of vessels" (Anderson 1984: 26). 
With the British claim to the island now more secure, merchants from the English 
West Country began to establish more year-round operations in eastern Newfoundland. 
These operations were much larger than had been evident in the previous century and 
some included hundreds of servants as well as many resident families (Handcock 2000). 
The early prui of the eighteenth century also marked the entry of substantial numbers of 
Irish workers into the Newfoundland fishery for the first time. Ships from the English 
West Country bound for Newfoundland would regularly stop in Irish ports, primarily 
Waterford, to pick up salt provisions and Irish labourers for the fishery (Mannion 2006). 
For the most part, the English "banker" fishery was built around large wooden 
schooners which carried a number of smaller vessels called "dories" (Thurston 1982). 
Fish were caught aboard the dories using hand lines and then returned to the schooner to 
be salted and packed before being brought back to land to be dried. This industry, in turn, 
helped to stimulate the development of other fishery-related manufacturing operations in 
many settlements, such as boat building and sail making. 
The commencement of the Seven Years War in Europe rekindled hostilities 
between France and England, and this had significant repercussions in Newfoundland. 
The war concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. This agreement 
brought about a substantial realignment of the North American territories held by 
England, France and Spain. As part of the Treaty, France ceded the entirety of Canada to 
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England, along with all of its territories to the east of the Mississippi River. Instead of 
fighting to retain control of its North American territories, France preferred to reclaim the 
sugar producing islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, which had been recently 
conquered by the English. After 1763, France's only remaining territorial claim in North 
America was over St. Pierre et Miquelon, a small island archipelago off Newfoundland's 
south coast, which it could use as a base from which to conduct its fishery on the Grand 
Banks. It also retained the right to fish offNewfoundland's north and west coasts, 
although French vessels were not permitted to come ashore (Hiller 1998a).44 With 
England's territorial claim to the region now largely uncontested, Captain James Cook 
was able to chart the Newfoundland coast between 1763 and 1767 (The Newfoundland 
Herald 1995). 
4.2 A Colony Takes Shape (1790-1855) 
While mercantile centres across the island continued to prosper, year-round 
settlements in Newfoundland remained relatively few in number for much of the 
eighteenth century. It was not until the commencement of the Napoleonic and French 
Revolutionary Wars in Europe dming the 1790s, along with associated conflicts in the 
Americas, that the migratory Newfoundland fishery began to decline and permanent 
settlement began to take hold in earnest. A number of different forces that were 
associated with these wars made the migratory fishery much less feasible. For one thing, 
there was a sudden shortage of labourers and boats brought on by the high demand for 
suitable vessels and experienced mariners in the military (Janzen 2001e). In addition, 
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there was a recession that was triggered by the closure of Spanish markets to English salt 
fish and growing competition from rival producers in Scandinavia and the United States. 
This led to a sudden fall in the price paid for Newfoundland fish and led to a slew of 
bankruptcies among West Country merchants who had invested heavily in the fishery 
during the very prosperous 1780s (Tulk 1997: 19). By the early 1800s, large numbers of 
British West Country merchants had moved away from the Newfoundland fishery to 
concentrate on other ventures, which were believed to be less risky (Tulk 1997, Janzen 
2001 e). Between 1793 and 1807, the British migratory offshore fleet fell from 82 vessels 
to only 33 and, ofthese, 30 fished out of St. John's (Janzen 2001e). 
The decline of the migratory fishery created an opportunity for permanent 
settlement to take hold. A further incentive was created by much higher fish prices 
brought on by the recovery of European fish markets, the emergence of new markets in 
the West Indies, and the near complete suspension of American salt fish production 
during the War of 1812. Together, these developments contributed to unprecedented 
prosperity and drew large numbers of pe1manent settlers from southern Ireland and the 
English West Country, many of whom were escaping economic hardship in their 
homelands (Janzen 2001 b). Between 1790 and 1835, Newfoundland' s population 
multiplied seven-fold to about 73,000, as waves of immigrants moved across the Atlantic 
to exploit the fishery (Statistics Canada 2007). These included far greater numbers of 
women and children than had been the case in previous eras (Janzen 2001c). On the 
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strength of this population explosion, Newfoundland was formally recognized as a British 
colony in 1825 (Long 1999). 
Immigration to Newfoundland came to an abrupt stop by around 1840, when a 
downturn in the fishery, combined with better opportunities on the Canadian mainland 
and in the United States prompted many would-be migrants to go elsewhere instead 
(Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage Web Site Project 1997). Rates of immigration to 
Newfoundland have remained extremely low ever since, and many ofthe island's 
approximately 500,000 current residents can trace their lineage directly back to these 
early settlers. 45 
The decline ofthe migratory fishery also witnessed the emergence of St. John's as 
the new centre of merchant capital for most of Newfoundland and Labrador (Tulk 1997). 
This brought about more connections between the many fishing stations that dotted the 
coast than had ever been the case previously. Prior to the 1790s, these settlements tended 
to have much closer economic ties with pmts in England than they did with each other 
(Janzen 200le). With links to Europe increasingly severed, however, St. John' s quickly 
became "the economic, social, military and administrative centre of an emerging colonial 
society," boasting a population of around 10,000 by 1813 (ibid.) 
In most rural coastal settlements, men would harvest cod using small boats and 
stationary technologies, such as hooks and lines, when the fish migrated into near-shore 
waters each summer. The cod were then cleaned, salted and dried locally, with all family 
members playing a part in the curing process. Finally, this "salt fish" was traded to 
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merchants for export.46 Merchants, in tum, would provide fishers with credit, which could 
be used to obtain imported food items and manufactured commodities. Most common 
among these were: "salt, lead weights, nets, flour, tea and molasses" (Kennedy 1997). 
Although fishers were typically granted significantly less than market value for their 
catches under this "truck system," the economic credit extended by merchants helped 
most families to survive resource fluctuations, hard winters, and sporadic shortages (Sider 
1986; Cadigan 1995). In addition to commercial fishing for cod, people were also able to 
procure food and other necessities through a combination of animal husbandry (cows, 
sheep, horses, pigs, fowl) , small-scale agriculture (potatoes, carrots, tumips, cabbage, hay 
and, in some cases, oats, wheat and/or barley) and subsistence fishing (trout, salmon, cod), 
hunting (caribou, hares, beavers, otters, foxes, partridge, ducks and other waterfowl) and 
gathering (berries and other wild plants) (Wix 1836; Tulk 1997). 
Sider has argued that, under the merchant system, coastal fishing settlements 
retained some degree of autonomy, albeit within a larger context of domination by distant 
capital, because they were able to retain "substantial local control over their own social 
relations of work and daily life" (Sider 2003: 24). He links this to the common property 
nature of the fishery resource, which by its very nature could not be easily "taxed, 
enclosed, or alienated" (Sider 2003: 91). As a result, fisher families in Newfoundland 
were able to sell "the product of their labor, not their labor itself' (ibid: 91). Sider 
cautions that the autonomy of salt fish producers was, however, "fundan1entally illusory" 
and was made possible only through their relative isolation (ibid: 304). 
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After the brief economic boom of the early part of the century, prices for 
Newfoundland salt fish plummeted once again, due in large measure to stiff competition 
from Norwegian and French salt fish producers who were also competing for control of 
the Mediterranean market (Janzen 2001b). This plunged Newfoundland into an economic 
depression, leading to the bankruptcies of numerous merchant fim1s. 
4.3 The Age of Independence (1855-1934) 
In 1855, Responsible Government was established in Newfoundland for the first 
time, a status which persisted until 1934 (Long 1999). The latter part of the nineteenth 
century brought about significant changes in both the inshore coastal fishery and the 
offshore banker fishery. While cod remained the mainstay of most inshore harvesters, 
some people throughout Newfoundland began to move away from the conventional hook 
and line fishery to embrace new methods, such as cod traps and trawls. Cadigan has 
argued that dwindling catches, in spite of increasing effort, prompted some fish 
merchants to demand the use of these more efficient gear types in an effort to sustain or 
increase production (Cadigan 2003). Although people in some areas ofthe province 
complained that these new technologies were too efficient and would eventually destroy 
the fishery, the government refused to respond to demands to regulate the industry more 
stringently (Bavington In press). Some have suggested that this was due to the fact that 
many politicians regarded the coastal fishery as backward, and did not see it as a major 
component ofNewfoundland's economic future. Instead, their preference was to invest in 
the development of modem, land-based industries (Wright 2001 ; Cadigan 2003). 
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While participation in the inshore fishery was a critical element in the survival of 
small coastal villages, it is important to recognize that the production of fish for export 
was only one part of a much more complicated way of life. In most areas, fishing 
continued to be supplemented by a range of other subsistence practices, which better 
enabled people to withstand downturns in the abundance of key species. When they were 
not busy catching and processing fish, the majority of rural households had to devote time 
to making their own clothing and furniture, harvesting and processing wood for heating 
and building purposes, and engaging in subsistence food production. 
In areas with less abundant local fisheries, some men would instead choose to 
participate in the "Labrador fishery." Since the turn of the century, schooners from 
Newfoundland would travel nm1hward each spring to take advantage ofthe inshore cod 
fishery off the Labrador coast. This migratory fishery drew large numbers of labourers 
from across eastern Newfoundland each year.47 
The sudden downturn in the health of the Labrador fishery in the 1880s prompted 
an intensification ofthe Newfoundland-based banker fishery, as schooners would leave 
from major ports in Newfoundland to fish on the Grand Banks. Although vessels 
throughout Newfoundland sought to exploit the offshore cod resource, they were by no 
means alone in their use of the Grand Banks. Each year, about 800 schooners also sailed 
nm1hward from the ports of Boston and Gloucester, Massachusetts to fish for cod 
(NOAA Fisheries 2005). Canadian schooners also fished the Grand Banks at this time, 
sailing mainly out of Lunenburg, Nova Scotia (Andersen 1999). 
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The newly independent government also sought to encourage new forms of 
resource development on land as a way of reducing economic dependence on the fishery 
(Sinclair and Omri1er 2006). Between 1844 and 1875, the "Crown lands acts," "provided 
for the alienation of land as private property for agricultural, sawmilling, and railway 
expansion" (Cadigan 2003: 22). By the 1860s and 70s, the government had begun leasing 
large tracts of land in the island's interior to sawmill operators in an effort to develop a 
forest industry. While this drew protests from some residents who lost access to lands that 
had been used for subsistence purposes, the government persisted with its plan (ibid.). In 
the 1890s, it completed construction of a railway system that traversed the island and 
made it easier to exploit the largely untapped resources of the interior (Schrank eta!. 
1992). By the early part of the twentieth century, even larger plots had begun to be 
granted to British lumbering companies. In 1909, a pulp and paper mill was established in 
Grand Falls, in central Newfoundland, and this was followed by a second in Comer 
Brook, on the west coast of the island, in 1925 (ibid.). 
Efforts were also made to encourage the mining industry. By 1864, a large copper 
mine was established at Tilt Cove on the north coast ofNewfoundland (Decker 2002). 
Elsewhere in Newfoundland, a very large iron ore mine opened on Bell Island in 
Conception Bay in 1895, employing hundreds of people. Then, in 1927, the company 
town ofBuchans was established deep in the island's interior to mine a large deposit of 
zinc, lead, copper, gold and silver (ibid.). There were also a variety of smaller operations 
in various parts of the island over the next few decades (Rennie 1998). 
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Despite the efforts ofNewfoundland's politicians, however, the economic impact 
of these developments was quite limited in most rural, coastal areas. For the most part, 
coastal settlements remained highly dependent on the fishery for their livelihoods (Wright 
2001). To the extent that people in fishing families did partake in these other economic 
activities, it tended to be on a part-time basis. Many men would fish in the summer and 
travel to other parts of the province in the winter in an effort to supplement their fishing 
with some form of cash income. Others would travel to urban centres, like Toronto, 
Boston and New York to find work as labourers for construction or manufacturing 
companies. Still others developed secondary trades that could be sold to or bartered with 
others in their home communities. In many respects, this emerging occupational pluralism 
parallels the situation described by Pi-Sunyer in his ethnographic study of Cap Lloc, a 
small fishing (and increasingly tourism) community on the coast of Catalonia in the 
1970s. He noted that, for most people, fishing was not considered to be a part-time, much 
less a full-time job, but rather as "one segment of a diversified economic base that 
includes horticulture and some degree of wage labour" (Pi-Sunyer 1977: 42). He, 
furthermore, pointed out that these complementary trades were rarely viewed as 
secondary to fishing. Rather, they made up part of a larger economic strategy, which 
enabled fishing people to respond to events that were largely beyond their control, such as 
fluctuations in their catches (ibid.). 
In the end, however, dreams of a diversified and prosperous rural economy within 
an independent Newfoundland were never to be realized. A chain of events that followed 
112 
the First World War brought about dramatic social and economic changes on the island 
and ultimately led to the downfall of the Newfoundland government. Newfoundland sent 
a large fighting force to Europe and many faced front line duty. By the close of the War, 
the Newfoundland Regiment had suffered a 72 percent casualty rate. Of the 5,482 
Newfoundland men sent overseas, about 1500 were killed and about 2300 were wounded 
(Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage Project Web Site 1997). In addition to the loss of 
so many young men, Newfoundland also suffered financially. The nation borrowed 
heavily to finance the War and, while it did eventually pay back the $35 million it had 
spent, these payments added significantly to its public debt. The situation was worsened 
significantly with the onset of the Great Depression and the subsequent plummeting of 
fish prices, which ultimately lead to the downfall of the merchant credit system. This left 
many rural Newfoundlanders destitute and in need of government relief. The situation in 
the capital city of St. Jolm's was equally dire, as urban residents could not tum to 
subsistence practices in order to obtain food (Wright 2001). 
By 1934 with the young dominion saddled with a crippling $97 million dollar debt, 
rising levels of poverty, and growing public discontent with an increasingly corrupt 
government, Newfoundland' s constitution was suspended and replaced by a British 
appointed Commission of Government. This made it the first and last country to ever 
"voluntarily" relinquish its sovereignty (Hiller 1998b; Long 1999). 
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4.4 High Modernism and Economic Development 
In his book Seeing Like a State, James Scott (1998) defines "high modernism" as 
"a supreme self-confidence about continued linear progress, the development of scientific 
and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, the rational design of social order, 
the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, not least, an increasing control over nature 
(including human nature) commensurate with scientific understanding of natural laws" 
(1998: 90). High modernism is characterized by the belief that the workings of nature are 
logical, ordered, generalizable, quantifiable, and predictable. It suggests that only experts 
are capable of uncovering nature's 'laws' and, therefore, tends to view other ways of 
understanding the world with suspicion, if not disdain. 
Building upon Foucault (1991 ), Scott claims that one of the central elements of 
high modernist statecraft in the twentieth century has been the attempt to impose 
"legibility" upon both biological systems and human populations. By this he means that 
they have been subjected to a variety of standardized quantitative measures designed to 
make them more easily observed and manipulated from the outside (ibid.). Scott and 
others have, furthermore, argued that the unflinching faith that high modernist thinking 
places in science and planning to deliver progress has been at the root of a variety of state 
and non-state schemes to set rural societies on the path toward "modernization" and 
"development" (Sachs 1992; Escobar 1992, 1995; Peet and Watts 1996; Arce and Long 
2000). 
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Escobar (1995) has similarly noted that the modernist discourse of"development" 
became ubiquitous in the twentieth century, particularly after the Second World War, as 
the search for new markets and natural resources prompted many industrialized countries 
to look for ways to extend their economic influence into less developed areas of the world. 
Under the "developmental gaze" of Western planners, differences between non-
industrialized societies were effectively ignored. All were constructed as backward, 
inhibited by their poverty, ignorance, and antiquated cultural traditions (1995: 8). Escobar 
claims that, in spite of the humanitarian facade presented by most development programs, 
they are best understood as techniques for eradicating local traditions and subsistence 
strategies and allowing for an efficient expropriation of natural resources (1992: 135).48 
Following Sinclair (1987), House ( 1988), Apostle et al. (1998), Wright (200 1) and others, 
I argue that the same high modernist ideology that fuelled the international development 
movement has been very much at the heart of efforts to transform Newfoundland's 
enviromnent, economy, society and culture during the twentieth century. 
4.5 The Commission Government and the First Wave of Modernization (1934-1949) 
Given the centrality of distant markets and highly migratory fish, bird, and marine 
mammal species in the ecological and economic history ofNewfoundland, it is difficult 
to speak of a coherent local environmental management system that existed prior to the 
establishment of formal resource management bureaucracies. Rather, the position taken 
here is that the term "environmental management" is best reserved for the historically 
specific idea that "nature" can be understood through modem science, and this knowledge 
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can be used to make instrumentally rational interventions. The considerable uncertainties 
that have historically characterized life in Newfoundland and Labrador make it difficult 
to believe that resident peoples had any illusions about being able to fully understand, 
much less control, their environments. This was confirmed through a number of 
interviews with retired fish harvesters and other elderly people, who generally agreed that 
the seasonal abundance of many fish and game species necessitated that people try to 
catch as much as they could during the short periods when particular species became 
available. Since most of these species were not in reach for most of the year, and 
harvesting capacity was limited by the technologies that they had available to them at the 
time, the threat of catching too many fish was generally not considered serious. 
There was, furthermore, relatively little effort made on the part of the 
Newfoundland government to manage the activities of fishers and hunters prior to the 
suspension of independence in 1934 (Wright 2001 ). This was probably because the cash 
strapped government lacked the funds that would have been needed to administer 
prescriptive regulations. While some regulations were in place governing such things as 
the length of fishing and hunting seasons and the kinds of technology that could be used, 
they were not tightly enforced (Cadigan 2003). 
These trends began to change after Newfoundland relinquished its sovereignty. 
Upon assuming power, the new British-appointed "Commission Government" began to 
push for the modernization and industrialization of the fishery. One of its first acts was to 
establish a centralized regulatory bureaucracy to manage all natural resource industries, 
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including fisheries, forestry, mining, and agriculture. This represented the first concerted 
attempt to manage the environment in a hands-on fashion (Wright 2001). Newly 
appointed resource managers stressed the importance of applying the ideas of 
centralization and economic efficiency to the fishery. They also believed in the 
importance of taking advantage of new developments in fisheries science and 
management and, to that end, they invested in the construction of a new scientific 
fisheries research centre in 1940 (ibid.).49 New regulations and licensing regimes were 
introduced in the salt fish industry at this time as well, although there were increasing 
calls on the part of managers for producers to move away from the salt fish sector 
altogether and establish a frozen fish industry in order to tap into the growing American 
market for mass produced frozen foods (Alexander 1977). In support ofthat goal, the 
Commission government offered low interest loans to a number of companies in the early 
1940s to build frozen fish processing plants, and larger vessels capable of catching 
enough to provide these plants with a steady supply offish (Wright 2001). 
While the fishery continued to be the primary source of income for most residents 
of coastal communities in rural Newfoundland throughout the 1930s, the island's 
involvement in the Second World War would provide wage labour opportunities on a 
scale that had never been experienced before. Aside from localized forestry, mining and 
construction operations which employed no more than a few thousand people in total, 
paid jobs remained almost non-existent in much of rural Newfoundland prior to the War 
(Wright 2001). This began to change by around 1940. Newfoundland' s strategic location 
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at the easternmost point ofNorth America made it a highly desirable place from which to 
launch the American and Canadian contributions to the war effort in Europe. In 1940, as 
part of the Anglo-American Lend-Lease Agreement, the United States agreed to supply 
the United Kingdom with fifty destroyers. As payment, they were given ninety-nine year 
leases to build bases in various locations in Newfoundland and the Caribbean (Bruce 
2006). Shortly thereafter, construction began on three large American military bases in 
different parts of the island. The bases supplied short-term labouring jobs to large 
numbers of people from across Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces. Several 
smaller Canadian bases were also built, along with a new international airport at Gander 
in central Newfoundland (Matthews 1987). 
The war had significant consequences for the Newfoundland fishery as well. Fish 
prices spiked with the high demand for protein sources in Europe during the war. This 
helped to provide justification for the continued intensification of frozen fish production. 
By the end of the war, there were a total of eighteen frozen fish plants owned by six 
different companies (Wright 2001 ). 
4.6 The Canadian State and the Second Wave of Modernization (1949-1992) 
On June 3rd, 1948, a referendum was held to determine Newfoundland' s future. 
Voters were given the opportunity to choose between three possible options: declaring 
responsible government; continuing with the Commission of Government; and entering 
into confederation with Canada. The results were extremely close with responsible 
government receiving 44.6 percent ofthe vote, confederation receiving 41.1 percent of 
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the vote and the Commission of Government receiving 14.3 percent of the vote. While 
the responsible government option had won, the margin of victory was not accepted as a 
clear majority and an extremely controversial decision was made to hold a second 
referendum with the Commission of Government removed from the ballot. When the 
referendum was held on July 22 11ct, Newfoundlanders voted by a narrow margin (52.3 
percent) to become the tenth Canadian province, and, on April 1, 1949, Newfoundland 
formally entered into confederation with Canada. 50 While the decision to join Canada 
made residents of the new province eligible for a range of new social services, such as 
social assistance, old age pensions, baby bonuses, and Employment Insurance, it also 
surrendered full control over the management of fisheries and all other activities in 
marine waters to the Canadian federal government (Wright 2003). 
After confederation, the Canadian government sought to continue the push toward 
a modernized fishing and fish processing industry, consistent with its existing policies in 
the Maritime Provinces (Wright 2001). Canadian officials shared the Commission of 
Government' s view that the Newfoundland fishery should be developed in the most 
rational, efficient, and productive manner possible. This rationality, it was believed, could 
best be achieved by further industrializing the fishery, based on the model that had been 
used in other successful resource and manufacturing industries (House 1988). Shortly 
thereafter, the federal Department of Fisheries announced that it would be centralizing its 
scientific and managerial operations in Ottawa, the national capital, as part of its larger 
move toward bureaucratic modernization (Wright 2001). 
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In the 1950s, a high proportion of the cod, haddock and redfish landed in 
Newfoundland was gutted and frozen into ten pound blocks which were then exported to 
major American fish markets in Boston or Gloucester, Massachusetts, where they were 
usually reprocessed into fish sticks or other battered products. High US tariffs placed on 
imported battered fish products generally deterred Newfoundland processors from 
carrying out secondary processing operations, such as battering and breading, in the 
province. The duties applied to ten pound blocks of frozen fish were much less severe, so 
that tended to be the preferred expOii commodity (ibid.). 
The 1940s and 50s also witnessed the emergence of new engine powered trawlers, 
which quickly revolutionized fisheries the world over. Technological changes that 
emerged during the Second World War, such as the advent of sonar and new navigational 
technologies, in combination with an abundance of inexpensive fossil fuels, prompted the 
world's fishing powers to develop fleets of 'midshore' draggers and 'offshore' otter 
trawlers. These boats fished by dragging large weighted nets along the ocean bottom and 
were capable of following migrating schools of fish rather than waiting for them to move 
inshore. Some of the larger trawling vessels were also able to continue fishing through the 
winter spawning period, despite heavier seas and the presence of high concentrations of 
sea ice in more northerly regions. Spurred on by these developments, European, 
American, and Canadian trawlers soon began to intensify their fishing efforts on the 
Grand Banks (ibid.). 
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As the practice of flash freezing catches aboard trawlers became more affordable 
in the 1960s, vessels began travelling from much greater distances and staying at sea for 
much longer periods of time than had ever been the case in previous years. This 
innovation drew new fleets from East Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan to fish off 
the Newfoundland coast, joining existing fleets from Spain, Portugal and Italy (Schrank 
et al 1992; Wright 2001 ). Wright (200 1) notes that the number of foreign offshore vessels 
over 40 gross tons in weight that were fishing off Canada's east coast rose from about 
five hundred in the early 1950s to almost a thousand by the early 1960s. In these years, 
foreign trawlers were allowed to fish as close as three miles from shore and this often 
brought them within view of coastal communities. In particularly rich fishing areas, it has 
been reported that the lights from the assemblages of trawlers made them look like 
floating cities at night (Wright 2001 ). Since inshore fishers depended primarily on fish 
like cod that spawned in offshore waters before migrating inshore in the summer to feed, 
the enormous catches of foreign offshore fleets soon began to contribute to diminishing 
catches in many parts of the island (ibid.). This fuelled demands on the part of many 
fishers and coastal communities for the government to take action against foreign trawler 
fleets (ibid.) 
Wright (2001) argues that the federal response to their demands was two-pronged. 
Firstly, the Canadian government began negotiating with European fishing nations in an 
effort to broker an agreement at the intemationallevel. While such multilateral 
negotiations are ongoing to this day, Newfoundland fishers and politicians have often 
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complained that they have done little to conserve fish stocks. Some have claimed that the 
protection of Atlantic fish stocks has often been sacrificed in order to preserve positive 
trade relationships for other Canadian commodities, such as wheat and steel (Harris 1998). 
The other federal strategy was to invest in new technologies and skills development 
within the fishery to make the Canadian fleet more competitive with their foreign 
counterparts (Wright 2001 ). 
Prior to joining Canada, most rural Newfoundland fishers lacked the capital and 
infrastructure needed to travel great distances from shore. 51 This began to change after 
confederation. The major aim of federal policy in the 1960s was to accelerate the 
development of a fleet of offshore trawlers. The government also encouraged the building 
of"midshore" draggers, longliners, and seiners, usually between 40 and 65 feet in length. 
At the same time, both the federal and provincial governments actively discouraged the 
small-boat inshore fishery (generally consisting of vessels under 35 feet in length) and the 
seasonal cycle of subsistence practices that went along with it (Andersen 1979; Sinclair 
1985; Omohundro 1994; Apostle et al. 1998; Wright 2001; Sider 2003). On land, 
continued efforts were made to replace the supposedly "backward" practice of 
community-based salt fish production with modern fresh and frozen fish processing 
plants, and Fordist "assembly line" production methods (Wright 2001, Sider 2003). 
In the years that followed, both foreign and Canadian cod harvests on the Grand 
Banks soared, reaching their combined historic peak at about 810,000 metric tons in 1968. 
This so-called "killer spike" has been identified by some as a major contributor to the 
122 
-~~---------------------~------------ ---
eventual collapse of cod and other groundfish stocks more than two decades later 
(Hutchings 1999). Despite the bolstering of the Canadian fleet, the vast majority of the 
1968 catch was still non-Canadian. Even that which was caught by the Canadian fleet 
tended to be caught by vessels based outside ofNewfoundland (Wright 2001). In 1962, 
the Canadian offshore fleet consisted of 272 vessels and only thirty-three were based in 
the province (ibid: I 05-6). This would begin to change in the decades that followed. 
The further development and expansion of the Newfoundland fishery would 
require that more people be concentrated in larger population centres, in order to provide 
inexpensive labour for the growing numbers of fish processing plants that were to be built 
in the province. This also fit with the high modernist vision ofNewfoundland's Premier 
Joseph R. (Joey) Smallwood. Smallwood was the central figure in Newfoundland politics 
during the thirty years that followed confederation, retaining his hold on power through 
six consecutive provincial elections between 1949 and 1972 (Matthews 1983). 
Smallwood soon became renowned for his dynamic oratory style, although he had no 
previous political experience. Prior to becoming Premier, he had worked as a journalist, 
author, publisher, union organizer, broadcaster, and pig farmer at various points in his life 
(MacGregor 2003a). Smallwood's governing philosophy was characterized by the belief 
that Newfoundland must "develop or perish" and he promised to single-handedly "drag 
Newfoundlanders kicking and screaming into the twentieth century" (Matthews 1987). In 
keeping with this vision, Smallwood was responsible for investing heavily in the building 
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of new roads and communications infrastructure and for enacting new laws to restrict 
subsistence activities. 
Beginning in the 1950s Smallwood supported a series of rural resettlement 
programs designed primarily to move people away from the inshore fishery and into 
larger population centres. While many rural Newfoundlanders had resettled voluntarily in 
the years following confederation in order to gain better access to government services, 
the Smallwood government saw a need to take steps to accelerate this trend. In addition to 
reshaping the fishery, resettlement was seen as a way of reducing the costs associated 
with administering health, educational, and social programs and providing various 
services (telephone access, electricity, running water and sewers, etc.) to a widely 
dispersed rural population. Resettlement was also viewed as a tool for stimulating the 
development of other land-based industries (Iverson and Matthews 1968; Matthews 1983; 
Maritime History Archive 2005). 
In 1954, the provincial Department of Welfare unveiled what it called the 
"Centralization Program" (Mathews 1983: 120). The progran1 initially promised to pay 
people' s moving costs, but this was soon replaced by a single lump sun1 payment for each 
family that agreed to move. In the early stages of the program, the payments were only 
about $150 per family, but this was gradually raised over time, reaching a high of about 
$600 per family (Maritime History Archive 2005). While this may not seem like much by 
contemporary standards, it is worth noting that most fishers made less than $900 per year 
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at the time (ibid.). By the end of the program, 110 communities across Newfoundland had 
been resettled (Matthews 1987; Tulk 1997, 91). 
In 1965, the Centralization Program was replaced by a joint federal-provincial 
"Fisheries Household Resettlement Program," which was administered by the federal 
Department of Fisheries (Wright 200 l ). The program offered significantly higher 
payments than had been the case in previous years. Families that moved would receive 
$1000, plus an additional $200 for each member of the household (Matthews 1987). This 
time, however, payments would only be issued if a number of additional conditions were 
satisfied. Firstly, there was a requirement that 90 percent of a town's residents must sign a 
petition indicating their willingness to leave. This was later reduced to 75 percent 
(Matthews 1983: 121 ). Secondly, in order to receive their payments, families had to move 
to a community that had been designated by the government as a "growth centre" 
(Maritime History Archive 2005). Many of these "growth centres" were sites that had 
been targeted for industrial development projects of various kinds, such as fish processing 
plants and natural resource processing facilities. He was also responsible for securing 
foreign capital to assist with the development of a variety of manufacturing businesses in 
rural Newfoundland, creating products as diverse as boots, cement, chocolate bars, and 
sports equipment (Matthews 1983; Letto 1998). While campaigning for re-election, 
Smallwood reportedly proclaimed repeatedly that there would be so many jobs after 
resettlement that fishers could feel free to "burn their boats" (Thurston 1982). 
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While Smallwood's efforts to stimulate land-based economic development in the 
years after resettlement did produce some successful projects, the number of long-term 
jobs created through these initiatives was far smaller than had been hoped for. Most of the 
manufacturing businesses quickly went bankrupt, due in part to their distance from export 
markets and suppliers of raw materials and stiff competition from companies in mainland 
Canada (House 1998; Wright 2003). In the words ofNewfoundlandjournalist and orator 
Rex Murphy, "Mr. Smallwood' s rubber-boot factory and hockey-stick plant have passed 
generously into that region of myth where .. . princesses kiss toads ... Mr. Smallwood 
specialized in toads that stayed toads" (Murphy 1999: 3). Smallwood has, furthermore, 
been criticized for "giving away" resources to companies in exchange for short term 
employment and failing to fully consider the province's long-term interests (Alexander 
1983; Wright 2003). 
The resettlement program itself has also faced severe criticism. Some have argued 
that the petition system was deeply flawed, because it sometimes led to coercion and 
intimidation within bitterly divided communities (Matthews 1983). Another commonly 
cited problem was that the program allowed young unmarried people who had already 
moved away from the community to receive compensation payments as well, if they 
signed the petition and helped to tip the balance in favour of resettlement (ibid.). This 
provision sometimes had the effect of dividing families. 
In total, the two programs resulted in the abandonment of more than 300 
communities with a total population of about 28,000 people. This represented about one 
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quarter of all the communities in Newfoundland and about ten percent of the province's 
residents (Maritime History Archive 2005). 52 A final program called the Federal-
Provincial Resettlement Program ran from 1970 to 1975, resulting in the relocation of 
another twenty-nine communities. 
From the point of view of Smallwood and other provincial and federal planners, 
these towns were considered too remote and were therefore seen as an impediment to the 
modernist project they envisioned for the province. By concentrating people in larger 
centres they believed that they could wield much greater control over the way in which 
the provincial economy developed. Government reports on the program at the time tended 
to emphasize that they were just accelerating the "normal and ongoing process of 
migration" (Matthews 1983: 122). This portrayal, of course, downplayed the fact that the 
types of migrations that were required were specifically designed to serve the broader 
political and economic objectives of the federal and provincial governments. As James 
Scott notes, historically, the stated rationale for resettlement schemes throughout the 
world was: 
. . . almost always couched in the discourse of orderly development and 
social services (such as the provision of health clinics, sanitation, adequate 
housing, education, clean water, and infrastructure). The public rhetoric 
was not intentionally insincere; it was, however, misleadingly silent about 
the manifold ways in which orderly development of this kind served 
important goals of appropriation, security, and political hegemony that 
could not have been met through autonomous frontier settlement" (1998: 
191). 
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According to Scott, newly resettled communities are particularly susceptible to 
hierarchical management. Prior to resettlement, he argues, such groups have "their own 
unique histories, social ties, mythology, and capacity for joint action." By contrast, "a 
new community is ... a community demobilized, and hence a community more amenable 
to control from above and outside" (ibid: 191).53 
The resettlement era brought about significant changes within the fishery, as the 
federal and provincial governments continued to push toward a more streamlined industry, 
characterized by larger boats and an intensification of frozen fish production. Beginning 
in the late 1960s, both levels of government began providing loans to many fishers across 
Newfoundland to enable them to upgrade to larger "midshore" vessels between 35 and 65 
feet in length, such as long liners and Danish seiners (House 1988: 192-193). As a result, 
the Newfoundland "midshore" fleet grew rapidly from about 400 vessels in 1968 to about 
1200 in 1981 (Wright 2001: 152). The offshore fishery was expanded considerably in this 
period as well. 
The inshore fishery was less prosperous in the years after confederation. The 
introduction of seasonal Employment Insurance for fishers in 1957 did, however, make it 
possible for many inshore fishers t<? survive through the winter, provided that they were 
able to secure about three months of paid employment each year (Wright 2001 ). In the 
fall and winter many inshore fishing families were also able to continue to supplement 
their incomes with subsistence activities like hunting, berry picking and wood cutting 
(Omohundro 1994). Most rural communities also contained ample expertise to allow 
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them to build and maintain their own homes, and repair their own clothing, boats, fishing 
gear and, in later years, cars (House 1988: 197). 
Inshore fishers were further aided by the introduction of gillnets in the early 1960s. 
A gillnet is "a rectangular net, usually 50 fathoms long, which hung in a straight line in 
the water. As the fish swam through the net, they were caught by their gills in the mesh" 
(Wright 2001: 142). Unlike some other gear types, such as cod traps, gillnets can be 
"easily moved to take advantage of the changing migration patterns of cod" (ibid: 142). 
Gillnets dramatically increased the efficiency of the inshore fishery and were soon in 
wide use throughout Newfoundland (ibid.). Gillnets do, however, have one major 
disadvantage. In bad weather, gillnets can sometimes become dislodged from the ocean 
floor and get lost at sea. These "ghost nets" are extremely destructive, because they can 
continue fishing for years after they have been lost. 
In 1977 concerns about overfishing by foreign trawlers prompted Canada to 
follow other states in unilaterally extending its exclusive economic zone to include all 
waters within two hundred nautical miles of its coastline. While this move enclosed much 
of what had been international waters under Canadian jurisdiction, it left exposed the so-
called "nose" and "tail" of the Grand Bartles and the Flemish Cap, all of which are now 
understood to be critical spawning and nursery areas. 
Shortly thereafter, a new Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) was created 
by the Canadian federal govenunent, with the stated goal of applying "rational scientific 
management" to the Atlantic fishery (McCay and Finlayson 1995: 9). DFO adopted a 
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hierarchical approach to fisheries management, in which small-scale inshore harvesters 
were given no formal input into key policy decisions (Finlayson 1994; Cadigan 2001; 
Power 2005). Quotas for both the offshore and inshore cod fisheries were based on 
scientific stock assessments, which relied exclusively on information obtained from large 
offshore fishing and processing companies (Cadigan 2001 ). These companies were seen 
as preferable consultants because they could provide scientists with quantitative data that 
could be easily assimilated into stock assessment models (Finlayson 1994; Hutchings et 
al. 2002). By contrast, the knowledge of inshore harvesters tended to be portrayed as 
anecdotal, and was granted little credence (Finlayson 1994; Power 2005). 
The faith that DFO fisheries managers had in their capacity to predict events in 
the biophysical world and use this knowledge to drive economic development is a clear 
illustration of"high modernism." Scott (1998) argues that managerial solutions rooted in 
high modernism are often presented as being technical rather than moral or political 
interventions. Building on Scott's work, Arun Agrawal (2005) has noted that the turn of 
the twentieth century saw the emergence of new technologies for representing nature 
which granted an almost unquestionable authority to resource managers. He writes: 
"Statistics, maps, numerical tables, and their collation in specific formats can become the 
basis for producing new forms of knowledge that make some actions seem naturally more 
appropriate than others ... " (2005: 224 ). Similarly, Palsson (1998), who studied fisheries 
research in Iceland, argued that modernist fisheries management suggested that cod 
populations were fully observable, as though they were being studied in an aquarium. 
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This simplistic characterization, however, drew attention away from the fundamental 
uncertainties and complexities that were inescapably part of the fisheries management 
enterprise. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, these very uncertainties would be 
made more explicit in the management models that emerged in subsequent decades, 
which were more heavily influenced by the so-called "new ecology" and its focus on 
complex, non-linear systems. 
Frozen cod production was expanded significantly on the wave of optimism that 
was stimulated by the extension of the offshore boundary. So too was the harvesting of 
other species. Despite protests from the Fish, Food and Allied Workers Union (FFAW), 
DFO expanded the dragger fishery during the following decade and, for the first time in 
several decades, new licences were issued in the small-boat inshore fishery as well (Felt 
and Locke 1995). While there were only 13,736 registered full-time inshore harvesters on 
the island in 1961 , this number had almost tripled to 3 3,640 by 1980 (Crowley 1999). 54 
Much ofthis increase came after 1977 (Schrank et al. 1992; Hamilton and Seyfrit 1994). 
In the late 70s and early 80s, Canadian cod harvests soared. The extension of the 
offshore boundary served to encourage the intensification of domestic harvesting since, 
under international law, any portion of the Total Allowable Catch that the Canadian fleet 
could not land had to be given to foreign nations which had traditionally fished within the 
200 mile limit (Finlayson 1994; Bavington 2005). The economic boom created by these 
developments allowed unprecedented numbers of people to find employment in 
processing plants. 
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The enonnous demand for labour in the processing sector was also responsible for 
the entry of growing numbers of women into the wage labour force. Prior to that point, 
both women and children had played prominent roles in the processing and curing of salt 
fish, but men tended to be the ones who caught the fish and did business with merchants 
(Porter 1993; Neis 1999a). Several scholars have shown that this was part of a relatively 
firmly entrenched gendered division of labour in rural Newfoundland that had developed 
in coastal communities in most areas of the province during nineteenth and the first half 
of the twentieth century (Wadel 1973; Porter 1993; Williams 1996; Neis 1999a; Power 
2005). Williams notes that, in addition to fishing, men were typically responsible for: 
fishing, mending gear, hunting and trapping, woodswork and carpentry, whereas women 
"did most of the farming," "produced food and clothing," and "looked after the children 
and ailing family members" (1996: 7). She adds: "After men dug the gardens, women 
planted, weeded and harvested. They also picked berries, which in some areas could be 
traded to merchants. They dried and bottled the berries and vegetables, made daily 
batches of bread and served at least four meals a day. They made and re-made clothing, 
bedding and rugs, sawed and chopped firewood and tended the animals" (Ibid. 7). They 
also did various forms of unpaid work such as "bookkeeping, dealing with suppliers and 
cooking for fishing crews" (Ibid. 19). While several authors have noted that there were 
exceptions to these general pattems in some areas (Williams 1996; Grzetic 2004; Power 
2005) the vast majority of the wage labour opportunities that were available prior to the 
1970s were regarded as the exclusive purview of men (Williams 1996). 
132 
After 1977, many more women found employment in the fish processing industry. 
Some also began working as crewpersons on inshore fishing vessels, which were 
generally operated by their husbands or partners (Williams 1996; Grzetic 2004; Power 
2005). The latter strategy kept money within the family unit, but was not widely practiced 
in some areas. This is likely because, prior to the 1980s, it was not advantageous to do so, 
because it would make it more difficult for one or both family members to qualify for 
Employment Insurance (Power 2005: 170). 
While processing plants provided women with independent wages, for the most 
part they were given lower status positions and paid less than their male counterparts 
(Fishery Research Group 1986; Neis and Williams 1987; Porter 1993; Williams 1996; 
Neis 1999a Power 2005). Furthermore, in most areas, women were employed in direct 
processing operations, as trimmers, packers, and machine operators, and were therefore 
subject to higher degrees of surveillance from floor managers (Fishery Research Group 
1986; Williams 1996; Power 2005). Accordingly, while this boom period did provide 
new opportunities, the restructuring of the industry during this era also contributed to the 
formation of new gender, as well as class divisions within many coastal towns (Sinclair 
1985; Williams 1996; Palmer and Sinclair 1997; Neis 1999a; Power 2005). 
The strategy of rapidly expanding the offshore fishing and processing sectors 
ultimately proved to be problematic. Many of the larger processing companies in the 
province had borrowed heavily to finance this expansion, and were ultimately brought to 
the brink of bankruptcy by the early 1980s as a result of high interest rates and a growing 
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recession (Fishery Research Group 1986; Wright 2001 ). In 1982, the federal government 
appointed the Kirby Task Force to examine the industry and make recommendations 
about how to move forward. They ultimately recommended a major realignment of the 
fishery to make it more consistent with the broader goals of "efficiency, consolidation, 
and centralization" (Wright 2001: 153). In response to these conclusions, the federal and 
provincial governments paid $233.5 million to buy up several companies, including 
Fishery Products Limited, The Lake Group, and John Penney and Sons and merge them 
into a large crown corporation which was called "Fishery Products International" or FPI 
(ibid: 153). The company was later re-privatized in 1987. Similar actions were taken in 
Nova Scotia, to create National Sea Products Ltd. , which went on to produce the very 
successful High Liner brand of frozen seafood. Together these two companies would 
dominate the offshore fishery in Atlantic Canada in the decade that followed (House 1988: 
185). This change had a particularly significant impact in Placentia Bay and Fortune Bay, 
where both companies had a strong presence. 
By the end of the decade, however, the quantitative models of fisheries managers 
proved to be inadequate. They were based on a simple equilibrium-based science that 
paid insufficient attention to the ways in which habitat destruction, ecological fluctuations, 
and unreported human actions affected the abundance of particular species. Furthermore, 
managers did not heed the warnings of inshore harvesters in several different bays on the 
northeast coast of the island, who complained about striking declines in their catch rates 
throughout the 1980s (Finlayson 1994). As discussed in earlier chapters, this exclusion of 
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fishers from the policy process stands in stark contrast to more recent UN-inspired oceans 
governance approaches, such as the one outlined in the Oceans Act, Canada's Oceans 
Strategy and Canada's Oceans Action Plan, in which it is openly stated that the 
knowledge of resource users should be incorporated into the management enterprise. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, dwindling catches had become apparent in 
Newfoundland's offshore fishery as well and it was becoming undeniable that stocks in 
many areas were in serious trouble (Wright 2001). In the face of mounting evidence that 
they were in the throes of a full-fledged environmental disaster, DFO decided to shut 
down the fishery on Newfoundland's north and east coasts and along the coast of 
Labrador in 1992 to give cod stocks time to recover (Finlayson 1994, McGuire 1997). 
This was followed by further closures along the island's west and south coasts in 1993. 
Seventeen years after the initial declaration of the moratorium, there is little 
evidence of a cod recovery. While the commercial fishery reopened on a small scale in 
some areas along Newfoundland's south coast in 1998, and some small commercial 
quotas have been issued on the west coast as well, the commercial cod fishery has 
remained closed in most areas of the province. A recent study concluded that spawning 
stock biomass (the reproductively active part of the stock) for the "Atlantic cod" stock off 
the east coast of Newfoundland and Labrador has been reduced by more than ninety-nine 
percent since the early 1960s (Hutchings 2004). 
Nearly fourteen years after the cod moratorium was declared, there is still 
considerable disagreement about what exactly went wrong. Despite being one ofthe most 
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intensively studied wild fisheries in the world, there remain a variety of competing 
hypotheses about what factor, or combination of factors, led to the collapse. While most 
scholars agree that domestic and foreign overfishing played a very predominant role in 
leading to the crash, there is also some evidence to suggest that other forces may have 
played a contributing role as well, including cooling water temperatures caused by 
melting polar ice caps in the Arctic, a decline in key food species such as capelin due to 
overfishing, increasing predation from a booming harp seal herd, or habitat destruction 
caused by decades of seismic blasting by the offshore petroleum industry. This diversity 
of explanations highlights the inherent unpredictability of ocean processes and the 
immense difficulty of predicting their behaviour, or even definitively explaining how they 
have behaved in the past. As later chapters will demonstrate, this very uncertainty has 
sometimes been used rhetorically in support of differing political agendas, such as those 
advocating for or against the commercial seal hunt, the offshore oil industry or particular 
fishing technologies (Davis 2000; Power 2005). 
4. 7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated that social and economic networks which stretched 
far beyond the shores of Newfoundland had a tremendous impact in shaping and 
transforming the relationship between resident peoples and marine resources over time. 
While the production of salt fish for distant markets remained the economic anchor of the 
region for almost 500 years, the lives of the people catching and curing those fish were 
altered significantly by forces that were largely not of their own making. 
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The survival of most rural residents in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
necessitated that they retain a high degree of flexibility in adapting to broader social, 
economic and environmental changes. As a result, most households supplemented fishing 
with a wide range of land-based subsistence practices. When it was deemed advantageous 
to do so, some men would travel far from home to work as labourers in larger fishing, 
lumbering, mining, construction, or manufacturing operations. In many cases, however, 
these positions were temporary. Most were taken up during the winter off season or 
during periods when commercial fish species were less abundant. The common property 
nature of marine resources meant that rural families knew that they could always opt to 
return to the fishery to earn a living at a later time if they deemed it advantageous to do so. 
In this sense, it is fair to say that fishing, subsistence activities, and wage labour were not 
mutually exclusive, but were rather part of a continuum with many families taking 
advantage of all three of these strategies at different points in time. 
After the 1930s this dynamic interplay between land and sea-based economic 
activities was increasingly undermined by the high modernist ambitions of central 
planners. Government policies increasingly sought to impose a strict division between 
land and sea-based economic practices, as concerted efforts were made to transform 
coastal residents from single commodity producers into wage labourers, both within the 
fishery and in new land-based industries (Matthews 1983; Sinclair 1985; Palmer and 
Sinclair 1997). Increasingly, use of the ocean was restricted to persons employed in the 
commercial fishing sector. This gradually contributed to the formation of much firmer 
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distinctions between fishers and non-fishers than had ever been the case in previous eras. 
Within the fishery, efforts were made to "modernize" the industry by discouraging the 
small boat fishery and the production of salt fish and pushing toward the mass production 
of frozen fish for the North American market. This strategy, in combination with heavy 
fishing pressure from foreign fleets , ultimately backfired, contributing to the biological 
collapse of cod stocks in most areas of the province and the loss of thousands of jobs. In 
the aftermath of this crisis, a major restructuring of the Newfoundland fishing industry 
took shape, which would lead to even greater inequalities within many coastal 
communities. These changes are discussed in detail in the following two chapters. 
I 
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Chapter 5 The Great Divide: The Emergence of a New Fishery 
This chapter explores the ways in which the Newfoundland inshore fishery was 
restructured in the wake of the 1992 cod moratorium, focusing particularly on the 
ongoing efforts by federal regulators to bring about a more "responsible" fishing industry 
that is less reliant on state support. It begins by drawing upon interviews with fish 
harvesters, fish processors, and government employees in describing the debates that 
emerged in the aftermath of the cod moratorium and outlining the restructuring process 
that followed. It then discusses the lucrative crab fishery that developed in the aftermath 
of the cod collapse and the political struggles that have emerged over the future direction 
of that sector. 
5.1 In the Aftermath of a Disaster 
The announcement of the cod moratorium prompted a dramatic overhaul of the 
fishing industry (Power 2005). While the impact was felt throughout Atlantic Canada, 
nowhere was it more severe than in the rural coastal communities ofNewfoundland and 
Labrador, where cod had remained the primary income generator for many households. 
To compensate the more than thirty thousand fishers and processing plant workers in the 
province who were directly affected by the closure, along with ten thousand more living 
in other parts of Atlantic Canada, the federal government unveiled the "Northern Cod 
Adjustment and Recovery Program" (NCARP) in 1992 and the "Atlantic Groundfish 
Adjustment Program" (AGAP) in 1993 (Williams 1996). The programs were intended to 
provide short-term income support to fishers and plant workers and offer fishing licence 
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buybacks and retraining programs for those individuals willing to move into new 
professions (Neis 1996; Sinclair eta!. 1999; Woodrow 1996). Attendance in retraining 
programs was not compulsory, however, and they did not draw as many people as had 
been anticipated (Williams 1996; Davis 2006). 
When, by 1994, cod stocks had shown no signs of rebounding, the moratorium 
was extended indefinitely. NCARP and AGAP were replaced by a five-year, 1.9 billion 
dollar restructuring program called "The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy" or TAGS (Millich 
1999). In addition to providing new funding for licence buy-backs and early retirement 
programs, TAGS placed a stronger emphasis on retraining people to work in new 
professions. The "active programming" approach ofTAGS was outlined in a brochure 
entitled "Helping People Help Themselves," which was widely distributed to affected 
individuals in May of 1994 (Human Resources Development Canada 1994). It promised a 
more aggressive attempt to move people out of the fishing industry and prepare them to 
compete in a "diversified and changing labour market" (ibid.). Income support was 
committed for between two and five years, depending on an individual's years of 
experience and degree of dependence on cod (ibid.). 55 This time, however, bi-weekly 
payments were made contingent on the agreement of workers to "participate actively" in 
"labour market adjustment" programs (Williams 1996). 
The labour market adjustment component of TAGS was intended to provide 
individuals with: "career plmming and counselling; mobility assistance and support for re-
employment; measures to prepare individuals for work such as literacy and basic skills 
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training; and measures designed to enhance employment opportunities such as support for 
entrepreneurship, restoration of the environment and other community activities" (Human 
Resources Development Canada 1994). Individuals were expected to meet with 
designated career planning and employment counsellors to help them to "assess 
individual employment possibilities, set goals and develop individual action plans" (ibid.). 
They were also encouraged to take part in a career development program entitled 
"Improving Your Odds," which offered a variety of eight-week training courses in rural 
communities. The courses available varied by region, but common options included: 
carpentry, hair styling, small engine repair, tailoring, and entrepreneurship. TAGS 
recipients could also receive support if they decided to take designated college or 
university courses or complete their high school diplomas. Finally, the program provided 
incentives for people who were willing to move to more prosperous provinces in search 
of work by offering short-term financial assistance to partially offset the cost of"seeking 
work, house-hunting and permanent relocation" (ibid.). In my previous work, I have 
argued that TAGS may be best understood as a bridge between welfare state-era policies 
and the new, more overtly neoliberal approach that was emerging during the period, 
noting: "While TAGS did commit to several years of financial support, it was explicitly 
designed to persuade people to abandon the lives they had known before and accept a 
changing economic, political and ecological reality" (Davis 2006: 523). While many 
initially resisted this pressure, many fishing communities have experienced steadily 
increasing rates of outmigration since the moratorium (Ommer and Sinclair 2000). 
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Sider has argued that the economic restructuring that occurred in the aftermath of 
the cod moratorium brought about a "crisis of social reproduction" in rural fishing 
communities (2003: 312). He contends that the cultural and material continuity of these 
places was gradually undermined by a political and economic system that is literally 
pulling families and communities apart, through widening class divisions, longer trips at 
sea, and the chronic exporting of people of working age as seasonal or permanent 
migratory labourers. In this new predicament, Sider suggests that: " ... people must live 
across and often simultaneously against, the ruptures between their present situation and 
their past values, their past social relations, their own culture" (ibid: 57, emphasis in 
original). 
TAGS was strongly criticized in many parts ofrural Newfoundland for 
encouraging people to move away to find employment and not working harder to create 
permanent jobs in their communities (Williams 1996). A number of researchers have 
found that many people were very reluctant to relocate because they deemed themselves 
to be poorly positioned to start over again (Williams 1996; Power 2005; Davis 2006). In 
my previous research, I have noted that: 
Most of those employed in the fishery were in their late thirties, forties, and fifties; 
had a limited amount of formal education and few transferable job skills; owned 
their own homes; had school-age children; and had deep historical ties to the 
people, land and seascapes, and traditions of the area. The vast majority of persons 
employed in the inshore fishery had family connections to the sea that stretched 
back multiple generations. Many saw retraining programs as a farce, because they 
had no intention of moving and, even if they did, they doubted they would be able 
to find satisfying work elsewhere (Davis 2006: 51 0). 
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Several anthropological and sociological studies conducted during the TAGS era found 
that the state of chronic underemployment that resulted from the fishery restructuring 
process frequently contributed to various secondary problems in many areas, including 
increased rates of alcohol consumption and gambling (Davis 2006), growing frustration 
and anger (Williams 1996), health problems (Neis and Grzetic 2001 ), and increased strain 
on family relationships (Power 2005). Some of these problems were due to the fact that 
displaced people had a great deal of extra time on their hands and were becoming fed up 
with spending most of their time at home. There were also growing tensions within many 
coastal towns about perceived injustices over who did and did not qualify for TAGS 
payments (Williams 1996; Neis and Grzetic 2001; Power 2005) and over the fact that 
fishers (most of whom were men) tended to receive higher payments over a longer 
duration than did fish processing plant workers (most of whom were women) (Williams 
1996; Neis and Grzetic 2001; Power 2005) 
A number of studies that were carried out after the declaration of the moratorium 
have, furthem1ore, reported that it also was common for rural Newfoundlanders to blame 
the federal government for the collapse of the cod stocks, and many resented the fact that 
they were being asked to pay the price for the mistakes of fisheries managers (Steele, 
Andersen and Green 1992; Finlayson 1994; Palmer 1995; Williams 1996; Woodrow 1996; 
Palmer and Sinclair 1997; Davis 2000, 2006; Power 2005). The government-supported 
push toward industrialization and overcapitalization in the fisheries was also frequently 
presented as the major cause of the problem (Palmer 1995; Power 2005). Many inshore 
143 
fishers also complained that large fishing and processing companies like Fisheries 
Products International and National Sea Products, with their extensive use of offshore 
trawlers, were responsible for the collapse, because they fished during the spawning 
period, discarded undersized fish, and damaged the ecology of the ocean floor (Palmer 
1995; Williams 1996). Another source of hostility among many small boat fishers was the 
unwillingness of Department of Fisheries and Oceans managers to seek input from small-
scale regional fishing operations in conducting their stock assessments during the 1980s 
(Neis 1999b; Cadigan 2001; Murray et al2005; Power 2005). 
5.2 Envisioning the Fishery of the Future 
The declaration of the moratorium sparked heated debates about the direction that 
a restructured fishing industry should take in the future (McCay 1999). In many respects 
these debates can be understood as the continuation of longstanding philosophical 
differences that pre-dated the decline of cod stocks, pitting those promoting a highly 
capitalized and market-regulated corporate fishery against those advocating a smaller-
scale, community-based coastal fishery (Cadigan 2001). 
In 1994, the Fisheries Council of Canada (FCC), a lobby group representing the 
largest fish processing companies in Canada, released a report entitled "Building a 
Fishery That Works: A Vision for the Atlantic Fisheries." In it, they argued that, 
Canadian fisheries policy should abandon the goal of managing fisheries in such a way as 
to maximize employment benefits for individuals living in small coastal communities. 
The report claimed that this misguided sentiment had dominated fisheries policies since 
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the late 1970s and was epitomized by a 1978 speech delivered by then Minister of 
Fisheries Romeo LeBlanc, shortly after Canada had unilaterally extended its exclusive 
economic zone. In the speech, LeBlanc stated: 
Measuring the 200-mile limit as a belt from the coast, we must measure its 
benefits first of all in relation to those living on the coast. When we divide 
up those few million tons of fish, the coastal communities of inshore and 
nearshore fishermen must have first claim ... .Instead of starting with an 
offshore, large vessel development that cuts off future inshore growth, we 
must buildji-om the independentjleet up andfrom the coast out. We must 
give inshore and nearshore fishermen a greater and an assured amount of 
fish. As he begins making money, he can move up to vessels that extend 
his mobility, increase his catches, and lengthen his working season. 
(LeBlanc 1978, referenced in Fisheries Council of Canada 1994, 3, 
emphasis in original). 
LeBlanc' s vision was reflected in two federal policies that came into effect during 
this era: the "Fleet Separation Policy" and the "Owner-Operator Policy." The former 
divided the Atlantic fishing fleet into three sectors, 'inshore' (vessels under 35 feet in 
length), ' midshore' (vessels between 35 and 65 feet in length) and ' offshore' (vessels 
over 65 feet in length). The latter stipulated that vessels in the inshore and midshore fleets 
were required to be owned by the independent harvesters who operated them. The 
combined effect of the two policies was to ensure that corporate entities, most notably 
fish processing companies, could not gain ownership of the inshore and midshore fleets 
and to ensure that control of those two sectors was left in the hands of independent fishers. 
No such restriction was placed on vessels over 65 feet in length, which were already 
owned predominately by processing companies (Fisheries Council of Canada 1994). 
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The FCC report blamed these two policies for leading to chronic instability in the 
industry, because they drove "a wedge between processors and supply making it 
cumbersome and expensive to secure raw material and unduly difficult to conduct 
effective marketing and production planning" (Fisheries Council of Canada 1994: 17). 
The incapacity of processors to obtain a secure and affordable supply of fish, the report 
argued, limited the capacity of the industry to realize its vision of producing higher value 
products and fishing "for dollars, not pounds" (ibid: 15). The group called for the fishery 
to be restructured so as to increase its net profitability to the Canadian economy and make 
it more environmentally sustainable. 
The report further criticized the historic refusal of the federal government to 
"resolve the common property characteristics of the fishery" and for allowing for the 
continuance of 'competitive' fisheries, in which a single quota is set for the entire fleet 
and harvesters are free to catch as much as they can before the fleet limit is reached (ibid: 
3). It argued that this creates a race between fishers to catch as much fish as they can as 
quickly as they can and this, in turn, further contributed to a "supply-driven" approach 
which reduced the quality of the fish and made it difficult for processors to respond to the 
demands of the market. Borrowing elements of the Tragedy of the Commons thesis 
discussed in Chapter One, the FCC repmi argued that management decisions should be 
"de-politicized" and encouraged the federal government to take active steps toward 
downsizing the number of people working in the fishing and processing sectors. This 
move, it suggested, could be facilitated by eliminating subsidies to unprofitable 
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operations, such as grants to processing plants in order to provide jobs in more isolated 
rural areas and offseason Employment Insurance benefits for seasonal inshore fishers 
(ibid.). 
As an alternative to the status quo, the FCC advocated the adoption of an 
individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, in which each individual fishing enterprise is 
allocated a fixed amount of fish, which they may catch at any time when the season is 
open. ITQs also provide fishing enterprises with the flexibility to land their catch at the 
times that are most profitable for them, rather than having to catch as many fish as they 
can when the season opens. Most significantly, they argued that an ITQ system would 
give fishers de facto property rights, which could be bought and sold freely on the market. 
This, they suggested, would eventually reduce the number of people who depend on the 
fishery, citing the examples of Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand, where ITQs have 
been used to bring about greater vertical integration in the industry. 56 
Although individual quotas or Enterprise Allocations (EAs) were introduced in 
the offshore sector in 1982 and were incorporated into most inshore and midshore 
fisheries in the 1990s, the latter were not made transferable (McCay 1999). 57 This meant 
that no single inshore or midshore licence-holder could receive multiple quotas in any 
single fishery. The granting of ITQs, by contrast, would give individuals who are 
struggling an opportunity to exit the industry easily by selling their quotas and gear to 
other independent operators, processing companies or private investors. This of course, 
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assumes that all fishers will behave as profit maximizers, and all will be willing to move 
out of the fishery for the right price (Palsson 1998; Cadigan 2001) 
The FCC report underscored the need for the fisheries management approach of 
the future to be driven not by "social objectives," but by the twin goals of sustainability 
and economic efficiency. It argued that the fishery should, furthermore, be governed by a 
new "industry-government alliance," characterized by "a move away from control and 
excessive regulation" (ibid: 12). It states: 
Rather than be frustrated, initiative and enterprise should be harnessed and 
channeled into productive, sustainable behaviour, using incentive based 
mechanisms . . .Industry must be more accountable and responsible for self-
management... It must play a greater role in self-policing and should 
contribute towards the cost of enforcement. .. Policy changes in these areas 
will afford government the opportunity to reduce its presence in the 
industry" (ibid: 12-13). 
What would soon emerge, the report suggests, is: "an economically sound, market-driven 
and self-managed industry offering investors secure and stable opportunities, and 
accountable to Canadians for the health of the resource and capable of making a net 
contribution to the Canadian economy" (ibid: vi). 
This vision of sustainable development, characterized by privatization of ocean 
resources and the self-regulation of resource users was a clear attempt to engage with the 
ideas that became institutionalized at the Rio Summit. By emphasizing the importance of 
exclusive access rights and participatory management institutions in bringing about a 
more economically and environmentally sustainable fishery, the FCC sought to steer the 
debate away from questions about social justice or the harmful impacts of trawling 
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technology and instead frame the problem as a case of too many fishers chasing too few 
fish. 
5.3 Professionalization and Exclusion 
The proposal laid out by the FCC was staunchly opposed by the Fish Food and 
Allied Workers Union (FFAW), which represents the vast majority of fishers and 
processing plant workers in Newfoundland and Labrador. The FF A W vowed to fight all 
efforts to do away with the Owner-Operator and Fleet Separation policies, stressing that 
they were vital to the maintenance of a just and equitable fishing industry. The union has 
repeatedly called upon government to recognize the important role played by the 
independent fishery in ensuring the survival of small coastal communities throughout 
Newfoundland and Labrador and in the rest of Atlantic Canada, and to resist pressures to 
let the industry fall entirely into corporate hands. 58 
The eventual response of the recently renamed "Fisheries and Oceans Canada" to 
these conflicting demands was to reaffirm the rights of independent fishers, but to do so 
in such a way as to ensure that those that remained in the fleet would be forced to assume 
greater responsibility for managing their own affairs (Neis and Williams 1997; Power 
2005; Ommer 2007). In 1994, the federal and provincial governments worked in 
consultation with the FF A W to develop a program of professional certification for 
independent fish harvesters in Newfoundland and Labrador. The primary goal ofthe 
program was "to reduce the number of fish harvesters by eliminating marginal or part-
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time fishers from the industry, theoretically retaining those who had the strongest 
attachment to it" (Clarke 2001: 137). 
In 1996, the provincial government passed the Professional Fish Harvesters Act, 
which required that all fishers be certified under a newly created Professional Fish 
Harvesters Certification Board. The Board divided fishers into three categories: 
Apprentice, Level I and Level II. These classifications were also formally recognized at 
the federal level through Fisheries and Oceans Canada's new "Commercial Fisheries 
Licencing Policy," which was released in the same year (Power 2005). Many experienced 
fishers were "grandfathered" into the program and were given "core status" as Level II 
fish harvesters. In order to be grandfathered in: "a fisherman had to have fished full time 
for seven qualifying years" and have "a minimum of $3,000 (and 75 percent of reported 
earned income) from fishing during three of the last four years of his qualifying period" 
(Schrank and Skoda 1999: 3). Fishers with core status were the only ones that were 
eligible to obtain newly issued fishing licences or to purchase existing licences from other 
fishers. It was also decided that the total number of core enterprises in the province would 
be capped at 5400. Anyone else wishing to obtain core status would have to wait for 
somebody else to retire (ibid.). 
So-called "part-time fish harvesters,"59 who did not satisfy all of the requirements 
for "core status" were designated as Level I harvesters and new entrants into the fishery 
were given "Apprentice" status. Level I and Apprentice harvesters were required to 
complete a series of training courses if they wanted to remain involved in the fishery. 
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Most of these courses are taught through Memorial University's Marine Institute in St. 
John's, which offers training modules dealing with a variety of issues, including: safety at 
sea, radio communications, and navigation. The Institute has also offered many of these 
courses at satellite campuses in other areas of the province. Harvesters wishing to obtain 
Level II status must also obtain the required nwnber of hours of sea time under the 
tutelage of a Level II harvester in order to advance to Level II status (Professional Fish 
Harvesters Certification Board n.d.). 
Those who did not proceed toward Level II status would be gradually fazed out of 
the industry. This has created a problem for some people, as obtaining Level II status can 
require a significant investment of time and money. Many of the required courses cost as 
much as regular university courses, and some students have to commute considerable 
distances in order to attend them. The high cost of obtaining the required training was 
decried by some of those I interviewed as clear evidence of the government' s intention to 
phase smaller enterprises out of the industry altogether. Some also argued that it was a 
deliberate attempt to create barriers that would deter young people in rural communities 
from choosing to pursue fishing as their livelihood. 60 
The introduction of the professionalization program also drew a number of 
protests from individuals who felt they had been wrongfully denied "core status." Some 
went as far as to hire lawyers to pursue their cases. Most Level II fishers that I 
interviewed acknowledged that there were a number of people who deserved core status, 
but had "fallen through the cracks" for a variety ofreasons.61 The most common problem 
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was that they did not possess enough receipts to prove they had sold the required amount 
of fish during the designated time period. This was often because they had fished with a 
family member or partner and had sold all or most of their fish in that person's name. 
Others had sought work outside of the fishery for a period of time during the early 1990s, 
since there were so few fish to be caught in many areas. These individuals were denied 
core status because they did not have enough landings over the period in question, even 
though some had fished extensively in previous years. In many of these cases, anger over 
the seemingly unjust criteria used to determine who did and did not receive core status 
built upon existing frustrations about who was and was not deemed to qualify for benefits 
under the NCARP, AGAP, and TAGS programs. Eligibility for these programs was based 
largely on grOtmdfish landings in the years immediately prior to the moratorium, so they 
excluded many of the same people (Power 2005). 
While most readily acknowledged that some people had been wrongfully denied 
core status, many core harvesters agreed with the sentiment that most of the benefits from 
any future fisheries be restricted to those who had the greatest ties to the industry. Several 
stated that most of those who were deprived of core status were so-called "moonlighters" 
who often worked at other jobs and only used their fishing licences during good seasons 
when the fishery was most profitable. Dan, who had worked with the FF A W in 
promoting the professionalization program explained: 
Probably for the whole history of the fishery in Newfoundland, the fishery 
was used as an employer of last resmi. I wonder whether some of these 
people were the type of fellas who when things were looking good and it 
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was easy to make a living in the fishery, they went fishing, but when times 
were tough, they went to greener pastures. 
Paul, who fished in Placentia Bay, echoed these sentiments: 
When all these new industries started up, it took a lot of people off the 
fishing grounds. A lot of people went ashore to get their twelve or fifteen 
dollars an hour. But I didn ' t go ashore to help build the oil refinery. I 
didn't go ashore to work in the fish plants. I didn ' t go ashore to build the 
Trans-Canada Highway. I didn 't go ashore to build the Hydro Lines across 
Newfoundland. I didn't ashore to go up and work in Churchill Falls or 
Labrador City. Instead, I became a professional at my trade and did pretty 
good at it too. 
Both men were of the strong belief that those who had only fished in certain years should 
be the ones who were excluded in order for the more established harvesters to make a 
better and more secure living, even though they both believed that this new system would 
lead to the eventual privatization of what was once a common resource. Similar findings 
were reported by Power (2005), based on her research on the Bonavista Peninsula in the 
mid to late 1 990s. 
5.4 The Rise of the Crab Fishery 
Although Fisheries and Oceans Canada managers did review the cases of some 
individuals who felt they had been wrongfully deprived of core status, very few decisions 
were reversed. The full significance of these exclusions would soon prove to be greater 
than anyone had anticipated. Most of those who were able to obtain core status were also 
able to gain access to the emerging inshore snow crab fishery, which quickly proved to be 
very lucrative. 
153 
~·~~~~·----- --
The first snow crab licences in Newfoundland were allocated in 1968, and the 
fishery expanded slowly in the decade that followed. Until the mid 1980s, the crab fishery 
was prosecuted by only about fifty medium to large sized boats, each of which was 
entitled to catch as much as they could when the season was open, provided that they did 
not use more than 800 traps at a time (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 1999). In the early 
1980s, crab landings and the catch per unit of effort in many areas of the province 
dropped significantly, but, as the decade progressed, there was evidence to suggest that 
stocks were making a significant recovery. Beginning in 1986 and continuing into the 
early 1990s, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans created a program to issue a number 
of new "supplementary" crab licences to fish harvesters across the province (McCay 
1999). These licences were restricted to individuals in the "midshore" longliner fleet 
(between 35 and 65 feet in length) and were intended to supplement income that had been 
lost due to the downturn or closure of other staple fisheries (ibid: 305). There was also a 
significant intensification of effort permitted in the original offshore fleet at this time. 
This period also brought a very significant regulatory change in the crab fishery. In the 
early 1990s, the DFO abandoned the competitive fleet quota system it had employed in 
the past and introduced an individual quota system, in which each licence holder would 
be allocated a fixed amount of crab each season rather than having to compete with others 
to catch as much as they could before the season closed (ibid: 1999). These were not 
ITQs, however, since in keeping with the owner-operator policy, fishing rights could not 
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be transferred away from the individually owned vessels with which they were associated 
(Ibid. 301). 
In McCay's (1999) study of the way in which this change came about on Fogo 
Island, on the northeast coast ofNewfoundland, she notes that this step toward privatizing 
access to the crab resource was a tlu·eat to the egalitarian ethic that had predominated 
within many fishing communities and, accordingly, faced some resistance. Many fishery 
workers did, however, see benefits to the change, since it allowed harvesters to refrain 
from fishing in dangerous weather conditions and would provide them with greater 
economic certainty from one season to the next. She also notes that, between 1992 and 
1995, she noticed a growing entrepreneurial perspective among many of the fishers she 
interacted with, as they began to see themselves as running individual fishing enterprises, 
rather than simply seeing themselves as members of a fishing family or community (Ibid. 
303). A similar conclusion was reached by Power (2005), who found that, on the 
Bonavista Peninsula, this period was characterized by the emergence of a new "lingo" 
among fishers that was deeply rooted in the tenets of neoliberal economics, with "words 
like enterprise, vessel and harvester replacing livelihood, boat, and fisherman" (2005: 
136). 
Inshore fishers remained largely excluded from the snow crab fishery until the 
mid 1990s. While some vessels of approximately 35 feet in length were eligible for 
supplementary licences in the 1980s, relatively few applied for them. At the time, crab 
prices remained quite low and few people deemed it worthwhile to invest the necessary 
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time and money that would be needed to prosecute what most believed to be a marginal 
fishery. Interviews in a number of different areas revealed that, at the time, crab was 
regarded by many in the inshore sector as a worthless pest, routinely getting tangled up in 
their fishing nets when they were pursuing other species. By the mid 1990s, however, 
their perspective had begun to change considerably. 
Within a couple of years of the moratorium, it became apparent that snow crab 
stocks, along with those of other shellfish species like northern shrimp, were booming in 
many areas. While the reasons for this transformation are unclear, an intriguing theory 
has been put forward. In an article published in the journal Science in 2005, Frank et al. 
argued that the explosion of shellfish populations just as large predator species like cod 
were declining is evidence of a "cascading effect" (Frank et al. 2005). The authors used 
data from the Scotian shelf, off the south coast ofNova Scotia, which is home to many of 
the same species that are found in ewfoundland waters. The authors claim that, as large 
predators like cod and haddock were removed from the system through overfishing, the 
species that they once preyed upon such as shellfish and smaller pelagic fish, have 
tended to increase in numbers. This, in turn, has had a trickle-down effect within the food 
chain. Zooplankton, the tiny animal species that are preyed upon by shellfish and smaller 
species of fish have experienced a decline of as much as 45 percent as their predators 
have grown in nwnbers. As a result, phytoplankton, the algae species that are consumed 
by zooplankton, have boomed. Frank et al. also note that the recent boom in the seal 
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population in the region is probably also related to the decline of large fish species, 
leading to reduced competition for food sources (ibid.). 
At the same time that this biological boom was taking place, snow crab boomed in 
economic value as well. A rapid and unexpected decline in the abundance of both snow 
crab and the larger and more highly valued king crab in Alaska's Bering Sea prompted a 
striking rise in the price paid for Newfoundland snow crab in the mid 1990s (MacNamara 
2002). Alaskan crab is the primary competitor for Newfoundland crab in the North 
American market, so the supply crisis brought on by its decline created a golden 
opportunity for Newfoundland processors and distributors. 
The coming together of these largely unpredictable ecological and economic 
forces also had a dramatic impact on the social dynamics within many coastal 
communities. Between 1992 and 1995, the average prices paid to Newfoundland 
harvesters for their snow crab multiplied six fold, from under $0.40 per pound to almost 
$2.50 per pound (Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador 1996). This brought 
unprecedented prosperity to those who held crab licences. Most of those in the offshore 
fleet had annual quotas of 300,000 pounds per year, while those in the supplementary 
fleet were landing about 100,000 pounds per year, depending on the area in which they 
were licensed to harvest. The sudden increase in price meant that these enterprises often 
increased their yearly income by hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. On 
the north and east coasts of the island, many people with larger boats also benefited from 
historic landings in the offshore fishery for northern shrimp. 
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This convergence of events created a widening gulf in prosperity between those 
who had access to these fisheries and those who did not. As many offshore and midshore 
operations with crab or shrimp licences prospered, those in the inshore fishery were 
struggling to make do through a combination of government support payments and 
smaller scale fisheries for much less profitable species like lobster, capelin, and lumpfish. 
Complaints about the injustice of this situation eventually persuaded Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada fisheries managers to issue a number of temporary snow crab permits to 
some inshore fish harvesters with core status in 1995. A lottery system was used to 
determine twenty-five harvesters in each of the major bays of the province who would 
qualify to receive a crab quota for that year. 
Prices remained strong that summer and this newfound access to crab stocks 
proved highly profitable for those who were selected. Dan, who was instrumental in 
lobbying for this change, described how this situation unfolded in his hometown in the 
north-western part of Conception Bay: 
We got a few permits first. Inshore fishermen fought and fought and 
fought to get those. We had nothing else. We knew that there was big 
money in the industry and there seemed to be a lot of crab, so why should 
the larger boats be the only ones getting to fish it while we were struggling 
just to hang on, fishing a bit of lump and a bit of lobster and whatever else 
we could get our hands on? Those guys who got the first permits hit the 
lottery big time. They got 11 ,000 pounds of crab at $2.50 per pound, so 
that's $27,000 bucks bang just like that. The guys here caught it in less 
than a week. That drove the rest of the fishermen crazy, myself included. 
Not that we didn't want those guys to have it, but we said ' Jesus, this is an 
opportunity.' 
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On the strength of the 1995 fishery , the inshore committee ofthe FF A W was 
successful in convincing FOC officials to distribute inshore snow crab permits more 
widely throughout the province for the 1996 season. This was done with the stipulation 
that the permits would remain temporary in nature and would have to be reissued 
annually, depending on the state of the resource. In order to be eligible to receive a snow 
crab permit, inshore fishers had to have core status and hold a groundfish licence. This 
last provision created further controversy in many coastal communities, because it meant 
that those individuals who had agreed to sell their groundfish licences back to FOC 
during the NCARP, AGAP, and TAGS progran1s along with those who had not been able 
to obtain core status, were excluded from the snow crab fishery altogether. 
At the time that the cod moratorium was declared, none of the inshore harvesters 
who opted to sell their groundfish licences could have possibly anticipated the 
consequences of their decision. Inshore groundfish licences usually sold for less than 
$25,000, depending on the fishing area in which the licence was held. That figure paled 
by comparison to the wealth that harvesters with inshore crab quotas would earn in the 
decade that followed. The frustration of many of these individuals was exacerbated by the 
decision to reopen the commercial cod fishery to core harvesters in Placentia and Fortune 
Bays in 1998, areas where the cod population seemed to be recovering. 
In the late 1990s, crab landings and prices remained high in most areas ofthe 
province. While permit holders still received much lower quotas than those with full or 
supplemental crab licences, inshore fi shers came to rely increasingly on the income 
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provided by crab. In many parts of Newfoundland, snow crab provided a higher 
percentage of their annual fishing incomes than all of the other species they fished 
combined. Because the permits continued to be temporary in nature, however, there was 
no guarantee that this source of income would continue to be there for them in the future. 
This situation changed in 1999, when the inshore committee of the FF A W was 
finally successful in having all temporary permits turned into permanent licences. This 
was the culmination of years of struggling to persuade Fisheries and Oceans Canada and 
representatives of larger fleet sectors within the FF A W that inshore harvesters should be 
given more secure access to a share of the crab resource. Dan, who was on the inshore 
committee and attended all of the meetings leading up to the final decision, described the 
unfolding of events as follows: 
We fought our way into the crab industry. We had our toe in the door and 
then we got up to a foot, and then in 1999 we finally broke the door down. 
There was a big conference in Gander to decide who was going to fish 
where and how everybody was going to participate. The original full time 
fleet and the supplementary fleet and the inshore guys were all at the table. 
We said, we're getting licences or nobody is catching one god damn pound 
of crab this year. We had arranged three busloads of people that came 
from the Southern Shore, Conception Bay and Trinity Bay. That wasn't all 
the fishermen there, but it was a lot of them. Then we had other guys that 
travelled from different areas by vehicle. So we had seven or eight 
hundred fishermen that showed up in the parking lot of the hotel wanting 
to talk to DF062 and the FFAW. We weren't all formal inshore committee 
members or anything, but we decided we were going to informally 
organize people and get a group to go down to have a show of force, 
because if it is just one or two guys speaking, the guys in the other fleets 
are going to say that we've got no backing. This way they could see them 
all standing right there outside the window. Right from then, my feeling is 
that we had won over the large fleets, the full-time and the large 
supplementary fleet. They didn ' t mind moving farther offshore. They 
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could go off as far as they wanted to, which they do now. As long as they 
got paid for their time and their fuel with an increase in quota, they were 
all for it. But the small supplementary fleet felt differently. Many of them 
had 35 and 36 foot boats of an older style. A lot of them had been fishing 
in the bay all their lives and weren't used to dealing with bad weather so 
they had apprehension about going that far from land. They put up a real 
fight. 
The issue was finally resolved at another meeting in St. John's a short time later. Dan 
explained: 
There must have been a thousand inshore guys that showed at the next 
meeting in St. John 's. They were very vocal then, because they knew this 
was the final decision about what would be done. Then, the fire 
department came and said there were too many people and they had to get 
out. But they had a chance to say what they wanted to the managers at 
DFO and to the other fleets. Before they left, one of the leaders of the 
group said: 'Now look, we're leaving, we're going to give you a chance to 
have your meeting, but you best make the right decision. Because, we've 
got a thousand people here, three hundred right here and another seven 
hundred downstairs and out in the parking lot. We're going to leave and let 
you guys discuss it, and you better do it right, because we don't have 
enough crab right now. We are only getting a four or five thousand pound 
quota and the TAGS program is finishing up, so we want something to 
allow us to make a living. If you don't do it right and you don't give us an 
opportunity, you guys are going to lose big time. You are going to lose 
your summer too. There are four thousand of us with permits. With our 
wives and husbands and children and grandchildren and parents and 
grandparents, we'll block every wharf in Newfoundland and nobody will 
be going anywhere.' 
Eventually this show of force proved successful in providing them with more secure 
access to the resource. Dan explained: 
The argument between the under 3 5 foot inshore fleet and the small 
supplementary fleet went on all afternoon. Eventually it got to the point 
where the other two fleets (offshore and large supplementary) were saying 
absolutely nothing. And finally an inshore guy stood up and said: 'The 
argument is between us and them. Now here's how we' re going to settle it. 
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There's two fleets over there that haven't spoken today. You heard the 
message this morning, but I think you may have forgotten it. If these guys 
don' t move and give us something close to what we' re looking for, you 
guys aren't getting anything either. You've got sixty-five foot boats to pay 
off and you're not landing anything this summer and they' ll be damned if 
you are.' So they kind of went white ... So the commissioner said, ' Well, 
we're going to take a break to let everybody have a chance to think it 
through. We (DFO) are ultimately going to make the decision, but we'd 
rather that you guys were on side than if you were not.' Then a couple of 
days later, we got the word from DFO that they were going to establish 
zones for the inshore fishery. The one thing that they said to us is 'You've 
got an inshore zone inside 22 miles. Go back and tell your fisherman that 
that is where you're living or dying, because there will be no more 
movement.' 
This notion of allocating a specific area for inshore harvesters, but implying that they 
would have to suffer the consequences in the event that the fishery proved to be 
unsustainable is reflective of the broader commitment to self-management and risk 
devolution that typically characterizes neoliberal approaches in fisheries management. In 
practice, the specific distance that these exclusive inshore zones extended from shore 
varied somewhat from one bay to the next, but the general concept was extended across 
the island. 
The entry of inshore harvesters brought with it a significant increase in the size of 
the overall harvest of snow crab. In 1992, prior to the entry of the inshore fleet, there 
were only 750 snow crab licence holders in Newfoundland and Labrador landing a total 
quota of about 10,000 metric tons of crab per year. By 2004, there were 3,411 licence 
holders in the province and snow crab landings in Atlantic Canada topped 100,000 metric 
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tons, with the lion's share of that (about 70,000 tons) landed in Newfoundland and 
Labrador (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005; Canadian Press 2006). 
Between 2000 and 2004, snow crab prices remained high. While the profits 
obtained by inshore crab harvesters represented a mere fraction of those enjoyed by the 
full time and supplementary fleets, they helped many harvesters to earn unprecedented 
incomes. The size of the quotas given to inshore harvesters at this time varied from one 
bay to the next, depending on the perceived health ofthe local crab stocks and the total 
number of licence holders in the area, but most received quotas of anywhere from 8,000 
pounds per year (Placentia Bay) to over 30,000 pounds per year (St. Mary's Bay). In most 
areas, inshore quotas were between 10,000 and 20,000 pounds. That usually translated to 
anywhere between $15,000 and $45,000 annually from the sale of crab alone, depending 
on the price. This was combined with income from fisheries for other species and from a 
newly restructured seasonal Employment Insurance program, which made it much easier 
for fishers to qualify for offseason payments due to their high earnings, even as it made it 
more difficult for fish processing workers and other seasonally employed workers in rural 
Newfoundland to qualify (Neis and Grzetic 2001). 
In 2000, concerns by Fisheries and Oceans Canada scientists that the overall 
abundance of crab in Newfoundland waters had fallen by as much as 40 percent in one 
year led the agency to cut the total allowable catch for the province by 17 percent, but 
quotas remained fairly constant in most areas in the years that followed (MacDonald 
2002). Although many inshore fishers that I interviewed in 2004 expressed concern that 
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snow crab populations were being harvested at unsustainable levels and could soon go the 
way of cod, many took advantage of their newfound prosperity to add additions to their 
homes or to purchase new trucks and snowmobiles. This economic boom also helped to 
drive interest in bars, gambling, and other pastimes (Davis 2006). Such displays of wealth 
created widely acknowledged tensions in many coastal communities, where numerous 
individuals did not have access to income from the snow crab fishery and were struggling 
to make ends meet (ibid.). 
One common strategy for women who were married to inshore fishers was to 
begin working as crewpersons, fishing alongside their husbands or partners (Grzetic 2004; 
Power 2005).63 This enabled families to hold onto more of the profits from the fishery 
than they would have been able to if they had hired someone from outside the family. It 
also made these families much more vulnerable to fluctuations in the prices or abundance 
of key species, such as lobster and lumpfish. 
5.5 The Responsibilization of the Inshore Crab Fishery 
The allocation of exclusive fishing zones for inshore harvesters is very much in 
keeping with the new philosophy governing Canadian ocean policies. While fishers were 
granted their long desired foothold in the crab fishery, this newfound access clearly came 
at a price. In granting new snow crab licences, Fisheries and Oceans Canada demanded 
that inshore harvesters assume greater responsibility for reducing the number of people 
who depend on the fishery. They were required to adopt a "self-rationalization program," 
wherein one fisher would be allowed to buy another one out and combine their two 
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quotas under a single licence. This was, in effect, a transferable quota system, in that it 
allowed for quotas to be bought and sold and created a mechanism through which 
licences could be removed from the system. The number of licences that could be 
combined was limited to two, however, and private companies continued to be prevented 
from purchasing these licences by the Owner-Operator Policy. 
At the same time, independent fishers in Newfoundland and Labrador, and 
throughout Atlantic Canada, were being required to play a more prominent role in 
funding and carrying out the science, monitoring and, in some cases, enforcement 
activities associated with fisheries management than had ever been the case previously 
(Power 2005). Since 1992, a variety of new collaborative management measures have 
been initiated. These include: the mandatory participation of harvesters in scientific data 
collection through jointly conducted and funded surveys and logbook programs; new 
rules requiring harvesters to pay for some forms of fisheries science and, in many cases, 
for onboard observer and dockside monitoring programs; mandating that all fishing boats 
over 35 feet be equipped with GPS "black boxes" which allow them to be easily located 
and monitored by fisheries managers; programs to encourage the reporting of illegal 
activities or poaching to anonymous 'snitch lines' ; and the development of new 
consultation bodies, such as the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC), 
through which fishers are expected to provide feedback on management plans and offer 
suggestions for future management measures. 64 These changes have occurred against the 
backdrop of significant cutbacks to fisheries science budgets during the 1990s (Ibid.). 
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In concert with this new spirit of cooperation and partnership has been growing 
pressure on harvesters to play a greater role in disciplining themselves and to assume a 
greater share of risk in the event of another management failure. During the 1990s, 
several attempts were made to amend Canada's Fisheries Act to reflect a new focus on 
shared responsibility. The Act is Canada's oldest piece of environmental legislation, 
having existed, largely unchanged, since 1868. The proposed changes to the Act were 
strongly resisted by the Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters, an Ottawa-
based lobby group representing fish harvesters ' organizations from across Canada. 
In lieu of formally re-writing the Fisheries Act, Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
developed what it called the Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review (AFPR), a consultative 
policy process intended to bring about a new vision for fisheries management. The 
process was launched in 1999 and released a discussion document in 2001 (Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada 2001 ). The document called for a new approach to fisheries management 
and identified a number of key areas of focus, including: conservation, access and 
allocations, and governance. Wiber (2002) has argued that the AFPR represents a 
"fundamental change" in management philosophy of the department, "from one of 
micro manager, heavily involved in day-to-day operations, to one of policy maker and 
strategic direction setter" (2002: 21-22). 
Central to the new approach of the AFPR is a major reconceptualization of the 
goals of fisheries management. Whereas the high modernist fisheries management 
approaches of the past expressed faith in the capacity of science to understand and predict 
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the behaviour of marine ecosystems, the AFPR openly acknowledges that fisheries 
management is always characterized by tremendous uncertainty and risk, due to the 
highly complex nature of marine ecosystems. As an alternative to top-down science and 
management, the AFPR discussion document focuses on developing new mechanisms of 
governance as a way of bringing about a shared consensus. It states: 
Uncertainty is an intrinsic feature of managing a living resource. Fish 
stocks are subject to changes in the ocean environment. Our ability to 
forecast the effects of these changes is imperfect; our ability to control 
them is non-existent. Conservation is paramount, but it does not mean 
avoiding all risks to stocks or species. What is does mean is avoiding 
unacceptable risks . .. Participants in fisheries management decisions must 
clearly acknowledge the existence of risk and, ideally, arrive at a 
consensus on an acceptable level of risk. In the event that risks become 
unacceptable, stakeholders must agree on the actions that are required 
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2001: 16). 
Implicit in this argument, of course, is that said stakeholders must also agree to accept 
their share ofthe blame in the event that the worst case scenario comes to pass. A 
representative of the Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters in Ottawa 
explained the new approach as follows: 
The government is now making it so in order to get your quota; you are 
required to sign a co-management agreement that obliges you to fund the 
monitoring of the catch and the collection and analysis of scientific data. 
So you are funding the science related to your own fishery. I believe that is 
extremely dangerous. They say that the fishery is still a public resource 
and that resource belongs to the people of Canada, but don't the people of 
Canada need to have some kind of autonomous determination about the 
state of that resource. DFO seems to be trying to divest themselves of 
everything ... The trend is to give stakeholders long term access rights, and 
make them responsible for the conservation and the management of that 
resource. That way, the money to pay for the research is generated from 
the exploitation of the resource. At the heart of it is this economic theory 
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of the Tragedy of the Commons, which is being used to justify the whole 
thing. The theory is that you don't need to worry as much about 
enforcement when the property owner is looking after their own long term 
interests. 
The recently elected Conservative Govemment is once again renewing efforts to 
"modernize" the Fisheries Act, to place a greater emphasis on "sustainable development" 
principles and bring about an even greater sharing of responsibility between fish 
harvesters and management agencies. To that end, the government carried out extensive 
consultations across Canada in the fall of 2006 and put forward a bill to establish the 
revised Fisheries Act on November 29, 2007 (Government of Canada 2006b, 2007). At 
the time of writing, this bill had not yet been debated in the House of Commons, and it 
was widely anticipated that it would face resistance from opposition parties. 
In 1998, the fishing industry was also further responsibilized through the 
establishment of a new Canadian Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing Operations. It 
was intended to serve as a voluntary code of practice for fishers and was closely modeled 
on the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) initiated 
International Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, established in 1995 (United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 1995; Fisheries and Oceans Canada 1998). 
5.6 Participation and the Politics of Knowledge 
While some of those fishers interviewed indicated that they welcomed the 
opportunity to play a more active role in the enterprise of management, many were 
suspicious of the motives that underlay this new approach. One of the primary concerns 
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raised was that this new focus on participation was essentially an attempt by the 
government to divest itself of any responsibility to assist the individuals and communities 
in times of crisis. For most of its history, the Newfoundland fishery has been buffered by 
exogenous capital during poor seasons. In the early years, this was typically provided by 
the system of merchant capital and in the latter years, by the Canadian welfare state. 
While both of these systems have been justifiably criticized as being exploitative of rural 
livelihoods, both tended to provide enough security to allow harvesters to adjust to 
sudden changes by making the transition to new species or fishing areas and waiting for 
stocks or markets to rebound. Many interviewees were fearful that for the first time ever, 
they were being left to bear the full brunt of any future resource collapses. Jolm, a fish 
harvester from Notre Dame Bay stated: 
... they ask you for your opinion in some cases, but usually that is just to 
cover their own asses. That way if the fishery goes down again, they can 
say, 'Well, we asked you. We gave you a chance this time and it still went 
bad.' DFO refuses to be held accountable anymore. The second words that 
can1e out of Jolm Crosbie's mouth after saying that we had to shut the 
fishery down were: 'We can' t go laying blame.' He wasn ' t to blame, the 
scientists weren' t to blame, the managers weren' t to blame, the draggers 
weren't to blame, but it was gone. And there is still nobody to blame. This 
is no different. When it' s gone, they' ll say, it's not our fault, we consulted 
you. 
In the minds of some harvesters, participatory management was primarily a 
legitimation exercise, designed to obtain the consent of fishers without surrendering any 
real power to make critical decisions. Many expressed doubts about whether their 
participation could possibly have a meaningful impact on fisheries management practices. 
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Some pointed out that, even when they were given an opportunity to voice their opinions 
about the state of the fishery or the direction they would like management to take, their 
knowledge was used very selectively and only in ways that did not fundamentally 
challenge the wisdom of senior Fisheries and Oceans Canada scientists and managers. 
Dan stated: 
... the government is always talking about community participation. It is the 
hot thing. But on the important stuff, there is no participation. They might 
ask you what you think, but they've got their minds made up before they 
even meet with you. I think a Jot of decisions are made before the 
consultation starts and they just use whatever they want. So, if you've got 
fifty fishermen and forty-eight or forty-nine are against their plan, and 
only one or two are in favour of it, they can say that fishermen agreed with 
us. They are not telling a lie, but they're not telling the whole truth either. 
I've seen that a lot over the years ... They want it to look like they are 
listening, but they know what they are going to do and they will just keep 
on consulting until they hear it. I give my opinion and you give yours and 
the next guy gives his, and they are going to pick the one sentence that 
most suits their agenda. Then they'll say: ' We had participation from these 
people. We included the industry stakeholders and the community was 
well represented and they have all been respected. ' All of that rhetoric will 
be there .. .! always go and give my opinion in the hope that someday, 
they'll get it right. I don't know if I'm the eternal optimist or what, but I 
keep hoping that eventually somebody will start listening. The people we 
are dealing with now at DFO in the lower management are a fair group of 
people who are trying their best to make all this work. But the final 
decision comes from higher up. We make our recommendation to the 
lower management and they bring the information up, but somewhere 
along the line, it either gets changed or gets twisted, or somebody else 
comes into play with their opinion and it gets changed. 
Dan exhibited a high degree of awareness and reflexivity about the way in which his 
knowledge had been decontextualized, recoded, and, in some cases, overtly manipulated 
by government research managers, often in the service of goals very different from his 
170 
own. While he appeared quite skeptical of the capacity of his participation to bring about 
changes that he supported, he continued to participate all the san1e, in the hope that this 
dialogue, however biased, might enable him to influence the process in a positive way. 
The tension that lies at the root of Dan's concerns was also identified by Wilson and 
McCay in their 1998 paper on participatory fisheries management. They argued: 
Fisheries management is not just a policy process, it is a science-based 
policy process that relies on facts about the state of the fisheries that are 
not, in principle, subject to popular opinion. Participation cannot change 
the "facts" about the resource. The "facts" of fisheries science, however, 
are nearly always probabilities. Participation in management exists in 
constant dialogue with the extensive uncertainties of fisheries 
science .. . Those who define the scientific questions exercise a degree of 
both discursive and legal control over every aspect of management. The 
probabilistic nature of fisheries science allows considerable latitude in how 
this power is used ... the official description of the resource is a cornerstone 
of bureaucratic power (Wilson and McCay 1998: 52) 
Many fishers that I interviewed saw the continued elevation of federal government 
science to a position of epistemological privilege as highly problematic, particularly 
given that sweeping budget cuts during the 1990s had significantly reduced the presence 
of scientists and enforcement officers on the water and this severely limited their capacity 
to study and police the fishery effectively. Several harvesters also stressed the tremendous 
unpredictability of the marine environment and most pointed to instances of 
unexplainable booms and busts in the abundance of particular species that had taken place 
over the course of their fishing careers. A frequently cited example was the dramatic 
recovery of the lumpfish fishery in Placentia Bay in 2004, after most had given up hope 
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ofthe species ever coming back. Paul, a Placentia Bay harvester, recounted his shock at 
seeing their return: 
There is just so much uncertainty. Nobody was expecting the lwnp fishery 
we got in 2004. We all figured it was pretty well fished out a long time ago. 
You see, the lump fishery is a very destructive fishery. You destroy all the 
females, and only sell the roe. We're after fishing it pretty heavily, and we 
really thought it was fished out. But in the back of my mind, I was 
remembering stories from fellas fishing offshore saying that they had been 
getting some lumpfish out there, so it must have been something to do 
with the temperature or something. My God, our lumpfish was as good or 
better this year than it ever was before. In 2003, I didn' t put a big lot of 
effort into them, because they were so scarce and I was busy fishing crab. I 
finally got 1,800 pounds or something. Then, in 2004, I had 23,000 pounds, 
so that was a big difference. And that was true for just about everyone. 
There is nobody that could have predicted that. Everybody got a big 
surprise, the fishers, the scientists, everybody. It really makes you wonder. 
We might not have any fishery next year or we might have a great one. 
Experiences like these had led many fishers to the view that marine ecosystems are highly 
complex and very difficult to predict and this made them very suspicious of the power of 
government scientists to manage fish stocks effectively. John, from Notre Dame Bay, 
expressed his reservations about ever being able to fully understand the behaviour of the 
marine environment: 
There is an awful lot that they don't know, and an awful lot that we don't 
know. We know that it is all intertwined in some way, but when it comes 
down to the finer points of how much fish a whale eats and how much the 
different kinds of birds eat and how much we can catch. How much crab 
do the cod eat and how much do the seals eat? That's overwhelming, that 
is. That's doomed for failure from the start. yve all know that we can't just 
look at one thing, but they don't know how to study the whole thing, and 
even if they did, they've got no money to study it anymore. Then again, 
they had all that money just to study cod and look what happened with that. 
I don't know whether if you had the whole budget of Canada and you had 
172 
thousands of scientists if you would ever figure it all out and understand 
all the interactions. 
Similarly, Chris from Bonavista Bay stated: 
There is so little knowledge of the ocean. They can put a man on the moon 
and they can send satellites everywhere, but they have no idea what is 
going on in the ocean. It is so complicated. How different fish interact and 
how a slight temperature change causes them to interact differently. Even 
just one degree can cause a lot of little changes and together they can have 
a big impact. You can do a study one year and find that it was a warm 
summer and there were lots of fish and seagulls. Then you could do the 
same study next year and it is a bit colder and not so many fish come in 
and neither do the birds and the whales and so on. And it can change 
quickly. I can take a scientist out one day and not be able to get enough to 
feed him for a week. And he will walk away with the impression that there 
is nothing there. But the following week, if I get a bit of sunshine and a bit 
of mixing of the water, and take him out again, he 'd get the impression 
that there are tons of fish there. The problem is that they have no ways to 
work those variables into their models. 
Most recognized that the inherent unpredictability of marine ecosystems often defied 
predictability, and feared that the new system would leave them highly exposed to 
ecological and economic fluctuations that may make it more difficult to earn a living in 
the industry in the future. 65 
5.7 Independence and "Trust" 
An even greater concern amongst the harvesters I interviewed was that more and 
more of them were entering into new kinds of economic agreements with crab processing 
companies and many feared that this trend could eventually undermine the independence 
of the fleet as a whole. In the aftermath of the cod moratorium, many processing plants 
moved quickly into the crab sector, buying from Newfoundland fishers and re-selling to 
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markets in the US and mainland Canada. While this trade resulted in a considerable profit 
for processing companies, its benefits to processing workers were very limited. The crab 
fishery was responsible for reviving a number of processing jobs in many rural areas, but 
the labour required to process this new species paled by comparison to what was needed 
in the 1970s and 80s, when the offshore fishery for cod and other species was at its peak 
(Clarke 2003). Whereas some plants focused on the labour-intensive process of removing 
shells and packaging crab meat, this strategy was soon abandoned (Connors 2003). The 
lucrative US and Canadian restaurant markets increasingly began to demand whole crabs 
or crab sections with the shells left on. This prompted most Newfoundland plants to scale 
back their processing operations considerably, resulting in a situation in which processing 
workers in some areas found it difficult to get enough hours of work to be able to qualify 
for seasonal Employment Insurance payments in the winter (Neis and Grzetic 2001). For 
the most part, crab are now simply cut into halves or sections, packaged and shipped to 
market with minimal processing. Those that are too dark in colour or have other visible 
defects are still processed into meat, but this work has been almost entirely outsourced to 
China, where labour costs are much lower (Kirby 2005). Those Newfoundland crab 
plants that were successful in retaining most of their year-round workforce did so by 
combining crab processing with the seasonal processing of one or more other species, 
such as mussels, scallops, lumpfish, monkfish, capelin, herring, mackerel or, in a few 
areas, cod (Herridge 2006d). 
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While the crab trade proved very lucrative for many processing companies across 
the province, the sudden conversion of so many groundfish plants into crab plants led to 
significant overcapacity in the processing sector. Whereas in 1995, there were only 
nineteen plants licensed to process crab in the province, by 2002, there were forty-four. A 
2005 study by the Newfoundland and Labrador provincial government concluded that 
there is now enough processing capacity in Newfoundland and Labrador to handle four 
times the total volume of crab landed worldwide each year (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation 2007). 
This overcapacity, in combination with the booming demand for snow crab in the 
United States, created fierce competition between processing companies and led to a 
bidding war for the crab that was available. Catches tended to be sold to the highest 
bidder, and crab was often trucked across the island for processing rather than being 
processed in the same town or bay in which it was landed (Clarke 2003). This situation 
prompted many processing companies to begin forming strategic alliances with each 
other as a way of keeping their costs down. 
During the 1990s, the Newfoundland crab fishery was characterized by numerous 
disputes between harvesters and processors. Crab fishers went on strike three times 
between 1992 and 1997, accusing processors of failing to pay them fair market value for 
their catches (Canadian Press 1997). These allegations were confirmed in 2002, when 
investigators conducted a raid of several processing plants belonging to the largest crab 
buyers in Atlantic Canada, including: The Barry Group, Inc. , Quinlan Brothers, Ltd. , 
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Daley Brothers, Ltd, and Grand Atlantic Seafoods, Inc. It was later found that these and 
other crab processors had been working as a "cartel" since as early as 1994 in an effort to 
ensure that they all received a secure supply of crab, while keeping the prices they paid 
fishers as low as possible (Mcintosh 2002). 
Another strategy employed by several processors was to form side deals or "trust 
agreements" with independent crab harvesters in the full time and supplementary crab 
fleets, in order to obtain exclusive access to their catches. In the aftermath of the charges 
of price fixing, this pattern became even more common, as processing companies were 
once again forced to compete with one another in order to get enough crab to satisfy their 
export markets. Trust agreements took a number of forms. In many cases, processors 
provided harvesters with the financing needed to upgrade to larger fibreglass boats, which 
were capable of travelling farther offshore to harvest crab and shrimp. These new boats 
tended to be very expensive to buy and costly to operate, however, and few independent 
fishers could afford to pay for them on their own. For the most part, fishers had been 
unable to secure bank loans for this purpose, because their fishing licences were not 
recognized as collateral. Thus, obtaining a loan from a processing company to put a down 
payment on a boat or to buy it outright was the only option available if they wanted to 
upgrade their fishing enterprises. 
As prices for snow crab continued to rise during the 1990s, competition between 
processors intensified. Many ofthe fish harvesters I interviewed recounted instances in 
which harvesters in the full-time and supplementary fleets had been paid annual signing 
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bonuses of $80,000 or more in cash, promised an extra dollar for each pound of crab sold 
or offered new Ford F150 pickup trucks in exchange for promising to sell their crab to a 
particular processor. Although processors were still forbidden from buying licences 
outright, trust agreements provided them with a means through which to gain control over 
crab licences through the back door and ensure themselves of a steady supply of crab. 
Dan from Conception Bay explained that while the legality of these agreements was 
deemed questionable at first, court decisions were increasingly favouring processors: 
There was a trust agreement that took place between a company and a fisherman 
that I know about. They never had all of the Is dotted and the Ts crossed legally, 
and the guy walked away with a pretty big down payment on a boat as well as the 
licence that the company thought they had secured. They took him to court, but the 
fisherman won. That happened twice that I know of. But since then, the processors 
have not made the same mistakes and, when cases have gone to court, the judges 
have ruled in favour of the company ... Before they will give a fisherman money to 
make a down payment on a boat or buy him a licence or whatever, they will make 
him sign these agreements that the company drew up in advance with their lawyer. 
What the fishermen usually don' t know is that if they default on the loan, the 
licence goes straight to the corporation. So, they have found a loop hole to get 
around the Owner-Operator Policy. DFO hasn't closed it yet, and I don' t expect 
them to. The independent fishermen are lobbying to have it closed, but the boats 
that the companies own are lobbying and threatening the other way. Once the 
companies have control over enough enterprises, they can control the market again 
and pay whatever prices they want to. If the company owns 60 or 70 percent of the 
resource, they don't need the independent fisherman anymore. They can manage 
just fine with the guys they have on their payroll. If the companies get enough 
people that are dependent on them, then before you know it, the independent 
fishermen are going to be in the minority. Guess who rules the day then? The union 
can come up with whatever policy they like, but the company can just call all ofthe 
skippers that work for them and tell them how it is going to be. You do it this way 
and you vote this way or else. 
Many ofDan's fears did come to pass in 2003, when many ofthe same crab 
buyers again joined forces and refused to pay market value for crab from any fishers who 
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had not entered into trust agreements with them. Most fishers interviewed believed that 
they made this decision because they had gotten into bidding wars with each other earlier 
in the season in their attempts to secure trust agreements with larger boats, prompting 
many to pay such high prices that they had trouble reselling the crab at a profit. Thus, 
they were trying to make up for this mistake by paying far lower prices to inshore fishers 
who had much less bargaining power. The standoff was eventually broken, when a 
number of smaller processors took advantage of the opportunity and began paying higher 
prices to independent fishers in order to secure their business. 
Since inshore crab fishers tended to only have small quotas, it was far less 
common for them to have been approached directly by processors. Most of those 
interviewed did, however, see trust agreements as one of the greatest threats to the future 
of the independent inshore fishery, mainly because they allowed companies to dictate 
prices. Many fishers were also worried that the self-rationalization program they had 
agreed to as a condition for their entry into the crab fishery could ultimately lead to the 
full-scale corporate takeover of the inshore fishery. Chris, who fishes in Bonavista Bay, 
explained: 
Now, with them allowing us to buy each other out and buddy up licences, 
the inshore fleet becomes more attractive to the processor, because now 
they can get two or maybe eventually three licences on the one boat. If you 
combine three 20,000 pound crab quotas on one vessel, you're looking at 
60,000 pounds of crab, and they can make money on that. So, the small 
boats are becoming more and more appetizing to the processors. Once you 
get to three inshore licences aboard a single boat, Mr. Daley and Mr. 
Quinlan and Mr. Penney, and Mr. Barry are going to be really interested in 
buying in. What will happen is that one fisherman will start buying out 
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other fishermen, but the company will give them the money to do it. That 
way the fisherman still owns the licence on paper, but the processor owns 
it in practice. So what you will find is that if the fishery goes down, you 
will have big corporations owning all of the fish stocks around 
Newfoundland. 
Dan, from Conception Bay, also made this argument, and he expressed his deep concern 
that the self-rationalization progran1 was a slippery slope toward even greater corporate 
encroachment into the inshore fishery. He furthermore believed that this trend was not 
being resisted by fisheries managers, because it fit with their larger vision of transferring 
responsibility onto harvesters. 66 
From DFO's point of view, it makes more sense to have the processors get 
everything passed to them. They have the boats, they have the quota, they 
hire the people, and when they decide that they want to use one 120 footer 
instead of four 65 footers , I get my pink slip and I have to go find another 
job. That way DFO can say to those processors: 'Here it is. You look after 
it. If you screw it up, that's your problem. ' 
From Dan's point of view, allowing the crab fishery to fall into the hands of a few large 
players fit seamlessly with the new policy focus of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, since 
privately funded corporations are better equipped to withstand dramatic swings in the 
abundance of particular species with little or no assistance from the state. When asked if 
he saw any indication that this trend would be reversed, he stated: 
I don't really see any way around it. The government isn' t doing much to 
try to stop it. It works better for the fish companies this way and it works 
better for the government because they don't have to regulate as much. It 
works better for just about everybody. The fisherman who sells out is 
satisfied, because he got his money. The problem is that, at the end of the 
day, you're going to have a few companies owning the whole resource. 
Sure, the fishermen don't want that to happen. Everybody is afraid of the 
companies owning everything and everyone and smaller communities 
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getting shut out for good, but the reason I don't see it changing is that I 
don't see a mechanism to change it. The companies are waiting to buy 
them up when they retire and, without enough young people coming up 
behind them who have core status and can afford to take over their 
enterprises, I think most are eventually going to sell out. 
Such concerns were supported by a 2005 "Human Resources Sector Study" that was 
commissioned by the Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters (Praxis Research 
and Consulting Inc. 2005). The study found that the continued viability of the inshore 
fleet on Canada's east coast was severely threatened by a variety of factors , including: 
increasing corporate encroachment; an aging labour force along with poor recruitment of 
young people into the industry; escalating license costs fuelled by private speculation; 
rising operating costs; and the failure of the federal government to take steps to keep the 
inshore fishery in the hands of small-scale independent harvesters. 
Most participatory management models assume that each "stakeholder group" 
operates independently of all others. Many harvesters were, however, concerned that if 
processing companies were allowed to gain enough clout through these agreements, they 
would eventually be able to steer fisheries policies in a direction that would largely 
exclude the concerns of inshore fishers, processing plant workers, and other people living 
in coastal communities. Several said that some fishers were already facing external 
pressures that were influencing their publicly stated positions. They suggested that 
changing economic circumstances have created new bifurcations within the fishing 
industry, suggesting that the idea of a unified ' fishers' perspective' that can be expressed 
through participatory management bodies may be more myth than reality. 
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In the fishing seasons that occurred after these interviews were completed, many 
of the concerns of fishers seemed even more pertinent. At the close of the 2004 fishing 
season, when these interviews were carried out, the crab fishery was still performing 
strongly in many areas. Although there was some uncertainty about the overall health of 
stocks, prices paid to harvesters reached a historic high of over four dollars per pound in 
some areas that year, leading to continuing prosperity. Since that time, however, the state 
of the crab fishing and processing industry has taken a sudden and alarming turn for the 
worse. 
Prior to the commencement of the 2005 season, the government ofNewfoundland 
and Labrador took steps to alleviate the intense competition between processing 
companies for crab, arguing that the present situation denied them access to a secure 
supply of raw material and made it more difficult for them to satisfy market demand. In 
April of that year, then Provincial Fisheries Minister Trevor Taylor introduced a new 
system whereby each crab plant in the province would be allocated a fixed quota that they 
would be entitled to process each season, thereby eliminating the need for them to 
compete with one another (The Canadian Press 2005). 
The policy outraged the FF A W, which presented it as a deliberate attempt to strip 
fish harvesters of their bargaining power in their negotiations with processors. On March 
291h, 2005, 84 percent ofthe FFAW membership voted to go on strike once again, 
refusing to land any crab until the Provincial Government abolished the new approach 
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005i). This decision was followed by a series of 
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highly symbolic protests across the province. On a cold and rainy March 4th in 2005 close 
to 3000 fish harvesters gathered at the Confederation Building in St. John's to express 
their displeasure with the government. A CBC reporter noted that: "the fishermen hung 
crab pots that resemble enormous mesh lampshades from the flag poles and perched one 
on top the head of a statue ofthe explorer Jolm Cabot" (Richer 2005). Later that day, a 
group offishers filled the gallery ofthe Newfoundland House of Assembly and jeered the 
Minister of Fisheries, until the legislature was shut down for the day (Roberts 2005). The 
legislature was disrupted again nine times in the next two weeks, before the gallery was 
formally closed to the public. (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005j). On April 6th, 
this tactic was extended to central Newfoundland, where more than 250 fish harvesters 
blocked the Trans-Canada Highway at Grand Falls (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
2005e). The TCH is the only way to drive across the island and is the vital artery for 
commercial transport trucks travelling between the Nova Scotia feny service in Port aux 
Basques, on the south-western tip of the island, and the much more heavily populated 
areas on the east coast. Thus, shutting it down at this central point for any length of time 
had the potential to be a significant blow to the provincial economy. 
There were also repeated protests on the water. On April 13111, a flotilla of about 60 
fishing boats blockaded the shipping lanes in Placentia Bay for two days. This brought 
an abrupt halt to oil tanker traffic to and from the oil refinery at Come By Chance and the 
oil transhipment facility at Whiffen Head and it also affected European freight destined 
for the port at Argentia. Fishers also surrounded the pilot boats that guide tankers in and 
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out of the bay. These actions were repeated again one week later (Canadian Press 2005c, 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005d). 
Similar blockades targeted numerous other symbolically significant sites in the 
province. Between April 24th and April 28th, fishing boats repeatedly blocked vessels 
from entering St. John's Harbour. St. John's is the other major shipping port in the 
province, receiving freighters from the Canadian mainland, numerous supply vessels used 
by the offshore petroleum industry, and occasional visits by cruise ships and yachts 
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005c). Fishers present also made a point of 
surrounding a Portuguese fishing vessel in the harbour that had been twice cited for 
overfishing two years earlier, calling it a "citizens' arrest" (The Canadian Press 2005a). 
These events led to the passing of a temporary court injunction "that bans the FF A W and 
its members from interfering with the users, clients and employees of the Port of St. 
John's" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 20051). Another blockade on April 26th 
targeted the community of Bay Bulls, the hub for the iceberg and whale watching tour 
boat industry on the east coast of the island (Canadian Press 2005e).67 
In many respects, the confrontational strategy pursued by the FF A W stands in 
stark contrast to the ideal of the "responsibilized" fish harvester that is increasingly being 
put forward in the "civil society" discourses present in most new ocean policy 
frameworks. Their actions imply that there is a fundamental antagonism or, in Marxian 
terms, class struggle between plant managers and independent harvesters which cannot be 
solved through dialogue alone and sometimes requires a show of force. 
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The standoff was eventually brought to an end when the provincial government 
agreed to establish an independent task force led by Richard Cashin, the former head of 
the FFAW, to author a report on the issue and develop a workable solution. Cashin's 
report ultimately concluded that the idea of processing plant quotas should be abandoned, 
but that the two groups should work together to broker an agreement that was satisfactory 
to both sides (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005b; Canadian Press 2005). 
While Cashin's compromise brought a temporary reprieve on the issue of plant 
quotas, the 2006 season would prove equally volatile, but for very different reasons. This 
more recent crisis was not caused by any single variable, but by a complete reversal of the 
unforeseen ecological and economic forces that had benefited the industry in previous 
years, leading FF A W president Earl McCurdy to describe it as a "perfect storm" 
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005k). 
Prior to the 2006 season, Fisheries and Oceans Canada announced that it would be 
cutting the overall Newfoundland snow crab quota by 7 percent from the previous year. 
The bulk of this reduction would be concentrated in two fishing areas: 3K (on the 
northeast coast of the island, including Notre Dame Bay and White Bay) and 3PS (on the 
south coast of the island, including Placentia Bay and Fortune Bay). Both areas would 
sustain cuts of about 25 percent from the previous year (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation 2006h, Canadian Press 2006). Snow crab stocks have long been known to be 
"notoriously episodic in terms of abundance" (National Post 2002), but the worsening 
state of the resource in these areas may also be partly attributable to overfishing. 
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Some areas, such as 3K, have also been plagued in recent years by a very high 
incidence of "soft-shell crab." Soft-shell crab "are defined by high water content and are 
commercially worthless" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005n). This condition "is 
formed during the molting process when a crab releases its old shell and begins growing a 
new one. The meat in soft-shell is noted for being mushy because the crab pumps itself 
full of seawater to aid growth" (ibid.). Soft-shell crab had mysteriously been showing up 
earlier in some areas over the last few seasons, leading to speculation that the health of 
the crab fishery might be in jeopardy. When interviewed in the fall of 2004, one fisheries 
manager explained the problem on the north coast of Newfoundland as follows: 
Soft-shell crab was a very big issue last summer. Science doesn't even 
know what the problem is. The appearance from scientific data is that 
there is a high recruitment, so maybe they are just growing fast throughout 
the summer and that's why there are a lot of soft shells. Then again, soft 
shells can happen at any time of year. Usually we don' t see it between 
April and say July, but since I've been here, we've seen it earlier and 
earlier every season. This year was the first time we had it all season. We 
simply don't have the answer about what the problem is. It could be 
overexploitation, but we can' t say that for sure and because of the high 
levels of recruitment, we haven't done anything about the quotas yet. 
This profound uncertainty underscores the dilemma highlighted by the new ecology 
(Wallace et al. 1996, Scarce 2000). Crab biology may be influenced by a range of factors, 
anatomical, environmental, and human-induced, and any effort to understand it must 
endeavour to consider the combined impact of all of these dynamics. This makes it 
extremely difficult to establish clear causal relationships. 
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Perhaps the greatest problem in the fishery in 2006 was economic, as the price 
paid for crab plunged to a fourteen year low of 92 cents per pound (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2006c, 2005d). That is less than half of the average price paid 
in 2004 and less than one quarter of the highest prices paid that year. There are a number 
of probable reasons for this dramatic fall in price. The first is the gradual recovery of 
stocks of Alaskan snow crab and of the more highly valued king crab. In 2006, Alaskan 
landings of snow crab alone more than doubled from 2005 (Welch 2006). The timing of 
this recovery could not have been worse from the perspective ofNewfoundland fishers 
and processors, because it coincided with a meteoric rise in the value of the Canadian 
dollar relative to the US dollar, making it much harder for all Canadian seafood exports to 
compete in the American market. 
Another factor affecting the industry was the highly publicized boycott of 
Canadian seafood products that was spearheaded by the American Humane Society in 
2006 in order to pressure the Canadian government to abolish the annual harp seal hunt 
offNewfoundland, Labrador, and the Magdalene Islands. The campaign against the seal 
hunt has been ongoing since the 1970s, but was again thrust into the international media 
spotlight in 2006, spurTed on by high profile visits to Canada from a host of celebrities, 
including Paul McCartney and his now former wife Heather Mills, Pamela Anderson, and 
longstanding seal hunt activist Brigitte Bardot. There is concern that, if the boycott 
continues to gain momentum, it could have a significant negative impact on the already 
low price being paid for crab caught in the province. 
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The recent difficulties faced by crab harvesters, processors, and exporters have 
been compounded by rising oil and gas prices, which have significantly increased the cost 
oftravelling to and from fishing grounds and transpotiing seafood to market. These 
circumstances have created massive problems for vessel owners, many of whom carry 
significant debt loads (Clarke 2003). The head of the FF A W recently claimed that low 
crab prices, combined with a high demand for labourers in western Canada has prompted 
many Level I and Apprentice level harvesters to leave the province and has made it very 
difficult for some enterprise owners to even come up with a crew to go fishing. 
The struggles between fishers and processors involved in the crab fishery 
highlight the often conflicting interests at play in the fishing industry. Fishers have argued 
that trust agreements and the recent move by the provincial government toward plant 
quotas threaten to undermine their bargaining power and leave them at the mercy of 
processing companies. These tensions are made even more acute by the immense 
scientific uncertainty that presently characterizes the crab fishery, raising serious 
questions about whether the fishery will remain prosperous in the futme. This situation 
promises to have a major impact on the form taken by new participatory management 
mechanisms. Participatory management often demands that each industry speak with a 
single voice, but this requirement serves to marginalize the ongoing conflicts that often 
exist within each of these sectors. 
The case of the fishery is made even more complex by the fact that crab 
processing workers themselves have interests that often diverge from those of both of the 
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aforementioned groups. The ecological, economic and political instability affecting the 
crab sector threatens many processing jobs and many plants have already undergone 
significant downsizing. Many of those who continue to be employed in the sector have 
had their hours cut back significantly, making it difficult for them to qualify for 
Employment Insurance (Neis and Grzetic 2001). In some cases, they have also faced 
downward pressure on their wages to compensate for the prices paid to fishers. 
Furthermore, Neis and other scholars have observed that snow crab processing workers 
often face a variety of negative health consequences, including serious respiratory 
problems (Fishery Research Group 1986; Neis 1995; Williams 1996; Neis and Grzetic 
2001; Howse et al. 2006). 
These situations have created new antagonisms between processing workers, their 
employers and fish harvesters, many of whom are their friends and family members. 
Since participatory management institutions tend to respect existing organizational 
hierarchies, however, it seems unlikely that processing workers and other politically 
marginalized groups in rural communities will be granted a distinct voice, independent of 
processing companies and fishers. The vulnerability of processing workers is even more 
apparent in the primary and secondary fish processing sectors, which I will turn to in the 
next chapter. 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the restructuring of the Newfoundland inshore fishery 
in the aftermath of the cod moratorium and the new fisheries policy directions that have 
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taken shape over that same period. Whereas the cod fishery was managed in a top-down 
fashion, with scientists, managers and enforcement officers operating largely 
independently of inshore fishers, the crab fishery came to prominence just as harvesters 
were being asked to share greater responsibility for carrying out the science, monitoring, 
and policing associated with fisheries management. 
In concert with these new responsibilities have been clear efforts to shift many of 
the risks associated with fisheries management decisions onto the harvesters themselves. 
In the case ofthe cod fishery, the NCARP, AGAP, and TAGS programs provided 
compensation and retraining in an attempt to soften the impact of the collapse. With the 
crab fishery, by contrast, deliberate attempts are being made by federal policy makers to 
ensure that this situation will never again repeat itself. 
Harvesters had mixed reactions to these policy changes. While some people 
preferred this new approach, many expressed skepticism about the capacity of the federal 
government to manage resources sustainably, particularly in light of sweeping cuts to 
fisheries science in recent years. Several indicated that they were pleased that scientific 
assessments were allowing for greater openness to the use of fishers' knowledge in 
ecosystem assessments, but many feared that these consultations were primarily an effort 
to download responsibility for any future fishery collapses or accidents onto resource 
users. This theory will be put to the test if crab stocks across the island continue to show 
signs of extreme vulnerability.Additional concerns emerged from the growing reliance of 
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many harvesters on "trust agreements" with processing companies, which they felt 
threatened the future ofthe independent fishing fleet. 
The next chapter examines the impact of recent fisheries restructuring processes 
on another segment of the industry, the primary and secondary fish processing operations 
in Placentia and Fortune Bays, on Newfoundland' s south coast. It argues that, while 
harvesters have been forced to take on new responsibilities through new participatory 
frameworks, fish processing workers have been largely excluded from this new approach, 
due in large part to the fact that most are framed as being connected to the ocean only in 
indirect ways. 
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Chapter 6 Global Forces and Local Problems: The Transformation of the Fish 
Processing Industry on Newfoundland's South Coast 
Larger towns along the south coast of Newfoundland have historically served as 
major processing centres for the offshore fishery. Particularly significant have been 
communities located in Placentia and Fortune Bays, both of which are characterized by 
deep-water and strong currents which have kept them ice-free year-round and made them 
easily accessible to offshore draggers fishing on the Grand Banks (Wright 2001 ; Power 
2005). 
This chapter examines the attempts made by several offshore fishing and 
processing companies operating in these areas to adapt to the closure of the cod fishery 
and the new oceans governance regime that followed. It also discusses the changing 
experiences of workers in the processing sector and their ambiguous role in the new 
approach to ocean management that is being developed by the Canadian federal 
government. I conclude that the structure of new participatory institutions is such that fish 
processing workers are at serious risk of being excluded from the discussions that will 
shape the places in which they live in the future. The chapter focuses on two distinct 
models that were pursued after the moratorium by Placentia and Fortune Bay processing 
plants that previously serviced the offshore fishery: the primary fish processing 
operations pursued in towns like Marystown, Arnold' s Cove, Harbour Breton and Fortune, 
and the secondary seafood processing operations pursued in the town of Burin. 
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6.1 The Fishing and Fish Processing Industry on Newfoundland's South Coast 
The fishery pursued along the south coast ofNewfoundland has always been quite 
distinct from that pursued elsewhere on the island. Fishing communities along the north 
and east coasts ofNewfoundland have typically had to contend with severe winters and 
heavy concentrations of sea ice, which have made it impossible for most people to fish 
during the winter and during significant parts of the spring and fall. Accordingly, these 
areas have tended to be characterized by short and intense fishing seasons in the late 
spring, surnmer and early fall , when large schools of capelin and cod migrated into 
inshore waters and could be easily caught. Fishers on the west coast were more sheltered, 
but lacked easy access to the Grand Banks and tended to concentrate their fishing 
activities in the Gulf of St. Lawrence instead. 
Fishing communities along the south coast had the advantage of relatively mild, 
albeit extremely windy and foggy, winters. Furthermore, the warmer water and ice-free 
conditions in Placentia and Fortune Bays extended the fishing season and increased the 
growth rate and abundance of several key species. This contributed to unusually bountiful 
harvests of cod, herring, and other species (Tulk 1997). While those closest to the 
headlands, particularly those living around the extremely biologically productive Cape St. 
Mary's area, have historically focused almost exclusively on cod, those farther inland and 
on the islands in the middle of the bay had begun to expand into fisheries for other 
species, like herring, salmon, capelin, and lobster by the 1870s. 68 Squid, mackerel and 
seals were also harvested when they were in abundance (Tulk 1997: 29).69 
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Because of the very strong currents in Placentia Bay, it has never been regarded as 
a very good bay for fishing with cod traps. Instead, trawling for cod became a much 
more common practice. Trawl or "longline" fishing involves dragging a line with many 
baited hooks behind the vessel, rather than staying in one place and using just one hook. 
The first trawls began to be used in the bay by the 1860s and they continued to grow in 
popularity in the century that followed, due to the higher catches they brought (ibid: 28). 
Others continued to fish in small boats with conventional hook and line technology. By 
the 1960s and 1970s, however, most inshore fishers had come to rely heavily on the use 
of gillnets instead. 
Due to their convenient location and considerable natural advantages, Placentia 
and Fortune Bays became preferred sites from which to prosecute the Newfoundland 
offshore banker fishery in the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth 
century. These advantages also contributed to the area being selected as a major 
processing centre for the offshore dragger and trawler fisheries after the Second World 
War (Tulk 1997; Wright 2001). 
While the town of Burin, on the west side of Placentia Bay, had retained a 
prosperous banker fleet since at least the begirming of the nineteenth century, 
participation in the banker fishery expanded considerably after the 1880s. Increasingly, 
people living deeper in the bay began to travel to these larger fishing centres to work as 
labourers aboard large "Western" boats, which were capable of venturing into rougher 
waters farther offshore (Ibid.). 
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After the Second World War, this tradition of fishing offshore intensified. In 1946, 
the first Fishery Products Ltd. Plant was established at Burin and it soon introduced some 
ofthe first steam powered side trawlers to Newfoundland (Wright 2001). The number of 
offshore plants and trawlers operating out of the region would grow steadily in the three 
decades that followed and side trawlers would soon be replaced by much more powerful 
petroleum powered stem trawlers (ibid). The early 1970s also witnessed the arrival of 
large herring seiners in Placentia and Fortune Bays for the first time as well. Most of 
these vessels were owned by BC Packers, a large salmon canning company based in 
British Columbia which established a herring fishing operation based out of Harbour 
Breton (Wright 2001 ). Within a few short years, the once formidable herring stocks in 
the area had been almost completely exhausted. Some fishers complained that the federal 
government had done nothing to stop this trend (Interview data). One retired Placentia 
Bay fisherman that I interviewed explained: 
This used to be a wonderful place for herring, but the big seiners carne in and wiped 
it out. We saw the writing on the wall pretty early on. Those same boats had wiped 
out the herring stocks in Fortune Bay and in Labrador in the couple of years before 
that and now they were coming to destroy ours. The worst part about it was that 
probably only about one third of what they hauled up was kept and the rest was 
dumped over the side because they didn' t have the capacity to process all of it. 
They were destroying the stocks and it wasn't even being processed! Some people 
went into St. John's and had a meeting with the federal department of fisheries in 
1971 to complain about it. The government scientists told us we'd never live to see 
the day that the herring stocks in Placentia Bay would be depleted. If that were true, 
we would have had to have had very short lives, because three years after that they 
were gone. It had all been completely wiped out by 1974 and it hasn't been 
anything close to the same since. 
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The offshore fishery expanded considerably in the 1960s and 70s, although 
relatively little trawling was done within the bays themselves, as compared with other 
bays around the island. 70 The two bays soon emerged as the most important base for 
offshore fishing and fish processing on the island. By the end of the 1960s, Fisheries 
Products Ltd. was operating major multi-species trawler plants out of Burin, Marystown, 
and St. Lawrence on the western side of Placentia Bay. There were also large offshore 
plants operated by various other companies in Fortune Bay towns, such as Harbour 
Breton, Fortune, and Grand Bank, although all of these plants came under the ownership 
of the newly created Fishery Products International in the 1980s. Another plant operated 
by National Sea Products, Ltd. ofNova Scotia was established in Arnold's Cove, at the 
head of Placentia Bay, which produced both offshore fish and locally caught cod and 
herring. 
Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, many of the already established fish 
processing centres along the south coast were chosen as the sites for the construction of 
new highly specialized processing plants, which depended primarily on cod and other 
groundfish landed by offshore trawlers and midshore draggers (Fishery Research Group 
1986). This expansion was, however, curtailed somewhat by an unfavourable economic 
climate in the early 1980s, which pushed some processing companies to the brink of 
bankruptcy (Fishery Research Group 1986; Sinclair 1986; Power 2005). By the mid 
1980s, however, both the newly created FPI and National Sea invested millions of dollars 
in highly specialized mechanical processing equipment designed to transform cod and 
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other groundfish species into value-added fillets as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
This marked a move away from the export of frozen blocks of cod to the United States, 
which had been the primary strategy pursued since the early 1950s (Neis and Williams 
1987: 6). 
In the mid 1980s a major study ofthe social impact of technological change in 
Newfoundland's "deepsea" processing plants was undertaken (Fishery Research Group 
1986; Neis and Williams 1987). This research focused primarily on three offshore plants: 
the FPI plant in the town of Catalina (on the island's northeast coast); the National Sea 
Plant in the town ofBurgeo (on the southwest coast); and the other major National Sea 
plant in Arnold's Cove (in Placentia Bay). All had undergone significant technological 
and managerial changes in order to adapt to the rapidly developing offshore trawler 
fishery. In all three cases, significant efforts had been made to make the plants more 
efficient, although not all of the same strategies had been implemented in all three cases. 
Among the changes identified by the researchers were: a growing focus on plant 
specialization, with each plant processing fewer species and less variation in size than 
they had in previous years; increasing job specialization, including a shift from group 
work stations to individual work stations; and a growing move toward highly 
sophisticated processing machinery, such as automated presorting and quality control 
systems, the use of "machine vision" to identify defects and to group fish by species and 
size, automated cutting and deboning machines, automated weighing systems to 
determine the maximum yield for each fish, and various kinds of electronic surveillance 
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systems for monitoring the performance of each individual worker (Fishery Research 
Group 1986; Neis and Williams 1987). They noted that, because ofthis new, more capital 
intensive approach, managers, union representatives, and workers were all anticipating 
job reductions in most plants. 
Those jobs that continued to have to be done manually, such as the trimming away 
of bones and blemishes, would carry new pressures, as workers would be forced to move 
faster to keep up with the machines and would be exposed to new regimes of surveillance 
and new managerial approaches, such as performance incentive systems (ibid). These 
conditions, the report's authors argued, were already beginning to contribute to more 
repetitive strain injuries, higher stress levels among workers, and growing tensions 
between workers and managers in most plants (Fishery Research Group 1986; Neis and 
Williams 1987). A further danger they identify is that workers will become increasingly 
"de-skilled" as they begin to occupy positions that are "ancillary to the machines" and 
this will limit their power to demand better working conditions (Neis and Williams 1987: 
39).71 They argued that workers would have to win the right to negotiate the rate and 
direction of technological change if the negative impacts on their quality of working life 
were to be kept to a minimum (Neis and Williams 1987: 4). 
6.2 The Restructuring of the Primary Fish Processing Industry 
The moratoria that were imposed on the harvesting of cod and other offshore 
species of groundfish, such as yellowtail flounder and American plaice, in the early 1990s 
had a severe impact on the fish processing industry throughout Atlantic Canada, and 
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nowhere was hit harder than the south coast of Newfoundland. Several plants in the 
region were closed down, including major plants in the communities of Galtois, Ramea, 
Trepassey, and Burgeo. Those that survived were forced to undertake a major 
restructuring of their operations in their efforts to adapt to a changing ecological reality. 
This typically included: making dramatic reductions in the size of their workforces, 
selling off many of their large fishing vessels to harvesting companies operating in less 
developed countries, and scaling back their harvesting activities (Power 2005 : 189). 
Atlantic Canada's two processing giants, Newfoundland' s Fishery Products 
International (FPI) and Nova Scotia's National Sea Products, Ltd., chose to limit their 
involvement in the primary crab processing sector after the cod moratorium. FPI did, 
however, play a major role in distributing Newfoundland crab internationally and the 
company converted several of its plants on the island' s north and west coasts to focus 
more intensively on shellfish. On the south coast, these companies pursued a very 
different strategy in response to the sudden shortage of cod and other groundfish. This is 
largely due to the fact that the area was home to several technologically sophisticated and 
specialized fish processing plants, which had been servicing offshore fleets but were 
suddenly left without a reliable supply of raw material. 
With the onset of the moratorium, the two companies began to look overseas to 
satisfy their demand for fish. Some soon began buying frozen blocks of cod that had been 
caught by Russian and Norwegian trawlers fishing in the Barents Sea, home to what was, 
at the time at least, said to be the last relatively healthy wild Atlantic cod population in 
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the world. 72 This subarctic sea is exposed to the North Atlantic drift, which carries the 
warm waters of the Gulf Stream northward and this moderating effect makes it a very 
productive fishing area for cod and other species (Wall 2006). 
While the importation ofBarents Sea cod initially proved to be an effective stop-
gap measure, by the end of the decade it had become clear that the experiment was failing. 
Declining resources in the Barents Sea, a rising Canadian dollar, high energy prices, and 
strong competition for the same fish from a rapidly expanding Chinese processing sector 
caused the price of Barents Sea cod to more than double in a matter of only a couple of 
years and most of the Newfoundland plants quickly becan1e unprofitable (Pitts 2006, 
Wall2006). 
A non-factor before the dawn of the 21 51 century, China has subsequently come to 
dominate the world's primary fish processing industry, accounting for about one third of 
global production (Kirby 2005, Lem 2006). The Chinese processing sector has expanded 
rapidly since 2002 on the strength of very generous loan conditions from the country's 
banks (Kirby 2005). China now has an overabundance of processing plants, most of 
which are primarily dependent on fish bought from the world market (ibid.). Whereas the 
Newfoundland primary processing sector has become highly capital intensive, most fish 
and shellfish that is shipped to China is processed by hand in large, gated factory 
complexes. Workers typically live in dormitories on site, working six day weeks about 
fifty weeks a year, often for as little as fifteen cents (Canadian) per hour (Kirby 2005). 
Although Chinese plants typically employ more than ten times the number of workers to 
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process the same amount of fish, labour costs are sufficiently low as to make them much 
more profitable than their rivals in Canada and elsewhere (Lem 2006, Pitts 2006). 
In 2004, FPI decided to shut down its Barents Sea cod processing facility in the 
community of Harbour Breton in Newfoundland' s Bay d'Espoir region. A year later, the 
closure was made permanent. This decision put about 350 people out of work, most of 
them in their fifties (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2006a). While the company 
cited the high cost of bringing the plant up to code as their main reason for its decision, 
many have speculated that it no longer deemed the processing of imported cod to be a 
profitable venture and simply wanted to rid itself of further responsibility to keep the 
plant operational (Callahan 2004). These accusations appeared to be substantiated shortly 
thereafter, when FPI stopped production at its last Barents Sea cod processing plant in 
Fortune on the west side of the Burin Peninsula. In the spring of 2006, the company 
indicated that it had no intention to reopen the plant and issued dismissal notices to 
another 345 people (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2006±). 
A similar fate befell FPI's final groundfish plant in Marystown on the eastern side 
of the Burin Peninsula. Once the jewel in the FPI crown, the multi-species trawler plant in 
Marystown employed more than 1200 people in the early 1990s and was serviced by 
dozens oftrawlers. This made it the undisputed economic anchor of the Burin Peninsula 
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2006c).73 In 1997, the company opted to transform 
the plant's operations to focus exclusively on yellowtail flounder, caught by a fleet of five 
of its own trawlers about two hundred kilometres from shore. FPI also formed a strategic 
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funding partnership with Fisheries and Oceans Canada in which the company would be 
responsible for carrying out research on yellowtail flounder which would then be 
transferred back to government scientists for analysis (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2000: 
11). 74 This reflects the broader trend toward devolving scientific responsibilities to the 
private sector that was described in the previous chapter. 75 
While the plant's workforce was reduced to about six hundred and fifty people, it 
hoped to remain competitive on the strength of a newly purchased line of highly 
specialized machinery designed for processing flounder and other flatfish. Steven, a 
manager at the plant whom I interviewed in the winter of 2004 expressed concerns that 
even with these changes, the plant remained highly vulnerable to competition from 
processors in China: 
All manufacturing is moving toward Asia like a shot out of a gun. You 
can' t compete with a country that has the option of paying workers 
basically only what they need to eat. You just have to try to differentiate 
yourself. You have to emphasize that Canadian fish is clean and pristine 
and comes from fresh, clear water. It's all marketing. The marketing 
people in North America are really going to eam their money over the next 
five years if Canadian fish companies are going to survive. But that' s not 
so easy anymore, because Chinese products are not what they used to be. 
Years ago, the quality just wasn't there, but now the quality is second to 
none and everything is done by hand, so there are no machines to service. 
For them, a breakdown only happens when somebody breaks their leg. 
This sentiment was echoed by George, a union representative at the plant, whom I 
interviewed a short time later. 
To get an idea of what we're competing against, we traveled to China to 
see how they do it. They use exclusively manual labour over there. The 
only machinery you see is the one that freezes the fillets. Other than that, it 
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is just lines and lines and lines of people. In China, they view machinery 
as expensive, but people are cheap. So they just hire hundreds of workers. 
When we got there, we couldn't believe what we saw. It was not what you 
would expect to see in a plant in a third world country. There were marble 
floors and everything was clean as a whistle. Their sanitation and hygiene 
was second to none. As a matter of fact, it was even stricter than it is in 
North America. The fact that China is a third world country still probably 
makes some people stay away, but if they could see it with their own eyes, 
we'd probably be in worse shape than we're in now. 
Both men's concerns soon proved warranted. In the spring of2006, FPI 
announced the Fortune and Marystown operations were losing the company about eleven 
million dollars per year (Fishery Products International, Ltd. 2006). It suggested that if 
the Marystown plant was to remain operational, a number of changes would have to be 
made. Namely, it called upon the government to introduce an early retirement program. 
At the time, the average age at the Marystown plant was fifty-nine. The company argued 
that removing the oldest workers from the industry would significantly reduce the number 
of people who would have to be laid off. Furthermore, it indicated that the union would 
have to make significant wage concessions as part of their new collective agreement. 
The company also wanted the FPI Act changed or abolished (ibid.). The Act was 
created in 1987, when the company was first privatized. It was a requirement imposed by 
the provincial government, which had helped to create the company three years earlier 
out of the ashes of four debt-ridden processing companies operating in the province. The 
purpose of the FP I Act was to ensure that the company continued to act in the best 
interests of rural Newfoundland, containing provisions that required fish caught by the 
company to be processed in the province and ensured that its ownership did not become 
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concentrated in too few hands. After the emergence of China as a serious competitor, the 
company began arguing that this legislation put it at a severe competitive disadvantage 
and called for the right to sell some of its undersized flounder to China for processing, 
which it already had done without authorization a short time earlier (Fishery Products 
International, Ltd. 2006, Pitts 2006). 
The company's demands were met with angry protests from the Fish Food and 
Allied Workers Union, as well as many of the workers at the Marystown and Fortune 
plants. In late March, workers occupied FPI's headquarters in St. John ' s and erected a 
Chinese flag as a statement about where the company's loyalties now seemed to lie 
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2006e). The event touched off a bitter series of 
labour negotiations in which the company sought to obtain a wage concession of $2.66 
per hour as a precondition for bargaining. It also proposed to downsize the Marystown 
plant's workforce by more than 100 people and reduce the number of weeks of 
employment provided to those who remained. The union's unwillingness to agree to these 
conditions has led to a standoff which prevented the plant from operating between 
December 2005 and 2008 (Herridge 2006a, 2006c). 
By 2004, the only industrial groundfish plant in Newfoundland that was 
continuing to try to compete directly with processors in China was the Icewater Seafoods 
Plant in Arnold's Cove at the head of Placentia Bay. The fact that it was the last 
remaining plant to pursue this seemingly unsustainable strategy is interesting, in light of 
the plant's unique history. For several decades, the plant was operated by National Sea 
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Products, Ltd., which is based in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. In the early 1970s, it served as 
a year round herring processing facility, employing about 20 all male workers in the 
cleaning, pickling and bottling fish caught by BC Packers seiners for export to 
Scandinavian markets. In the summer, an additional 40 to 60 male and female seasonal 
workers would be hired on to fillet cod that had been collected from inshore fishing 
communities along the southeast coast. The fish was then sent on to a larger National Sea 
plant in St. John's for further processing (Fishery Research Group 1986). 
In 1978 and 1979, the Arnold's Cove operation underwent a dramatic 
transformation. At that time, National Sea replaced the existing plant with a new highly 
mechanized plant that was capable of processing a wide variety of species, such as 
herring, mackerel, lumpfish, squid, capelin, flounder, sole, lobster, and scallops. The 
primary focus, however, would be on processing cod into varying sizes of fillets . By the 
early 1980s, the Arnold' s Cove plant employed about 200 people, and this rose to more 
than 325 by the middle of the decade (Fishery Research Group 1986). Soon thereafter, 
employment rose to an all time high of over 500 people, as National Sea closed down its 
other large operations in St. J olm' s and Burg eo and started processing all of its 
Newfoundland cod in Arnold's Cove (Fishery Research Group 1986; Sinclair 1986). The 
plant was serviced by three Nova Scotia-based trawlers during the winter, but also 
processed cod purchased from local harvesters during the summer and fall months 
(Fishery Research Group 1986: 440-441 ). 
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The new Arnold's Cove plant was designed to be a cutting edge processing 
facility, making use of a variety of high-end heading, cutting, skinning, sorting, and 
scanning machines made by companies such as Marel of Iceland and Baader of Germany 
(ibid: 464). Much like similar plants, the Arnold's Cove facility made use of a Taylorist 
approach, built upon quickly moving assembly lines that were equally dependent on both 
human and non-human elements (ibid: xii). The Arnold's Cove plant did, however, differ 
from other plants in a number of important respects. 
The aforementioned Fishery Research Group study in the mid 1980s found that, 
unlike the other two plants they studied, the Arnold's Cove plant had not developed an 
individual worker incentive system and continued to allow for more collaboration 
between workers (Fishery Research Group 1986: 53).76 The authors also found that, of 
the three, the Arnold ' s Cove plant had been most influenced by the so-called "Quality of 
Working Life" management approach, which among other things, suggested that workers 
should be given some power to make small decisions in the plant (ibid: 58). This, they 
suggest, is largely attributable to the fact that the manager in Arnold's Cove had 
developed a penchant for reading the biographies of successful business people and had 
been successful in promoting this alternative approach to his superiors at National Sea 
(ibid: 513). The authors of the study are, however, quick to point out that ultimate 
decision-making authority ultimately rested with management, noting: 
... by giving workers some power over the small decisions and reducing levels of 
stress and hostility in the workplace, the Arnold's Cove management style obscures 
both the fact that management continues to control all of the important decisions 
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and the fact that the control that workers do exercise over the small decisions, is a 
gift from management that may well either disappear or assume a dramatically 
different form in the future (ibid: 54). 
Even still, they did observe that this approach had contributed to generally better 
"working conditions" and "management-labour relations" than were present in most 
other plants they studied and concluded that this had contributed to "softer support" for 
the Fish, Food and Allied Workers Union (ibid: 54, 512). 
After the moratorium was declared, the National Sea plant in Arnold's Cove 
joined FPI plants in the region in deciding to process imported blocks of Barents Sea cod 
until the local fishery recovered. By 2001, however, with its profits slumping, National 
Sea announced its intention to sell the plant, citing its desire to divest itself of all of its 
primary processing interests and instead focus on secondary processing and marketing of 
its Highliner brand of frozen seafood and pasta entrees (Hilliard 2001 , Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador 2004). When it had still been unable to find a buyer by the 
end of 2003, it announced that it would seriously consider the possibility of shutting the 
plant down altogether (ibid.). 
To prevent the plant from closing and protect the nearly 400 jobs it provided, an 
agreement was reached whereby it would be sold to Bruce Warehan1, who had managed 
the plant for the entire thi1iy-five years that it had been owned by National Sea (Canadian 
Broadcasting Company 2004). He was a direct descendent of the Wareham merchant 
family77 which had dominated the fish trade in Placentia Bay before the resettlement 
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program of the 1960s and had established and run the first processing operation in 
Arnold's Cove before National Sea took control. 
The deal to keep the plant operating came with a number of stipulations, however, 
which were specified in a 2004 memorandum of understanding between National Sea, the 
Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador and Wareham's newly created Icewater 
Seafoods Company. It was agreed that the provincial government would invest $3.5 
million dollars to purchase the fish quotas (cod, flounder and halibut) and vessel licenses 
that were associated with the plant and lease them to Icewater Seafoods for twenty years 
at a nominal cost in exchange for 35,000 Preference II shares in the company (Auditor 
General ofNewfoundland and Labrador 2005). It was furthermore agreed that National 
Sea would have the first right to purchase fillets produced at the plant for use in their 
secondary processing operations in Lunenburg and that the company would agree to 
purchase all of its Canadian sourced raw materials from the Arnold's Cove plant. 78 
National Sea did, however, also leave itself the flexibility to buy the majority of its fillets 
from China and other locations outside of Canada. 
Wareham's willingness to keep the plant operational was also contingent upon 
workers voting in favour of a new collective agreement that would see them take a 35 
cent per hour pay cut and a 50 percent decrease in their vacation pay and give up their 
pension plan, all of their health benefits, their clothing allowances, and all of their non-
statutory holidays. Furthermore, the severance payments they would have received from 
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National Sea if the plant had closed down were instead incorporated into the sale price of 
the plant. 
Upon taking over the plant, the new ownership invested 2.2 million dollars in a 
brand new line of Marel processing equipment, including an experimental automated 
bone removal system which was capable of plucking out the fish 's pin bone, a process 
which had historically had to be carried out by hand. The new machinery was expected to 
accelerate the pace of production and expand the range of portion sizes the plant could 
produce, thereby making it more competitive internationally. It was furthermore hoped 
that Icewater could survive on much lower profit margins than could National Sea, since 
it is not a publicly traded company (Antle 2004). 
While accepting that these reforms may have been necessary in order to save their 
jobs, many of the employees I spoke to complained about the new working environment. 
Linda, who worked at the plant, described it as follows: 
We had no choice but to take that deal. They had us over a banel. But you 
can believe me, it's not much fun in there these days. They have to pay 
more and more for the fish so they are always putting more pressure on us 
to move faster and get better yields. We're always getting compared to 
China, but in China, they have thousands of people working in that one 
factory producing two hundred pounds of fish a day. We're expected to do 
twice that in an hour. The management mentions China all the time. It's all 
China, China, China. Everything they see on China in the paper gets cut 
out and put on the bulletin board so that we can see what we re competing 
against. It's gotten to the point where everyone in there is hurting 
physically, especially the women. Most people are in their fifties and 
sixties now. It has always been tough work, but at least before we had 
chiropractic benefits. When I first started in the seventies, a woman on the 
trimming line was probably expected to trim eighty-five to ninety pounds 
an hour. The past few years, with the imported cod and the new machinery, 
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they have to do three to five hundred pounds an hour. They have to stand 
in that one position for eight hours a day and that arm is going constantly. 
Since the new machines went in people are just tom apart trying to keep 
up. Their arms, their necks, their shoulders, even their elbows and their 
fingers. And every break, they are coming around with their papers telling 
you: "well you trimmed this much in the last two hours, and your yield 
was such and such." And if it is not good enough, they' ll tell you that in 
the next two hours you better bring it up ... Those machines tell them 
everything about everybody. Every pound of fish that goes down the line 
is coming up on the computer in their office. They know who processed it 
and who is responsible for any problems. And if it's you, you can bet 
you'll hear about it. And the worst part is that you know there are so many 
people on the waiting list that would love to take your job in a second if 
you can' t keep up. They may tell you they employ 400 people, but the 
reality is that half of them barely get any hours. So that pressure is always 
there. 
Many of these complaints were foreseen two decades earlier by the Fishery Research 
Group study (Fishery Research Group 1986; Neis and Williams 1987). Some trimmers 
complained that the constant emphasis on getting higher yields was particularly troubling 
in light of the fact that the fish coming in from the Barents Sea tended to be "bloodier" 
than was the case in previous years and this forced them to cut away more of the flesh. 
Furthermore, many of those interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the new 
machinery, arguing that the bone removal system was not working as well as had been 
anticipated and this was slowing down production significantly. 
In a further effort to boost productivity, the plant has introduced a new system of 
team-based management in which workers are evaluated in groups and are encouraged to 
police one another's behaviour. The new management framework was strongly 
influenced by a Kansas-based consulting company called Career Track which offers a 
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variety of seminars on encouraging team-building and improving managerial 
effectiveness. Among other things, the company's web site promises that their seminars 
will: build loyalty and commitment; teach new ways of motivating and criticizing 
employees; teach ways of dealing with crying and other "overemotional responses;" 
"harness natural competitiveness as a positive, powerful force;" identify and overcome 
the "anti-management attitude;" and teach people to work effectively to meet deadlines 
under pressure (Fred Pryor Seminars and Career Track 2007). Workers have been 
required to go away sporadically for training days, where they have been put through a 
series ofteam-building exercises designed to teach them this new approach. Several of 
the workers I interviewed were less than impressed with these activities. Linda explained: 
Those self-directed work teams work in the owner's mind and as long as 
he believes it and he's happy, then I guess that' s all that matters. He got all 
kinds of government money for training us, but usually all we do is sit in 
the church basement and play with macaroni. They also gave us all yellow 
pieces of paper and asked us to fill out something about our personalities 
and stuff like that. The thing is run by some high priced consultant and 
we'd all have to go see him in our teams. The packing department would 
go for four hours, and then the trimming department would go. And we 
even got a certificate at the end of it. We all became certified professional 
macaroni bridge builders. Laughs. 
The company has also recruited motivational speakers, including a retired National 
Hockey League player who showed the workers his Stanley Cup ring and stressed the 
importance of approaching their work with dedication and tenacity. 
The emphasis on shared responsibility in the managerial approach ofthe plant has 
strong affinities with that underpinning the participatory management approach that is 
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being introduced through the new approach to ocean governance being pursued by the 
Canadian federal government. The Icewater Seafoods managerial strategy is not merely 
intended to control the company' s workers. It is also intended to inspire them and to 
persuade them to internalize the goals of the company. While new fonns of electronic 
surveillance are enabling processing companies to micromanage workers to a degree 
never before thought possible, efforts are clearly also being made to create new 
subjectivities amongst the workers. Despite the small profit margin of the plant, its 
managers saw fit to recruit professional consultants and implement tean1-based 
management in an attempt to motivate workers to feel as though they are a part of 
something larger than themselves and to inspire them to internalize the broader goals of 
the company. That way, it was argued, they would become more responsible employees 
and would be more inclined to hold their co-workers accountable for their performance. 79 
These attempts to make workers see themselves as flexible, adaptable, 
accountable, and loyal subjects who identify personally with the goals of management is 
reminiscent of descriptions of similar managerial projects that have been provided by 
other anthropologists in recent years (Kondo 1990, Martin 1994, Wright 1994). Ironically, 
the idea that workers are part of a larger corporate team with shared interests and that 
their opinions matter stands in stark contrast to the harsh working conditions on the 
processing line, which most workers agreed had become progressively worse over time, 
and the growing sense of powerlessness that many plant workers expressed. 
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Despite the recent changes implemented by the company, serious questions 
remained about the capacity of the Icewater plant and other primary fish processing plants 
in the province to remain economically viable over the long haul. Icewater Seafoods was 
forced to lay off about 150 workers in January and February of2005 and the company 
has publicly expressed concerns about its capacity to remain competitive under current 
economic conditions (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005a). The irony of the 
situation is that the native cod population within Placentia Bay is widely believed to be 
the healthiest in Newfoundland. While the plant does operate its own trawler which has a 
small cod quota and it buys additional cod from harvesters across Newfoundland, this 
amounts to a small percentage of what is needed to keep the capital intensive operation 
running. so 
6.3 The Emergence of the Secondary Seafood Processing Industry 
Perhaps the most successful adaptation to the cod moratorium was undergone by 
the FPI plant in Burin, Newfoundland, which was the first and only plant in the province 
to focus exclusively on secondary processing. Ironically, this decision did not come about 
through the enlightened vision of the company, but as a result of a long-standing labour 
dispute between Fishery Products Ltd. (the largest of the four companies that later 
became FPI) and the employees of the plant. Efforts by the company to close down the 
Burin plant in 1982 and transfer the fish it processed to its newer plant in nearby 
Marystown were met with large public protests and road blockades (Woodworth 1983). 
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Tensions persisted over the next two years as the company proceeded with integrating the 
operations of the two plants. 
The conflict was finally resolved when Fishery Products, Ltd. agreed to build a 
new secondary processing facility in Burin to make use of the cod and other fish fillets 
that were being produced in Marystown and at other FPI trawler plants in Grand Bank, 
Fortune, Harbour Breton, Port Union, and Trepassey. The new plant was opened in 1987, 
just as the former crown corporation was being privatized (St-Jean 2002). Stan, a 
longstanding manager at the facility, explained the context in which the idea of secondary 
processing was initially conceived: 
If you look back to the mid 80s, I think it is safe to say that everybody: the 
company, the government, and the scientists thought we were going to 
have all this cod at our doorstep and it was going to continue to grow. The 
question was: "What on earth are we going to do with all of the cod we are 
going to gain access to now that the 200 mile limit has been declared and 
we don't have to compete with the foreign fleets anymore? How and 
where are we going to sell it all?" Nobody had any idea of what was to 
come. 
In the early years, the plant mainly produced products for the restaurant trade, 
particularly battered and breaded cod products, such as fish sticks and nuggets, breaded 
sole fillets and rolled and stuffed sole. While strong tariffs prevented them from 
competing in the US market, FPI intended to develop its business on the strength of 
markets within Canada and eventually capitalize on a growing demand in Japan. This 
focus would change significantly with the declaration ofthe groundfish moratorium and 
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the enactment ofthe North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1980s, 
which made the US market accessible for the first time (McDougall 1988). 
In the absence of locally sourced groundfish, the company began to turn to 
overseas sources for their raw materials. This trend continued over the course of the 
decade that followed and the plant is now almost entirely dependent on imported fish. In 
2004 and 2005, their products typically consisted of some combination of pollock, 
flounder and crab from Alaska; haddock from the Faroe Islands, Denmark, and Poland; 
cod from Russia; aquacultured salmon from Chile; and aquacultured shrimp and scallops 
from various countries in Asia, Central and South America, most of which pass through 
China for primary processing en route to Burin. Only about 20 percent of the fish and 
shellfish they use is taken from Canadian waters (St.-Jean 2002). 
While the plant is still active in the restaurant trade, the majority of their products 
have been sold through specific chains or product lines. At any given time, the 200 or so 
workers at the Burin plant may be found churning out a wide range of different frozen 
fish products on their two production lines. Most end up on grocery store shelves at major 
chains across Canada, the United States, and Europe under brand names such as Our 
Compliments, No Name, Smart Choice and President's Choice. The plant also produces 
all of the McDonald's Fillet-0-Fish patties consumed in Canada. Whereas in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, they were made entirely from Newfoundland cod, since the 
moratorium, they have been made entirely from Alaskan Pollock. 
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One of the largest clients of the plant is pop singer Jimmy Buffett. Though most 
famous for wasting away in Margaritaville, Mr. Buffett has emerged as an influential 
player in the global seafood industry. His chains of Margaritaville Cafes and 
Cheeseburger in Paradise family restaurants have become fixtures south of the border. 
Buffett, who coincidently has ancestral ties to the south coast ofNewfoundland,81 now 
operates forty-two successful restaurants in nineteen states (Smith 2005). He has, 
furthermore, used his restaurants to launch a popular line of pre-packaged frozen seafood 
entrees, most of which are produced at the FPI plant in Burin. The products are sold at 
Costco stores throughout the US under the slogan "because man cannot live by 
cheeseburger alone" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2006b ). 
On a snowy December day in 2004, I had the opportunity to tour the Burin plant 
just as a new batch of Buffet's "Margaritaville Island Lime" shrimp was rolling down the 
line. I joked with my tour guide that the people who eventually ate them would probably 
never guess which island their shrimp actually came from. Unfortunately for the people 
ofBurin, in December of2006, Buffett released a statement declaring that he had opted to 
join a number of other celebrities in supporting the Humane Society of America's boycott 
of all Canadian seafood products as a protest against the annual seal hunt. According to 
his web site, Buffett proudly serves as the chairman of the Save the Manatee Club of 
Florida and is now hoping to build upon that legacy by championing the rights of all 
marine mammals and other "creatures in the crosshairs" (Buffett 2006). 
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The irony is that the question of whether those island lime shrimp are in fact a 
Canadian seafood product at all is a matter of some debate. Most of the shrimp are raised 
in large-scale aquaculture operations in Thailand before being sent to factories in China 
for primary processing. They are then shipped on large Icelandic container ships to 
Newfoundland where they are battered, cooked, frozen and packaged and then trucked to 
the United States market. It has yet to be seen whether Buffett and company will 
eventually take advantage of this loophole to continue their association with Burin. 
Despite the challenges Mr. Buffet's stance will present for the Burin plant, its reliance on 
a diverse array of internationally sourced seafood products and export markets has made 
the plant quite resilient by the recent standards of the industry. Even still, the plant 
remains at the mercy of high transportation costs and is vulnerable to competition from 
other secondary processing plants around the world. 
6.4 Epilogue 
Since the completion of this research, the processing sector on the south coast of 
Newfoundland has experienced further turmoil. In 2006, the labour standoff between 
workers and managers at FPI's primary processing facilities continued, and the Harbour 
Breton, Fortune, and Marystown processing plants remained closed for the entire year. In 
December, FPI tabled a second offer that proposed a wage cut of $2.00 per hour, along 
with severe benefits rollbacks, including concessions on overtime, statutory holidays, 
floating holidays, and vacations, but it was soundly rejected, with 98 percent of all voting 
FF A W members voting against it (Knott 2007). 
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Faced with growing financial instability and rising tensions with its workforce, 
Fishery Products International (FPI) began entertaining offers for the sale of its assets. In 
January, the first bid was made by Bill Barry, CEO of the Comer Brook-based processing 
giant The Barry Group. Barry had already purchased the Harbour Breton plant in 
November with a view to transforming it into a processing facility for redfish and now 
sought to take over the remainder of the company' s assets, including its sizeable offshore 
quotas for a variety of species (Hunt 2006; Brautigam 2007; McArthur and Pitts 2007). 
Barry had expressed interest in FPI's assets seven months earlier, but had been rebuffed 
at the time (Mac Vicar 2007). In the month that followed, additional bids came in from 
several other companies. 
While FPI's board of directors reached an agreement in principle to accept the 
Barry Group' s offer, the sale was vetoed by the Government ofNewfoundland and 
Labrador (McArthur and Pitts 2007). Any sale of the company' s assets required the 
approval of the provincial government under the terms of the FP I Act, which was put into 
place when FPI was re-privatized in the 1980s (Brautigam 2007, Mac Vicar 2007). The 
provincial government deemed that the Barry Group offer would be less beneficial to the 
people of the province and ordered FPI to work out a deal instead with another company: 
Ocean Choice International (McArthur and Pitts 2007). Ocean Choice is owned by the 
Penney Group, which is itself owned by Newfoundland-based shipping and fish 
processing magnate Ches Penney. Despite protests from FPI's board of directors, who 
argued that it was inappropriate for the provincial government to meddle in the affairs of 
217 
private companies, they eventually complied and an agreement to sell most ofFPI's 
assets and fishing quotas to Ocean Choice was reached on April 30, 2007. The only 
exceptions were the FPI secondary processing facilities in Burin, Newfoundland and 
Danvers, Massachusetts, which were instead sold to National Sea's High Liner Seafoods 
ofNova Scotia. The sale agreements also stipulated that all of the existing plants must 
remain operational and in their present locations for at least five years after the sale was 
finalized (Roberts 2007). 
A month later, a tentative three year collective bargaining agreement was reached 
with FPI plant workers, pending completion of the sale. The agreement still involved a 46 
cent per hour pay cut for workers, but this was far less than the $2.66 cut originally 
offered by FPI (Herridge 2007a; Roberts 2007). While 61 percent voted in favour of the 
agreement, two plants voted against it, including workers at the Burin Secondary 
Processing facility, where 97 percent voted against the deal, refusing to accept any wage 
cuts. They also staged a brief wildcat strike to protest the sale of the plant to High Liner, 
fearing that their jobs could soon be deemed redundant (Herridge 2007a). This fear may 
be justified, since the Burin and Danvers FPI plants have long been in direct competition 
with the High Liner secondary processing plant in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia, and the 
possibility exists that deteriorating market conditions may eventually lead the company to 
close down the Bmin plant. 
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6.5 Participatory Ocean Planning and the Plight of Fish Processing Workers 
The problems faced by workers in the fish processing industry highlight the fact 
that the interests of fish processing workers need to be understood as being considerably 
different from those of their employers and those of fish harvesters. Whereas fishers 
prospered on the strength of high shellfish prices and the freedom to sell to the highest 
bidder, many processing workers found themselves in an increasingly precarious position, 
relying on fish shipped in from distant locales and having to compete with plants in China 
and elsewhere that are able to take advantage of much lower labour costs. This, in 
combination with the desires of their employers to remain profitable, puts severe 
downward pressure on the wages and benefits of these workers and, in some cases, has 
resulted in the complete loss of their livelihoods. 
Primary fish processing workers, most of whom are women, appear ill-equipped 
to represent their interests in newly emerging participatory ocean management forums. 
Unlike plant managers, who have often been given a token seat at the table in such 
discussions, processing workers are generally seen as being only indirectly connected to 
the ocean and they are therefore not considered ocean stakeholders. This echoes the 
findings ofOttenheimer (1993), Porter (1993), Neis (1999a), Wright (2001) and Power 
(2005) that the sexual division of labour in Newfoundland has also often been viewed as a 
division between land and sea-based economic activities and this has contributed to an 
underrepresentation of women in decision-making forums. This alienation of processing 
workers from the sea that surrounds them is even more apparent in cases where plants are 
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relying on fish that does not even originate in Canadian waters. Thus, to the extent that 
the perspective of processing workers is to be considered under Oceans Act inspired 
management frameworks, it is likely to be represented by their employers, a scenario 
which masks the hierarchical nature of processing plants and presumes that a 
homogenous "industry perspective" is, in fact, possible. 
At the time when this research was carried out, the position of secondary fish 
processors in Burin appeared to be more secure (Kirby 2005). China had not become a 
prominent player in this sector, and most of those interviewed indicated that their 
working conditions had not deteriorated over time. If the concerns of most workers at the 
plant are to be believed, however, their security may be severely threatened by the sale of 
the plant to High Liner. Regardless, workers at the plant will have little hope of 
participating directly in oceans management planning committees, since virtually all of 
their products make use of internationally sourced seafood, which is likely to be deemed 
to be outside of the Newfoundland ecosystem. Thus although the majority of 
Newfoundland's fish processing workers were raised in fishing communities and have 
worked in the seafood industry for their entire adult lives, they will be no more able to 
make a legitimate claim to the sea than any other residents of Canada. 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
While the emergence of the crab fishery lessened the blow of the cod moratorium 
for many fishers and seafood marketing companies, it has provided far fewer hours of 
employment for fish processing workers than was available in previous eras and has, 
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therefore, had a much less positive economic impact on their lives. As an alternative, 
some plants along Newfoundland's southeast coast have come to depend on 
internationally sourced fish in order to keep their operations going. This approach has 
proven to be immensely challenging, however, particularly in the face of rising 
competition from processing plants in China which have been able to operate much less 
expensively. 
While Newfoundland's coastal towns have been at the mercy of distant market 
forces for hundreds of years, it is difficult to see the situation presently faced by 
processing plant workers as anything but new. Although most have lived their entire lives 
beside what were arguably the richest cold water fishing grounds in the world, their future 
would now appear to be more closely tied to currency markets, energy prices, and the 
success of the Humane Society boycott than to the health of the ocean at their doorstep. 
While some successes have been apparent in the secondary processing sector, it is only 
responsible for about two hundred jobs and questions remain about the capacity of rural 
Newfoundland plants to compete globally in the secondary processing sector in the years 
to come. 
The immense uncertainty and conflict that have characterized the fish processing 
industry in recent years provide an important reminder that the concerns of workers are 
often quite different from those of their employers and those of fishers. Thus, allowing 
either of these groups to speak on their behalf in participatory management institutions 
has the effect of silencing them, and marginalizing many of the issues of greatest 
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importance to them. It remains to be seen how, if at all, the interests of fish processing 
workers will be incorporated into emerging participatory management institutions, but 
committees that have been created in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland and elsewhere 
suggest that a single plant manager or owner may be given the authority to speak as the 
official voice of the processing industry. The fact that many processing workers are now 
reliant on fish species that are imported from other parts of the world suggests that they 
will be even less likely to be able to make a legitimate claim to being an ocean 
"stakeholder." Thus, processing workers, much like the non-core harvesters discussed in 
the previous chapter, appear to be in serious danger of being shut out of the new 
democratic institutions that will govern the regions in which they live in the years to 
come. 
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Chapter 7 Rules of Engagement: Reactions to Ocean Management in the Offshore 
Petroleum Industry 
This chapter examines the ways in which the new policy regime brought about by 
the Oceans Act was received by senior managers and consultants working in the offshore 
petroleum industry. It explores the ongoing efforts of the Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers (CAPP) to lobby the federal government to implement policy 
reforms that would speed up regulatory approval processes and make Newfoundland a 
more attractive location in which to do business and then draws upon interview data and 
published materials in identifying the main concerns about new ocean policies that have 
been expressed by members of the petroleum industry. The final section describes some 
of the strategies that have been employed by CAPP and its member companies in an 
effort to engage with this new policy regime and to ensure that it takes shape in a way 
that is accommodating of their concerns. It also looks at the recent movement by some in 
the industry to embrace the discourse of "Corporate Social Responsibility" and exan1ines 
some ofthe efforts they have made to promote themselves as socially and 
environmentally responsible corporate citizens who are committed to the concept of 
sustainable development. 
7.1 The Offshore Petroleum Industry in Newfoundland 
In 1965, oil exploration was initiated on the Grand Banks. For several decades 
prior to that point, offshore finds in other parts of the world had fuelled speculation that 
the Grand Banks might contain oil and, in anticipation of a new discovery, Premier Joey 
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Smallwood made a claim to all sub-sea resources on behalf of Newfoundland shortly after 
it entered confederation. In spite of the promising geology of the area, most companies 
stayed away in these early years, due in large measure to extremely rough water, 
inclement weather, dense fog, and the annual threat of collisions with large icebergs 
drifting southward from Greenland. The fact that there was an abundance of more easily 
accessible sites in other parts of the world diminished interest even further (Hamilton and 
Seyfrit 1994). Although some experimental drilling did take place and a few small 
deposits were found, none were deemed sufficiently large to develop at that time. As oil 
prices rose precipitously with the oil shocks of the 1970s, however, interest in the area 
grew and exploration activity began to increase (ibid.). 
The first major oil find on the Grand Banks was discovered in 1979, when the 
Hibernia well was drilled about 320 kilometres east of St. John' s (ibid.). Initial estimates 
forecasted that the field contained six hundred and sixty-six million recoverable barrels of 
oil, but subsequent estimates indicate that it may actually be 20 percent larger (Hamilton 
and Seyfrit 1994; Tutton 2005). The recognition that the Hibernia field was a very 
significant find, in combination with the subsequent discovery of the Terra Nova and 
White Rose fields in 1984, sparked tensions between the provincial and federal 
governments over who owned the resource (Slade 2003). A long and often bitter dispute 
between Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and the new Newfoundland Premier Brian 
Peckford dragged on tlu·ough the early 1980s (Thorne 1985). 82 Although the Supreme 
Court of Canada eventually sided with the federal government, arguing that it was 
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entitled to the same rights as all other coastal states under international law, the province 
was successful in negotiating shared jurisdiction over the resource under a new "Atlantic 
Accord" (Slade 2003 ). This agreement was entrenched by the passing of the 1985 
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act and the creation of a jointly 
managed Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NOPB), later renamed the 
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB), to oversee 
the industry (Davis 2001).83 The board was, in turn, given the authority to establish new 
statutes and regulations to govern the various stages in the life-cycle of an offshore 
petroleum project, namely geophysical or "seismic" exploration, exploratory and 
delineation drilling, development, production, and decommissioning. The boards also 
have a range of additional responsibilities in the areas of environmental protection and 
health and safety and over the economic benefits derived to Newfoundland and Labrador 
from the industry (ibid.). 
Fluctuating oil prices in the late 1980s stalled negotiations over whether to move 
forward with the Hibernia project, but an agreement was finally reached to develop the 
field in 1990 and it came into production in 1997 (Hamilton and Seyfrit 1994 ). This was 
followed by the commencement of production at the Terra Nova and White Rose fields in 
2002 and 2005 respectively. All three fields are located in close proximity to each other 
in what is known as the Jean d'Arc Basin and, together, they typically produce about 
350,000 barrels of oil per day (Harding and Cattaneo 2007). A fourth commercial 
discovery in the same area, named Hebron-Ben Nevis has also been identified, but 
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development of the field has been slowed by a bitter, long-running dispute over revenue 
distribution between the Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador and the largest 
shareholders in the project, Chevron Resources and Exxon-Mobil (Cattaneo 2005; 
Brautigam 2006; Chase and Ebner 2006). An agreement between the two sides was 
fmally reached in August of2007, however, and construction is slated to begin on a new 
platform for the project in 2010 (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2007). 
While many people in rural Newfoundland struggled in the aftern1ath of the cod 
moratorium, urban areas in and around St. John's boomed during the 1990s on the 
strength of the emerging petroleum industry. St. John's, which is located very close to 
Newfoundland ' s most easterly point, has always had a symbiotic, if unequal, relationship 
with rural areas of the province. With the decline ofthe migratory fishery in the early 
1800s, merchants based there gradually began to play a more significant role in the 
coastal fishery, eventually taking over completely from those based in Europe. By the 
time Newfoundland received its independence in the 1830s, St. John' s had emerged as the 
capital city and the undisputed commercial centre of the island, manufacturing clothing, 
household goods, and fishing gear for the domestic market (Wright 2001). The existing 
urban infrastructure in St. John' s, along with its relative proximity to the offshore oil 
fields made it the logical choice as a supply centre for offshore oil projects (Jacques 
Whitford Consultants 2005). Accordingly, the commencement of oil production brought a 
significant injection of capital into the city. It has been estimated that, between 2001 and 
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2005 alone, the petroleum industry added about 1.6 billion dollars to the St. John's 
economy (Warson 2005). 
The rise of the oil industry has also helped to spur on the development of a 
number of other maritime industries, particularly those focusing on ocean-related science 
and technology. Recent years have seen the emergence of extensive local expertise in a 
variety of marine and ocean technology fields, including: hydrographic services and 
seismic survey mapping, engineering for cold-ocean and ice-affected environments, 
vessel design, hydrodynamic research and testing, remote sensing, marine 
communications, the development of navigational aids, aquaculture development, and 
marine biotechnology.84 Much of the expertise that has driven these industries has been 
developed in association with Memorial University ofNewfoundland, particularly its 
Marine Institute and its Ocean Sciences Centre, and through the Institute for Ocean 
Technology of the National Research Council, which is also located on the Memorial 
campus (National Research Council 1998; Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador 
2002). 
Together, these developments have brought sweeping changes to the capitc;tl. The 
downtown core is now dotted with new restaurants and boutiques, and weathered 
Victorian row houses have been gentrified and resold at much higher prices. On the 
outskirts of the city, big box stores and suburban sprawl are rapidly overtaking forests and 
wetlands. Housing starts skyrocketed, fuelled in part by people from economically 
depressed rural areas who are flooding into the city to find employment. The St. John's 
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metropolitan area has grown steadily over the last two decades and, as of January, 2006, 
it contained 181,584 people, about one third of the province 's total of 514, 409 
(Government of Canada, Department of Finance 2006). 
The importance of the "new oceans economy" has been seized upon by the St. 
John's city council and used in a new marketing campaign. In 2004 the longstanding 
slogan "St. John's: City of Legends" was replaced with a new one: "St. John's: Centre of 
Ocean Excellence." The slogan was accompanied by a glitzy new promotional campaign, 
which sought to present the city as a world class ocean technology centre. Whereas the 
"City of Legends" brochures harkened back to a romantic past, emphasizing the 
"colourful history of fishing villages, pirates, sailors and soldiers," "traditional songs and 
dances," and the "friendly faces that wait to greet you," the "Centre of Ocean Excellence" 
campaign takes a very different approach. The new brochure describes St. John's as "an 
Atlantic hub for culture, promise and progress" and stresses the need to "use our strength 
and skill to harness the ocean to its full potential." The document's section headings 
reinforce this pro-development tone, employing such phrases as "Mastering the Sea," 
"Charting a Course for Success," "An Ocean of Opportunity" and "A Port of Potential" 
(City of St. John's 2004). 
The challenge for the future will be in keeping oil revenues flowing (Harding 
2006). All existing commercial fields are located relatively close to one another and, 
despite continued drilling, the Newfoundland offshore area has failed to yield any new 
commercially significant finds in the last two decades. While some oil reserves have been 
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discovered close to shore on the west coast of the island, and the coast of Labrador is 
known to contain significant deposits of natural gas, neither area has been brought into 
production. In the latter case, this is largely due to very difficult winter ice conditions, 
and the very high risk of collision with icebergs in the spring. 
There is hope that new drilling programs in areas that had previously been 
avoided by companies because of difficult exploration conditions or jurisdictional 
disputes could yield new commercial discoveries, but this possibility remains unproven 
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005e). Heavy exploration activity is currently 
underway in the Orphan Basin, to the north of the Jean d'Arc Basin and in the Laurentian 
Channel, which lies between Newfoundland and Nova Scotia (Cattaneo 2004; Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2005g; Stevenson 2006; Harding and Cattaneo 2007). While 
the proven oil reserves on the Grand Banks are expected to be exhausted over the next 
two or three decades, there is hope that newly emerging technologies will make it 
possible to drill for and produce oil in deeper and rougher water and could yield 
additional major finds (Baird 2006). 
7.2 The Push for Regulatory Streamlining in the Offshore Petroleum Sector 
In addition to the Atlantic Accord legislation, offshore petroleum companies that 
operate in Atlantic Canada are subject to a variety of additional laws, which require them 
to gain authorization from other federal and provincial departments. Since oil and gas 
projects invariably engage in some forms of "ocean dumping," approvals have to be 
sought through Environment Canada. Since they invariably destroy fish habitat, approvals 
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must also be obtained from Fisheries and Oceans Canada' s Habitat Management Branch. 
If foreign workers are employed in any part of the project, further approvals are required 
from Human Resources Development Canada and the Canada Revenue Agency, and so 
on. 
Many companies have long complained that the regulatory environment in 
Atlantic Canada is among the more cumbersome in the world, and that the slow pace at 
which the process moves is making the area significantly less competitive internationally 
and less capable of attracting new investment. These delays, it is often stressed, can be 
very costly; adding to what is already an expensive area in which to operate. Keith, a 
senior executive at the Hibernia Management and Development Company, which is now 
owned primarily by Exxon-Mobil, described the investment climate in offshore 
Newfoundland as follows: 
There is potential here without question, and obviously geological 
prospectivity is important. Leaving that aside, however, there are still a 
number of problems. This is still a relatively remote area of the world, so 
the local infrastructure is lacking. You don' t have an active rig market or a 
supply vessel fleet just waiting to be tapped into like some other areas do. 
It all has to be brought in ... It is also a very harsh environment in which to 
operate, so it is a very high cost environment, as opposed to somewhere 
like West Africa, where we' re also very active. Our offshore environment 
here is such that you need to invest in big expensive projects in order to 
make any money, and you need big companies operating these big projects, 
because they are so high risk. You're not going to get your mom and pop 
operations investing in offshore Newfoundland. For a company as big as 
ours, however, it can be advantageous to invest here, because it has the 
potential for some very big prizes. It has lots of other advantages as well. 
It has security. It has political stability. It has a fairly well educated work 
force. You've got some skilled people here. And, the fiscal environment is 
fairly competitive ... Considering that it is such a high risk and high cost 
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place to operate, however, it is very important that the fiscal terms reflect 
that. 
Keith and several of his colleagues described Newfoundland as a "high risk, high reward" 
area for offshore petroleum exploration and development. In order to have any hope of 
finding oil, companies must invest in highly specialized equipment and be willing to drill 
multiple exploration wells. This can be an expensive and time consuming process. As a 
result, exploration in offshore waters has generally been restricted to large multinational 
companies, often working in consortia with one another. Thus far, the central players 
have included: Exxon-Mobil; Chevron; Conoco-Phillips; Royal Dutch/Shell; Norsk 
Hydro; along with Canadian-based companies Petro-Canada and Husky. 
Since the late 1990s, the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) 
and its member companies have been lobbying for policy reforms that would streamline 
the regulatory process and make it easier for projects to move ahead in a timely manner. 
The preference frequently articulated by CAPP is a "one window" approach, in which the 
C-NLOPB would serve as the liaison point between companies and other government 
agencies and could work to ensure that the seasonal business cycle of the industry does 
not encounter any extended or unnecessary delays. CAPP has also been a strong advocate 
for so-called "performance-based" or "smart" regulations, which are less prescriptive and 
allow for greater flexibility in their implementation. Companies have frequently made the 
argument that, since technologies and operations used in the industry change so quickly, 
it is important to have a regulatory framework that is capable of rapidly adapting to these 
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changes. Mark, a senior CAPP employee based in St. John's, described the move toward 
performance-based regulations as follows: 
The push toward performance-based regulations seems to be gaining steam 
around the world, particularly in industries that are more capital and 
technology intensive. The nature of the technology and the high capital 
investment requires you to react within a relatively short time frame, and a 
heavily prescriptive environment really slows your progress. In a more 
flexible environment, you can undertake a lot more activity in a much 
shorter time frame. The more flexible you are with your regulations, the 
easier and quicker it tends to be to undertake your activity. Instead of 
saying 'thou shalt produce a well with such and such a rig ' and then giving 
you a big checklist of things you need to do, smart regulations will just say: 
'you will be permitted to drill a well, provided that you submit an 
appropriate drilling program.' That leaves it up to the operator to decide 
how they plan to drill and what they intend to drill with. Then the regulator 
either approves it or it doesn't. That can, however, present a challenge for 
the regulator, because they have got to be more in tune with business and 
the technology and understand what is being proposed to them ... So you 
have to have smart regulators as well. 
Smart regulations typically require a much closer working relationship between 
government and industry, and companies are often invited to play key roles in the 
monitoring and data collection processes associated with regulating their activities. 
In 2002, CAPP's efforts started to bear fruit. That year, the federal government 
announced the convening of the Atlantic Energy Roundtable, which is comprised of "four 
federal and three provincial ministers together with support from senior representatives 
from the petroleum industry and government and regulatory bodies" (Erlandson and 
Associates 2003: 2). The Roundtable was given a mandate to "identify challenges facing 
the offshore petroleum industry and look for ways to improve regulatory efficiency and 
encourage increased investment and local involvement" (ibid: 2). These negotiations have, 
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in turn, given rise to a number of regulatory changes in the Newfoundland industry, 
including new, more "smart" or "performance-based" drilling, production and 
conservation regulations and a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding signed by several 
regulating agencies, which was designed to reduce the time needed by companies to 
obtain regulatory approvals. 
7.3 Petroleum Industry Concerns about the Oceans Act 
While many in the industry were pleased with the federal government's openness 
to the idea of moving toward smart regulations, some were deeply unsettled about the 
Oceans Act and Canada's Oceans Strategy and had serious concerns about how this new 
agenda was going to influence the regulatory process. Since the Oceans Act was intended 
to serve as an overarching piece of legislation, some worried that it could "destabilize" or 
even supersede the existing structure and undermine their push to develop a more 
streamlined approach (Luff2002: 5). When I first met many ofthese individuals in 2001, 
suspicions were growing about what form the new oceans agenda would take and what 
impact it would have on existing and future operations. There was little sense of urgency 
at the time, however, since it was widely known that the Oceans Directorate in Ottawa 
had not received any new funding to move the agenda forward. While the proponents of 
the Oceans Act agenda in Ottawa at that time were taking pains to explain that it would 
not significantly interfere with the existing regulatory regime, many people in the 
industry remained unconvinced. When I met with several of these same people again two 
years later as part of my dissertation research, I sought to revisit the question of why this 
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new approach to managing the ocean had been seen as a threat and how, if at all, 
members of the local petroleum industry had attempted to engage with it in the 
intervening years. 
In 2003 and 2004, I carried out a series of confidential interviews with senior 
members of CAPP, Exxon-Mobil, the Hibernia Management and Development Company, 
Petro-Canada, Husky Energy, the petroleum and fishing industry liaison group "One 
Ocean," and several independent petroleum industry consultants in an attempt to 
understand their concerns about the emerging federal ocean policy regime and understand 
the ways in which they were responding to it. All but one of these individuals were men, 
and most preferred that I meet them in their offices, most of which were located in 
downtown office buildings and featured large solid wood desks and panoramic views of 
the St. John's harbour. I was generally required to sign in with a receptionist, who was a 
woman in each case, and then wait for my prospective interviewee to greet me in the 
lobby. The individual would then escort me to his office, often pausing to pw1ch in one or 
more security codes along the way. A few people suggested that we meet after work 
instead, generally in downtown restaurants, bars, or coffee shops where they felt free to 
speak more candidly. I also carried out participant observation at several petroleum 
industry-related workshops and conferences over this same period, usually at the 
invitation of one of my earlier contacts. The remainder of this section discusses the three 
main concerns people in the industry voiced about the policy shift ushered in by the 
Oceans Act. These are: 1) the possibility that it will create further regulatory delays; 2) 
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the possibility that it could lead to a downloading of additional costs onto private 
companies; and 3) the possibility that it could expose them to greater criticism from 
individuals and organizations who express hostility toward their industry. 
7.3.1 Regulatory Delays 
The largest single concern voiced by individuals working in the offshore 
petroleum industry was that such an ambitious new policy framework could add to the 
already slow process of gaining regulatory clearance to undertake exploration and 
development activities. Mark from CAPP explained: 
We're certainly not against the Oceans Act. It' s hard for anybody to argue 
with the concept of integrated management. But there are still a lot of 
sceptics in our membership who see this as an additional layer of 
bureaucracy where one isn't really needed. To this point, we've dealt 
mainly with the Petroleum Board in undertaking our activities and it has 
been working reasonably well. A lot of people believe that the areas where 
we undertake our activities are already well protected through the current 
regulatory regime that we work under. We're not shying away from 
regulation, but we certainly don't really think there need to be undue levels 
of regulation or duplication of effort by different agencies. With the 
Oceans Act, you're bringing in a whole new group that one has to deal 
with and many don't see how that can bring any real efficiency to the 
process. 
These sentiments were echoed by Tony, who had been actively involved in developing 
and managing the Hibernia project. 
I don't think we really see the Oceans Act as a big threat, but we will if it 
is implemented in a way that turns things upside down. Hopefully they 
won't go too far down that road. It is going to take a Jot of hours and a lot 
of meetings and it's not exactly clear what the real benefit of it is. Right 
now, we're all doing our own thing and, so far, it kind of works. They may 
have all the best designs in the world, but if there is a lack of recognition 
about what is already out there, then you're going to end up with a lot of 
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redundancy and a lot of resentment. What you end up getting is an added 
burden, a less efficient process, more time, more consultations, more 
meetings, but not necessarily more effectiveness. Hopefully they will leave 
the regulations to the regulators and focus on those few critical issues that 
truly relate to the interfaces between industries. You know; if it ain't broke, 
don't fix it. 
Another concern was that Fisheries and Oceans had provided very little 
clarity about how the idea of "the precautionary principle," expressed in the 
Oceans Act as "the precautionary approach," would be interpreted and applied in 
practice. 85 There was particular concern that sweeping cutbacks to federal ocean 
science budgets in recent years could make it impossible for environmental 
assessments to be performed in a timely manner and this could slow the process 
down considerably. This point was clearly articulated in a letter written by 
CAPP's Vice President of Stewardship and Public Affairs to the FOC Assistant 
Deputy Minister responsible for the Oceans Act in 2002: 
Unreasonable expectation of the precautionary principle . . . could cause 
unnecessary delays and excessive costs for proposed offshore activities or 
developments. Because of the conflicting scientific data base available for 
managers to make decisions about the implications of offshore activities 
(in the context of determining effects at the ecosystem level) there is a risk 
that financial constraints within government could be used as a reason for 
not allowing an activity to proceed or for deferring a decision. 
This argument suggests that the neoliberal restructuring of the federal government in the 
1990s may have left it without the capacity to effectively assess whether or not a 
particular activity should be allowed to go ahead in a given location. Some worried that 
their activities could be prevented from going ahead without sufficient justification. A 
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similar argument was made about FOC's newly granted power to create marine protected 
areas. There was concern that the agency did not have the baseline science to effectively 
determine which "ecosystems" would be designated for protection. Thus, there was a risk 
that certain oil or natural gas development projects could be derailed by an MPA after 
companies had already invested considerable amounts of time, energy and resources in 
that area. CAPP has taken the position that, if land that had already been leased to a 
petroleum company is designated as the site for a marine protected area, the company in 
question should be compensated accordingly. Mark noted: 
If a company spent millions in acquiring the licence and did some activity 
and all of a sudden, someone puts a MPA on top of it and we can't do 
work anymore, then somebody is going to have to compensate us, because 
the government gave us the right to have that licence. 
Some petroleum company representatives said that the onus should be on the federal 
government to identify areas that they are considering for MP As well ahead of time in 
order to save companies from having to go through the entire approval process only to 
learn that they could not carry out exploration or development activities in the area in 
question. One said that the federal government should invest resources into carrying out 
the baseline science needed to accelerate the process of designating MP As, so that 
companies can operate in a "climate of certainty." When I presented this argument to an 
employee of FOC in St. John's, however, he laughed and replied that they could just as 
easily say that the industry should be forced to determine all of the areas in which they 
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could possibly wish to drill in the future, so the federal government would know which 
areas to focus their attention on. 
7.3.2 Downloading 
Another concern was that through their failure to supply adequate resources for 
the implementation of the Oceans Act, the federal government was forcing the private 
sector to bear an inordinate share of the costs associated with ocean management. At the 
time of interviewing, the injection of federal funding that accompanied the release of 
Canada's Oceans Action Plan had yet to be announced. Thus, all federal funding in 
support of the Oceans Act mandate was being diverted from existing Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada program budgets. Many of those interviewed felt that this signified a lack 
of commitment to making integrated management work on the part of the federal 
government. Instead they seemed content to rely on funding partnerships with non-
government agencies in order to move this new agenda forward. Mark from CAPP 
explained: 
What we're noticing in recent federal budgets is that there is not a lot of 
money being put into the Oceans Act. In the overarching DFO budget, it is 
a pittance compared to the other areas that are being funded. So, what does 
that really signal? Is the federal government really committed? Because if 
they are, they should fund it accordingly. 
This sentiment was also expressed at a FOC-CAPP joint workshop on Canada' s Oceans 
Strategy in 2003. The summary report that emerged from the workshop stated CAPP's 
concern that: "Public expectations being set about the importance of Canada's Oceans 
Strategy do not mesh with the resources being made available to deliver on those 
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expectations" and their belief that " ... it will be difficult to convince non-government 
partners that they should bear costs of the implementation process, if the government has 
not placed a priority on it internally" (Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers 2003: 13 ). 
A further concern was that, since the petroleum industry is widely perceived as 
being extremely wealthy, they could be asked to pay a disproportionate share of the costs 
associated with integrated ocean management plans. Mark noted: 
People look around the table and have a tendency to view us as the big 
industrialists with the deep pockets. We are often viewed that way, so we 
always have to overcome that type of stigma. We are often involved in 
discussions where people will say: ' Well the oil and gas industry has deep 
pockets, so they should pay for that.' We hear that quite often. 
What those people failed to realize, he suggested, was that those people who work in the 
industry in St. John's do not have unlimited budgets with which to work, and do not have 
the financial wherewithal or incentive to fund what most of them believed should be 
government-funded activities. 
We certainly don't anticipate picking up any of the funds for it. We 
anticipate being a part of the process of integrated management or 
whatever concept comes out of the Oceans Strategy, but we don't see 
ourselves funding it in any way. It is a regulatory issue so it should be 
funded by the federal government. That's why we pay taxes to them. 
These and other interviewees stressed that, while they would prefer to see less 
prescriptive regulations in their industry, they believed that the federal 
government continued to have an important role to play in carrying out research 
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and in structuring the new participatory processes involved in the new ocean 
management. 
Some interviewees were also concerned that Fisheries and Oceans Canada may 
not fully realize that representatives of the petroleum industry in St. John's are quite 
limited in their capacity to set regional policy for the companies they represent. They 
stressed that people in the St. John's offices are often beholden to the demands of their 
superiors in Calgary or Houston, who are, in turn, beholden to the demands of the market, 
their shareholders and various other national and international regulations or agreements. 
They stressed that local company offices are just one node in a much larger economic 
network and argued that it would be na'ive of FOC employees if they failed to 
acknowledge the ways in which the industry is affected by extra-local forces that are 
beyond their capacity to control. If taken seriously, this argument would seemingly 
suggest that planning based on an ecosystem approach must not only consider vast and 
interconnected ecological networks, but also equally vast and interconnecting economic 
networks, some of which may span multiple countries or even continents (Castells 2000). 
Several industry representatives pointed out that petroleum-related activities in 
Newfoundland are responsible for generating considerable tax revenues for the federal 
and provincial governments and it was therefore irresponsible and unfair for them to 
expect the industry to shoulder a substantial share of the costs associated with 
implementing new ocean policies as well. One Exxon-Mobil executive suggested that if 
stakeholder groups are going to be expected to pay costs associated with integrated 
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management, then it should be funded equally by all of these groups, to avoid the 
suggestion that the process is biased in favour of those who paid more. He pointed out, 
however, that this may not be possible, since even such things as paying for gas to attend 
meetings and taking time away from work could prove to be a major financial burden for 
representatives of less affluent groups. 
For Bill, an industry consultant, the Oceans Act and other pieces of recent federal 
environmental legislation, were merely attempts on the part of federal officials to divest 
themselves of responsibility for environmental management and shift that burden onto the 
industry. He asserted that this trend was embodied by Canada's recent commitment to the 
"Polluter Pays Principle." 
I think a big part of the problem is the concept of Polluter Pays. It just rolls 
off the tongue and environmental groups and politicians have picked right 
up on that. They say. You're doing something, so you're a polluter, so you 
should pay. You see how the logic jumps there? You're doing something, 
so, therefore, you're polluting? Whoa, wait a minute there! I'm in full 
compliance with all the laws, so I guess I'm not polluting, so why should I 
pay more. Every department says, they've adopted the Polluter Pays 
Principle, but what does that really mean? I think that means that the 
government doesn't have to do anything anymore. That means they can 
just wait until somebody comes along and raises an issue and then say, 
"Oh, that's his problem. He's the polluter, so he pays." I'm just going to 
sit here and coordinate and so on, but I'm not actually going to take any 
responsibility for anything. 
Bill believed that this recent discursive shift was diverting attention away from the 
failure of the federal departments to live up to their responsibilities as regulators. 
The fact of the matter is that if you wait until something happens, it's too 
late. You haven't done your job up front as a regulator. You haven' t been 
proactive. These plans should have been in place at least ten years ago, if 
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not more. Everybody knew what the issues were coming out of the North 
Sea experience. Cuttings piles, drilling discharges, produced water. 
Everybody knew that. But was anything done about it to build a basis for 
understanding and competency to support regulatory decision-making? No. 
There was nothing to stop them from saying well in advance: 'OK, let's 
establish some ground rules and boundary rules for this kind of stuff.' 
They never do it. Instead, they want to shift everything onto us and wash 
their hands of it. 
7.3.3 Vulnerability to "Radical" or "Extreme" Positions 
The third major area of concern surrounded the question of what form the 
integrated management process would take and who would be invited to take part in it. 
Several were concerned that their industry would serve as an easy target for people who 
adopt what they called "radical" or "extreme" positions, such as cettain NGOs who are 
opposed to oil and gas development on principle. Mark stated: 
We don't seem to have a very active environmentalist community here. 
There are various pockets, but they don't seem to be as active or as 
organized in this province as we see elsewhere. It hasn't been much of a 
problem here, but we're expecting that it will be if we move forward in 
British Columbia, because they have a heavy environmental lobby there. 
Many people out there are interested in preventing industrial activity 
altogether. You have the Greenpeaces of the world playing a role there 
trying to prevent any progress whatsoever. There are all sorts of other 
groups, like the WWF, who have a vested interest and lobby for their 
wishes, but are willing to work with other stakeholders to develop plans. 
The WWF are a legitimate environmental group that want to protect the 
wildlife and habitat where we operate, but want to work out ways that 
allow others to work in that area. They are more willing to collaborate as 
long as certain provisions are accorded. Groups like Greenpeace, on the 
other hand, are completely against industrial activity and are more radical 
and more confrontational, so I don't know how you deal with groups like 
that. There is also a small group in Nova Scotia called "No Rigs 2000," I 
think. Not surprisingly, they want no rigs. They aren't really interested in 
having a discussion about integrated management or about scheduling 
activities at certain times of the year or anything like that. 
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Several of those interviewed said they had no interest in entering into any kind of process 
that was so open-ended as to allow groups who take such strong positions against their 
industry to play a prominent role. Several said they believed that the integrated 
management process should be restricted to "legitimate users" of the marine environment 
and not accessible to those who would seek to "politicize" or "moralize" the process. 
Instead, their preference was for a "highly focused" and "well-organized" dialogue, 
which focused on pragmatic issues and recognized the rights of industrial stakeholders to 
operate "sustainably" and "efficiently" in a given area. Some also feared that the 
stakeholder process could prove extremely time consuming and costly if it was not 
carefully structured. They worried that if the process was too open-ended, it could lead to 
protracted public debates, which could prove difficult to resolve. Thus, many stressed the 
importance of minimizing the number of stakeholder groups involved in the process and 
establishing clear mandates about what was and was not up for discussion. Ron, an 
Exxon-Mobil manager, observed: " It can't be just a measure of participation in the 
process for its own sake. The processes themselves can't be the endgame. Presumably 
they are there to serve another need." He argued that consensus is not always easy to 
come by and when it does, it is often not the best policy, but simply the "lowest common 
denominator." 
A number of people made the case that responsibility should still fall on 
government to use the best available expertise to determine the best course of action for 
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the "society as a whole," and not simply be beholden to the integrated management forum 
and "whichever group screams the loudest." Colin, a senior employee who had worked 
with several companies explained: 
Decisions about land and ocean use planning belong to the government, 
not the industry or anybody else for that matter. Sometimes hard decisions 
have to be made. Government has to be willing to say 'we are going to 
favour the oil industry over the lobster industry in this particular area.' But 
those are hard decisions to make and often they will not go near them. So, 
the worry is that you've got the industry moving along and it's got all of 
its permits and approvals and it's complying with all the laws, and 
suddenly people want to go back ten years and decide whether they want 
to do this or not. Aaargh! So all that happens is that the industry keeps 
doing its thing, the environmental groups get all hurt and upset and think 
the world is against them and the government just sits on its hands. In 
order to make those kinds of decisions, the feds and the provinces have to 
get together and say, OK, we're going to make a decision for the collective 
good. We' re going to classify the coastline and we're going to decide 
which areas things are going to happen in. Instead they usually just stay 
out of it and wait until something blows up. 
Robert, a manager at the oil transshipment terminal in Placentia Bay, added that strong 
leadership from government would be particularly essential in navigating through the use 
conflicts that would inevitably emerge in that bay, as oil traffic increases in the coming 
years: 
We provide a lot of economic benefit to the communities we work in and 
often that isn' t documented and it gets missed in some of these decisions. 
In a place like Placentia Bay, the trade-off is going to be: Is society better 
off having a refinery and a transhipment terminal at the head of the bay, a 
smelter in the middle of the bay and a shipyard on the other side of the bay 
or fishing activity in the bottom of the bay? Inevitably, some tradeoffs are 
going to have to be made. How do you decide what is best for the overall 
society? These are not going to be easy decisions and not everybody is 
always going to be happy about them, but they still have to be made. 
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Both men worried that FOC representatives seemed to be intent on clinging to vague 
rhetoric which suggested that it would be possible to "please all of the people all of the 
time" and seemed unwilling to speak openly about the need to favour some sectors over 
others in certain circumstances. 
A related concern stemmed from the fact that in addition to being the lead agency 
for developing integrated ocean management, FOC is also the primary regulator of the 
fishing industry. Some expressed concern that this dual role could put the agency in a 
conflict of interest situation, or at least create that perception amongst people working in 
other sectors. Since the department had historically focused on fisheries some thought this 
might lead it to systematically prioritize the interests of renewable resource industries 
over those of non-renewable resource industries in integrated management settings. 
Accordingly several of those interviewed advocated a clearer distinction between FOC's 
regulatory and facilitation functions. This concern has also been formally articulated by 
CAPP in its correspondence with FOC (Luff2002: 5). 
7.4 Strategies of Engagement and Disengagement 
The response of the petroleum industry to the growing centrality of "sustainable 
development," "ecosystem-based management" and "participatory" or "integrated" 
management discourses in Canadian oceans policy has been varied. On the one hand, the 
industry has entered into bilateral negotiations with Fisheries and Oceans Canada in an 
effort to ensure that the new oceans agenda unfolds in a way that is accommodating of 
their interests. At the same time, however, various players in the industry have sought to 
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develop their own approaches to interpreting and applying these discourses, which bypass 
government agencies altogether. This has included the development of a number of 
industry-sponsored initiatives, most of which have been designed to represent petroleum 
companies as responsible corporate citizens who are concerned about sustainable 
development, regardless of whether or not they are being pressured to be by government. 
This section discusses each of these approaches in turn. 
7.4.1 Bilateral Negotiations 
On September 23, 2002, representatives of the Oceans Directorate at FOC made a 
presentation to CAPP as part of its National Engagement Initiative. The goal of this 
initiative was to introduce Canada's Oceans Strategy and the Policy and Operational 
Framework for Integrated Management of Estuarine, Coastal and Marine Environments 
in Canada to key ocean user groups and solicit feedback. CAPP responded quickly with 
an eleven page letter. While the letter describes CAPP as "a strong supporter of 
stakeholder involvement in government decision-making processes," it also raised 
numerous questions about how this new policy framework will be implemented in 
practice and requested that a bilateral workshop be scheduled to address these concerns 
directly (Luff2002: 2). 
When asked about the rationale behind their reasons for asking for a bilateral 
forum, one Exxon-Mobil employee noted: "Well, there ' s input into the process and then 
there's input into the process. It's one thing to be invited to participate in a process that 
has already been developed, but it's another thing altogether to be involved in shaping the 
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way in which that process develops." A similar point was made by Mark from CAPP, 
who stated: 
There is certainly a willingness on the part of the industry to be a part of 
that dialogue. We share the space with others. We don' t want to have a 
negative impact on their business or on the environment, so we need to 
have some type of plan where we can all undertake the activities that we 
need to without harming each other or the environment. So, our view is 
that there is that management/regulatory aspect needed and we' re not 
shying away from it. Most of us see the importance of making sure that 
everyone works together in a cooperative manner and we think we have 
some things that we can bring to the table to help DFO to realize that 
goal. .. However, we also think that it is important that DFO recognizes 
that we have legitimate concerns around regulatory efficiency that have to 
be taken into account and I think they do ... If the process becomes too 
cumbersome, there will be a tendency on the part of the industry to stay 
away and invest their time and energy in the regulatory process instead. 
Interviews with members of the Oceans Directorate in Ottawa revealed that there 
was some disagreement within the agency about whether it was appropriate to engage in a 
bilateral dialogue with a prominent ocean stakeholder at such an early stage of the 
process, particularly considering that the idea behind Canada' s Oceans Strategy was to 
give all affected interests an equal opportunity to participate. One individual within the 
Oceans Directorate expressed his reservations as follows: 
Oil and gas is really pushing hard right now. They are the big kid on the 
block. They come to the table and bring a lot of weight at a variety of 
different levels: expertise, capacity, dollars, political influence, promised 
economic benefits. At the working level, we've tried to be sensitive to that, 
but my worry is that there may be some tendency to focus too much 
attention on the star industries. I am particularly concerned about the 
precedent we are setting by having a lot of bilateral relationships with the 
oil industry. Sure there are a lot of issues that we have to solve with them 
in the near term, but we've got to keep in mind that they've got to be part 
of the bigger process. If we solve their problems bilaterally, they are just 
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going to bugger off and not want to deal with us. Different people here 
have very different views on that. 
In spite of these concerns, the first bilateral workshop between Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada and CAPP members went ahead in Halifax from April 141h to April 16th, 
2003. FOC's presentation at the workshop characterized their new "transformative 
agenda" as having four interrelated goals, all of which were deemed to be compatible 
with the goals of the petroleum industry. These were: 
1) moving from single species science to ecosystem and precautionary 
approaches; 
2) moving from single sector approaches (e.g. fisheries, energy, marine 
transportation) to integrated management; 
3) moving from centralized decision-making to transparent and 
participatory decision-making; and 
4) moving from trading off environmental-economic goals to advancing 
sustainable development objectives 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada representatives also stressed the critical need to "resolve 
user-conflicts" in order to "avoid creating barriers to economic activities" and "mazimize 
wealth generation," provided that it is based on the principle of sustainable development. 
The position taken by CAPP and its members at the workshop and in subsequent 
months raised a number of critical objectives of their own, which they wanted to see built 
into the new approach as it moved forward. One of the clearest messages articulated by 
CAPP was the need for national consistency. It was argued that the industry required a 
"transparent and seamless national policy and legislative framework to ensure 
consistency between regions" so that it could operate in a climate of relative certainty. As 
one CAPP official told me: "We just want to know the rules ofthe game." At the 
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workshop, it was pointed out that this call for national standards is at odds with the 
implementation strategy that had been employed by FOC up to that point which has been 
"to work regionally on projects, building knowledge, understanding and experience from 
practice." Thus, CAPP's challenge raises a fundamental tension between the "potentially 
competing requirements for regional flexibility and national consistency" (Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2003: 6). The 
aforementioned letter written by CAPP to FOC described this concern as follows: 
The absence of identified and accepted processes for the development and 
implementation of integrated management plans and the identification and 
designation of protected areas could lead to the development of ad hoc 
area-by area processes that could introduce considerable uncertainty into 
land access and tenure in offshore areas (Luff2002: 7). 
CAPP's proposed solution to this problem was to develop a National 
Implementation Working Group to deal with issues that apply to multiple jurisdictions, 
while continuing to have smaller scale discussions to deal with problems that are solely of 
a regional nature. Otherwise, it has argued that both policy makers and industries will 
find themselves mired in a series of often conflicting "regional interpretations" of key 
ideas (ibid: 5). A related suggestion was for FOC to enter into a series of Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) with other regulating agencies to ensure that all relevant federal 
agencies "buy in" to the oceans agenda and understand the need to have a consistent 
policy approach across multiple jurisdictions. If successful, this strategy would, of course, 
severely limit the power of regional interests to shape or curtail the activities of the 
petroleum industry. 
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While advocating national consistency in terms of policy implementation, many in 
the industry have also called for a high degree of flexibility in determining what kinds of 
activities should and should not be permitted in particular areas. Acknowledging that 
outright bans on some or all forms of industrial activity may be necessary in 
exceptionally sensitive habitats, CAPP officials have also argued that some activities can 
be carried out with minimal damage to the marine environment if they are performed in 
particular ways or at particular times of year. One CAPP employee I interviewed after the 
workshop had taken place pointed to one instance on the west coast of Newfoundland in 
which the industry had refrained from engaging in seismic testing at a time when a major 
migration of cod through the area was believed to be taking place. He added that this kind 
of strategic planning could, in many cases, enable the benefits of offshore petroleum 
resources to be harnessed, while significantly reducing the "ecological footprint" of the 
industry. 
Some also pointed to the power of new technologies to reduce the negative impact 
of the industry in sensitive areas. One such example is the dramatic improvement that has 
occurred in the capacity of oil rigs to drill horizontally over large distances, thereby 
making it possible for them to extract oil and natural gas from underneath protected areas 
without technically carrying out any activity within their borders. As one CAPP official 
noted: 
It is fine to prohibit activity in a park. When you look at the terrestrial 
parks, there is no hunting and no fishing. That makes sense. But you can 
undertake some oil and gas activities and not really have any impact on the 
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environment if you do it in such a way that it works. So why write "no oil 
and gas" into the legislation? You can certainly say that it is prohibited 
under certain circumstances, but at least talk to us about what those 
circumstances are going to be. 
Once again, this approach suggests that oil and gas development can be a functional part 
of a healthy, and even representative, marine ecosystem. It is a clear response to more 
restrictive portrayals of what constitutes a healthy ecosystem, many of which would 
suggest that the presence of heavy industry in a given area means that it can no longer be 
considered healthy or pristine. The CAPP perspective appears more easily reconcilable 
with developments in the new ecology, which tend to portray ecosystems as constantly 
changing and inevitably defined and shaped by human values and actions. CAPP has 
consistently argued against blanket prohibitions against development, instead insisting 
that each area be considered on a case by case basis, even as they have argued for 
national consistency when implementing other aspects of the new approach. The 
organization has furthermore recommended that FOC should initially "focus on the 
integrated management planning component of the Act" and "defer decisions about MP As 
until management plans for each region have been accepted" and use those planning 
forums to determine how best to protect the sensitive locations within those planning 
areas (Chircop and Marchand 2000: 14). 
Many in the industry have also taken advantage of meetings with FOC to 
underscore the importance of imposing a high degree of procedural discipline on the 
integrated management planning process in order to ensure that the process moves 
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quickly and efficiently and is not open to those who take a confrontational stance toward 
industrial development. A presentation made by CAPP at the Halifax workshop stressed 
the "need to define a common purpose at the outset of planning processes so that all 
stakeholders understand the: nature of the end product, scope of the end product, content 
ofthe end product, and end use of the end product" (Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers 2003: 3). CAPP officials have furthermore recommended the importation of 
"professional guidance and discipline," to ensure that this specific agenda remains at the 
forefront along with clear "terms of reference with clear descriptions of the roles and 
responsibilities of all participants," "realistic timelines" and "quantifiable performance 
measures" to gauge results (Luff2002: 3). From CAPP's perspective, participatory 
planning should be pragmatic and not political in nature. It should be used as a means 
through which to develop more efficient mechanisms of coordinating interactions 
between industries and not as a public forum through which to express hostilities toward 
other ocean users or challenge their right to carry out particular activities in particular 
places. 
Many of those interviewed also said they would prefer that access to planning 
bodies be restricted to those who are actively engaged in ocean industries or who have 
particular expertise so that the process does not grow to be too large and "cumbersome." 
Bill stated: 
You have got to have processes that are long-term and inclusive without 
being cumbersome and unwieldy and self-congratulating. If inclusive 
means consulting everybody and their dog, that's not inclusive, that's an 
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election or a referendum. Inclusive means saying to everybody: "we need 
a bunch of people with the following specialties and they are going to be 
the ones we consult and move forward with, making that very public and 
very evident. And it is going to go on for a long time, saying, these are the 
possibilities we are considering and this is the one we're favouring. And 
that is not necessarily to solicit endless letters from inarticulate riff raff 
like me. It is simply to say, this is the direction we're going in. If there is a 
real issue with it, there will be a mobilization of special interest groups. 
You've got to be open enough to allow people to challenge you, but closed 
enough to be able to head towards your target. 
Several people called for a system of "stakeholder weighting," which would grant a 
greater say to those with a larger presence in the ocean. 
While the influence of the petroleum industry' s demands remained unclear at the 
time of writing, the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for oceans policy at FOC had 
agreed to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the leadership of CAPP in Calgary. To that 
end, several meetings between the two parties have been held in an effort to ensure that 
the new oceans agenda unfolded in a way that was responsive to the concerns of the 
industry. 
7.4.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Even as CAPP was working with FOC in an effort to influence the direction taken 
in the implementation of the Oceans Act, its members were also working through non-
government channels in an effort to reposition themselves in response to the new policy 
discourses that it espouses. Their key strategy has been to identify themselves with the 
global "Corporate Social Responsibility" movement in an attempt to demonstrate that 
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they are committed to the principles of sustainable development and public participation, 
regardless of whether or not they are forced to do so by legislation. 
In March of2004, the "Oil and Gas Development Partnership" an industry-
university collaboration based at Memorial University of Newfoundland facilitated a 
three-day workshop entitled "Sustainable Development: Getting it Right the First Time." 
The goal of the event was to bring together a collection of representatives from petroleum 
companies operating in Newfoundland to discuss ways of incorporating "sustainable 
development principles" into their activities. The workshop, which was held in the 
boardroom of an expensive downtown hotel, also featured a series of distinguished guest 
speakers who had been flown in from around the world to discuss their experiences. I was 
given the opportunity to attend the event for free, along with several graduate students 
enrolled in Memorial's Master of Oil and Gas Studies progran1, thereby avoiding the 
prohibitive two thousand dollar registration fee. 
The opening speaker, representing the "Leadership Development Group" of Royal 
Dutch/Shell International, had been flown in from London for the morning to set the tone 
for the event. In what appeared to be a very well rehearsed power point presentation, he 
stressed the need for companies to embrace the concept of sustainable development as a 
central part of everything they do. This would mean moving away from simply 
"managing risk," and instead committing to an entirely new philosophy of doing business 
in which they would seek to be "proactive" and concentrate on "managing their legacy" 
in the places where they work. He stated that governments around the world had 
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"dropped the ball," by failing to invest sufficient resources in science and conservation 
initiatives, so the onus was falling upon the private sector to pick up the mantle of 
sustainable development and become more socially and environmentally responsible. 
They must transform themselves "from sinners to saviours" and create internal 
mechanisms through which to ensure that sustainable development principles make their 
way into the "hearts and minds" of all of their employees. 
While some of those in attendance appeared skeptical, worrying that making these 
changes could have negative economic consequences, he took pains to point out that the 
model he was proposing should not be viewed as altruistic. To the contrary, he argued 
that they would prove to be sound business decisions that would benefit companies in the 
long run, as customers and shareholders would reward them by giving them their business. 
It would also make for smoother interactions with other industries and with the residents 
of the places where they work and this, in turn, would help to reduce conflict and improve 
their public image. 
The fact that Royal Dutch/Shell International' s representative was such a sought 
after guest at a workshop of this nature is interesting, given that company's unique history 
within the global "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR) movement. In 1995, Royal 
Dutch/Shell was faced with two public relations disasters. Its plan to sink an aging oil rig 
offNorthern Europe had given rise to a growing international protest movement. Non-
government agencies were characterizing the company as an environmental menace, 
more concerned with profits than with sustainability. A short time later, the Nigerian 
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government executed Ken Saro-Wiwa, an indigenous author and activist who had been 
the founder and public face of a campaign against the environmental atrocities committed 
by Royal Dutch/Shell and other petroleum companies operating in the Niger Delta region 
(Watts 2004). In the aftermath ofWiwa's execution, the company was widely accused of 
having failed to use its economic influence to pressure the Nigerian government to spare 
his life and this led to a very public boycott of Royal Dutch/Shell products around the 
world (Becker 2003). 
These events and the backlash that followed prompted a sudden and dramatic shift 
in the policy direction of Royal Dutch/Shell. The company sought to rebrand itself as a 
model corporate citizen, attending major UN Conferences and lending its support to 
agencies such as Amnesty International, the World Wildlife Fund and Human Rights 
Watch. In 2003, it also became the first petroleum company to commit to refraining from 
drilling in areas designated as World Heritage Sites by UNESCO (ibid.). The company 
has subsequently taken advantage of every opportunity to promote itself as a responsible 
alternative to its competitors. It has invested in expensive advertising campaigns which 
demonstrate its commitment to protecting "fragile ecosystems" and "local communities" 
and its shareholder reports are now adorned with brightly coloured seashells and stories 
about how its sensitivity to social and environmental concerns has enabled it to be not 
only a enormously successful petrochemical conglomerate, but also a positive force for 
change in the world (Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 2003, 2004, 2005). These changes 
have done little to appease the company's critics, however. Wiwa's son Ken Wiwa Jr., 
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who is now a columnist for the Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail, once launch d 
a lawsuit against Royal Dutch/Shell for its actions in Nigeria and has continued to speak 
out publicly against it. In a recent editorial, he proclaimed: 
It is no exaggeration to say that my father' s death gave birth to a new 
industry - Corporate Social Responsibility. The best I can say about CSR 
is that while I welcome the efforts to promote best practises and standards, 
business history tells us that corporations were only tempered by labour 
agitation followed by regulation. The notion that left to their own devices 
corporations will act as good corporate citizens is a laudable one but one 
that belies historical experience or the lack of public faith and trust in 
those institutions. Because while CSR was being trumpeted and propped 
up by an artifice of voluntary codes and offered as a sap to its critics, 
corporations were showing their true hand, working through GATT 
negotiations or trying to install the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAl) and subsequently through the undemocratic offices of the WTO 
(Wiwa 2004: 18). 
Despite such criticisms, the CSR movement has gained significant momentum on 
the strength of the high profile conversions of Royal Dutch/Shell and many other 
multinational corporations. Members ofthe United Nations executive have been strong 
supporters of this trend. Representatives of several multinational corporations were 
invited to play prominent roles at the Rio Earth Summit, and they were influential in 
contributing to the more market-friendly discourse that emerged from it (Bernstein 2001). 
This spirit of partnership with the private sector was further entrenched in 1999 when 
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan created the United Nations Global Compact. 
The Compact invites companies to publicly commit to nine non-binding principles, 
covering three key areas: human rights, labour, and the environment. The agency has 
made it clear that this is not a "regulatory instrument," but rather a non-binding code of 
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practice that promotes "public accountability, transparency, and the enlightened self-
interest of companies, labour and civil society" in order to achieve "a more sustainable 
and inclusive global economy" (United Nations 1999). 
Over the last decade, many more multi-national companies have announced their 
commitment to "sustainable development" principles. Some have taken steps to modify 
their business operations in an effort to: reduce negative environmental impacts, create 
'eco-efficiencies,' or increase 'transparency' and 'public participation. ' Some have made 
sustainability oriented projects a key focus of their corporate sponsorship strategies and 
have contributed money to community development programs or protected areas in 
countries where they operate. In recent years, a number of product certification councils, 
self-labeling programs, and codes of industry "best practices" have come into being as 
well. By committing to these programs, companies may be able to gain entry into more 
exclusive markets and charge higher prices (Neale 1997). 86 Some have sought to be listed 
on· the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, which includes major companies that satisfy 
certain designation criteria. Most of these changes have been actively promoted to 
shareholders and used in marketing campaigns in the hope that doing so will attract 
capital investment and increase brand loyalty. It is hoped that new ' sustainable 
development' friendly strategies will prove to be profitable, as new revenues will more 
than offset the cost of modifying practices (Holliday et al. 2002). 
While the message that the goals of sustainable development and profitability can 
be reconciled was often repeated at the St. John's workshop, several of those petroleum 
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industry employees in attendance told me privately that they remained skeptical. While 
most said that they supported the idea of trying to be more responsible, many were not 
convinced that doing so would lead to higher profits. One man told me that he thought 
that there would always be some companies who would take shortcuts and he suspected 
that they would continue to be rewarded with substantial profits for doing so. This idea 
shares some commonalities with the Tragedy of the Commons thesis (Scott Gordon 1954; 
Hardin 1968), in that it implies that individual companies cannot be trusted to do the right 
thing on their own and emphasizes that regulation and enforcement are necessary 
elements in bringing about responsible behaviour. Another man who was present at the 
workshop claimed that he had little faith that the numbers of people who would be 
attracted to "ethical investments" could ever outweigh the many others who are simply 
looking for the highest return on their investment, regardless of whether or not the 
companies they were investing in were "doing the right thing." He thought that educating 
consumers and investors could only go so far and the real challenge would be in 
educating financial analysts so that they will steer their clients to make long-term 
investments in "sustainable companies." 
One of the petroleum industry representatives in attendance at the workshop said 
that she thought it was unfair to focus all of the attention on the polluting activities of the 
oil industry, when other industries were not being targeted as intensively, noting: 
This is all well and good, but I think that fishers and other stakeholders 
need to become corporately responsible too . . . Fishers can throw their 
garbage over the side of their boat and nobody cares, but if we do the 
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slightest thing wrong, they are all over us . . . There seems to be a real 
double standard. We're happy to do our part, but it has to be a two way 
street. 
Bill shared this cynicism, believing that the petroleum companies are often unfairly 
portrayed as being irresponsible by the general public, whereas others are often given an 
easier time. He did, however, accept that committing to the rhetoric of CSR was 
important and necessary, even if it wasn't always genuine: 
In my view, the big oil companies represent a new bourgeoisie or 
aristocracy. I believe that all societies tend to drive toward an aristocracy, 
whether it's the Louis the 14th type of aristocracy or it's the Enron, Exxon-
Mobil type. One universal is that none of them like to be embarrassed in 
public. The environmental groups understand that, the pressure groups 
understand that, and the politicians understand that. It's not that they can 
really do much to hurt the big players, but it just pisses in their cornflakes 
and ruins their day and it does nasty things to their share prices when the 
casino that is the stock market reacts openly to that ... Ecologically, it 
doesn't matter if we kill three thousand fish today, but nobody will 
understand that, except maybe some scientists at DFO. The fact is that 
regulations are made at a particular point in time with a certain set of 
concepts that are informed by certain political pressures. Those pressures 
most often have nothing to do with anything scientific and everything to 
do with either punishing somebody or controlling something or just 
fluffing up one's tail feathers ... So those are the pushes and pulls. That 
doesn't mean that companies aren't sincere. I guess half of it is sincere and 
the other half is, in leftist terms, crass reality. That means it makes you act 
a little bit less like a pure tyrant or a robber baron and be a bit more like: 
' OK, yeah, I can see how I can get to where I want to go and you can get 
what you want if we do things a bit differently.' It's a negotiation and we 
understand negotiations. We do that every day, either with our friends or 
with our enemies. That's what it all comes down to . 
In this quote, Bill is once again drawing upon arguments from the new ecology in making 
his claim that the industry's activities are largely compatible with most ecological 
processes, even if they do have some impact. In his view, CSR is ultimately a strategy 
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through which to accommodate or undercut attacks on the industry by groups of people 
who subscribe to a highly politicized vision of what is and is not ecologically harmful. 
Some others made the case that there have already been significant steps taken 
toward "sustainable development" by the local industry. Thus, the phrase "Getting it 
Right the First Time" seemed far-fetched, particularly given that the industry had been 
producing oil for nearly a decade and had been engaging in dialogue with fishery workers 
and other affected interests in the province since the 1980s. The discourse of "good 
corporate citizenship" has been present in the industry since the 1980s, when planning of 
the Hibernia project began (Ottenheimer 1993). 
This was particularly apparent during the building the Hibernia platform, which 
took place in Bull Arm, at the head of Trinity Bay. Mobil Oil, which was the lead 
investor in the project carried out extensive consultations with people living in the area 
and introduced a number of new programs in an effort to improve relations with 
surrounding towns and minimize the extent to which the fishing and oil industries were 
disruptive to one another's operations. One former Mobil employee who played a key 
role in negotiating with local people explained the early interactions between the industry 
and fishers operating in the Bull Arm area: 
They knew big vessels were going to be coming into Trinity Bay and lots 
of activity was going to be taking place. Up until then the fishermen had 
the place entirely to themselves and many of them were using small boats, 
so they felt threatened. They didn't have any navigation training or 
systems or aids and they had no communication. They didn't even put 
radar reflectors on their lines. So, they thought they'd be run down. We 
thought, unless you do something, you might be. So we set up traffic lanes 
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and we issued them all radios, but we insisted they take training to learn 
how to use them ... We also provided radar reflectors for their gear and, 
with the help of local fishermen, we set up a program for environmental 
effects monitoring so we could track the quality of the marine environment. 
To be honest, the fishermen in the area seemed more worried about losing 
their livelihood, but we thought that they should also know that we weren't 
hurting the environment and the quality of the fish that they were making a 
livelihood from. 
Others have painted a less positive image of the interactions between the 
petroleum industry and fishing industry during this period. In her Master' s thesis Fish 
and Oil Don't Mix: Power Relations at the Bull Arm Construction Site, Trinity Bay, 
Newfoundland, Ottenheimer (1993) criticized the oil industry for: "excluding fishers ' 
grievances from the agenda, the inadequate representation of fishers ' intrinsic interests 
and the elimination of women's issues from the negotiation process" (ibid: 9). She 
furthermore notes that members of the petroleum industry opted to negotiate contracts 
with individual fishers who were actively using the area rather than dealing with them as 
a group and they failed to compensate processing plant workers, whose livelihoods were 
also affected by their presence (ibid: 129). 
Working a decade earlier, several authors had noted, that, while there may be the 
potential for a mutually beneficial relationship between Newfoundland citizens and oil 
companies, there are certain tensions implicit in this relationship (House 1985a, Hynd 
1986, Overton 1986). House ( 1985a) argued that, since oil companies operating in 
Newfoundland are controlled from head offices based elsewhere, it is likely that they will 
leave when it no longer becomes as profitable for them to operate there or when better 
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opportunities present themselves elsewhere. Thus, the economic boom had the potential 
to end abruptly, with few lasting benefits. He pointed out that some oil companies were 
already bristling at the provincial government' s insistence that they hire 
Newfoundlanders for particular jobs, when there were more qualified people available 
(ibid: 133). He also noted that with most infrastructure targeted for St. John's, the direct 
benefits to rural Newfoundland would be limited (House 1985b). A related argument was 
that rural areas might be further disadvantaged by conflicts over ocean space that were 
likely to emerge between the oil industry and the fishery (House 1985a). 
Despite these lingering issues, petroleum companies in Canada have continued to 
try to present themselves as responsible corporate actors. Perhaps the most obvious 
example ofthis trend in recent years has been the CAPP Stewardship Initiative, which 
was first unveiled in 1999. It was developed through CAPP's main office in Calgary with 
assistance from the Macleod Institute, "an independent third party affiliated with the 
University of Calgary" (CAPP 2002a: 2). According to the CAPP publications, 
"stewardship is a responsible approach to business that lets companies succeed while 
protecting the natural environment and enhancing the quality of life" (CAPP 2002b: 9). 
The program requires CAPP members to commit to seven core "Stewardship principles:" 
1) Place a high corporate priority on Stewardship and integrate it into operations and 
business planning; 
2) Acknowledge and respond to public concerns when examining risk. 
3) Establish effective communication and reporting with internal and external 
stakeholders; 
4) Establish objectives and targets to measure performance and continuously seek 
opportunities to improve; 
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5) Support applied, peer-reviewed research that increases our knowledge, assists 
decision-making and develops solutions to industry environment, health, safety 
and socio-economic issues; 
6) Pursue proactive strategies and support the implementation of sound management 
systems; and 
7) Promote the understanding of sustainable development and the efficient and wise 
use of resources. 
The CAPP Stewardship Initiative was initially voluntary, but has subsequently 
been made mandatory for all ofthe organization's members (CAPP 2002b: 10). 
Companies are, however, given the opportunity to choose from four levels of 
commitment to the aforementioned principles, for which they are assigned a 
corresponding "recognition level." These range from a bronze level, for which companies 
must simply sign a declaration saying that they endorse CAPP Stewardship principles and 
meet basic planning and reporting requirements, all the way up to a platinum level in 
which "companies routinely submit to external audits ... " (CAPP 2002b: 1 0). When asked 
about the reasoning behind the development of the program, Mark explained: 
It was brought in for a number of reasons. The petroleum industry was and 
is doing a lot to protect the environment and to protect the health and 
safety of its workforce, but a lot of people were not understanding 
everything that we were doing to be good stewards. So, we wanted to set 
up a program which would help those within and outside of the industry to 
get a better sense of what the industry is actually doing. Also, we wanted 
to generate statistics on a number of environmental and health and safety 
fronts so that we can benchmark good performance versus bad. We can 
also benchmark different nations against each other, and we can look at 
trends over time to determine whether companies are improving their 
performance over time. That way we can document who is being a good 
steward and who isn't and motivate a sense that all members should be 
good, conscious environmental health and safety stewards. 
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He also conceded that the program created new opportunities to lobby the federal and 
provincial governments for improvements to the current regulatory regime, since it would 
show that they were already engaging in self-management: 
If we can do that and demonstrate that we are attentive to environmental 
and health and safety issues, then people in government might be more 
amenable to having more discussions about developing more performance-
based regulations. 
CAPP and its member companies have also engaged in various philanthropic activities in 
and around St. Jolm's in recent years, including the allotment of funds for the 
construction of a new performance hall for the School of Music at Memorial University 
of Newfoundland and the sponsorship of several concerts, festivals, and conferences. 
While the industry has spent far less on initiatives in rural areas, where they have less of a 
presence, CAPP has allotted a small sum to support a "seabird recovery centre" in 
Placentia Bay in which seabirds that have been caught in oil slicks released by passing 
vessels can be taken to be cleaned and nursed back to health. 87 While most of these slicks 
are caused by passing shipping vessels in international waters and are unrelated to the 
local industry, this distinction is not apparent to most residents of the province. Thus, 
some in the local industry have concluded that it is in their best interests to take steps to 
appear as though they are doing all they can to combat the problem of oil pollution in all 
its forms. 
Another approach pursued by the petroleum industry in Newfoundland had been 
to fund a new institutional body through which to engage bilaterally with members of the 
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Fish Food and Allied Workers Union, which represents the vast majority of fishers and 
fish processing plant workers in the province. One Ocean, an independent liaison group 
between CAPP and the FF A W was formed in 2002. The idea of forming a liaison group 
between the two sectors was first recommended by the Terra Nova Panel in 1997, a 
multi -disciplinary panel of researchers which released its report in advance of the 
development of Newfoundland's second major offshore oil project (Terra Nova 
Development Project Environmental Assessment Panel 1997). It was not until 2001 , 
however, that concrete actions began to be taken to bring it into being. In the fall ofthat 
year, the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Petroleum Board sponsored a series of 
meetings between representatives of the two groups with a view to developing ways of 
improving the working relationship between the two industries (Slade 2003). The 
following spring, One Ocean was formally created. The agency is chaired by Dr. Arthur 
May, a former Deputy Minister of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and President 
of Memorial University ofNewfoundland, and is managed by a two person secretariat. It 
also includes a twelve member Advisory Board, which is intended to be made up of equal 
representation from the fishing and offshore petroleum sectors. (ibid: 18-19). At the time 
of its formation, it included: four professional fish harvesters, one fish processing 
company representative, one representative of the Canadian Centre for Fisheries 
Innovation, one representative of CAPP and five representatives of individual petroleum 
companies. Two government representatives also attend the meetings, one from FOC and 
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the other from the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, but 
only to serve in an advisory capacity (ibid.) 
The organization was initially established with a four year mandate to "provide a 
neutral forum for both sectors to facilitate communication, information exchange and 
shared opportunities" and to "endorse cooperation, transparency and a proactive approach 
to the exploitation of marine resources" (ibid: 19). It is also expected to: "commission 
research studies and conduct literature reviews to maintain diligent responses to industry 
inquiries" "ascertain potential problems" and "provide conflict resolution alternatives and 
independent expert analysis." (ibid: 20). One Ocean has also developed a program 
through which the petroleum industry has provided funds with which to train fishermen to 
participate in oil spill response programs. 
Another major function of One Ocean has been to identify areas in which the two 
industries have the potential to form strategic alliances, thereby strengthening their 
bargaining position relative to government departments or other industries. Reflecting on 
the merits of the initiative, one Exxon-Mobil executive stated: 
The hope is that if you do get into issues of potential concern there will be 
a payoff, because you will have already invested time and effort and you 
already have a good relationship established. That' s the theory anyway. 
You don't just come together when you have something that you need to 
deal with you try to keep the dialogue open and spot problems and 
opportunities well ahead of time. 
One such case emerged in 2004, when the Canadian federal government began 
carrying out consultations with a view to listing Newfoundland cod as an endangered 
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species under Canada's new Species at Risk Act. Both the FFAW and CAPP have been 
outspoken critics of this legislation since its inception, particularly the provision that 
states that it is illegal to "kill," "harm," or "harass" a listed species. Both have made the 
case that the Act is based on a terrestrial model and does not translate well to the marine 
environment, where it is very difficult to know whether one is harming a particular 
species until after one has already done it. Many feared that this could lead to the unfair 
targeting of particular individuals or companies. One Ocean has served as a vehicle 
through which the two groups have sought to formulate counterarguments to this new 
policy and most of those interviewed conceded that this likely would not have been 
possible if the two groups had not already been engaged in a bilateral dialogue. 
Eventually a decision was made by Environment Canada to refrain from listing cod, 
despite scientific recommendations to the contrary, although it is unclear what role, if any, 
was played by the strong opposition of the two industries. 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the ongoing efforts of members of the Newfoundland 
petroleum industry to engage with the new policy approach being ushered in through the 
Oceans Act. While most ofthose interviewed were understanding of the need for an 
overarching policy framework to coordinate interactions between ocean user groups and 
were supportive of the core principles of sustainable development and integrated 
management, many had serious concerns about how new ocean policies would affect their 
industry. The general consensus among interviewees was that the regulatory environment 
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in Atlantic Canada was already too cumbersome and prescriptive and many were worried 
that the Oceans Act was an attempt to reinvent the wheel. Echoing the discourses put 
forward as part of the new ecology, some worried that the federal government lacked the 
scientific knowledge needed to understand the marine environment and this climate of 
uncertainty could lead regulators to impose unnecessary delays on industrial activity. 
Many also feared that the new approach could expose them to the "unreasonable" 
demands of some environmental NGOs and fishers who were against oil and gas 
development on principle. They almost unanimously agreed that integrated management 
meetings should be kept small and should be restricted to " legitimate users" of the ocean 
environment. They furthermore emphasized the need for the process to be driven by 
clearly articulated shared goals and emphasis on efficiency and some believed that every 
effort should be made to ensure that integrated management did not simply result in 
"participation for its own sake." 
In response to these concerns, various segments of the industry have taken steps to 
try to influence the ways in which ocean policy is implemented in practice. CAPP has 
engaged in bilateral consultations with high level managers at Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada in Ottawa in an attempt to ensure that their concerns are adequately represented. 
Furthermore, the industry has engaged directly with the global Corporate Social 
Responsibility Movement in an effort to demonstrate that they are responsible stewards. 
Through these actions, the industry has sought to position themselves as a prominent 
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stakeholder and exercise a direct bearing on the way in which ocean management unfolds 
in the future. 
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Chapter 8 Community-based Conservation and the Cultural Politics of Marine 
Protected Area Planning in Newfoundland 
This chapter discusses the rise and fall of an attempt to establish a federal Marine 
Protected Area (MP A) in the waters surrounding the town of Leading Tickles, on the 
northeast coast of Newfoundland. It begins by discussing the social and political context 
in which the MP A proposal emerged. It then describes the efforts that were made by a 
group of local fish harvesters to build support for the establishment of an MP A in the area 
and the challenges they faced in their attempts to get it off the ground. Finally, it 
discusses the circumstances that eventually led to the disbanding of the proposal in 2007. 
While the marine protected area program is based on a model of consensus-based 
decision-making and shared responsibility for managing marine resources, the Leading 
Tickles case highlights the tremendous challenges of bringing this type of project into 
being. It illustrates the diversity of perspectives that can be present within a single 
"community" or "region," even one that has long been bound together by relative 
geographic isolation and a widely shared dependence on marine resources. This raises 
questions about whether it is, in fact, possible to "empower" coastal communities without 
inadvertently resurrecting old antagonisms or creating new conflicts. 
8.1 The Road to Leading Tickles 
The road to Leading Tickles is a long and bumpy one. Beginning in the historic 
port of Botwood, 88 it winds its way through dense groves of spruce, fir, and birch trees 
and a seemingly endless network of ponds for nearly an hour before finally reaching the 
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cape. The town, which is nestled in the heart ofNotre Dame Bay, is home to 
approximately four hundred people. Its provocative name is derived from the narrow, 
rocky straits (tickles) that separate the many islands in the area, creating a navigational 
challenge for inexperienced mariners (Story et al. 1982). The town is itself divided by one 
such tickle and is connected by a short causeway. 
In many respects, Leading Tickles is typical of the many small coastal fishing 
villages that are scattered along Newfoundland's northeast coast. Settled around the turn 
of the nineteenth century by families from Twillingate and other larger fishing centres to 
the east, the local economy has historically focused on the catching, salting and drying of 
codfish for export. It was its close proximity to excellent inshore cod fishing grounds and 
abundant timber stands that first prompted people to move there, in spite of the fact that 
the headlands offer little shelter from the elements during the long and often harsh 
Newfoundland winter. During the twentieth century, people living in the area 
supplemented income derived from cod fishing by harvesting other marine species, 
including mackerel, herring, capelin, salmon, winter flounder, lobster, and seals. Some 
also pursued occasional wage labour, with local men most often working in logging 
camps.89 
While fishers residing in the town have historically used small boats and fished 
close to shore, the surrounding area has been fished extensively by large trawlers since 
the 1950s, first by foreign fleets and later by vessels based in nearby fish processing 
centres like Twillingate and La Scie. This heavy fishing pressure ultimately contributed to 
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dramatic declines in the catch rates of local harvesters during the 1980s, so much so that 
many had become convinced that a moratorium was needed several years before one was 
finally declared in 1992. While the population of Leading Tickles reached a historic high 
of over one thousand people in the late 1970s, on the strength of the booming inshore 
fishery that followed Canada's extension of its exclusive economic zone, it has 
experienced a steady decline since that time, particularly after the announcement of the 
moratorium. 
At the time this research was carried out, people living in the area had become 
highly dependent on revenues derived from the inshore crab fishery. In many cases, 
married couples had teamed up to fish together aboard a single vessel. Leading Tickles 
does have a fish processing plant, but it is at a major disadvantage relative to other plants 
in the region because the town lacks access to three-phase power. This is a necessary 
prerequisite for the highly mechanized processing and flash freezing operations of fresh 
fish plants as well as most other forms of factory production. Instead, the plant has 
survived by continuing to focus primarily on the production of salt fish while most of its 
competitors have modernized their operations. According to the plant manager, the 
facility provides up to thirty people with at least some employment during the peak 
season, but is only able to provide five to six of them with enough hours to qualify them 
for Employment Insurance payments during the long winter offseason. 
The Leading Tickles plant is now operated by a parent company, Golden Shell 
Seafoods of Random Island, which uses it primarily for the processing and salting of 
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mackerel and lumpfish that is landed in different locations along the northeast coast and 
cod, most of which is caught as bycatch by trawlers along Newfoundland's south coast 
before being trucked to Leading Tickles to be salted. 90 The plant also serves as a landing 
point for snow crab, lobster, and capelin which are caught by local harvesters and then 
trucked to various other locations across the island for processing. 
As of 2006, the unemployment rate amongst those who remained in Leading 
Tickles was 53.1 percent, compared with 18.6 percent in the rest of the province and 
about half of the people living in the town derived most of their living from fishing or fish 
processing (Statistics Canada 2008). While few employment alternatives are available, 
some people do commute for two hours each day to work in Grand Falls-Windsor, most 
often in the call centre, the hospital or the small service industry. Still others have left 
Newfoundland, either seasonally or permanently, to work on the Canadian mainland, 
usually in the province of Alberta, which is enjoying the benefits of a booming petroleum 
industry and is experiencing a chronic labour shortage. Between 1991 and 2006, the 
population of Leading Tickles fell by 157 people, including forty-six since 2001 
(Statistics Canada 2006, 2008). That represents a drop of nearly 28 percent since the 
announcement ofthe cod moratorium. Furthermore, most of those who have left are quite 
young, relative to those who remain, raising serious questions about the capacity of the 
town to sustain itself over time. 
While those with crab licences and some seasonal migrants had enjoyed a decade 
of relative prosperity at the time when this research was completed, the town was facing a 
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number of major challenges, including a shrinking tax base and sweeping cutbacks to 
provincial and municipal services which were threatening its long-term viability. 
Residents often complained of inadequate snow clearing services and very poor road 
maintenance, both vital services in a place where many people's livelihoods depend on 
their capacity to drive to their places of work during the long and often severe winter. 
Some have moved to larger centres in order to be closer to employment opportunities. 
This trend has been intensified by the fact that many of Leading Tickles ' elderly people 
have been transferred to a long-term care facility in Grand Falls-Windsor, creating an 
incentive for their families to move there as well to be closer to them. 
I first arrived in Leading Tickles on a cool day in early November, overcast skies 
doing little to mask the stark beauty of the place. I had intended to speak with people 
about their reasons for choosing to pursue Marine Protected Area status for the 
surrounding waters and, to that end, I had accumulated a list of the names and phone 
numbers of people who I had heard had been involved with the initiative in some way. 
When I began calling them, however, it soon became apparent that the vast majority saw 
themselves as peripheral players and many politely expressed their concern that they 
could probably not be of much help to me. While many consented to be interviewed, they 
were quick to point out that the quest for MP A status was essentially the brainchild of one 
man, who I will refer to by the pseudonym Gary Peddle, and encouraged me to direct 
most of my questions to him instead. 
275 
I made Mr. Peddle's acquaintance the following morning. After completing 
another interview, I was provided with a rather crude set of directions to his home. I was 
told to walk toward the edge of a nearby cliff overlooking the ocean and then make my 
way down the steep foot path I would find there until I reached the water. As I proceeded 
gingerly down the trail, eyes fixed firmly on my feet, I was greeted by a booming voice in 
the distance: "How's she goin' b'y?" It took me a few seconds to realize that the voice 
was not emanating from below me, but rather from above. Mr. Peddle stood perched on 
the roof of his partially constructed home with a hammer in his hand and a broad smile 
across his face. He warmly introduced himself, as though he had been expecting me and 
proceeded to welcome me to the town. Although he was in a rush to complete work on 
his roofbefore an impending stretch of bad weather, we agreed to meet again later in the 
week to continue our conversation. 
In the days that followed, I conducted a series of interviews with other people 
living in the area and I learned a great deal more about Mr. Peddle's biography. 
Descended from a long line of successful inshore fishermen, he had lived his entire life in 
Leading Tickles. In the aftermath of the moratorium, he had emerged as a community 
leader, struggling relentlessly to keep the town afloat, against seemingly insurmountable 
odds. He assumed a prominent role in the Leading Tickles-Glovers Harbour 
Fisherpersons Committee and often represented the two communities in meetings held by 
the Fish, Food and Allied Workers Union (FF A W). He also fought to keep the fish plant 
afloat and was able to obtain some funding to renovate it and enable it to handle a broader 
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range of species. He tried unsuccessfully to start a mussel farming operation in the 
community and later developed a pilot aquaculture project to take wild cod and grow 
them to larger sizes in captivity.91 He also became the first person in the community to 
begin scuba diving for sea urchins, and started a successful new hunting lodge and 
outfitting business which catered to big game hunters from the United States, mainland 
Canada, and Europe, most of whom were in search of moose and black bear. 
Peddle was eventually elected mayor of the town and he sought to use this 
position to transform Leading Tickles into a tourist destination. He helped to procure a 
grant to develop "Oceanview Park," a large area of fully serviced oceanfront camp sites 
and trailer hook-ups, featuring a small takeout restaurant and the only cellular phone 
access point in the region. In an attempt to lure people to the park, Peddle aggressively 
campaigned for the construction of a new "Seaquarium" in the town. It was to be an 
ocean-themed museum, featuring illuminated tanks to simulate the local marine 
environment, along with an interpretation centre and a gift shop (The Express 1998). 
Peddle's initial vision had been to build it underground, with windows looking out to the 
real ocean, but had been convinced that it would not have been feasible. While the project 
ultimately failed due to the inability of Peddle and others to persuade investors to support 
it, his interest in taking advantage of public interest in the marine environment to 
revitalize the local economy remained his major focus in the years to come. This 
determination ultimately contributed to his decision to seek Marine Protected Area status 
for the area in 1997. 
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8.2 The Marine Protected Area Program in Newfoundland and Labrador 
While the implementation of the Oceans Act was obstructed by a variety of forces 
at the national level, the challenges of putting it into practice in Newfoundland and 
Labrador were arguably even greater. In the mid 1990s, the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans was facing widespread criticism throughout the province for its alleged 
mismanagement of the fishery. This problem was recognized by many of the federal 
bureaucrats I interviewed in 2003 . Most were keenly aware ofthe obstacles that the 
agency's history in the region presented for them in their efforts to put new ocean policies 
into practice. As one individual working for the Oceans Directorate in Ottawa explained: 
Newfoundland is an extremely touchy area, because of the strength of the 
fishing industry and the frustration left by the cod moratorium. I think that 
whole situation has shaped people's receptiveness to the oceans program. 
It has made them very leery of DFO, for one thing. I don't think there is 
any question that it is a very challenging place in which to move forward. 
The establishment of new projects in the province was further complicated by the 
very public failure of another federal agency, Parks Canada, to establish a large marine 
conservation area in Newfoundland just a short time earlier. In 1995, Parks Canada 
developed a new policy framework which allowed for the establishment of "National 
Marine Conservation Areas" (NMCAs) in marine areas under federal jurisdiction (Parks 
Canada 1995). This power was later incorporated into formal legislation through the 
National Marine Conservation Areas Act in 2002.92 The agency was given a mandate to 
establish 29 NMCAs in different parts of the country for the purpose of "protecting and 
conserving representative marine areas for the benefit, education and enjoyment of the 
278 
people of Canada and the world" (Parks Canada 2002). While the main focus of the 
program was on protecting representative ecosystems, it was also designed with the 
intention of permitting the "ecologically sustainable use" of marine resources contained 
within NMCAs by human beings (ibid.). 
In 1994, Parks Canada began carrying out informal consultations along 
Newfoundland's northeast coast with the goal of eventually creating an NMCA to 
represent what it called the "Newfoundland Shelf' region (MacNab 1996; Lien 1999). 
The NMCA was conceived of as a marine extension of Terra Nova National Park, which 
had been established in 1959 (ibid.). It was decided that the NMCA would ideally take in 
an area of about three thousand square kilometres, including all of Bonavista Bay and the 
eastern half of Notre Dame Bay, and extending out to sea as far as the Funk Island 
Ecological Reserve, about sixty kilometres from shore (Lien 1999). The proposed area 
was home to about 60,000 people, 2000 of whom were commercial fishing licence 
holders (ibid: 5). It also accounted for the majority of the aquacultured mussel production 
in Newfoundland. 
In 1997, Parks Canada undertook a feasibility study to assess the viability of an 
NMCA in the region. By March of 1998 a twenty person Advisory Committee was put 
into place, consisting of both researchers and representatives of various industries and 
community organizations (ibid.). The committee proceeded to carry out a series of public 
meetings to give area residents an opportunity to ask questions about the proposal and 
provide feedback. 
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While many interviewees agreed that the idea of an NMCA was initially well 
received by most people in the region because of its potential to attract tourists, over time 
a number of key groups began to come out against it. Most notable among these were the 
Newfoundland Aquaculture Industry Association, the Fish, Food and Allied Workers 
Union, and the Rural Rights and Small Boat Owners Association. All three organizations 
actively campaigned against the NMCA and their supporters openly voiced their 
displeasure with Parks Canada in public meetings and on radio call-in shows (ibid.). The 
project soon became a lightning rod for criticism of the federal government's failed 
fisheries policies, and of the unwillingness of Parks Canada to live up to many of the 
commitments it had made to local residents when it had established Terra Nova National 
Park nearly four decades earlier. Finally, in March of 1999, growing public opposition to 
the project prompted a non-secret vote amongst the Advisory Committee members, which 
resulted in a split decision in favour of terminating the feasibility study process. Growing 
tension within the committee and in the region at large soon led to the abandonment of 
the NMCA proposal altogether (Lien 1999). 
Lien (1999) has identified several factors that contributed to the failure of the 
project. Most significantly, he has argued that the policy framework underlying the 
NMCA program could not be easily reconciled with the predicaments that fishing 
communities in the area were facing at that time. In the aftermath of the cod moratorium, 
many people were fearful about their capacity to continue to make a living in the region 
and were reluctant to accept a new policy approach that had the potential to further 
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restrict their use of the marine environment.93 Some feared that the NMCA could result in 
a situation in which the interests of fishers would be marginalized to accommodate 
particular environmental concerns or to make way for new industries like tourism (Lien 
1999). These concerns, he suggests, built upon longstanding distrust of government in 
many rural areas of Newfoundland and widespread "suspicions of bad intentions . .. on 
both sides" (ibid: 14). 
Lien also points to a lack of support for the project at higher levels. He argues that 
ground level administrators were not given sufficient budgets with which to work, nor 
were they given adequate flexibility to allow them to adapt to problems on the ground as 
they emerged. This severely limited their capacity to engage in long-term planning. They 
were also faced with inadequate technological and scientific support, due in part to the 
lack of full participation from the management and science branches of Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada (ibid.). Interviews that I carried out in the region echoed these sentiments. 
Many people said that the inability of Parks Canada officials to definitively answer their 
questions about how the marine environment would be managed and which activities 
would and would not be permitted inside the boundaries of the NMCA led to growing 
suspicion about the agency's intentions and helped to turn many people against it. 
It was in this tense climate that the first Oceans Act projects in Newfoundland and 
Labrador came into being. In 1999, the Science, Oceans, and Environment Branch was 
established at Fisheries and Oceans Canada' s (FOC) regional office in St. John's and 
granted responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the Oceans Act in the 
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province.94 Faced with the task of overcoming public distrust of federal planning 
initiatives, they adopted a very different approach than their colleagues in other regions of 
the country. Whereas FOC regional offices based in Nova Scotia and British Columbia 
focused on the development of large-scale integrated ocean management projects, the 
Newfoundland region opted to begin by focusing on small-scale, "community-based" 
projects where there was considerable "grassroots" support already in place, so that their 
actions would not be viewed as an imposition from outside. 
One such project emerged out of the ongoing efforts of a group of fish harvesters 
on Newfoundland's Eastport Peninsula to develop measures to protect the area' s rich 
lobster stocks from increasing fishing pressure in the years following the rumouncement 
of the cod moratorium (Davis et al. 2006). The Eastport Peninsula is located in Bonavista 
Bay, which fell within the boundaries of Parks Canada' s proposed NMCA. Members of 
the Eastport Peninsula Lobster Protection Committee (EPLPC), which was created in 
1995, sought to develop an alternative approach to conservation that was more sensitive 
to the needs of coastal communities. With the aid of FOC, the EPLPC was successful in 
creating a boundary around the entire peninsula within which local fishers were granted 
exclusive lobster harvesting rights. In return, they agreed to refrain from fishing for 
lobster beyond the boundary.95 
Within their exclusive zone, local lobster harvesters worked with FOC to establish 
'no-take' closed areas around two groups of islands within the bow1dary that were 
believed to provide good lobster spawning habitat. They later decided to attempt to have 
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these closed areas recognized as a Marine Protected Area under the Oceans Act. The 
EPLPC also signed a memorandum of understanding with FOC agreeing to share 
responsibility for enforcement and the coordination of research activities in and around 
the closed areas. They have also developed a variety of other conservation strategies in an 
attempt to boost egg production in the lobster population, including the practice of v-
notching egg-bearing female lobsters. This involves cutting a small notch in the tail of the 
lobster before releasing it so that others will know to return it to the water if they catch it 
again. It is now illegal to sell a v-notched lobster anywhere in the province. In the short 
time since the Eastport project was formed, it has proven extremely influential. It has 
been the subject of several documentary films and newspaper articles and has given rise 
to a number of spin-off projects, both in Newfoundland and internationally. 
A second MPA project was located in Gilbert Bay, on the southeast coast of 
Labrador. It was quite different from the one in Eastport, in that it grew out of an attempt 
to provide special protection for a genetically distinct subspecies of cod. The fish are 
distinguished by their unique golden-brown coloration96 and by the fact that they reside in 
the bay year-round rather than migrating into offshore waters in the winter to spawn. 
While recent research has suggested that similar "bay stocks" may also exist elsewhere in 
the province, Gilbert Bay is by far the best studied example of this phenomenon (Green 
and Wroblewski 2001 ; Gosse 2002). While the Gilbert Bay project has commercial 
fishery implications, proponents have also been quick to stress the potential of the so-
called "golden cod" as a tourist attraction, as well as the possibilities for the commercial 
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aquaculture industry to take advantage of the fish's non-migratory tendencies. Both the 
Eastport and Gilbert Bay projects were identified by FOC as Areas of Interest (AOis) for 
Marine Protected Areas in 2000 and received formal designation as MPAs in 2005. 
8.3 "The Tickles" Marine Protected Area Project 
Leading Tickles fell just outside of Parks Canada' s proposed NMCA, but many 
local fishers had followed the process closely, believing that it could have an impact on 
their livelihoods if it were to be expanded or ifthose who fished within the NMCA 
boundaries were to shift their activities farther west. In 1997, while serving as mayor, 
Gary Peddle was made aware of the newly passed Oceans Act by employees at the local 
Regional Economic Development Board in Grand Falls. After meeting with 
representatives of FOC and the Exploits Valley Regional Economic Development (RED) 
Board in Grand Falls, Peddle became convinced that the Marine Protected Area program 
might be a good fit for the area around Leading Tickles and the neighbouring community 
of Glover's Harbour. In consultation with members of the Leading Tickles-Glovers 
Harbour Fisherpersons Committee as well as FOC and the RED Board, he developed a 
proposal to have the area formally designated as an MP A. When asked about his 
motivations for devoting himself to the idea, Peddle paused for a moment and then 
reflected upon the daunting challenges facing his town: 
I think a lot about my community. A lot of people are leaving and taking 
their kids. They are talking seriously about closing the school and 
eventually she is going to go. We've been fighting to save it for the last 
couple of years, but it looks like it's probably a lost cause now. When that 
happens, you will have to bus them out and that will cost more. We' re 
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already seeing the stores close down. This summer, the gas station closed 
down, so now you have to go to Point Leamington (a twenty-five minute 
drive away) just to get gas. It wouldn't surprise me that in five or ten years, 
the population will go down low enough that there won't even be 
community council or community water anymore. I might have to dig a 
well if I want to stay here. 
In spite of the undeniable uncertainties about the future of Leading Tickles, however, he 
expressed his deep commitment to continue fishing there for as long as he possibly could 
and to do his best to make sure that others would have the opportunity to do the same: 
I'm building a house right now, because I'm thinking and hoping that 
Leading Tickles is going to keep going for a long time, but I honestly 
don't know. I decided to build it right here beside the water because I love 
the ocean. I love fishing. It isn' t the money part of it. It is just part of me. 
Years ago when they were buying fishermen out, I could have probably 
sold out. I would have found something, but I knew I just wouldn't be able 
to give it up. I just love it. My family has been at it for hundreds of years. 
My father was down there until almost his very last day. It was his life, his 
work, his pleasure, his everything. Now he never really went anywhere 
like I do, but I still think that if the spring of the year came and I couldn't 
get out in a boat on the ocean, I'd go nuts. I just love being out there. I 
think better. I feel better. Things come to me better. It just feels good. 
People make things complicated, but as long as you feel good when you 
get up in the morning, that's all that matters ... If what' s in front of me goes 
as fast as what's behind me, then I won't have much time left. So you've 
got to make every day count and do things that make you feel good and try 
to make a positive difference to the world. I never sat down and decided to 
be mayor or whatever. I just found myself in situations where I thought I 
could do some good, so that's what I tried to do. 
He did, however, express concern that many people in Leading Tickles were losing touch 
with what had made it such a unique place in which to live: 
The big boats have definitely been a part of Newfoundland history, but the 
small boats going out from the wharves and coming back to their 
families, ... that's what Newfoundland is to me. When I was a kid, I saw so 
much cod and capelin that I never thought it could all be caught. Now 
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there's barely enough out there to keep it all going. There was a time when 
you could come down to that wharf, you wouldn't be able to get your work 
done, because there would be so many people and youngsters and 
everything around. Now, people say they could drown down there some 
days, because there's nobody else around. It is very sad. It is a way of life 
disappearing right before our eyes. The people here are who they are 
because they are so closely knit and that is being lost. Right now in 
Leading Tickles, if anything happened to people, others would take care of 
them. If their house burned down and they didn't have insurance, people 
would rebuild their house for them. And I know if anything ever happened 
to me, people would be right there for me and I would be right there for 
them. That's a good feeling. You just don't get that up on the mainland or 
in bigger places ... and people are even starting to lose it here. It is sad that 
people here don't know what they've got. Some look at how much money 
people have on the mainland and all the things they have and they want to 
live like that. . . You see the same thing happening in the fishery. Years ago, 
if a fisherman made thirty thousand dollars, it was a good year. Now, I 
would say that most of the fisherman in this community are getting about 
thirty thousand dollars just from crab. Then they might get another five to 
ten thousand for lobster and they draw full unemployment on top of that, 
so they are looking at forty to fifty-thousand at least. People are richer, but 
are they happier? Back in the day, people didn't have all this stuff, but 
they were happy. They didn't know the difference. All of a sudden people 
think they need all this stuffto be happy. You can be happy anywhere, but 
these people are trying to measure happiness with money. They want more 
and more and more, and it is dividing communities. But, if you are the 
type to worry too much about how much money you have, you would 
probably find something else to worry about if that weren't there. 
Peddle saw the MP A as a possible way in which to ensure that the fishery and the 
tourism industry could continue to provide modest livelihoods for those who wanted to 
remain in Leading Tickles: 
I'm hoping this MPA will take care of the fishery and it will help the 
community for the long run. It won't be easy, but it will make a difference, 
and any difference it makes in rural Newfoundland right now is a plus. A 
few things have been built and it has helped a few little businesses around 
here. It has created a bit of employment. Sometimes it doesn't take much 
to make a difference. And people from outside can look and see that 
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people here are taking care of their surroundings and that makes the 
community look better, so maybe there is a possibility that people will 
move here. We are also hoping the MP A will bring tourism in. When I 
was the mayor of Leading Tickles, everybody who came to visit used to 
say how much they liked to come and look at the scenery, but then they 
would turn around and leave because we had nowhere for them to spend 
money. Now you can stop and get some food or spend a few dollars at the 
store or stay at the park or whatever. That's a step in the right direction. 
He and others who became involved early on in the process believed that the MP A 
program provided a unique opportunity to simultaneously conserve and rehabilitate the 
fishery and create new opportunities to attract tourists to Oceanview Park by 
demonstrating that they were acting as responsible stewards of the marine environment. 
George, a fisherman who had worked on the project explained: 
This is mainly about protecting our fishery, but we hope it will bring in 
some tourists too. I believe that you can really draw a lot of attention to an 
area that is protected like that. You can draw a lot of interest that way. It' s 
a good thing to do also, because we' ve got a bad reputation in the eyes of 
some people, especially mainlanders. They think we just kills everything 
we sees. It probably comes from all the TV stories about the seal hunt, 
which makes us look like barbarians. They never give the 
Newfoundlanders a chance to tell our side of the story. This MPA is going 
to give us a way to show people that we do care about the environment. 
We want to protect the whole ecosystem and not just those parts that look 
cute and cuddly. 
While the group based in Leading Tickles and Glover's Harbour was actually the 
first in the province to submit a proposal to FOC, the project was considerably slower in 
developing than its counterparts in Eastport and Gilbert Bay. When asked why that was, 
one FOC employee speculated that was due in part to the fact that it lacked a "marquee 
species" and this made it harder to build support for it at the national level. Whereas 
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lobster and the "golden cod" have become synonymous with the Eastport and Gilbert Bay 
projects respectively, the people of Leading Tickles and Glover's Harbour wanted their 
project to be broader in scope, tackling a wider range of species, so that it could have a 
more significant impact on the health of the local fishery. In addition to lobster, the 
Leading Tickles project sought to develop protection measures for several other 
commercially harvested species as well. Peddle explained: 
We borrowed some of the stuff that worked for people in Eastport and 
Gilbert Bay, but this is a very different area. Gilbert Bay is a cod one. 
Eastport is mainly lobster. Here we have a lot of different species. It is a 
rougher and more out in the ocean type of area too. There are also more 
fishermen to deal with. So, it is much more complicated. This will be a 
harder MP A to supervise than any of the rest of them. There are so many 
fisheries going on. It is an advantage to have so many species involved, 
because we can tell people how much we're doing, but it is a disadvantage, 
because it is a lot more complicated. If you can get an MP A to work in an 
area like this, there is potential you can get it to work a lot of other areas, 
because this is one of the toughest areas to do it in. 
In spite of these logistical challenges, the Leading Tickles area was formally designated 
as an Area of Interest for an MP A by FOC in June of 2001 , one year after the same status 
had been given to the other two pilot projects in the province (Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada 2002b). By 2003, a multi-stakeholder steering committee had been established to 
oversee the ongoing operations of the proposed MP A. It included representation from 
FOC, the Provincial Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, the Leading Tickles-
Glovers Harbour Fisherpersons Committee, the Leading Tickles Town Council, the 
Leading Tickles Harbour Authority, the Exploits Valley Economic Development 
Association, and the Lewisport Yacht Club. In the case of both Leading Tickles and 
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Eastport, however, the steering committees were structured in such a way that only 
permanent residents of the area could be voting members. Outside investors and others 
wishing to do business in the region would be permitted to attend meetings and make 
their case to the steering committee, but they would not be permitted to vote on issues 
that were up for debate. Furthermore, in both cases, people employed as fish harvesters 
were given the majority of the seats, so they had the power to effectively veto any 
motions that they did not see as being favourable to their best interests. 
8.4 Islands of Sustainability: The Political Ecology of MP As 
The official recognition of the Leading Tickles site as an Area oflnterest enabled 
those involved to access some new research funding through FOC and other government 
agencies. Between 2001 and 2006, the agency helped to fund a variety of studies in the 
area, with a view toward gathering background data that could be used in the planning of 
the proposed MPA. In 2004, a plant and algae survey was carried out and divers, 
underwater cameras, and aerial photos were used to identify and map the marine 
vegetation in the area (The Coastal Current 2005a). That same year, Leading Tickles was 
one of five communities in the province that was selected to participate in a lobster 
conservation project based in part on the model developed at Eastport. The program, 
which was funded through the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Legacy Nature Trust, included the formal involvement of 
fishers in the at sea sampling, tagging and v-notching of lobsters, and the rough 
assessment of the numbers of juvenile lobsters in each area (The Coastal Current 2005b ). 
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There were also several closed areas established to protect lobster spawning habitat and, 
after 2006, this was expanded into new areas in an attempt to protect capelin spawning 
habitat as well (The Coastal Current 2006c ). 
In 2005 and 2006, this research was expanded. FOC, in collaboration with the 
Leslie Harris Centre of Regional Policy and Development, a research institute at 
Memorial University ofNewfoundland, funded new studies to determine good spawning 
areas for lobster, capelin and herring and surveys to estimate the egg densities being 
produced by each of these species in the Leading Tickles area (The Coastal Current 
2005c). Fishers were paid small sums to encourage them to take part in these research 
projects and to take scientists to various locations in their boats. In the Leading Tickles 
area, some fishers were also invited to share their knowledge with scientists in order to 
provide them with a better understanding of the area. Many of those interviewed 
indicated that they very much enjoyed their participation in these programs and hoped 
they would have the opportunity to continue to do it in the future. Several did, however, 
express concern that, with the exception of lobster and crab, they were dealing with 
highly migratory species that were very difficult to study. Peddle observed: 
You need the MPA for lobster and crab and species that don't travel much, 
but with traveling species, what can you do? The problem with those ones 
is that a lot of people think that if I don't catch it, somebody somewhere 
else will, so I better catch it first. I guess all you can really do is try to 
protect the spawn, but if the fish are going somewhere else and other 
people are taking them all, then it is hard to get people involved. 
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This is also a problem with lobster, to some extent, because lobster larvae can drift 
considerable distances with the tide before finally sinking to the bottom and hatching. 
Thus, depending on tidal patterns, the production of more eggs in one area may actually 
benefit harvesters somewhere else more than it does those in the area where the eggs were 
first laid (Davis et al. 2006). In an attempt to better understand this problem, graduate 
students from Memorial University carried out a "drifter study," releasing hundreds of 
grapefruit around the closed areas and attempting to recover them at other locations along 
the coast in the days and weeks that followed. These results were used to estimate the 
drift pattern of lobster larvae produced in the closed areas (The Coastal Current 2005c). 
Shortly thereafter, FOC installed eleven thermographs in the waters surrounding Leading 
Tickles and Glover's Harbour to determine the water temperature 30 feet below the 
surface. The thermographs automatically test the temperature every two hours and are 
also capable of taking underwater photographs (The Coastal Current 2006a). 
In an effort to better protect commercially fished species, harvesters in the area 
once again followed the Eastport model in seeking exclusive access to particular areas so 
that they could develop their own approach to conservation. Peddle explained: 
Until you have laws in place, people can come in from anywhere m 
Newfoundland and fish it. You could have all the fishermen in 
Newfoundland if you get things going good. You don' t have that yet, 
because the crab has been doing so well. We've got our area here, but it is 
very complicated to keep people out of it. If they aren't allowed to come 
into our area, then are we not allowed to go into theirs either? With the 
lobsters, we are making it so that only somebody who has fished there 
historically can fish there now. If people never fished there all those years, 
the only reason they would come in later is because we have made it better. 
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That's not a law yet, but I think it is pretty much a gentlemen's agreement. 
With capelin, we came up with the idea that anybody in Notre Dame Bay 
that has a license can fish capelin in this area, but nobody from outside of 
this area. But this is a big area, so that's still a lot of fishermen. We' re 
hoping the capelin thing will come through. We would also like it so none 
of the big purse seiners can come in here. They can take 50,000 and throw 
the other 150,000 on the bottom. I've seen that a lot. maller guys don't 
have the capacity to do that. So that change would certainly help. 
While officials from FOC Oceans were working with other branches of the 
agency in an effort to provide local fishers with some degree of exclusive access, it 
seemed clear that the MPA project would also be accompanied by clear expectations 
about how it should operate in the future. One FOC official who had worked on the 
Leading Tickles initiative explained: 
The fact of the matter is that DFO is simply not going to pay for 
everything anymore. If these projects are going to be community-based 
and they want more of a say, they are going to have to shoulder some of 
the financial burden. With rights come responsibilities. We're requiring 
collaboration at every level now .. . Volw1tary, self-regulating regimes are 
becoming well established and accepted by industry, governments and 
consumers, and that's what these projects are trying to achieve ... We pay 
for a lot of the incidentals, but when it comes to paying for the salaries for 
coordinators and raising public awareness, and that sort of thing, the 
funding will have to come from those who use the area. So the reality is 
that if a project like this is going to succeed, it will always have to be 
looking for new sources of money. 
This philosophy represents a radical departure from the more top-down, state-funded 
approach to ocean management that was pursued in previous eras. Instead of shouldering 
all of the responsibility for keeping MP A projects afloat, those charged with 
implementing the Oceans Act had been instructed to develop a more decentred approach, 
in which non-state actors are expected to play a more prominent role. Most of those 
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involved in the Leading Tickles project seemed to accept this new reality, and some 
expressed sympathy for local representatives ofFOC's Oceans and Environment Branch, 
who they felt had done as much as they could with the limited budgets they had available 
to them. Charlie, a fisherman who had been employed by the lobster tagging project 
noted: 
The people from DFO were telling me how hard they had to work to get 
money for it this year and how hard they will have to work to get more 
money for it next year, so hopefully it won't just die. It' s the type of thing 
where, if you don't keep it up, it's useless. That would be some sad if it 
does stop, because we've all put a lot of effort into it. I just don' t see the 
research being any good to us if we don't do the same things next year as 
we did this year, but it' s not so easy when you can't plan ahead and you 
always have to be thinking about how you ' re going to get more money for 
next year. 
Some of those fishers that were closely involved with the project had sought to develop 
ways of reducing costs associated with running it. This included voluntarily policing the 
would-be protected area themselves to make sure that nobody was poaching at times 
when there were very few boats on the water. This followed the approach taken in 
Eastport, where poaching had become a serious problem, due in part to the proximity of 
lobster fishing sites to cabins in the neighbouring Terra Nova National Park (Davis et al. 
2006). There were also discussions held in Leading Tickles about ways of raising money 
for the MPA at the community level, including the possibility of holding a polar bear dip 
and trying to attract people to sponsor those brave enough to take the plunge. 
Representatives of FOC based in St. John' s also took steps to assist those involved 
with the three MPA pilot projects in their efforts to lure external financial support, 
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demonstrating that corporate philanthropy is being viewed as a legitimate source of the 
funds through which to keep these "community-based" MPA projects afloat. In 2003, 
they worked with a design firm in St. John's to create corporate-style logos for the 
proposed MP A sites, so as to make them look more attractive to tourists and prospective 
investors. In the cases of Leading Tickles and Eastport, the logo designs were based on 
the winning entries in a contest that was held at the local high school, while the Gilbert 
Bay logo was the creation of the company. 
FOC's Oceans and Environment Branch also enlisted the assistance of the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Legacy Nature Trust, a non-profit organization based in St. 
John's with a mandate to raise funds from the private sector to support conservation 
projects operating in the province. The Legacy Nature Trust was ultimately successful in 
raising some corporate money to support various activities associated with the three MP A 
projects. The Shell Canada Environment Fund, a philanthropic arm of Royal 
Dutch/Shell's Canadian division, contributed funding to assist with scientific research at 
Leading Tickles and to pay a small part of the salary of a full-time co-ordinator that was 
hired to assist the Steering Committees of the Leading Tickles and Eastport projects. 
Another petroleum company, Petro-Canada has helped to fund research at Eastport and 
Gilbert Bay and has contributed ten thousand dollars to support the production of signs 
and brochures which promote the Eastport project, while also prominently featuring the 
Petro-Canada logo (The Coastal Current 2006b ). Petro-Canada, along with fellow 
corporate donors Shell International and outdoor apparel chain Mountain Equipment Co-
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op have also had their logos featured as sponsors in issues of the Coastal Current, a two 
page quarterly newsletter produced by the FOC Ocean Branch in St. John's, which 
provides updates on the ongoing activities of the three proposed Newfoundland MP A 
projects (The Coastal Current 2006b ). 
When interviewed in the summer of2004, the acting Director of the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Legacy Nature Trust indicated that she saw many 
opportunities for public-private partnerships in funding the operations of MP As and other 
small-scale conservation projects: 
The DFO people came to us because they feel that they shouldn't be the 
only ones pumping money into this. I don't think that DFO would say that 
full government funding for MP As is appropriate, and I would tend to 
agree with them. I think the communities should have ownership of it. The 
government is there to govern or administer the Oceans Act and work with 
the local communities to make sure that the regulations are understood, 
and I think that should be the role of DFO. My personal opinion is that, if 
it were to go beyond that and governments were to start pumping money 
into this, that would put certain other things and processes at risk. I think 
there is a role potentially for a number of different entities and 
partnerships to get involved. The mandate of the government is not to go 
out and fundraise either. So they need somebody to come in and help play 
that role and that's where we come in. That's not to say that the people on 
the Steering Committee aren't doing anything, because they are. They're 
out there trying to be self-sufficient themselves as well. 
She added that, for some private-sector donors, the fact that the project can be marketed 
as "community-based" is an attractive selling point: 
Some funders explicitly say they want the community angle. For many 
funders, what makes the project attractive is that it is community-driven. 
Like Shell 's Environmental Fund is one of the ones that explicitly wanted 
their money to be used for a community-based project. It is part of their 
mandate. I think that is important to think about with funding . . . If DFO 
295 
had a huge involvement, then a lot of foundations especially wouldn' t be 
as eager to throw money at it, since they would see it as a government 
initiative rather than a community one . . . Of course, the private sector 
partners do need to be recognized, but not necessarily through flashing 
lights or whatever. 
This focus on projects that are not government driven is very much a reflection of the 
core ideals espoused by the creators of the Corporate Social Responsibility movement 
discussed in the last chapter. It expresses a preference for a more overtly "community-
based" and "market-based" approach to conservation, in which government plays a less 
prominent role, and communities, universities, and private companies assume a 
heightened importance. Despite this new focus, however, most FOC employees indicated 
that they continued to pay for most of the research initiatives undertaken in and around 
the three MP A sites. 
While representing an attractive source of funds for conservation projects, there 
remains a danger that this growing focus on private sector support may result in a 
situation in which decisions are made for reasons other than the protection of the 
environment, and local people may eventually come to be displaced from the spaces they 
have used historically. In reference to the well-established tourism industry in the 
Mexican State of Quintana Roo, Pi-Sunyer and Thomas have noted that: "all too often 
ecology has been co-opted by the market... The underlying reality is that both nature and 
people ... are constantly asked to define everything in terms of price" (1997: 196-197). 
They furthermore argue that this marketization of nature for the sake of tourism has 
sometimes led to the extinguishment of existing "rights to land and resources," as "the 
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assertion by those in power that local people were not using their lands "properly" has 
been used to redefine "resources" and "public space" as "private property" ( 1997: 198). 
While most of those fishers who had been heavily involved in trying to get the 
MP A established were willing to do their part to keep it running smoothly into the future, 
several expressed concern that the recent shift toward "community-based" projects was 
coming at the expense of FOC' s historic responsibility to enforce fisheries regulations 
and carry out research. Both functions were severely eroded during the neoliberal reforms 
of the 1990s, and little, if anything, has been done to restore them. Several people openly 
worried that without a greater federal commitment to understanding and protecting the 
ocean environment, there was little hope for the future of the fishery around Leading 
Tickles, or anywhere else in Newfoundland. Gary Peddle noted: 
We've definitely been seeing DFO cutbacks over the last ten years or so. 
We're not getting anything like the enforcement we used to get. Some 
fishermen don't want to see DFO enforcement officers on the water, but 
most people are happy to see them coming and wish they saw them more. 
There is nothing wrong with seeing a fishery officer every once in a while 
to keep everyone honest. If I'm going to do it right, I want to make sure 
that buddy over there is doing it right too. That's the general way of 
thinking. Most fishermen are willing to do the right thing, but if they know 
their neighbour is cheating, they'll cheat too . .. DFO is counting on 
communities to police themselves, and that's good to a point, but don' t put 
it all in our hands, because we can't do it by ourselves . .. Sometimes it feels 
like the senior people in Ottawa are only getting interested in MPAs 
because they want to look good in the international community. They feel 
that they need to show that they are doing more to conserve fisheries and 
stuff like that, but there have been so many cutbacks in other areas. Local 
people do a lot of the work, and that's fine, but at the end of the day, the 
finances and everything depend on Ottawa. If they don' t support it, it' s 
gone. 
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Charlie echoed these sentiments: 
There have been so many cutbacks at DFO. Fisheries officers can barely 
get enough to pay for their gas to go around in the boat. To me, it seems 
like fisheries officers are trying to do their job, but DFO has no money, so 
they are relying on communities to do everything. That's a good thing in 
some ways, but we need the fisheries officers to support the communities 
and be involved with them more. What good is a protected area if you 
don't enforce it? That defeats the whole purpose. We've got to be a part of 
it too, but it is no good if we don't have protection for it. I don't think I 
saw a single fisheries officer all summer. I was at crab for two months and 
lobster for two months and capelin too. I spent a good bit of time on the 
water, but I didn't see them once. You used to see them every day but they 
have been cut back so much. The DFO people that work with us are best 
kind but the government people in Ottawa seem to have their priorities in 
other places. 
In many respects, these arguments echo the Tragedy of the Commons thesis (Scott 
Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968), suggesting that the risk of getting caught is a necessary 
deterrent to prevent people from overexploiting local fisheries. 
Many of those fishers interviewed also pointed to the failure of FOC to re-invest 
in ocean research on a larger scale. While several people praised the work of FOC Oceans 
Branch employees and expressed gratitude for the research that had been done locally as 
part ofthe MPA process, some noted that this focus on small scale projects like MPAs 
appeared to be coming at the expense of other kinds of research. The result was a move 
toward small community-based ' islands of sustainability' within what many believed to 
be a largely unsustainable ocean economy. George pointed out that without any science 
being done in many areas, the tendency had been to use research carried out in one area to 
make decisions in another and that often gave an inaccurate picture of what was 
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happening. This often contributed to a one-size-fits-all approach to establishing fishing 
quotas which often seemed out oftouch with the experiences of fishers: 
If they don't continue to keep up the science over the long term, it defeats 
the purpose. Nothing is stable and things change very quickly. There is a 
lot to learn, and you can't even begin to do it without putting in long term 
money. They just don't have much science, so they are using old research. 
Sometimes they might be using a study that was done in a different place a 
long time ago. Like, they'll do a trawl in Trinity Bay and use it to make 
decisions about Notre Dame Bay, but one area can be totally different than 
another. So how are you supposed to take that seriously? .. .In Eastport and 
in a lot of other places on the northeast coast, their lobster went down in 
the early 90s, but our lobster isn' t down here in Leading Tickles. If you 
look at our log book statistics over the last twenty years, you would find 
that it has been pretty consistent. The federal government loves to say ' the 
lobster fishery is down on the northeast coast,' but I asked them if there 
has ever been a study done in Notre Dame Bay and they told me there 
hasn't. So they don't really know what's going on, do they? ... They also 
love to talk about cod increasing and decreasing, but how can they know 
that when they don't have scientists out there testing it. They have no 
boats on the water. It's the same thing with the crab. How do they know 
how they are doing unless they are going around doing tests? It's a 
joke! . . . It seems like the government wants the communities to do all the 
research for them now, but the communities can't do it all. They don' t 
have any money. They can't even afford to take care of the water and 
sewer. Most fishing communities in Newfoundland are stripped down to 
the bare bones already. 
David, a non-fisher living in the area who had worked in fisheries research in the past 
questioned the sincerity of the recent emphasis on ecosystem-based management, given 
that so few resources have been allocated to that task: 
I just can't see how DFO is going to govern the way they want to govern 
in times of cutbacks. Ecosystem based management would require a lot of 
research and they don't even have the funding to give a good assessment 
of fish stocks. The science is just not there. And they are talking about 
broadening their horizons into areas that are new to them? Where are they 
supposed to get the money for that? 
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This sentiment was shared by one manager working in the FOC Fisheries Management 
branch office in Grand Falls, who was responsible for setting fishing quotas for people 
living in the Leading Tickles Area. 
There is more and more talk of doing ecosystem-based management, but 
that is going to be so complicated, it is not even going to be fmmy. You've 
still got your fisheries management over here and your ecosystem science 
over there and they haven't really come together yet. The reality is that we 
are working with very limited budgets and there is also the time issue. To 
do something like that properly, you would have to have a lot of resources 
to put into it, particularly in terms of time. There is a huge amount of 
background work that would be needed to develop a plan, and believe me, 
there are not many days where you' re sitting around wondering what 
you're going to do next...Something like an ecosystem approach is very 
difficult to implement when you are already pressed for time. You already 
have to pick and choose what you do with your time and money. In 
Conservation and Protection, which is responsible for the fisheries officers, 
they are still operating with 1995 budgets, and you know what inflation 
rates have been since then. And then there are the fuel prices. They have 
bigger boats now, so they feel the impact, definitely. They just can't get 
out there as much as they used to. 
These statements indicate that federal cutbacks have severely constrained the capacity of 
ground level researchers and enforcement officers to do their jobs effectively. For many, 
the promise of ecosystem-management being trumpeted in Ottawa seemed profoundly out 
of touch with their lived reality in which there had been a noticeable decline in the 
investments that the federal government was willing to make in the coastal fishery. While 
corporate funding may be used to offset some of these cutbacks, philanthropic donations 
tend to focus on small and highly marketable initiatives that produce local benefits and 
aim to improve the reputation of the company in the minds of potential customers and 
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shareholders. Corporate donors do not tend to fund the kinds of long-term studies that 
were historically done by government departments in an attempt to anticipate changes to 
fish populations and ocean processes. 
8.5 Community in Question: The Beginning of the End of the Leading Tickles 
Marine Protected Area Project 
Proponents of the MP A program in Canada have tended to argue that it represents 
the antithesis of the old top-down conservation approach, in that communities are now 
being "empowered" to present their own perspective on what must be done. In theory, the 
goals and strategies pursued in each MP A will reflect the shared values of those living 
around it. The notion of community-driven conservation, however tends to operate on the 
assumption that communities are fairly homogeneous entities, or are at least capable of 
arriving at a consensus about what should and should not be done (Brosius et al 1998). 
Otherwise, the idea of a single "community perspective" becomes nonsensical. As well-
intentioned as they may be, community-based conservation projects are perpetually at 
risk of being undermined by the social tensions and conflicts that exist within designated 
"communities" or between them and neighbouring groups, thereby exposing the 
heterogeneity that is masked by homogenizing notions like "community" or "region." 
This section discusses each of these cases in turn. 
8.5.1 Pressures from Without 
For most of the twentieth century, the maritime economy in Notre Dame Bay 
focused almost exclusively on fishing and fish processing. While the port of Botwood did 
301 
receive some commercial and military shipping traffic, these activities were able to 
coexist with the local fishery with minimal disruption. In the early 1980s, however, a new 
industry began to take hold, which led to a significant reallocation of ocean space. Due to 
its many islands and sheltered inlets, Notre Dame Bay quickly emerged as a desirable 
location for Newfoundland's growing blue mussel farming industry. By the end of the 
decade, it had more mussel farms than any other bay in Newfoundland by a considerable 
margin. 
Mussel farmers in the region, represented by the Newfoundland Aquaculture 
Industry Association (NAIA), were one of the main groups that came out in opposition to 
Parks Canada's NMCA proposal in the mid 1990s, arguing that it would undermine the 
capacity of their industry to operate profitably. While NAIA fought the idea of an NMCA 
from the outset, it was only after they allied themselves with the Fish, Food and Allied 
Workers Union, that they were able to successfully campaign to have it stopped. Rick, a 
mussel farmer who operated several sites close to Leading Tickles and Glover' s Harbour 
and was one of the most outspoken critics of the NMCA proposal reflected on this period 
as follows: 
We fought that for a couple of years, but we were getting nowhere until 
the fishermen's committees got the support of the union. Then there was a 
big uproar, as there should have been. They began to understand what we 
already knew ... that that thing would have limited the activities of the 
general public and of other user groups and it would have given Ottawa 
control over everything. That's what we totally objected to .. .It might have 
brought in a bit of money through tourism, but it would have severely 
limited aquaculture expansion and it would have severely limited what the 
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fishery could do. You would have needed a permit from them to do just 
about anything. 
He was particularly concerned about the new focus on the precautionary approach within 
Parks Canada, FOC and other federal agencies. Much like the petroleum industry 
executives discussed in the previous chapter, he viewed it as a potential threat to the 
operations of his and other ocean industries. 
They say they are on the side of the precautionary approach, right? So that 
usually means that they are going to try to water down commercial 
activities within that zone. If they just want ecotourism, they will find 
some excuse to shut down any activities that they think will interfere with 
that. They can use that idea of the precautionary approach to stop anything 
that could negatively impact the environment, whether or not they have the 
science to prove that it actually is harming the environment. It doesn' t 
matter about the social impact or the social responsibilities that the federal 
government has got to the people living on the coast. 
In his view, the precautionary approach tended to define ecosystems in a narrow fashion 
that did not include people and, as a result, it failed to adequately consider the impact that 
stopping development could have on coastal residents. 
While Rick and other members of the aquaculture industry in the area had the 
opportunity to participate as the NAIA representative on the steering committee for the 
proposed Leading Tickles MP A, he eventually decided against it because he had become 
convinced that FOC's MPA program was simply a continuation of the same federal 
agenda that had characterized the NMCA period. He believed that the federal government 
had come to the view that it was politically necessary for them to begin with small 
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projects, but their ultimate goal was still to expand these projects into a much larger 
VISIOn: 
They are sneaky buggers. What they are trying to do is encompass the 
headlands and ultimately achieve the same thing under a different heading. 
That is what I feel they are trying to do in the Leading Tickles area. That is 
the headlands, right. It's the same thing with Eastport. What they are doing 
is encompassing is the upper headlands for the exact same conservation 
area they wanted three or four years ago. They are trying to do it through 
the back door. So, if they take Bonavista and maybe Twillingate and so on, 
they can create three or four exclusion zones with all of these designated 
conservation areas. Then they've got exactly what they wanted in the first 
place. Once they have a few of these things in place, they can slowly 
expand it. Just you wait. Once a few of these are established, they can say 
that they want to add a three kilometre buffer zone around the MP As and it 
goes from there. We know all about that strategy in aquaculture. Once you 
get established and you have a presence there, you can prove you are a 
legitimate stakeholder and then it is a lot easier get the green light to 
expand your operation. So, ultimately, I think that is the objective, even 
though it is spearheaded by some of the fishermen. The government will 
get what they want somehow. They will get control. Then FOC and Parks 
Canada and the Canadian Wildlife Service can all have a war between 
themselves to decide who gets jurisdiction over it. 
He furthermore contended that many of the people of Leading Tickles and Glover's 
Harbour were profoundly naive about the real rationale behind the MPA project. 
My impression is that what the federal government is doing is what's good 
for the federal government, but it isn' t good for us. And I don't think it 
will be good for the fishermen or anybody else that is using the ocean 
environment. The fishermen see it as a way to protect their lobster and 
things like that. They will say that DFO or Parks Canada or whoever won't 
be able to control it because the fishermen will have more votes. They will 
say it isn't going to restrict them. But you and I both know that once the 
legislation is in, it can be used to their disadvantage. Those guys are only 
looking at the commercial fishery. They aren' t thinking about the 
ecotourism that could interfere with fishing or any other potential conflicts 
that might come along down the road. The fact is that the cod fishery is 
still not open and the crab isn' t going to last forever and there are no 
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young people coming into the fishery. Most people over there are over 
forty-five or fifty years old. So, in another ten years, they will be retired 
and guess who is going to run things then? Whatever the people in 
Leading Tickles think they are going to have, it will be over some quick. 
There is a hidden agenda, but none of them see it. Somebody in 
government is looking twenty years down the road or whatever. All they 
have to do is decide that the cod or the lobster or the mackerel or herring 
or capelin or whatever is in danger and then they can use that to justify 
closing down large areas. 
Rick felt that he had already been adversely affected by the proposed MP A, 
because it had denied him of the opportunity to expand his operations into new areas. 
There may be some positives that come out of the MP A down there, but 
right now, it is inhibiting the expansion of aquaculture in this area .. .The 
reality of mussel farming is that you need to encompass huge amounts of 
water and, naturally, that sometimes interferes with the lobster fishery and 
so on. Where we were going to expand is right near the border of where 
they were going to have this Marine Protected Area. So I applied for a 
licence and every person in Leading Tickles signed a huge petition and 
sent it to the province to block me from expanding there. They block us 
and, at the same time, they want us to support them with their MP A. They 
want everyone else to go along with what they want, but they don't want 
to see anybody else expanding. That's kind of hypocritical if you ask me. 
I'm just going to go through the normal processes and then they will have 
to have a sound reason to stop me from expanding, but even then, DFO 
makes you go to the fishermen's committee to make sure they don' t object. 
That MP A will give them even more control over me than they already 
have. Just imagine if they get complete control over that area ... We're not 
allowed to have a vote. We can have an affiliation. We can listen in, but 
we can't get a vote. But the fishermen don't speak for aquaculture. They 
aren't representing aquaculture, they are representing the fishery. They are 
representing their own interests and their livelihood or whatever, and more 
power to them. But, they shouldn't tell us that we can't expand into that 
area and Parks Canada or DFO or Environment Canada or whoever else 
shouldn't stop us from going into that protected area, especially when they 
have no ecological reason to do so. 
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Much like developers in the petroleum industry, Rick resented the fact that there 
was still a tendency to define ecosystem in ways that failed to acknowledge the 
presence of existing industries. He saw his activities as very sustainable and even 
complementary to the fishery, since it provided additional sources of food for 
lobsters, and he felt that political and not scientific motivations were ultimately 
responsible for curtailing his plans for expansion. 
In Rick's view, freedom to expand the mussel farming industry in Notre 
Dame Bay was the only hope for the long-term survival of the industry and the 
jobs that it provides to people in the area. He believed that the mussel farming 
industry in Newfoundland was at a natural disadvantage relative to other areas to 
begin with and it could not stand to be curtailed any more than it already was. 
Right now, we just can't compete internationally. Distribution networks 
are everything. We've got so many mussels here with no place to go. You 
just can't get them out of Newfoundland quickly and cheaply enough. 
You've got to deal with really high winds here, and a truckload of mussels 
can easily get stuck waiting for the ferry to Nova Scotia. If that happens, it 
can miss the connection to Boston, and if it does, it has to go to Toronto or 
Montreal and by that time it is four or five days old. The growers in PEl 
can get their mussels anywhere within twenty-four hours, whereas it can 
take us four days. 
The advantages Newfoundland mussel growers did have, however, were 
comparatively clean water and ample room to expand their operations into new 
areas. This, in his view, gave them a genuine opportunity to lure investment from 
multinational corporations, intent on transporting large quantities of mussels to the 
European market. 
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There is huge demand in Europe, but logistically we can't ship it there on 
the scale that we're working on now .. .I think in the next few years, you are 
only going to see just a small number of major players in the mussel 
farming business. The little household operations simply can't compete. 
Some have been bought up already, but I think soon you're going to see a 
major expansion with big European multinational companies coming in 
here. There are companies that are already starting to make big plays in the 
mussel industry in Newfoundland, so I can still see a future. I think the 
writing is on the wall. If you look at it, European waters are being more 
and more contaminated by bacteria and by heavy metals. They are also 
having problems with parasites and diseases. Europe has to get a source of 
raw material from somewhere. Eventually they are going to discover what 
we have here. Once it starts, it's going to go big. So, in order to compete, 
we're going to have to modernize. I can't stress that enough. Go big or go 
home. Volume is the key. We will need to produce four times what we're 
doing now. We need to get modem equipment and create efficiencies and 
compete globally. Transportation costs alone put us at a major 
disadvantage, so you have to make that up on your farming side or your 
processing side or a combination of both. But first you need to get that 
volume. That has been the history of the industry from the beginning. We 
don't produce enough to make it worthwhile to export quantity from here. 
What Newfoundland grows in a year, the European factories can process 
in a day. So, for now many of us are just trying to get to that level where 
we can get bought out and get out of the business. 
In addition to worrying about the MPA project limiting his capacity to expand his 
operations, Rick was deeply concerned that it could also be used as a vehicle through 
which to rebuild the local eider duck population. While the Newfoundland and Labrador 
eider duck population remains quite strong, the Canadian population is in serious 
jeopardy. It has been estimated that it has been reduced by about 80 percent from its 
historic levels, and now stands at about 400,000 birds, about one quarter of which reside 
in Newfoundland (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005h). Even in that province, 
hunting has led to a significant reduction in their numbers in some areas, especially in 
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Notre Dame Bay. One official at a regional development board in Gander who had 
worked extensively in wetlands conservation in the area estimated that the population on 
the northeast coast ofNewfoundland had fallen from approximately 150,000 breeding 
pairs to a low of about 500 breeding pairs in the 1980s, but it has been rising steadily 
since then. This recovery had been driven in large measure by the combined efforts of the 
non-government organization Ducks Unlimited and the federal government's Canadian 
Wildlife Service. The former has invested upwards of a million dollars in trying to bolster 
the resident population. These developments were extremely troubling to Rick, since 
eider ducks are voracious predators of mussels: 
We haven' t had problems with birds as predators yet, but that is one of my 
biggest fears with this MP A. It will pave the way for them to reintroduce 
eider ducks in this area, and that will wipe the mussels right out. They 
don't exist here now, although they did in the past. So, why should they 
use my tax dollars to reintroduce a predator to my area that is possibly 
going to put me out of business? Once ducks find you, you' re finished. 
They have destroyed seed farms overnight in PEl, Nova Scotia, and New 
Brunswick. They multiply very quickly and, once they sense that there is a 
source of food, they migrate and colonize new areas. Then they keep 
returning to the places where they have found food. We have already heard 
from Canadian Wildlife Service that they want to reintroduce eider ducks 
and I believe the hunting lobby is involved in that too. Once the federal 
government have the MPA, they won't need consent to reintroduce them. 
They can say that eiders are part of the historic marine environment and 
they' ll do that in a heartbeat and people won't even think twice about what 
it will mean for us. The only alternative I have then is to go get a lawyer 
and send a letter to them saying that if they do something that will affect 
my operations down the road, I'll take action. If the MPA is going to be 
used to protect the core fisheries and help the fishermen have a livelihood, 
that's fine, but I should be allowed to have a livelihood too. If they want to 
do this enhancement, they should do it where there are no mussel farms. 
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Once again, Rick's stance highlights an interesting dilemma. In his view, the considerable 
economic benefits provided to the region through aquaculture and the tremendous 
potential to expand the industry in the years to come necessitated that it be prioritized 
over the desire to encourage the recovery of eider ducks in the region. He viewed the 
latter concern as emerging from a misguided sentimentality that was based on the idea 
that a supposedly "natural" ecosystem characterized solely by indigenous species is 
"healthier" and more desirable than one that had manipulated by human beings in such a 
way as to improve its profitability. Rick's staunch refusal to support the MPA served as a 
clear critique of the idea that community-based protected areas are inherently good and 
beneficial to all who reside in a given region. 
Another critical discourse about the MP A initiative emerged from some 
individuals that I spoke with in the town of Point Leamington, which was about a twenty-
five minute drive south of Leading Tickles, on the road to Botwood. While Point 
Leamington also borders the coast, it is significantly farther from the headlands and has 
historically had access to far fewer marine species than have the people in Leading 
Tickles. While small numbers of people in the community have made a modest living by 
fishing for lobster and salmon, most have relied upon other industries. Men from Point 
Leamington have much stronger ties to the logging industry, and have historically worked 
in the woods for months at a time, harvesting pulpwood for the paper mill in Grand Falls. 
In recent years, fewer and fewer jobs have been available in the logging industry, leading 
to higher rates of unemployment in the town. While a small factory was built to 
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manufacture Superior brand industrial work gloves, production has increasingly been 
outsourced to China, leading to the loss of many jobs. 
While most people that I spoke with in Point Leamington supported the project 
and were happy to see it moving forward, a few also expressed thinly veiled resentment 
toward professional fishers living in Leading Tickles and Glover's Harbour, who they 
saw as being extremely fortunate relative to the displaced loggers in Point Leamington. 
Will, who had spent most of his life living in the town explained: 
Fishermen have had access to things that a lot of the ordinary Joes haven't. 
They've been bailed out a number of times. They said there would only be 
a two year program after the fishery collapsed, but then when that was 
done, they brought in TAGS for another five years and then they followed 
that with a third bailout. And then there were employment programs like 
Codskiff, so if you didn't get enough work to get your EI, you could apply 
for those programs so you could qualify. There always seems to be 
something for fishers to fall back on. There is a certain justice behind it, 
but there has been nothing similar for loggers or any sector other than the 
fishery. It is amazing how whenever there is some sort of crisis in the 
fishery and you listen to the open line shows and all you hear is fishers or 
fishers' wives phoning in and talking about the horrible injustice being 
done against them. Then there are the other people who outnumber the 
fishermen and have had it even harder, but they don' t want to be calling in 
against them, since fishers are their friends and their neighbours. But, deep 
down, our views on the fishery are not the same as those you will find in 
Leading Tickles. We're not fisheries based, so we never really benefited 
from it. People living here have a hard time making ends meet and if we 
don t get our Employment Insurance, nobody is going to step in and bail 
us out. We don't get any help from the federal government, even though 
the logging industry is in even worse shape. 
Will explained that some in Point Leamington see the MP A as another attempt by the 
federal government to funnel money into Leading Tickles, while those farther inland 
continue to be neglected and left to fend for themselves. Thus, it had the potential to be a 
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divisive force, as it would enable Leading Tickles to take advantage of new revenues 
through tourism and research, while Point Leamington was once again left on the outside 
looking in. Will had, however, gone as far as to read a bit about the Oceans Act when he 
learned about the MP A and he expressed hope that it might create an opportunity for 
people living in places like Point Leamington to have more of a say in how policies are 
made: "It would be nice if you could have a voice through the Oceans Act even if you 
lived in Point Leamington or somewhere else without a big fishing population. I'd like to 
think that ifi wanted a voice, it could be heard, but I don't know how it will work." 
Sam who lived in the town of Northern Arm, between Point Leamington and 
Botwood, also felt that federal policy had tended to favour the interests of fishers, while 
other people in coastal communities had been neglected. 
My ancestors have lived in this area for nearly 200 years too, but they 
weren't fishing people. They always did other kinds of work, be it logging 
or construction or whatever. Unfortunately, a lot of the time, those other 
people get left out and the fishermen are allowed to speak for rural 
Newfoundland. I have many friends who are fishermen, but what's in their 
best interests is not always what is in the best interests of everybody else. 
They' re pretty good at complaining though, and a lot of the time they get 
their way with the government. A fisherman once said to me: 'Do you 
know what the difference is between an old dog and a fisherman? At least 
the old dog will stop whining eventually.' 
While Sam supported the MP A and hoped it could improve the tourist industry in the area, 
he also thought that it was important to remember that there are other, sometimes 
conflicting, rural perspectives that should not be glossed over. 
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The positions taken by Rick, Will, and Sam cast the notion of community-based 
conservation in a different light. They provide a reminder that the MP A, which had to that 
point been driven largely by fishers, may reflect interests that are not necessarily the same 
as those of non-fishers. Thus, the "empowerment" of"fishing communities" may actually 
have the effect of excluding some perspectives. It remains to be seen what role, if any, the 
views of non-fishing community members will be given in the planning processes 
associated with MP As and other participatory planning initiatives. 
8.5.2 Pressures from Within 
The Tickles MP A project also met with considerable resistance from fishery 
workers living in the towns of Leading Tickles and Glover's Harbour. When I first spoke 
with Gary Peddle, he made it clear that his attempt to get the MP A off the ground had 
required him to devote considerable amounts of time to quelling the fears of people who 
thought that it would interfere with their capacity to earn a living from the fishery in the 
future. Much like Rick the mussel farmer, many fishers regarded the MP A project as an 
outgrowth of the Parks Canada NMCA initiative that had been attempted a few years 
earlier and feared that it would enable the federal government to seize greater control 
over the ocean and impose new restrictions. Peddle described the challenges that he had 
encountered in trying to convince people that the MP A was rooted in a very different 
management approach that could prove beneficial to people in the region: 
People here are always afraid of change, and understandably so, because 
they've had so much forced on them. A lot of people just had their minds 
set before this even started that it was going to be a bad thing. People get it 
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confused with the Parks Canada thing. A lot of people lump this in with 
that. That experience made this much harder. I tell them this has nothing to 
do with Parks Canada, but you hear that constantly . .. Some fishermen have 
been very concerned that DFO will get more control with the MP A, but I 
just tell them that DFO has total control now so we've got nothing to lose. 
They can't get any more control than they have right now. DFO does not 
want to be seen as having total control, and they haven' t got total control, 
not at all. Through the Steering Committee, the people have more control 
than DFO has. The bottom line is that fishermen have controlling interest, 
if you want to put it that way. They have the majority of votes, so nothing 
can happen without their approval. We come up with ideas and get things 
to happen and it rises up through to the higher levels, rather than ideas 
coming down from Ottawa, like it always was before. You have to get it 
into people' s minds that they won' t be forced to do what they don't want 
to do. This MP A is a place where fishermen can have a chance to have 
their say and hopefully the government will listen. At least this way we 
have at least some say in things. I have had to talk that one through a 
million times, but a lot of people still won' t listen. 
George and Charlie, Leading Tickles fishers who had become key participants in 
the MPA project, both concurred with Peddle's assessment, noting that even they 
had always been skeptical about DFO's intentions for the MPA. George claimed 
that he was immensely dubious of the MPA project at first and it was only his 
trust of Peddle that persuaded him to consider the possibility that it may be a 
positive change for the area: 
A lack of knowledge can destroy a lot of things. To tell you the truth, it 
took a couple of years to convince me that it was a good idea. I was one of 
the people who came out against it right away. At first I had my mind 
made up and I wouldn' t listen to nobody. I was nervous, because I knew 
about the other one. We thought this was the same thing. Word got around 
some quick. It doesn't take long in a small community. We thought it was 
bad for us and we'd lose our fishery if we went along with it. People 
thought there were going to be more and more fisheries closed down ... But, 
Gary is a nice fella and he' s after persuading a lot of people. I had nothing 
against him. I just wasn't so sure about this thing he was standing 
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for. .. But he's straightforward. He said he wants it, but he didn't want to 
force his will on anybody. He said, if you don't want it, that's your choice, 
but I still say it is a good thing. He made it clear that he respected our 
decision and he was sincere about it. Most people know that Gary Peddle 
is a good guy. He' s a smart guy and he really cares about the community. I 
came around from going to meetings and talking to Gary. He kept saying it 
was a good project and that helped. I eventually decided I'd give it a 
chance. I asked a lot of questions and finally I came around .. . There's still 
a good many fishermen against it, though. Gary was almost going to give 
it up last year because too many people were against it. 
Charlie shared these sentiments, noting that while most people trusted and 
respected Peddle, many of them, himself included, still didn' t completely trust 
FOC and remained fearful that they could eventually lose control over the waters 
surrounding the town: 
I used to be dead against the MP A. I thought it was the biggest kind of bull. 
A lot of people in the community are still unsure about it. They are afraid 
it will lead to the closing of more of the area. I've still got the thought that 
there will be more of it closed and I will lose more of my fishing area, but, 
they're telling us that fisher people are going to have the final say over it. 
Whether they is or they isn' t, I don't know. I'm not really against it 
anymore, but in the back of my mind, I am still wondering whether they 
aren't telling us everything. 
These anxieties were quite apparent to me during my time in the town. At the time, 
many fishers had grown deeply suspicious of the practice of v-notching, cutting notches 
in the tails of egg-bearing female lobsters so they can be easily identified at a later time 
when their eggs may not be visible. V -notching had been encouraged by fisheries 
managers in Leading Tickles and other locations in the province after being popularized 
through the Eastport process. It was seen as a key mechanism through which to bring 
about a new environmentality, transforming fishers into ecological stewards (Agrawal 
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2005). Many Leading Tickles fishers had become convinced that the practice was 
problematic and should be abandoned. Some feared that v-notching was detrimental to 
the health of lobsters and could inhibit their capacity to reproduce. Some complained that 
they had not been supplied with specialized v-notchers by the government and, as a result, 
people had been using other objects which were causing serious damage to many lobsters. 
Michael who fished in the town explained: 
I don't believe in v-notching. We were pressured into it because they were 
going to raise the minimum size on us if we didn't. But we weren' t even 
given v-notchers when the rule first came in and you couldn't even buy 
them, so people were using rocks, knives, hatchets, nails, ... whatever they 
could find. One guy even used a hole punch. I think that v-notching is the 
greatest abuse that was ever done to a lobster. If you cut a piece out of 
your finger, that won't grow back. You'll always have a scar. Probably if 
they were only using proper v-notchers, it wouldn't be so bad, but I've 
seen them with the tail fins tore off of them and chopped right in two with 
the meat taken off. They eventually gave me a v-notcher, but I told them I 
didn't agree with it and I didn't v-notch a single one. 
The v-notching issue was particularly sensitive because many felt that they had been 
misled into taking part in the program by fisheries managers. Peddle explained this 
frustration as follows: 
The v-notching thing created a lot of bad blood. There was a big 
discussion about making the lobster measure bigger, which would have 
forced people to throw back a lot more lobsters. A lot of fishermen were 
concerned that change would severely affect them, so we went to DFO to 
try to find another solution. We said we'd bring down the maximum 
number of pots from 300 to 200, cut out Sunday fishing, take a week off of 
our lobster fishing season and go into the v-notching. That's four things 
we did so they wouldn't make the measure bigger. And sure enough they 
still did it. It wasn't by quite as much as they said they would, but still, that 
was a kick in the face. We were trying to do the right thing, but we got 
burned. Things like that destroy the trust that has been built up with DFO. 
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An even bigger tension stemmed from the recent federal decision that it would be 
considered an illegal offence to have a v-notched lobster aboard one' s boat. Many felt 
that FOC fisheries managers were mistaking injured lobsters for v-notched lobsters and 
this had led to innocent people getting charged in court. Charlie explained: 
I don't care what they say. They can' t tell what is a v-notched lobster and 
what isn't. They came up with this stupid law that any harm on the lobster 
counts as v-notched. Now, it's no trouble for fishermen to get into trouble 
with the fisheries officers over it. If the lobster has any kind of a mark on 
him, you can' t keep him. For a lot of people, if they see one come aboard 
with the v-notch on it, they take the knife and cut it out so they won' t get 
into trouble. That's been done. The sad part is that a lot of people have 
been charged for something we decided to do. Lobsters have other 
predators after them that could notch them too. They could also do it on a 
rock. That v-notching is causing people to lose faith on the whole process. 
A lot of people are complaining and I can understand why. Every day I'm 
hearing about all these people in different parts of Newfoundland who are 
getting charged. Instead of giving us a warning, they are charging us. Most 
people feel angry about that. Fellow fishermen are being charged for no 
good reason. One fellow had 300 lobsters and they found two and they 
weren't v-notched properly, but they still hauled him into court. See how 
DFO treats us. They are so patronizing .. .I ' m not going to do it anymore, 
and I told them so. It is just a volunteer thing we did for our lobster, but 
now it has gotten out of control. 
Peddle agreed, noting: 
A lot of the little DFO laws for lobsters and stuff like that are just 
ridiculous. That v-notching issue caused so many problems. They think 
they know a proper v-notched lobster, but there aren' t always perfect 
conditions in the ocean. We got no v-notchers, so everybody used different 
things. So, what does a v-notched lobster look like? I've seen lobsters that 
I know aren't v-notched, but I worry that I could get into trouble if they 
think they are. I know I'm right, but I might throw it away just in case. 
That's a few dollars thrown away right there, so it isn't easy to do. But, 
what I say doesn't matter. It's still what they say that matters. They are the 
ones who decide if I will end up in court. So, now if I get one that I know 
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isn't v-notched, I will keep it. If they want to take me to court, that's fine. 
I'll call every fisherman in this community in as expert witnesses. They 
are the experts, not DFO. This is a big issue, and it all comes back to me, 
especially because of the MP A, Fishermen expect me to be the one to fix it. 
When they started this MPA, I knew it wouldn' t be easy or glamorous or 
anything, but this sort of thing makes it a lot harder. There is always 
conflict. 
Many Leading Tickles fishers, including those involved with the MPA, saw the laws 
surrounding v-notching as an imposition by FOC and an indication that they were not 
taking the knowledge and concerns of people in the town seriously. Some said that this 
unwillingness to take their concerns seriously contradicted FOC's stated emphasis on 
including local knowledge in fisheries management. Even though the v-notching program 
was administered by a different branch of FOC and technically had very little to do with 
the MP A, some fishermen saw the v-notching controversy as a sign of things to come and 
worried about what else they might be asked to do after the MP A formally came into 
effect. 
While Peddle shared the view that the recent emphasis on stringently enforcing 
the v-notching rule was a mistake, he saw the issue as simply the latest in a long line of 
complaints that local fishers had had about the MPA and about FOC more generally. 
When asked about whether the concerns of fishers in the area could ultimately lead to the 
downfall of the project, he stated: 
I have put so much time and effort into it now that I wouldn' t want to let it 
go, but I represent the fishermen and I'm going to do what they would 
want me to do. There have been plenty of times that I have not gone with 
things I would like personally, because I knew most of them wouldn' t 
want it. I may try to convince them of my opinion, but at the end of the 
317 
day, I want them to know that it is what they want that will ultimately 
make the decision. I tell people that I'm doing this for them and for fishing 
and for the area, but fishermen are always suspicious of DFO and that is 
probably always going to be a problem. I tell people to speak up and we'll 
stop it right now if they don't want it. I have said: 'this is for fishermen, 
but if you don't want this, tell me and we won't do it. Just don't wait until 
everybody has wasted their time and then get upset about it.' A few times, 
I've just said to people: 'Be honest! Do you want to do it or not?' And for 
the most part, people have been supportive. 
Despite Peddle's relative optimism, internal pressures did ultimately prove 
responsible for derailing the project a short time later. By the beginning of2007, the 
Leading Tickles project was preparing to apply for formal designation as an MP A. 
According to Coastal Current newsletter published by the FOC Oceans Branch in St. 
John's, a "Regulatory Intent Meeting" was scheduled for May ih and gth of that year in 
the community of Northern Arm. The meeting was a standard matter of course, intended 
to formalize the boundaries of the MP A and decide on the "regulatory package" that 
would accompany it (Coastal Current 2006d). The Steering Committee was to produce a 
"Regulatory Intent Document" which would describe the activities that could and could 
not take place in the MP A and that document would then be forward to the Department of 
Justice to start the process ofturning draft regulations into permanent regulations (Coastal 
Current 2007a). 
In practice, the Northern Arm meeting took an unexpected turn. After opening 
remarks from a professional facilitator who had been hired to oversee the meeting, Gary 
Peddle "took the floor to announce a decision made by the Leading Tickles and Glover's 
Harbour Fishermen's Committee representatives ... that the MP A did not have sufficient 
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community support to go ahead" (Coastal Current 2007b ). Peddle explained that: "there 
was a general feeling that FOC wanted to go further than Leading Tickles and Glover' s 
Harbour fishers were comfortable with" and there were serious concerns about "further 
actions, especially possible restrictions on fishing pelagics," such as capelin and herring. 
A further concern was that "once the MP A was created, a new government, new minister 
or any change oftop-level bureaucrats might mean unforeseen changes to the MPA 
program that would affect all MP As, including the Tickles" (ibid.). While Peddle praised 
the FOC staff and the work that had been completed in the area to that point and 
expressed sadness that there was not sufficient support for an MP A, he was clear and 
definitive about his statement that the process should be terminated effective immediately 
(ibid.). 
8.6 Chapter Summary 
The Leading Tickles case presents another illustration of the new managerial 
approach being ushered in by the Oceans Act and its associated policy documents. 
Whereas the other cases thus far have discussed the ways in which new responsibilities 
have been transferred onto industry groups, the Leading Tickles case shows how similar 
efforts were made to encourage entire communities to participate actively in the 
management of marine resources. This included the formation of new collaborative 
efforts to conduct scientific research and overt appeals to the private sector in an attempt 
to leverage funding with which to support the project. 
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While many people saw the MPA as an excellent opportunity to breathe new life 
into a region that had been hit hard by the restructuring of the fishery, the dissent that it 
eventually encountered illustrates the danger of assuming that a high degree of consensus 
exists within coastal communities or regions. Despite the economic benefits that the MPA 
might have brought through increased tourism and fisheries enhancement, suspicion 
about the possible "hidden agendas" of the federal government led some fishers as well as 
people in other industries, such as aquaculture to oppose the project, believing that it 
would prove to be detrimental to their long-term interests. This eventually resulted in the 
project meeting the same fate as that suffered by the Parks Canada initiative a few years 
earlier. 
320 
Chapter 9 A Master-Planned Bay: Technologies of Government and the Politics of 
Representation 
While the MP A projects in Leading Tickles, Eastport and Gilbert Bay were 
relatively small in scope, and remained primarily focused on the inshore fishery and the 
tourism sector, a far more ambitious vision was being developed for Placentia Bay on 
Newfoundland's southeast coast. The bay has come to be used by a much wider range of 
maritime industries than any other area in rural Newfoundland and it now contains some 
ofthe busiest ports in the country. In 1990, it was identified as the site in Canada most at 
risk of suffering a major oil spill, and this risk has only increased in subsequent years as 
new industrial "megaprojects" have come on stream (Brander Smith 1990). Since the late 
1990s, efforts have been ongoing to develop an elaborate new planning framework for 
Placentia Bay in an effort to better protect the marine environment and coordinate 
interactions between "stakeholder groups" that have a presence in the bay. This vision 
became even more ambitious in 2005 when the bay, along with a large section of the 
Grand Banks was identified as one of five "Large Ocean Management Areas" in the 
country that would be made priority sites under Canada's Oceans Action Plan. 
Efforts are now ongoing to transform Placentia Bay into a "Smart Bay," which 
will make use of cutting edge technologies to develop a new approach to ocean 
management. It has been suggested that by synthesizing diverse sources of knowledge 
and electronic data into a single format, it will be possible to develop a governance 
regime that will be both good for the environment and good for business, because it will 
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simultaneously: produce more accurate information about ocean processes; increase 
preparedness in the event of an environmental disaster; improve communication and 
reduce conflict between key ocean user groups; and streamline the ongoing economic 
development ofthe bay. This chapter revisits the three core discourses discussed in the 
introduction, examining how "the ecosystem approach" the participation of "civil 
society" and "sustainable development" are being put into practice in the Placentia Bay 
context. I argue that, while the new management approach being implemented in the bay 
may prove successful in promoting economic growth and diffusing tensions between 
some groups of ocean users, it should not be understood as a value-neutral process. To the 
contrary, it appears that the project's main objective is to find ways to encourage 
development, while mitigating environmental risks to the greatest extent possible. It 
seems much less well equipped to engage meaningfully with normative arguments 
suggesting that certain types of activities are incompatible or that some forms of 
development should be curtailed on the grounds that they are environmentally or socially 
unjust. 
9.1 A Brief History of Ocean Development in Placentia Bay 
From the point of view of many developers, Placentia Bay has a distinct 
geographic advantage over other bays in Newfoundland, because it is very deep and is not 
severely affected by pack ice in the winter. In addition to providing for a longer and 
generally more prosperous fishing season than was typically enjoyed in most other areas 
of the province,97 these qualities also made the bay accessible to large shipping vessels 
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year-round. As a result, since the early 1940s, Placentia Bay has been targeted for a 
variety of large development projects, many of which have had a significant 
transformative impact on the marine environment and on the people living in the bay. 
The first major efforts to develop Placentia Bay came in 1940, at the onset of the 
Second World War.98 The proximity ofNewfoundland to Europe led to the selection of 
the town of Argentia (just outside of Placentia) as the location for a new US naval base to 
supply, repair and service "the American war fleet and Naval Forces of the Allies" 
(Cardoulis 1990: 28).99 The base had a significant transformative impact on the lives of 
area residents, bringing in new cultural influences and wage labour opportunities, along 
with new roads connecting previously isolated communities and a dramatic increase in 
maritime traffic. 
By the 1950s and 60s, Placentia Bay also came to play a key role in the modernist 
dreams of Premier Joey Smallwood. Several ofthe more than 350 islands in the bay had 
been populated since the early 1800s, and all were targeted for relocation in Smallwood's 
resettlement programs, along with several mainland communities in the sparsely 
populated northwestern part of the bay. 100 One of the main ways in which Smallwood's 
government was able to persuade people to resettle was with the promise that there would 
be well paying jobs waiting for them in their new homes when they arrived. To that end, 
he set about creating fiscal incentives to lure private companies to move into the area. 
These efforts met with varying degrees of success. 
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Between 1967 and 1968, a new shipbuilding facility was constructed at 
Marystown, on the western side of the bay, to build and service trawlers for 
Newfoundland-based fish processing companies (Thurston 1982; Wright 2001 ). The site 
was expanded in the 1970s to enable it to build ocean going tugboats to be sold outside of 
Canada, and again in the 1980s to service oil rigs (Mac Vicar 2005). In 1968, Smallwood 
was also successful in luring the Electric Reduction Company of Canada (ERCO) to open 
a phosphorous mine and processing plant at Long Harbour, on the eastern side of 
Placentia Bay. The mine would continue operating for another two decades, but it left 
behind a toxic environmental legacy which lingers to this day (Legge 1982; Strawbridge 
1989; Jackson 1992). 101 
Perhaps the most elaborate development project encouraged by Smallwood was 
the construction of an oil refinery, paper mill and petrochemical plant complex at Come 
by Chance, near the head of Placentia Bay (McNight 1986; McGrath 2002). In practice, 
however, this project did not work out as planned. The would-be paper mill was 
abandoned before it ever came into operation102 and, while the oil refinery had a longer 
lifespan, it soon suffered the same fate. 103 Despite tremendous optimism, the failure of the 
American company that operated the refinery to cope with the oil shocks of the early 
seventies forced it into receivership with a debt close to two hundred million dollars and 
the operation was shut down in 1976 (Tulk 1997: 122). 
Despite the fact that many of Smallwood's ventures failed, the infrastructure 
constructed in Placentia Bay during this period, in combination with its natural 
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geographic advantages, made it an attractive site for the petroleum industry in the decades 
to come.104 In 1996, Whiffen Head, just outside of Arnold' s Cove was selected as the site 
for a transhipment terminal to handle oil from the Hibernia and Terra Nova offshore oil 
platforms operating on the Grand Banks. It began operating in 1998 and underwent 
considerable expansions in 2000 and 2002.105 Crude is transported from the offshore 
platforms into Placentia Bay aboard three specialized shuttle tankers, a journey which 
typically takes about five days (The Oil & Gas Magazine 2005b). 106 It is then pumped 
onto shore where it is temporarily stored in one of the facility ' s six 500,000 barrel 
holding tanks before being pumped back out onto smaller "second leg" tankers which 
carry it to market (The Oil & Gas Magazine 2005a). Second leg tankers, which tend to 
operate under flags of convenience, 107 are usually destined for major refineries on the 
eastern seaboard, most commonly those in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Dartmouth 
and Point Tupper, Nova Scotia and St. John, New Brunswick. 108 It is also common for it 
to be taken to Portland, Maine, where it is pumped into a pipeline that carries it to major 
refineries in Montreal, Quebec and Sarnia, Ontario. For the most part, Grand Banks crude 
is used in higher quality petroleum products, such as jet fuel, gasoline and diesel. 
The oil refining industry in the bay has also been reinvigorated. In 1986, the 
Come By Chance oil refinery, which had been dormant for a decade was sold to a new 
company called Newfoundland Processing Limited 109 and brought back into production 
(McNight 1996). 110 The refinery has subsequently been sold twice, in 1994 to Vitol, a 
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large Swiss Petroleum marketing company, and in 2006 to Harvest Energy Corp. , an 
Alberta-based oil company (Bradbury Mullowney and Tutton 2006; Squires 2006b ). 111 
The Come by Chance refinery is designed for lower quality "sour" crudes, which 
have a higher sulphur content and it is therefore not able to efficiently process the higher 
quality "sweet" crude from the Grand Banks. 112 Instead, it relies on internationally 
sourced crude, most of which originates in the Persian Gulf, the North Sea, Russia, 
Angola, Columbia and Venezuela. The very deep eastern shipping channel, which runs 
the length of Placentia Bay, enables the refinery to accommodate super tankers, or Very 
Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), which can weigh more than 200,000 dead weight tons. 
These vessels are typically at least 1000 feet long, and are capable of carrying upwards of 
2 million barrels of oil (T. White 1996; The Packet Staff 2006). The Come by Chance 
facility, which is able to refine about 105,000 barrels of crude per day, produces a range 
of petroleum products including: propane, butane, kerosene, home heating oil, jet fuel , 
and gasoline, most of which is marketed in North America (The Oil & Gas Magazine 
2005a). 
In addition to the fishing, fish processing, and petroleum industries, Placentia Bay 
has also come to be used extensively by a number of new ocean industries in recent years 
and this activity promises to increase over the course of the next decade. While 
aquaculture development in the bay has been relatively modest thus far, with only a 
handful of small-scale blue mussel farms and some experimental cod and sea urchin 
grow-out projects, the bay features warmer water than much of the rest of the province 
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and has been identified as a probable area for a major intensification of cod and salmon 
production in the years ahead. 113 Other forms of economic development are taking hold in 
Placentia Bay as well. Marine tourism is on the rise with the growing popularity of sea 
kayaking and an increasing number of cruise ship and pleasure boat visits, as well as the 
regular running of the Marine Atlantic ferry, which transports both passengers and 
commercial vehicles between Argentia and North Sydney, Nova Scotia. 11 4 Argentia has 
also emerged as one of the island' s largest shipping hubs, serving as the exit point for 
shipping vessels carrying many ofNewfoundland' s exports and the entry point for much 
of its European and Asian freight. 11 5 
9.2 Building a "Smart Bay" 
In 1997, the Terra Nova Panel was established to examine issues relating to the 
anticipated development ofNewfoundland's second major offshore oil field. The Panel ' s 
final report expressed concerns about the increasing rate of oil tanker traffic along 
Newfoundland' s south and east coasts that would be brought about by the addition of 
another offshore oil platform and the increased risk of a major oil spill that would follow 
from it. As a precautionary measure, it recommended that the Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador establish an integrated management plan to cover the 
A val on Peninsula and Placentia Bay, the areas that were most affected by oil traffic. 
While the government accepted the recommendations of the panel, no integrated 
management plan was established at that time. As efforts got underway to implement the 
Oceans Act in the province in 1998, however, the idea of developing a new planning 
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framework for Placentia Bay came to the fore once again. Individuals working within 
FOC soon recognized an opportunity to form a strategic partnership with the provincial 
government in moving the Oceans Act agenda forward. Noting the complexity of the 
Placentia Bay case, one FOC official based in St. John's explained: "We can' t really say 
that we' re doing integrated management until we show that we can do it there." 
In 2000, a joint federal-provincial working group was established to oversee the 
development of an integrated management plan for Placentia Bay. The group, which was 
co-chaired by FOC and the Newfoundland and Labrador Department of the Environment 
proceeded to compile existing information about the bay and produced a series of reports 
to assist with the development and implementation of the plan. These included a detailed 
bibliography of research done in the region and extensive "biophysical" and 
"socioeconomic" overviews of the bay to serve as tools for integrated planning. FOC also 
developed a GIS mapping database which sought to combine scientific and "traditional 
ecological knowledge" to produce new maps of the bay, highlighting such things as 
ecologically sensitive areas, historic sites, and economic infrastructure. The agency made 
much of this information available to the public through a printed "visual profile" of the 
bay and a CD-ROM. 
Even as FOC was working toward the development of an integrated management 
plan for Placentia Bay, another vision for managing the bay was being developed by 
individuals working for the National Research Council (NRC) in Ottawa and St. John's, 
in partnership with scientists based at the Canadian Centre for Marine Communications 
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(CCMC), a non-profit research institution which is based at Memorial University of 
Newfoundland. These groups shared FOC's focus on managing interactions between 
ocean users, but their approach placed a much greater emphasis on high-end technology 
as the mechanism through which to make this vision a reality. 
They intended to create the world's first ever "Smart Bay," in which cutting edge 
technologies could enable the wireless transmission of information about the marine 
environment and economy for use in integrated management. Whereas the FOC model 
initially focused on building support for integrated management in coastal communities, 
the NRC model sought to take advantage of new technologies to coordinate and simplify 
interactions between prominent users of the marine environment, improve environmental 
management, and generate new opportunities for economic development. 
This new focus on technology as the driving force behind ocean management 
soon became a central focus ofthe federal government's overall planning approach for 
Placentia Bay. With the release of Canada's Oceans Action Plan in 2005, Placentia Bay, 
along with the Grand Banks was named as a priority Large Ocean Management Area 
(LOMA) for integrated management planning. Picking up on the "Smart Bay" concept, 
the Oceans Action Plan designated Placentia Bay as the site for a new Ocean Technology 
Demonstration Platform intended to "facilitate wireless transmission of key 
oceanographic information for integrated management and for modelling systems" and to 
showcase new Canadian commercial technologies which could then be marketed abroad 
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2005). While the project was initiated by the Liberal 
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government of Prime Minister Paul Martin, it was given a vote of confidence by the 
current Conservative government, who pledged two million dollars in new funding to 
move it forward (Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 2006). 
9.3 Representations and Interventions 
Ian Hacking (1983, 2002), Bruno Latour (1987) and Petter Holm (1996) have all 
made the argument that attempts to manage or govern the environment are based on the 
construction of a symbolic system which corresponds to, but simplifies, some real system, 
which can therefore be brought under managerial control. They have pointed out that 
while managerial representations can never fully reflect the world they profess to describe, 
the very act of representing it in particular ways can enable new kinds of interventions 
that would not have been possible otherwise. The processes of naming and mapping 
particular spaces brings new understandings into existence and makes new kinds of 
actions possible. This, of course, builds upon Foucault's insight that even simply labeling 
particular behaviours as pathological, deranged or unhealthy enables the creation of new 
kinds of truths and legitimates new interventions by experts into the lives of individuals 
(Foucault 1973, 1978a, 1978b, 1979). 
In spite of the repeated failures of previous attempts on the part of the Canadian 
federal government to successfully manage the marine environment, the Smart Bay 
concept conjures up a new hubris. It promises to take advantage of new technologies to 
produce clearer understandings of marine ecosystems and economies and use this 
knowledge to determine the "smartest" way in which to manage the ocean. It envisions a 
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friction-free world in which diverse forms of economic activity can move ahead smoothly 
and efficiently, with minimal disruption to one another. What will emerge is a living 
illustration of sustainable development, enabling a wide variety of marine industries to 
generate economic growth while simultaneously minimizing damage to the marine 
environment and building new planning mechanisms that will make it possible to arrive at 
consensus-based decisions. 
While these are laudable goals, it seems difficult to believe that this ambitious 
vision can ever be fully realized. As previous chapters have shown, concepts like 
"sustainability," "ecosystem," and "participation" are being understood in quite distinct, 
and seemingly incommensurable, ways by differently positioned actors. The very act of 
modeling an ecosystem or constructing an integrated management committee inevitably 
serves to institutionalize some visions of reality while excluding others. 
The next three sections examine the representations of the ecosystem approach, 
participation, and sustainable development that were emerging from the early planning 
efforts that were underway in Placentia Bay at the time of my research. What is emerging, 
I argue, is not the tabula rasa that is being promised, but rather a new managerial agenda 
which is frrmly committed to the view that economic growth should remain the key 
priority, provided that some efforts are made to mitigate the negative environmental side 
effects that often emerge from it. 
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9.4 Approaching the Ecosystem 
In December of2004, I attended a "multi-stakeholder" workshop in St. John's, in 
which the Smart Bay concept was being unveiled for the first time. The facilitators 
promised that, if funded, the project (then called the Information Seaway) would 
revolutionize ocean planning, both in Canada and around the world. Whereas previous 
eras were characterized by mapping and sampling procedures which were based upon 
static points in time, the new approach was to be based on a model of "continuous 
coverage," making use of remote sensors and other technologies to provide data about the 
entire ecosystem, including human uses, in real time. It would be 
"an operational user-driven, end-to-end ocean observing system" that would enable 
managers to remain ever flexible and capable of rapidly adapting to the non-linear 
dynamics of marine ecosystems and economies (The Canadian Centre for Marine 
Communications 2007: AS). 
Multibeam bathymetric mapping would be used to generate highly detailed maps 
of the shape and elevation of the ocean floor and to classify the different types of 
sediment present on the bottom (ibid: AS). 116 This information could then be overlaid 
with other sources of data, such as scientific and ' local ' knowledge about flora and fauna, 
salinity, and currents to produce intricate maps and computer programs which could be 
used to identify particularly productive or sensitive habitats and determine good locations 
for such things as marine protected areas, aquaculture sites, underwater cables and fishing 
activities. 
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The project would also make use of a number of innovations in the fields of ocean 
observation and monitoring. New technologies have made it possible to instantaneously 
transfer information about the marine environment through the use of satellites, sensors, 
cellular communications and video cameras (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1987a, 
1987b ). This allows managers on land to continuously track changes to such things as 
weather, water temperatures, currents, sea ice concentrations, or the state of aquaculture 
cages and fish assemblages. The first so-called "smart buoys" were installed in Placentia 
Bay in the summer of 2006 and more have followed in subsequent years. The buoys are 
intended to monitor water quality and oceanographic information, such as weather and 
current flows. These same technologies may eventually allow for the transfer of real time 
information to investors over the Internet and this, in turn, may help to lure more outside 
capital to invest in the various industries operating in the bay (The Oil and Gas Magazine 
2005b; The Canadian Centre for Marine Communications 2007). 11 7 
The Smart Bay would take advantage of new developments in the fields of 
navigation and vessel detection as well. Electronic nautical charts have dramatically 
improved the navigational capacity of large vessels, such as oil tankers. They have also 
made it possible for managers on land to track the movements of these vessels as they 
occur (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2001: 15). Furthermore, through the use of satellites, 
radar, geographic information systems (GIS), and the Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) 118 managers are now able to exercise much more effective forms of surveillance 
than has ever been the case in previous eras (BBC 2004). Together, these tools promise to 
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have immediate applications in fields such as vessel traffic management, oil spill 
response, national defense, and fisheries management. 
One such example is the FishNet program which was developed through the 
Canadian Centre for Marine Communications and put into practice in Placentia Bay and 
several other areas in eastern Newfoundland. The program equips fishers with electronic 
devices which monitor their geographic position at all times and enable them to enter 
detailed information about their catches. The information these devices record can then be 
put to use in building new scientific, management, and enforcement models. The project 
is described as "a more holistic approach to resource management," which "recognizes 
that every participant in the fishery is a potential contributor of data from which a series 
of information outputs (e.g. species distribution and marine condition maps) can be 
generated for use by all stakeholders ... " (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture 2003). 
Proponents of the Smart Bay idea went out of their way to stress that 
communication with "stakeholders" would be critical in enabling the project to live up to 
its potential. One individual stressed that, in order to make their vision a reality, it would 
be necessary for all users of the bay to "buy in" to the project and commit themselves to 
making it a success. He stressed that, in addition to the creation of a new technological 
infrastructure, the project's success would depend, in large measure, on the creation of a 
new "culture" amongst users of the bay. In Agrawal's (2005) terms, new kinds of 
environmental subjects would have to be created who would be willing to play an active 
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part in the process of generating "useful" information. As one of the project's developers 
explained: 
As we see it, there is a difference between data, which is the raw material that we 
are able to get from our observations and the knowledge that the stakeholders 
contribute, and information, which is the value added project that this project will 
deliver. At the end of the day, the direction of this project will be shaped by what 
the stakeholders want to invest in and what they are willing to contribute. The 
stakeholders will need to become active partners in the process. 
By integrating multiple layers of data and knowledge, he argued, it would become 
possible to produce a more complete understanding of the ecosystem that all could agree 
on, because they would be based on the best science and local knowledge available. This, 
in turn, would significantly improve the capacity of managers to predict the future, 
despite limited resources for scientific studies, and would allow them to determine the 
best ways of coordinating interactions between prominent users of the bay. It also 
promises to provide: "Simple access by all stakeholders to data and information in 
support of effective management and sustainable development of coastal and ocean areas 
and the safety and security of life at sea" (The Canadian Centre for Marine 
Communications 2005: 2). 
The Smart Bay can be taken as an illustration of what Brosius (2003) calls an 
"eco-regional conservation project" (2003: 9). These projects, he states, are often 
characterized by new platforms which allow for the overlaying of "multiple data layers" 
that can incorporate information drawn from several different spatial scales about such 
things as: "the distribution of species and habitats, rates of disturbance, land tenure 
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arrangements, political boundaries and other types of data relevant to conservation 
planning." This data is then sent back to what Brosius, following Latour (1987), refers to 
as "centers of calculation," such as laboratories or planning offices, where it is processed 
and used to develop maps, computer programs, and other tools to facilitate the process of 
govemmg. 
What promoters of the Smart Bay and related projects rarely acknowledge, 
however, is that these tools do not produce direct representations of the world. Rather, 
they are the very mechanisms through which particular worlds are created and given 
meaning, since they inevitably help to make some things visible and obscure others. As 
many anthropologists, sociologists, and economic and cultural geographers have shown, 
mapping is an intrinsically political act which involves ongoing processes of selection 
and omission (Scarce 2000; Brody 2002; Brosius 2003). A single cove, for example, may 
simultaneously be viewed by different actors as: a potential "safe harbour" for parking a 
leaking oil tanker in order to contain a spill; a critical herring spawning area; a favourite 
place to watch the sunset, the burial place of a family pet, or the trigger of a significant 
childhood memory. Which of these representations are deemed to be legitimate and 
worthy of being mapped and preserved and which are dismissed as overly sentimental or 
detached from reality is not an "objective" scientific process, but a very subjective one, 
the outcome of which will undoubtedly shape what kinds of activities are and are not 
possible in that space in the future. As Soule and Terborgh (1999) have observed: 
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Maps stimulate desires - for territory, for natural resources, for real estate 
development, even for conservation. Therefore the ideology of those who produce 
land-use maps is important. If developers are the only people mapping the land' s 
future use, then they control the land-use agenda (Soule and Terborgh 1999: 13). 
The insight that ecosystem mapping is always shaped by particular subjective positions 
casts serious doubt on the idea it is possible to arrive at the single "smartest" course of 
action, regardless of how sophisticated the technologies being employed may be. Rather, 
it is always important to ask which agendas are being served or undermined by particular 
representations of reality. 
Similar arguments have been made about the ways in which knowledge is being 
mobilized, represented and incorporated into these computerized ecosystem models. 
Several critical scholars have suggested that, while the idea of including "local 
knowledge" in management may appear to be revolutionary, and great strides have been 
made in that direction, the conceptions of local knowledge that are being employed in 
new management models are often deeply problematic and tend to pay little attention to 
the social and political context in which that knowledge originated (Brosius 1997; 
Nasdady 1999; Gray 2002; Fernando 2003; Hayden 2003; Holm 2003, Pottier et al. 2003; 
Murray et al. 2005; Menzies and Butler 2006; Butler 2006). Some have argued that it is 
ironic that, while nature has come to be constructed as complex and unpredictable, 
cultural conceptions of nature are being constructed as relatively simple, orderly, and 
harvestable through the use of positivistic social science (Holm 2003; Butler 2006). 
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While the recent interest in "local ecological knowledge" (LEK) and "traditional 
ecological knowledge" (TEK) has led to an increasing demand for the skills of applied 
anthropologists and other social scientists, some have cautioned that this newfound 
recognition often comes at a price, as the deeper context in which that knowledge was 
produced and embedded is often stripped away in order to get at what are perceived to be 
a few nuggets of truth. In describing the predicament faced by social scientists who are 
engaged in what he calls Fishermen's Ecological Knowledge (FEK) research, Petter 
Holm (2003) points out that, from the point of view of most scientists: 
... raw fishermen's knowledge, comes in the form of a mixed bag of 
knowledge items; a huge pile where a few nuggets of genuine insights and 
well-tested truths are entangled in a wide variety of beliefs, speculations, 
rumors, misunderstandings, lies, hopes, ideas, exaggerations, superstitions, 
and anecdotes. The basic problem becomes one of untangling the good 
stuff from the bad - truths from beliefs, insights from hopes, observations 
from anecdotes, sound interpretations from politically charged ones, 
etc ... Instead of a broad perspective on knowledge, in which facts, values, 
culture, politics, morality, practices and social institutions form an 
integrated whole ... From the perspective of fisheries management, 
the ... model offers a mechanism by which the voice of the fishermen can be 
made to say the same as the voice of science ... the gap between polity and 
nature can be closed; the scientists and the fishermen will agree, and that 
agreement will be the truth (2003: 26-27). 
The implication of this argument is that the embracing of a particular kind of local 
knowledge by scientists and environmental managers may not amount to a full embracing 
of other ways of knowing or of the value and complexity of anthropological and 
sociological knowledge. To the contrary, the way in which knowledge is being solicited 
in projects like the Smart Bay remains fundamentally technocratic in nature. Other 
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sources of knowledge are invited, but only if they can be translated by experts into a form 
that can be integrated into the larger technological apparatus of the project. In this light, 
local knowledge may come to be seen as a supplement to science, not a potential 
challenge to it. That way, it can be used to generate hypotheses which can then be tested 
'scientifically' or provide data that can be used to enhance existing scientific models and 
bring them closer to grasping ' objective truth.' 
Butler (2006) has gone as far as to assert that, in the case of the knowledge of 
indigenous peoples, "the "evaluation" of Indigenous knowledge according to non-
Indigenous measures and standards" can, in some cases, be understood as "an act of 
colonization" since those who provide this knowledge have little or no input into the way 
that it is eventually interpreted and applied by resource managers (2006: 122). She makes 
a convincing case that local or traditional knowledge must always be shared with full 
attention to the social, political or historical context in which it occurs (ibid.). While 
Menzies (2006) shares this scepticism, asking whether: "TEK- and LEK-based 
approaches can be realized within the context of overarching processes that maintain 
(capital) accumulation at the center of most forms of societal planning," he maintains 
what he calls an "operational optimism," hoping that bringing a critical perspective to the 
study ofthese alternative sources of knowledge may help to reduce the likelihood that 
managers will simply "get it all wrong" (2006: 240). Similar positions have been 
articulated by other scholars who have stressed the importance of articulating the 
knowledge of marginalized groups, while recognizing that this must be done in full 
339 
recognition of the structural pressures that often lead to that knowledge being used in 
ways that were not intended by those that shared it or the social scientists that recorded it 
(Sillitoe 1998; Ross and Pickering 2002; Murray et al. 2005) 
While I share the hopefulness of these authors that anthropologists may be able to 
bring about new approaches to studying local ecological knowledge, which pay close 
attention to historical context and will not shy away from questions of power, I believe 
that the representations of the marine ecosystem and of local knowledge that are 
emerging in Placentia Bay are best understood as an extension of the modernist planning 
agenda that characterized previous eras, and not as a radical critique of it. While the new 
model is responding to the failures of the top-down scientific management models of the 
past by incorporating a much wider range of data inputs, it continues to rest firmly on a 
positivistic foundation. It is founded upon the idea that it is both possible and desirable to 
produce a totalizing vision of the bay that will be shared and accepted by all and can be 
used as a neutral planning tool upon which subsequent decisions can be made. Again 
following Agrawal's 'environmentality ' thesis, the Smart Bay project is helping to 
transform Placentia Bay into a domain that is "fit for modern government" (2005: 6). 
Through these new technologies, attempts are being made to transform the bay into a 
completely known space, to such an extent that little or no disagreement about the ' facts ' 
will be possible. It is only once this "baseline" information has been accepted as the 
undisputed truth that efforts can be made to engage "civil society" to participate in the 
planning of the bay. It is to this dimension that I now turn. 
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9.5 Integrating Management 
Building upon the central tenets of the Oceans Act, planning efforts in Placentia 
Bay profess to formally incorporate the participation of civil society through what is 
referred to as "integrated management" or simply "IM." On a map produced to promote 
the project in 2003, integrated management was defined as: "the comprehensive planning 
and management of human activities so that they do not conflict with one another" 
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2003). Efforts to establish a multi-stakeholder integrated 
management committee to represent the various interests operating in the bay pre-date the 
emergence of the Smart Bay concept by several years, although the two initiatives have 
subsequently become very closely intertwined with one another. 
In the spring of 2004, prior to the establishment of a steering committee, I carried 
out a series of detailed interviews with individuals working at FOC in St. John's in an 
effort to better understand their goals for integrated management and the efforts they were 
making to move it forward . While many of those behind the project hoped that it would 
help to build consensus amongst users of the bay, most accepted that some disagreements 
may still be inevitable. When asked about how she envisioned the integrated management 
plan in Placentia Bay unfolding over time, Elaine, a FOC employee who was one of the 
project's leaders explained: 
We want this thing to be proactive rather than reactive. If it was reactive, you would 
have your guidelines and your regulations and your rules, but in this case, we want 
to focus on preparing for things that may happen .. .Integrated management allows 
for information sharing. Once it is up and running, the west side of the bay will 
always know what the east side of the bay is doing .. . We want to plan ahead and 
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develop a conflict resolution mechanism, so once we know what the issues are we 
can start to deal with them. There may be places where people just can't reach an 
agreement, but at least we will have all of the interests at the same table working 
together and that is very different than just butting heads on something. 
Much like the developers of the Smart Bay concept, she indicated that the project, 
by its very nature, would require the development of a new relationship between the state 
and the users of the bay. 
The idea with integrated management is not for government to say 'we' re going to 
do this here and we' re going to do it this way.' The role of the federal and 
provincial governments at this point in time is simply to act as leaders and 
facilitators and get the ball rolling. What we would actually like to see happening is 
for the people to take ownership. It will be their decision to form a committee. It 
will be their decision on when to have their meetings and where those meetings will 
be held. They will decide how the group will be structured. It will no longer be our 
baby; it will be Placentia Bay's baby. That' s not to say that the government would 
not play a role in that, because we are still a stakeholder in the ocean, but when it 
comes to the steering committee, we want DFO, the province, the fisheries, the 
communities, and the industries to be on a level playing field. We would have no 
more of a voice than any other. And that is the way integrated management is 
supposed to be. No stakeholder would be any more important than any other. .. Of 
course, we also expect the stakeholders to be more responsible for figuring out 
where some of the long-term funding for the project will come from. Eventually, it 
will have to be self-sustaining. 
This idea that the project could eventually become "Placentia Bay' s baby," however, 
implies that it is possible for "the people of the bay" to arrive at a consensus about what 
actions should be taken and, thereby, come to speak with a single voice. This image was 
captured in an article profiling the project in the business section of the St. John' s 
newspaper The Express, which was titled simply "Group Think" (Westcott 2005). In this 
idealized representation, it becomes possible to envision a situation in which 
responsibilities once borne by the state can be downloaded onto the larger society, as 
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represented by the integrated management committee, and that society can, in turn, be 
held accountable for its decisions. 
Furthermore, the assumption that all stakeholders can be treated as equal partners 
in the planning process overlooks the stark power discrepancies between different 
stakeholder groups that exist within the larger society (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2003). As 
previous chapters have shown, some groups, such as the offshore petroleum industry and 
fish harvesters with core status have used their relative power to try to shape the form that 
public participation takes in particular areas, even if that means excluding those who may 
have a different agenda, such as fish processing workers or other citizens who are not 
deemed to have direct economic ties to the sea. Representatives of the offshore petroleum 
industry have negotiated bilaterally with FOC to ensure that participatory management 
does not undermine their capacity to operate profitably in marine waters and have also 
lobbied to have dissenting voices excluded from the process. They have also sought to 
ensure that major decisions about whether or not to permit development in a particular 
area will continue to be made through other regulatory mechanisms and will not be 
subject to the same degree of public participation. Similarly, fisherpersons groups in 
Leading Tickles and Eastport were able to use their relative power to gain controlling 
interest in the steering committees governing their respective Marine Protected Area 
proposals, even though some mussel farmers and other area residents felt that their 
interests had been marginalized as a result. In I ight of these illustrations, to ignore the 
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ways in which such power imbalances are also shaping the form that integrated 
management is taking in Placentia Bay would seem to be very short-sighted. 
Inequalities between users of the marine environment promise to be further 
amplified by the push to make the project "self-sustaining." With the growing shift 
toward public-private partnerships as vehicles through which to fund the implementation 
of ocean management plans, it seems likely that the groups who are capable of providing 
larger financial contributions will be best positioned to exert their will on the process and 
ensure that their interests are served by it. As became apparent during the Smart Bay 
consultation sessions, some powerful stakeholder groups are seeking to restrict access to 
information generated by the project to those who have a clear financial interest in it, so 
as to ensure that it is not available to potential competitors or to civil society at large. 
Brosius (2003) notes that large ecosystem-based management projects have 
proliferated around the world in recent years alongside the shift toward neoliberal 
conservation financing agendas, and contends that this is not a coincidence. He argues 
that, as large donations from corporations have come to be considered an increasingly 
important and legitimate source of funds, there has been growing pressure from these 
groups to develop ways of approaching planning strategically, producing clear measures 
of progress so that investment can be directed into areas that are believed to offer the 
most bang for the buck. This approach also enables private donors to identify areas where 
they do or do not wish to lend their financial support, in order to "maximize" the value or 
the visibility of their contribution. In this sense, he argues, such planning projects may be 
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understood as entrepreneurial ventures serving to efficiently target public and private 
investment in support of pre-determined objectives (ibid.). 
Further questions must be asked about just how representative stakeholder 
representatives actually are. In 2003 , FOC hired an independent consultant to carry out a 
survey to determine the receptiveness of residents of the bay to the idea of integrated 
management planning. The survey also asked respondents which groups would be best 
able to represent them on the integrated management committee and this information was 
used to generate a list of approximately 150 different stakeholder groups. This list was 
then examined by representatives ofFOC and the region's three Regional Economic 
Development Boards who collectively distilled this number down to about 50. By the 
time the committee was finally put into place a year later, it had been further reduced to a 
mere twenty people who were expected to represent all of the interests at play in the bay. 
At that time, the committee included eight people from various levels of government, two 
from development boards, one person from the Argentia chamber of commerce to 
represent all business organizations, one from the College of the North Atlantic to 
represent all educational institutions, one from the Burin Harbour Authority to represent 
all harbour authorities, one from the Placentia Bay traffic committee, one tourism 
operator to represent the tourism sector, one oil industry representative to represent all 
facets ofthe petroleum sector, one representative oflnco, the company behind the 
Voisey's Bay project, one person from the aquaculture industry, two fish harvesters, and 
the manager of the Arnold' s Cove processing plant to represent the fish processing 
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industry. When asked about the rationale for keeping the committee so small when so 
many different people lived and worked there and so many different groups were 
identified in the survey, Elaine explained: 
We really want to keep the numbers down, while still making sure that 
everybody has full representation. But, as far as we' re concerned, anything 
over 20 people is too many . .. way unmanageable. 
The central assumption of integrated management is that all people, regardless of 
where they come from, can be broken down into discrete, rational and goal-oriented user 
groups, which are characterized by a sufficient degree of internal consensus that each of 
them can be represented by a single individual (Wilson and McCay 1998; Wiber 2002). 
Those representatives, few of whom are formally elected, must see themselves as having 
clear goals that are shared with all others in the group they are being asked to represent, 
to such an extent that they feel comfortable making statements and critical decisions on 
their behalf. Only then can the stakeholder roundtable come to be characterized as a de 
facto representation of all of the interests at play in the larger society and a legitimate 
mechanism through which decisions can be made. While small groups may indeed be 
more manageable, it seems unlikely that twenty people, however well intentioned, can 
possibly reflect all perspectives. Once again, as marine ecosystems and market economies 
are increasingly being portrayed as complex and open-ended and in need of being adapted 
to, the models of society being employed seem to suggest that human interactions can 
somehow be rendered less complex and more manageable if they are domesticated 
through new forms of governance. This question of what is and is not deemed to be 
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controllable and amenable to change through government planning is an interesting area 
for future research. 
The model of society being produced through these small committees is in tension 
with much recent thinking in socio-cultural anthropology and other closely related 
disciplines, where anti-essentialist critiques have brought about a "crisis of 
representation" and have initiated a move away from the bounded notions of community 
and culture that characterized previous eras (Milton 1996, Wright 1998). More attention 
is now being paid to the internal struggles, and instabilities that have long been masked 
by these concepts (Handler 1994; Hall1996; Ong 1999; Bauman 2001 ; Roseman 2002; 
Sinclair and Ommer 2006). Most now accept that communities may be better understood 
as sites of struggle and contestation, in which a variety of different agendas and 
understandings converge and diverge. This raises important questions about whether 
achieving internal, much less external, consensus is a realizable, or even desirable, goal in 
all cases. 
While the stakeholder model may work relatively well for hierarchical 
organizations that have a clear chain of command such as government departments or 
private companies, it leaves much to be desired when it comes to less tightly integrated 
"communities," such as those defined by geography and history. 11 9 In many ofthese 
cases, these deputizing processes serve to reify the power relations already present within 
each of these groups: managers are asked to speak on behalf of workers, more affluent 
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fishers are asked to speak on behalf of poorer ones or on behalf of the "fishing 
community" as a whole, and so on (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2003). 
As demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, with its primary focus on the interests and 
concerns of "ocean users" and "mariners" to the neglect of those left on land, integrated 
planning may serve to restrict access to democratic institutions to an exclusive group of 
people with clear material interests in the ocean environment. While developers 
representing multinational interests are being granted an unprecedented degree of access 
to Placentia Bay, the same cannot be said of historic or indirect users of the ocean, like 
plant workers and other coastal residents who can no longer claim a material interest in 
the bay. Much like Suarez de Vivero et al. have observed in the Spanish context, many 
people living in "fishing communities" now face a "participation paradox" (2007: 323). 
They note: "During the process by which the number of actors was increased manifold as 
a result of the development of civil society, the fisher community has lost prominence and 
importance, fading into the wide spectrum of interests with which it is now competing to 
make its voice heard" (2007: 319-320). 
Although most people living in rural Newfoundland have historically taken 
advantage of both terrestrial and marine resources to make a living, decades of fisheries 
restructuring have severed many of these links, creating a class of professional full time 
ocean users that did not exist previously and leaving others on the outside looking in. As 
Kasperson (2006) has observed, typically left out of stakeholder committees are : 
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... those people who do not yet know that their interests are at stake in a particular 
decision, whose interests are diffuse or associated with a sense of community rather 
than personal material interest, who lack the skills and access to political resources 
to complete or who have lost confidence or are alienated from the political process 
(2006: 321). 
It is only by ignoring the historical forces that have shaped who can and cannot make 
legitimate claims to the sea that it becomes possible to speak of the ocean as a discrete 
realm, divorced from the problems of the coast, which can be made the focus of mapping 
and participatory development planning. 
9.6 Sustaining Development 
Perhaps the boldest claim of this new planning framework is that by producing 
these new models of ecological and social systems, it will be possible to ensure the 
"sustainable development" of Placentia Bay. That is to say, it will be possible to produce 
a management plan which will allow many different industries to move forward, while 
minimizing harm to the biophysical environment and ensuring that the perspectives of all 
key stakeholders are considered. Unfortunately, this utopian vision appears to be 
untenable in Placentia Bay, as the frantic push toward new development is introducing 
new risks and stoking existing tensions between groups. 
The single greatest point of contention surrounds the growing risk of a major oil 
spill or marine accident due to the heavy oil tanker traffic in the bay. As of 2006, an 
average of about 550 oil tankers entered Placentia Bay per year carrying approximately 
281.8 million barrels of oil (Herridge 2006b ). The bay now has far and away the highest 
number of oil tanker movements of any port in the country (ibid). Oil tankers typically 
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approach from the southeast, circling tightly around the Cape St. Mary's Ecological 
Reserve, and travelling up the narrow "eastern channel" toward the head of bay. They are 
then required to stop at the pilot station just south of Red Island, about 22 nautical miles 
from their final destination, where they are boarded by a pilot who steers them the rest of 
the way. 120 
Upon assuming control of the tanker, pilots chart an easterly course before again 
turning north and continuing toward the head of the bay where they dock at either Come 
by Chance or Whiffen Head. 121 If the vessels were to continue going straight without 
making this adjustment, they would crash into the largely invisible Red Island Shoal, 
which has the potential to cause severe damage to their hulls and could potentially lead to 
a major oil spill. Nick, who had worked as a pilot underscored the risks associated with 
moving large shipments of oil in and out of the bay: 
If they accidentally went a little bit too far for some reason, either because 
the weather was bad or a pilot couldn' t get out there to meet them, they 
would be in a very bad situation. There was a tanker that struck Red Island 
Shoal about four years ago, but luckily it was empty. If it had been a 
loaded tanker, it would have had the bottom ripped right out. 
A second incident took place on December 27, 2004, when the "Harmony," a large 
second-leg tanker approaching Whiffen Head to pick up a load was steered off course by 
high winds and stormy seas, lost control, and was scraped along the rocks (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2005m). While praising the efforts that had been made over the 
years to improve the safety of tanker movements, Nick remained concerned about the 
considerable risks that remained: 
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This is one of the roughest pilotages anywhere in the world. I've worked 
in over 60 knots of wind, although they don't allow that now. High winds 
introduce a huge possibility of error. The weather conditions can get pretty 
tough out there as well. You see it all, blizzards, freezing rain, fog, you 
name it. Placentia Bay might be the foggiest bay in Newfoundland. The 
fog can be so thick that you can' t see from one side of the road to the other. 
On one occasion, the pilot boat was just two boat lengths off of the tanker, 
but he still couldn't see it. 
Nick and many other interviewees noted that a major oil spill in Placentia Bay 
would be disastrous. It would be worsened by the fact that the current comes in the 
eastern side of the bay, where a spill would most like occur, and then travels through the 
islands in the middle ofthe bay before exiting along the western side. Thus, a sizeable 
spill in the eastern channel would likely have a severe impact on virtually all coastal areas 
of the bay. Although many interviewees had been happy to hear about the recent decision 
of the International Maritime Organization to phase out all single hulled tankers and 
replace them with much safer double hulled tankers by 2010, some expressed concern 
about the number of single-hulled tankers that continued to operate in the bay. 
Placentia Bay is also affected by oil spills from shipping traffic that is not destined 
for Newfoundland. It is a short distance from the so-called "Great Circle Route" which is 
traversed by thousands of shipping vessels annually, on their way between Europe and 
major ports along the US Eastern Seaboard, the St. Lawrence River, and the Great Lakes. 
Some of these vessels have developed a tendency to dump their oily bilge water in 
Canadian waters before venturing into US waters where punishment is more severe. 
These oil slicks are often carried towards shore by the tide and this has resulted is a 
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chronic oil pollution problem. While these slicks are not nearly as large as would be 
likely if a spill occurred within Placentia Bay, so-called "mystery spills" still lead to the 
deaths of between 100,000 and 500,000 seabirds annually, many of which wash up on the 
beaches of Placentia Bay and elsewhere along Newfoundland's south coast (Tutton 2001 ; 
Brautigam 2006). 
The heavy industrial activity in Placentia Bay and the associated risk of a major 
oil spill are of particular concern since the bay contains an extremely rich marine 
ecosystem. In addition to having the strongest remaining wild cod population in the 
province, it also boasts one ofthe largest bald eagle populations in eastern North America 
and is an important feeding area for several species of whales, dolphins, porpoises and 
seals. It is also sometimes visited by endangered species such as leatherback turtles and 
harlequin ducks and it borders on the Cape St. Mary' s Ecological Reserve, which 
contains numerous breeding colonies of seabirds (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2003). 
Many people living in the Placentia Bay expressed the sentiment that a major oil 
spill was probably inevitable and that little could be done to stop it, short of dramatically 
reducing the amount of traffic in the bay. One fisherman, who was interviewed by CBC 
News stated: "We're always expecting something is going to happen ... There ' s a lot of 
rocks in Placentia Bay for ' em to bring up pretty solid on" (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation 2005m: 1 ). When I interviewed the same man some time earlier, however, he 
seemed content to share the bay with the petroleum industry: 
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The risk of an oil spill is always in your mind. It can happen. I would still like to 
see more cleanup equipment in the area, but at least we're more prepared than we 
used to be. I've been criticized by some people for not speaking out more against 
the oil industry, but I'm not going to be a hypocrite. I bum oil and gas in my car 
and my boat and my power saws, and stuff like that. When the day comes that I 
don't use it, maybe I'll be more critical. 
Some were more willing to criticize the industry, and the government for not 
putting more stringent regulations into place. Ches, a local environmental activist 
explained: 
You have your small spills and then you have your medium sized spills and then 
you've got your catastrophic spills. What we have to worry about now is the big 
one. They predict a major one every ten years and we've gone twenty or more with 
nothing, so it's just a matter of when. You know with the law of averages, 
something will happen soon .. .If you ask me, all this participation stuff is just the 
latest effort by the federal government to allow big business to have their way, but 
absolve themselves of any responsibility if there is a negative consequence. The 
government caught onto that about ten years ago. It's easier to have you sign your 
own death warrant than to take you out and shoot you. They don't have solutions to 
any problems for the betterment of the marine environment or the people that live in 
Placentia Bay. It is just a way to make themselves look good. 
Ches and others have raised a number of critical questions about the effectiveness of the 
federal government's oil spill response regime in protecting the marine environment, 
which operates largely independently of the Oceans Act process. 122 "Canada's Marine 
Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime" was developed in 1995 (Transport Canada 
2007). Like most new environmental policies during that period, Canada's approach to 
combating oil spills is envisioned as a partnership between government and industry 
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 1997). It adheres to the Polluter Pays Principle which 
holds ship owners and oil handling facilities responsible for costs associated with 
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responding to oil spills and other environmental emergencies (Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada n.d.; Herridge 2006b). All facilities and large vessels are required to develop an 
emergency response plan involving a response organization that has been certified by 
Transport Canada (Fisheries and Oceans Canada n.d.).123 
In Newfoundland, the only certified response organization is the Eastern Canada 
Response Corporation (ECRC), a not-for-profit private corporation with a presence 
throughout Atlantic Canada (Eastern Canada Response Corporation n.d.). The ECRC 
retains a large warehouse in St. John's, which is filled with oil response equipment 
designed to clean up any oil spills less than 10,000 tons that may occur in the province. 
Spills over 10,000 tons would typically require additional equipment to be brought in 
from other regions or, in some cases, other countries (Transport Canada 2007) (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2006i; Osmond 2006). 124 
Some critics have questioned the decision to leave control over oil spill response 
to the private sector. One journalist argued that: "Canada's current clean-up system is a 
hodge podge, with businesses owned by the major oil companies having the primary legal 
responsibility for cleaning up any oil spills and federal and international agencies 
available only as backup" (Scoffield 1998). Others have argued that the resources 
provided to deal with a potential spill in Placentia Bay are insufficient for the task at hand, 
pointing to the absence of key pieces of equipment, such as ocean going tug boats, which 
are capable of towing tankers that lose power or begin leaking oil on the high seas. The 
tug boats that are currently used in Placentia Bay are much less powerful and are only 
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effective in sheltered inshore waters. In the event that a major oil spill were to occur, 
many important pieces of clean-up equipment would have to be transported from the 
Canadian mainland, which could take several days. By that time, it could be too late to 
stop irreparable harm from being done. 125 Gabe, a local fisherman who had been closely 
involved in oil spill response discussions, described another instance in which severe 
weather, in combination with shoddy equipment, had led to a failure of the existing 
technological infrastructure and created another near miss: 
Last April, a buoy broke its chain and drifted across to Merasheen bank and then 
when the tide and wind changed, it drifted back across the bay to the other side, and 
they had the nerve to say it couldn't be helped. I said, well you were watching the 
buoy at Argentia traffic and it is manned twenty-four hours a day. When that buoy 
moved they should have done something right away, but it was two or three days 
until they got that corrected. That should have been done right away. If you 
followed that buoy, you would go right over the reef on Merasheen Bank. I would 
like to know why it moved. Did it break its chain? If it broke its chain, then the 
chain wasn't good enough. If it dragged its anchor, then the anchor wasn't good 
enough. It upsets me that the Coast Guard and Transport Canada wait so long to get 
things done ... We don' t have enough oil spill preparedness. We never really had 
enough. It should be public knowledge what is out there, but it isn' t. 
Another common criticism is that major multinational oil companies, such as 
Exxon-Mobil, have been able to take advantage of a loophole in the existing policy 
framework by contracting out the transportation of oil from their platforms to smaller 
subsidiary companies, thereby substantially reducing their legal responsibility in the event 
of a spill. If a very large spill were to occur, these smaller companies would then be able 
to declare bankruptcy rather than paying the full cost of the response effort and the 
remainder would have to be borne by the ECRC and the state. 
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A further risk is presented by the threat of collisions with small fishing boats. 
Since Placentia Bay had historically had a longer fishing season than most other areas of 
the province and had a comparatively strong inshore cod fishery during the 1980s, far 
fewer Placentia Bay fishers chose to train out of the fishery at the time of the moratorium. 
This meant that many got core status and were granted crab permits. 126 In 2007, Placentia 
Bay contained about 500 licensed inshore fishing vessels under 35 feet in length, along 
with another seventy vessels that were over 35 feet (Sweet 2007). Of these, many operate 
primarily on the eastern side ofthe bay. The deep eastern channel which is traversed by 
tankers makes for exceptional snow crab habitat and is fished extensively. Since tankers 
typically travel at high speeds and require several kilometres to come to a complete stop, 
the risk of a fatal accident with a much smaller boat is very real (Sweet 2007). 
Fishing vessels over 3 5 feet in length are required by law to have GPS devices 
installed on their vessels which enable their whereabouts to be determined at all times by 
maritime traffic controllers. Because these devices are prohibitively expensive, smaller 
fishing boats do not typically have them, meaning that those vessels can only be detected 
with radar or with the naked eye. Since radar coverage can be limited in bad weather, it is 
not uncommon for small boats to be largely invisible to traffic controllers and tanker 
captains alike. Cecil, an operator at the maritime traffic station in Argentia explained: 
The little guys are the problem, especially during the crab season, when 
there are so many of them out there. We've had our share of conflicts at 
that time of year. Sometimes we can see them, but the radar is pretty 
sensitive, so anything from fog to rain to strong winds can throw it off and 
we get plenty of all those things. Fishermen can call in on their VHF 
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radios to ask when tankers are expected to be coming in, but not all of 
them do that. So, if they're out there, they are doing so at their own risk. 
Some fishers saw things in a different light and expressed frustration over what 
they saw as a regulatory system that favoured the petroleum industry and threatened their 
capacity to earn a living from the sea. Some argued that the continuing intensification of 
the petroleum industry had already resulted in damage to fishing gear and several near 
collisions, and feared that an oil spill could spell the end of the inshore fishery. 127 Paul, an 
inshore fisherman, expressed the suspicions that some held toward the petroleum industry 
as follows: 
If you look at all these policies, it tells you one thing loud and clear . .. that Ottawa is 
not serious about looking after small-scale fisheries or the ecosystem. It is all about 
big business. A lot of fishermen are of the opinion that in the mid 80s, when oil got 
discovered, a bunch of bureaucrats got together with the big oil companies and they 
came to the conclusion that the best thing to do with all those little fishing boats is 
to just get rid of them. If you have an oil spill or if the tankers damage fishing gear, 
all the fishermen have to get compensated for their loss of income. I can say that 
my living is gone and I can't fish, so they should have to pay me instead. It sounds 
far-fetched, but it would make sense that the government and the industry would 
prefer to just pass over the resource to the few big fish companies or large 
businessmen and let them deal with it. They will just dole out somebody a wage 
and, if there is an oil spill or if the resource goes and there is nothing left to catch, 
buddy just gets laid off and he can go to the mainland to work. 
He later explained that the 2005 protests, in which inshore fishers blocked oil tankers 
from entering the traffic lane, while primarily designed to protest crab allocation policies, 
were also a thinly veiled threat to the petroleum industry that they would not be bullied 
out of their ancestral fishing territories. It was a stark defiance of the collaborative ethos 
being promoted through the Oceans Act, making it clear that the old confrontational 
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tactics were still at their disposal and they would not hesitate to use them if they deemed 
it necessary. This message appeared to be lost on one Come by Chance oil refinery 
spokesperson, however, who said that she could not understand why fishers were 
targeting the petroleum industry, when they had nothing to do with the crab dispute: 
"While we understand that they are upset about what's going on . . . We' re not really sure 
why it is they're targeting us, because we have nothing to do with the crab fishery" (The 
Canadian Press 2005c ). 
Added risks promise to be introduced by the major intensification of tanker traffic 
that is anticipated over the next decade. A series of feasibility studies have been carried 
out by a consortium of Canadian, English and Scottish investors with the view to building 
a new refinery at Southern Head, just west of the Come by Chance refinery. Like Come 
by Chance, it would depend exclusively on sour crude bought on the world market. The 
company has decided to move ahead with the project and is presently awaiting the results 
of federal and provincial environmental assessment processes. If successful, the refinery 
would become operational by 2011 and would process about 300,000 barrels of oil per 
day, nearly three times the amount that the Come By Chance facility currently processes. 
It would also be built with the capacity to easily expand production to 600,000 barrels per 
day if market conditions are deemed to be favourable (Daly 2006; Harding and Cattaneo 
2007). 128 Although no new oil refineries have been built in North America in the last 
twenty-five years, growing demand for gasoline and the associated rise in prices helped to 
stimulate a resurgence of interest in the industry (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
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2006i). New refineries are also being considered for Sydney, Nova Scotia and St. John, 
New Brunswick (Squires 2006c; Myrden 2007). Discussions have also been held about 
the possibility of expanding the existing refinery at Come by Chance to triple its current 
output of 105,000 barrels of oil per day (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2006j). 129 
Efforts are also ongoing to develop a new liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage 
facility at Grassy Point, to the northeast ofthe Whiffen Head transhipment terminal and 
very close to the community of Arnold's Cove (Squires 2007). The facility would receive 
gas shipped in on large tankers, primarily from the North Sea, the Barents Sea, the 
Persian Gulf and the Middle East and then transfer it onto specialized tankers that would 
take it to markets in the eastern United States and central Canada (Squires 2006a, Squires 
2007). The project has already secured the approval of the provincial and federal 
governments and construction could begin as early as 20 10 (Squires 2006a, 2007, Reuters 
2008). 130 
Together, these various projects could bring about a seven-fold increase in the 
number of tanker movements occurring in Placentia Bay each year (Herridge 2007b ). The 
future development of the Hebron-Ben Nevis and Hibernia South fields and the potential 
for new discoveries in the Orphan or Laurentian Basin are likely to lead to even more 
traffic. So too will plans to send large shipments of nickel concentrate from the Voisey's 
Bay mine in northern Labrador to the soon to be constructed smelting facility in the 
community of Long Harbour. At peak production, the facility is expected to receive 3 to 4 
large shipments per week, each carrying about 40,000 tons of raw material. 131 
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These expected changes will undoubtedly introduce growing conflicts over ocean 
space and substantially increase the risk of a catastrophic disaster. The Fish, Food and 
Allied Workers union has increasingly spoken out publicly about these developments, 
arguing that local fishers are in serious danger of getting displaced. Earl McCurdy, the 
long-time president of the FF A W has stated: "People see themselves as being driven out 
of the job that has sustained them for their lifetime" and added that the forecasted level of 
tanker traffic "is not compatible with the current level of fishing activity in the bay ... so 
something has got to give" (Baker 2008). Wayne Masters, a Placentia Bay fishermen who 
often represents the FF A W in planning meetings has expressed similar concerns: "Let's 
face it, there's just not room enough there for everybody ... We've had problems already 
where fellows have been pulling up crab pots and the next thing you know, they're 
looking up the side of an oil tanker. .. Our take is we've been here for 500 years, do we 
just get pushed aside?" (Herridge 2007b ). He further stated that an oil spill would have 
far more serious consequences for the fishery than it would for the oil industry: "Who's 
taking the risk here? If they have an oil spill, it's going to cost them money. We have an 
oil spill, it's going to cost us our livelihood" (ibid.). 
While some discussions have been held about the possibility of the petroleum 
industry offering financial buy-outs to reduce the number of active fishers on the eastern 
side of the bay, this case illustrates that there may be some cases in which different uses 
of the bay are simply incompatible. As stated in the introduction, the sustainable 
development discourse, with its insistence that win-win solutions are nearly always 
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possible, is silent on the question oftrade-offs, be they between development and 
environmental protection, between different groups of ocean users, or between different 
ways of living on the coast. Instead it is assumed that risks and conflicts can be managed 
and diffused if the proper procedures are put into place. 
While the mitigating measures introduced through the Smart Bay project and the 
integrated management plan may go some distance toward easing these tensions and 
preparing for a potential accident, it seems clear that that the risk of a major disaster is 
steadily increasing, despite these planning mechanisms. The newly formed integrated 
management planning body will create new opportunities for dialogue among those 
groups who are granted a seat at the table, but larger decisions about whether new 
developments should or should not be allowed to go ahead remain largely outside of the 
participatory process. Instead, development applications are evaluated by various other 
federal and provincial regulatory agencies on a case-by-case basis, with little or no 
attention being paid to their cumulative effects on the ecosystem as a whole. While 
citizens may still engage with these processes through the federal environmental impact 
assessment process, it is extremely rare for applications to be refused solely because of a 
lack of public support. 
Since participatory planning bodies rely for their legitimacy on the buy-in of all 
prominent stakeholder groups, their mandate is typically restricted to issues that do not 
significantly restrict the development aspirations of more powerful industries. As 
mentioned, senior members of the petroleum industry will only participate in the process 
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if politically charged issues are left off of the agenda. Thus, while sustainable 
development may be the central mandate of all Oceans Act projects, it seems clear that 
some projects will only prove to be sustainable themselves if they are not seen as 
presenting a significant obstacle to economic growth. In that sense, in practice, this new 
approach does not appear to be dramatically different from the top-down development 
policies of the past. Much like its forbearers, the Smart Bay project appears to be more 
concerned with risk management and cost-benefit analysis than with risk avoidance or 
prevention or social and economic justice. 
9.7 Chapter Summary 
Ongoing planning efforts in Placentia Bay are relying upon particular 
representations of ecosystems and of the societies that depend on them. Through these 
models, it has been argued that it will be possible to produce new understandings of the 
bay which will make it possible to "weave a golden thread," allowing a diverse array of 
industries to create economic growth, while simultaneously creating new opportunities 
for stakeholder participation and safeguarding the health of the marine environment. This 
chapter has shown this dream appears destined to fail. While it is not often acknowledged 
as such, the new "sustainable development" regime appears to be overseeing an 
unprecedented intensification of risk, both to the environment and to some coastal 
livelihoods. The argument that ecosystems can be managed in such a way as to satisfy the 
goals of stakeholders and that win-win solutions are almost always possible does not 
acknowledge the full complexity of social and ecological systems and ignores the very 
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real possibility that some uses of the bay may be incompatible with each other. In these 
cases, difficult political decisions are required, even though they inevitably result in some 
groups "winning" at the expense of others. 
This new approach may, however, be more successful in achieving other, less 
explicit, objectives. In particular, new ocean management projects seem to be having 
some success in producing new kinds of ocean-using subjects, such as certain members of 
the fishery and the offshore petroleum industry, who have been willing to take on new 
responsibilities that were previously borne by the state. This may, in some cases, allow 
for ocean activities to be regulated less expensively, and with greater political legitimacy 
and fewer overt conflicts than were present in previous eras. 
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Chapter 10 Conclusion: Global Governance and its Discontents 
10.1 Economic Restructuring and Ocean Policy 
In this dissertation, I have shown that Canada's emerging approach to managing 
uses of the oceans is very much a reflection of larger trends in global environmental 
governance. Major United Nations Environment Program summits have articulated a new 
vision, which emphasizes the need for a more decentred approach to statecraft, in which 
the private sector and non-government organizations are invited to play a more significant 
role. This development is itself reflective of a broader shift toward neoliberal policy 
approaches that has taken hold in many countries since the 1980s. 
This new approach has been closely associated with the rise of three interrelated 
discourses, which have now become fixtures in national ocean policies throughout the 
world. The first is "sustainable development," which posits that economic growth does 
not need to be sacrificed in order to bring about a more sustainable way of living. The 
second is the "ecosystem approach," which is usually typified by the belief that the 
simple equilibrium models of the past are inadequate for understanding the complex 
interactions between humans and their surrounding environments. Instead, it stresses the 
need for new and more elaborate models and new sources of data in order to enable 
resource managers to better adapt to the unpredictable dynamics of ecological and 
economic systems. The third discourse focuses on the importance of incorporating the 
participation of "civil society" into environmental management. It emphasizes the need 
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for less prescriptive regulations and instead concentrates on "responsibilizing" designated 
groups of "stakeholders" (Rose 1999). That is to say, developing new mechanisms 
through which to influence the subjectivities of ocean users so that they will be willing to 
take on new responsibilities and participate in new forms of self-government. While some 
have been granted new property rights and exclusive access to marine resources, non-
state actors are now being asked to fund, and in some cases carry out, more of the 
research, monitoring, and enforcement activities associated with their respective 
industries and to assume a greater share of the risk in the event that their livelihoods are 
affected by resource shortages or other unforeseen events. In tllis sense, they are being 
deliberately transformed from passive recipients of top-down state policies into active 
participants in new managerial partnerships. 
This approach is a stark contrast to the "high modernist" approach, described by 
Scott (1998), which was employed in previous eras. It was typified by a highly 
centralized approach to science, planning and enforcement which reified expert 
knowledge and did not allow for non-government entities to play a significant role in 
developing or implementing policies. Instead, it emphasized new technological solutions 
whlch would make socio-ecological systems legible from above and could be generalized 
to a wide range of different localities. In many cases, however, these endeavours were 
eventually undermined by the repeated failures of such systems to conform to the 
predictions of scientific models. While the three discourses I have described also grew 
out of larger transnational ambitions, the new managerial approach that they represent 
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places a much greater emphasis on "empowering" local actors and understanding local 
specificities and, as such, it appears to allow for greater regional flexibility. 
The Newfoundland case provides an interesting opportunity to study this shift in 
action, because ocean policy reforms were introduced during a particularly dynamic 
period in the island's history. The sudden and unexpected collapse ofthe cod fishery, 
long the economic foundation of rural Newfoundland, provided a damning critique of the 
previous management regime and became a catalyst for reform. The economic crisis that 
followed the moratorium helped to justify the federal government's decision to bring 
about a complete overhaul of the way in which oceans are managed. In this sense, the 
Newfoundland experience with economic and ecological restructuring resembles the 
cases discussed in Naomi Klein's (2007) book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster 
Capitalism. Klein argues that sudden ecological or economic disasters often create 
tremendous social disruption and facilitate the imposition of sweeping neoliberal policy 
reforms that may have encountered greater opposition under different circumstances. 
10.2 Instabilities and Tensions 
Anna Tsing (2005) reminds us that, while the unique circumstances of particular 
places do indeed create opportunities for those wishing to promote new regimes of global 
governance, these same local particularities may introduce instabilities and tensions into 
this process which may bring about unintended consequences or present opportunities for 
subversion. Tsing' s concept of "friction" is useful in understanding the ways in which 
historically entrenched discourses and practices sometimes present obstacles to the 
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success ofthese "aspirations for global connection," even ifthis does not always take the 
form of overt resistance (2005: 4). Employing a multi-sited ethnographic approach, I have 
explored these dynamics in depth, presenting several case studies which have chronicled 
the preliminary efforts to bring this new vision to life in various locations in eastern 
Newfoundland and highlighted the opportunities and obstacles that have been 
encountered as part of that process. 
I have also shown that the development and implementation of the Oceans Act, 
Canada's Oceans Strategy and Canada' s Oceans Action Plan, while strongly influenced 
by transnational policy discourses, was in some respects uniquely Canadian and so too 
were many of the problems faced by those bureaucrats who were charged with putting it 
into action. In addition to having to overcome the hostile feelings that were created by 
what was widely perceived to be the "mismanagement" of fisheries on all three coasts, 
they were also forced to contend with a largely disinterested and "land-locked" public and 
an extremely restrictive fiscal climate which made it difficult to lure federal funding for 
new programs. Despite Canada' s international commitment to "modernizing" ocean 
management, the political will to make this vision a reality appeared to be lacking in the 
early years. The eventual contribution of greater federal support to the oceans agenda, I 
have argued, had less to do with ocean conservation in general and more to do with the 
fact that ocean policy reforms were successfully promoted as a mechanism through which 
to realize a number of specific federal government priorities, such as improving maritime 
security and developing new commercial technologies. 
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Shifting my focus to the Newfoundland context, I have demonstrated that, while 
discourses about sustainability, ecosystems, and participation were clearly developed 
elsewhere and have, accordingly, been imbued with certain intrinsic meanings, their 
specific meanings in particular social situations were often negotiated, contested and 
reshaped by various actors with vastly different and often competing agendas. I have also 
shown how these ideas have become entangled in longstanding power struggles over who 
should and should not be allowed to have access to particular spaces, resources, and 
livelihoods. 
These power struggles are perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the fishery. 
Large fish processing and distribution companies have long sought to position themselves 
as the rightful guardians of the resource, arguing that they are profitable enough to 
withstand ecological fluctuations without government assistance and are uniquely capable 
of delivering the privately financed sustainable fishery that the federal government has 
long aspired to. This characterization has generally been resisted by independent fishers, 
however, many of whom have argued that it is they who represent the proud fishing 
heritage of rural Newfoundland and offer the best hope of ensuring the long-term survival 
of coastal communities. Representatives of the less affluent inshore sector have fought to 
retain a foothold in the industry and have engaged in highly visible forms of protest in an 
attempt to halt the corporate takeover of the fishery, even though many said privately that 
it was probably inevitable that this would happen eventually. 
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The irony of this situation, of course, is that independent fishers have themselves 
been subjected to a variety of professionalization and downsizing programs in recent 
years, which have widened class divisions in most coastal communities and have served 
to exclude coastal residents who do not have a direct presence on the water from new 
decision-making mechanisms. While fishers are being granted unprecedented 
opportunities to participate directly in policy development and implementation, these new 
regimes appear to be shutting out many other people who also have strong historical and 
cultural ties to the sea, but are no longer able to make a direct economic claim to it. I used 
the example of fish processing plant workers in showing that even people working in 
what is traditionally considered a maritime industry risk being marginalized by this new 
managerial approach, despite claims that it will be more inclusive. Since the cod 
moratorium, most fish processing workers have not fared nearly as well as their friends, 
neighbours, and family members who fish for a living and they are now having to 
contend with tremendous uncertainty about the continued viability of their industry in the 
years to come. Despite their growing vulnerability, however, it does not appear likely that 
these individuals will have an opportunity to meaningfully influence the new decision-
making mechanisms that will govern uses of the sea in the future. 
A related dynamic is at work in the offshore petroleum industry, where companies 
have endeavoured to portray themselves as responsible, efficient and sustainable and have 
used this strategy to lobby for a less restrictive regulatory environment. Through 
initiatives such as One Ocean and the CAPP Stewardship Initiative, petroleum companies 
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have sought to rebrand themselves as environmental stewards who are willing to work 
with others. They have also engaged in various forms of strategically targeted 
philanthropy, including the provision of financial support for community-based marine 
protected area projects. Representatives of the Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers also began working to establish a bilateral relationship with Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada' s Oceans Directorate early on in the process and this has allowed them to 
put forward suggestions about ways of steering the oceans agenda so that it does not 
impinge upon their capacity to operate profitably. As part of this process, they have 
argued for a system of stakeholder weighting that would ensure that individuals and 
organizations that take an adversarial stance toward industrial development would be 
effectively excluded from many important discussions. Instead, they have insisted that the 
process should focus solely on narrow, well-defined goals and should avoid politically 
contentious issues. 
In the case of the marine protected area project in Leading Tickles, the 
responsibilized group was not an industry, but an entire community. Citizens of the town 
were expected to do their part to keep the federal MP A project afloat through the 
commitment of substantial labour (both paid and voluntary) from local residents and 
through their support of ongoing efforts to raise funds from the private sector. In practice, 
however, the project came to revolve primarily around a small, but well respected, group 
of fish harvesters, who retained a controlling interest on the steering committee. Those 
local fishers who were involved with the MP A voiced a strong desire to enclose this 
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particular area of ocean space and use it as a vehicle through which to rehabilitate the 
local fishery and grow the tourism industry. These changes would, they hoped, be enough 
to ensure that their town would continue to survive well into the future, in spite ofthe 
significant obstacles it was facing. Despite the immense popularity of the project's leader, 
the MP A project angered some people in the area, including a neighbouring mussel 
farmer, who felt threatened by the initiative and feared that it could ultimately undermine 
his capacity to earn a living from the sea. The eventual demise of the MP A project was 
not a result of external pressures, however, but was brought about by an internal rift 
amongst resident fish harvesters about whether or not the federal government could be 
trusted to keep their best interests at heart. 
Similar conflicts threaten to present serious challenges for the planning initiatives 
that are now underway in Placentia Bay. While new planning technologies are enabling 
the resurgence of high modernist optimism about the capacity of managers to understand 
and predict the behaviour of human-ecological systems and engineer "win-win" solutions, 
this idealized model fails to acknowledge that ocean planning is inescapably political in 
nature. Many established and potential future uses of the bay appear to be incompatible 
with the rampant push to promote new forms of industrial development in recent years, 
particularly the proposed expansion of the oil refining industry and the staggering 
increase in tanker traffic that would accompany it. This suggests that policy makers may 
eventually be forced to make difficult decisions about which interests are going to be 
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favoured in that area, even though doing so will undoubtedly have significant 
ramifications for those affected. 
What these cases have in common is that they all demonstrate that the attempt to 
shift responsibility onto non-state actors is not a simple process, but an immensely 
complicated and politically charged one. The efforts of government bureaucrats to enable 
certain groups of stakeholders to be active participants in sustainable development are not 
politically neutral and often have the effect of favouring some interests while excluding 
others. As Pi-Sunyer (1976) has observed, even though its influence may not always be 
apparent: "It is the state that takes it upon itself to define and grant legitimacy to a broad 
range of groups and associations and to establish rules according to which these entities 
may operate. It may be argued that all state systems, to a greater or lesser degree, select 
the 'players' and define the 'rules' of political activity" (1976: 66). As my research has 
shown, some groups, such as the offshore petroleum and fish processing industries, have 
recognized this from an early stage and they have sought to use their influence to steer the 
planning agenda in particular ways. 
Another interesting finding is that, while many individuals representing 
designated stakeholder groups were in favour of some aspects of this devolution process, 
several expressed concerns that the federal government was abdicating many of its 
historic responsibilities and relying too much on the private sector and they feared that 
this could have serious consequences. Interviewees from a range of different sectors were 
keenly aware of the fact that the new approach had come into being in the shadow of 
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sweeping budgetary cutbacks to ocean science and management since the early 1990s, 
and felt that this severely limited the capacity of the federal government to fulfil its 
obligations. 
Fishers tended to argue that fiscal restructuring at the federal level had severely 
eroded the capacity of scientists at Fisheries and Oceans Canada to understand and 
predict the rapidly changing marine environment. Instead, they were asking harvesters to 
become agents of the state, producing "data" for use in fisheries management models and 
developing new mechanisms through which to police each other and ensure that they 
complied with regulations. While some said they were happy to do their part, many 
worried that they could not perform this role effectively without considerably more 
federal support. Some also feared that this arrangement had the potential to leave fishers 
highly vulnerable to downturns in the health of key commercial species, like snow crab, 
about which very little is known. While some took the stance that prediction was virtually 
impossible, most believed that much more could be done to ensure that management 
decisions were based upon the best available information. Particularly important were 
long term studies, which simply could not or would not be funded by harvesters 
themselves or, as in the case of Leading Tickles, through corporate philanthropy. Many of 
those interviewed welcomed the opportunity to share their knowledge of the ecosystem 
with fisheries managers, but some said that this invitation seemed hollow, given that so 
few resources were being devoted to fisheries management at the federal level. This 
suggested to many that the move toward participatory forms of management had more to 
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do with downloading and cost cutting and less to do with a genuine desire to share power. 
Experiences like the lobster v-notching controversy in Leading Tickles, in which local 
consensus had been completely ignored, were taken by some as further evidence that the 
federal government's openness to the idea of including local knowledge was only 
superficial or at least highly selective, as their perspectives seemed to only be 
meaningfully considered in cases where they supported the existing managerial approach. 
Several of those resource developers interviewed expressed similar concerns, 
although they often framed them quite differently. Both petroleum company 
representatives and aquaculturists stated that they believed that severe cutbacks to 
government science budgets had resulted in a situation in which the federal government 
now lacked the expertise needed to effectively determine what level of development is 
harmful to the marine environment. Some feared that this uncertainty, in combination 
with vague new policy ideals like the "Precautionary Approach" and the "Polluter Pays 
Principle," could be used as a justification for curtailing their activities and this could lead 
to costly delays. Some feared that it might also result in a tendency to favour the interests 
of industries that are perceived to be more benign, such as tourism or even the inshore 
fishery. While most said they agreed with the move toward less regulation, several said 
that they strongly believed that the federal government continued to have important roles 
to play in carrying out research, being an "honest broker" between different stakeholder 
groups, and making difficult decisions when consensus wasn' t possible. 
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10.3 Knowing Our Place: Anthropology and the New Environmental Management 
In the winter of 2004, I was invited by a contact at Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
to participate in a workshop in the town of Arnold' s Cove to discuss the ongoing efforts 
to develop an integrated management plan for Placentia Bay. The workshop was the first 
of its kind and was well attended by people from a range of different communities and 
industry groups. After a series of short presentations about the work that had been done to 
that point, the facilitator announced that she would be breaking us up into discussion 
groups, and asked us to proceed immediately to the table that corresponded with the 
coloured dot on each of our name tags. 
After making my way through the crowd to get to my table, I began to realize 
what she had in mind. It seemed clear that what we were experiencing was the first 
attempt to put the stakeholder model into action. To my right was a table consisting solely 
offish harvesters. To my left were those representing heavy industries, such as oil 
refining and mineral processing. Across the room were representatives of municipal 
governments and development agencies. My group consisted mainly of academics from 
various science disciplines at Memorial University and the College of the North Atlantic, 
along with two environmental NGO representatives and me. 
Once everyone had settled into their seats, the facilitator announced that we 
should take twenty minutes to determine our group's priorities for integrated management 
and then report back to the others. Needless to say, my group did not get very far. One 
fisheries biologist started the discussion by announcing that we in the "research 
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community" were not like other stakeholder groups, in that our role was to lend our 
scientific expertise to the project so that the other stakeholder groups could make 
decisions based on the best available information. While most nodded in agreement, I 
could not help but question this characterization, asking whether we might not also have a 
responsibility to ask difficult questions about how particular issues were being framed 
and how different perspectives were being represented (or not represented) in the plan. 
A report of an impending blizzard brought an abrupt end to the workshop, and we 
were mercifully spared from having to arrive at a clear consensus to share with the other 
groups, but this brief interchange proved to be an eye-opening experience for me. I have 
come to believe that my inability or unwillingness to share in the conception of self being 
put forward by my academic colleagues speaks to a larger dilemma that is being 
encountered by a great many environmental anthropologists in recent years. In the high 
modernist resource management regimes of the past, anthropologists, like the rural people 
they tended to work with, often found themselves on the outside looking in. 
Environmental management was to be based solely upon scientific knowledge, and other 
cultural representations of nature were generally dismissed as irrelevant or, at best, 
anecdotal. In this exclusionary climate, many anthropologists positioned themselves as 
critics and activists, pointing out the short-sightedness of environmental planning 
initiatives and staunchly supporting the rights of the people whose lives were being 
manipulated by distant resource managers. 
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With the emergence of this new, more decentred approach to environmental 
management, the relationship between social scientists and environmental managers 
appears to be changing. Heightened efforts are now being made to incorporate a diverse 
array of perspectives and knowledge-bases into environmental management, with the 
assumption that doing so will lead to better representations of ecosystems and improved 
managerial effectiveness and legitimacy. As a result, anthropologists and their fellow 
social researchers are finding that our skills are suddenly in demand. With our expertise 
in understanding cultural knowledge and patterns of behaviour, we are seen as having the 
capacity to mobilize and code knowledge for use in management models and to devise 
strategies through which to mitigate conflicts between stakeholder groups. 
While this may represent a new opportunity for social research to influence policy, 
we must be cautious about how much faith we put in the capacity of this partnership to 
alter existing power relations. I believe that anthropologists must not be content with 
simply interpreting and integrating local perspectives into larger managerial frameworks. 
We must also work to draw attention to the broader context in which those perspectives 
have taken shape. Committing to retain a critical perspective in our research does not, 
however, mean that we cannot find creative ways of engaging with these new approaches. 
Like Brosius (2003), I believe that there are opportunities for anthropologists to "move 
beyond generalized statements of concern about the politics of legibility and high 
modernist ecology" and "try to specify a bit more precisely what is at stake in the recent 
turn toward place-making (and place-effacing) practices of ecoregional conservation 
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planning" (2003: 27). With our history of carefully examining the political struggles at 
play in particular settings, anthropologists are well positioned to articulate a broader 
vision which plays close attention to the historical dynamics and power relations which 
shape who does and does not have access to particular spaces and resources (Pi-Sunyer 
and Thomas 1997; Buanes eta!. 2004; Menzies 2006; Buscher 2008). In this way, it may 
be possible for anthropological methods to play a more meaningful role in analyzing and 
amplifying marginalized perspectives so that they can eventually exert greater influence 
over the goals and not simply the technologies of power. 
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Chapter 1 
1 A number of significant fish spawning areas on the Grand Banks protrude into international waters and 
have historically been fished heavily by foreign trawlers. 
2 The moratorium affected areas along the north and east coasts of Newfoundland and most of coastal 
Labrador. A year later, it was extended to include additional stocks along Newfoundland 's south and west 
coasts and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In addition to cod, the moratorium was also applied to Atlantic 
haddock, American plaice and yellowtail flounder. 
3 In the I 970s, OECD membership consisted of: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; 
France; Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; The Netherlands; New Zealand; 
Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; the United Kingdom; and the United States. More 
than two decades later, it expanded its membership to include: Mexico (1994); The Czech Republic (I 995); 
Hungary ( 1996); Poland (1996); Korea (1996); and The Slovak Republic (2000) (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (2005). 
4 The phrase "sustainable development" first came to prominence in the 1980 "World Conservation 
Strategy," which was co-authored by the United Nations Environment Program, the World Conservation 
Union (JUCN) and the World Wildlife Fund (Lele 1991). 
5 The report is also commonly referred to as "The Bruntland Report" after its chairperson Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, who was the Norwegian Prime Minister at the time. 
6 The "Polluter-Pays Principle" was first articulated at an OECD conference in I 972 (Johnston and 
VanderZwaag 2000). It demands that resource users must pay fees to fund response and restoration 
activities in the event that their actions cause damage. Under this framework, responsibility for funding 
environmental programs gets shifted away from government departments and placed into the hands of those 
private companies or investors who benefit economically from the use of those environments. In this way, 
environmental costs are internalized into the development process and become simply another cost of doing 
business. 
7 These ideas reflect those espoused in the " Washington Consensus," which carried a great deal of influence 
under the Reagan and Bush Administrations in the United States during the 1980s and early 90s (Finnegan 
2003). This term is frequently used to describe the shared commitment to: "deregulation , privatization, 
'openness' (to foreign investment and imports), unrestricted movement of capital, and lower taxes" by the 
US government and a number of Washington-based international agencies, including the World Bank and 
the IMF, that emerged during this period (Finnegan 2003). 
8 A small group of countries, led by the United States and Switzerland, have outwardly resisted the idea of a 
fixed commitment (Johnston and VanderZwaag 2000). 
9 While the ecosystem concept did not emerge until this period, the term "ecology" came into being several 
decades earlier. It was first used by German biologist Ernst Haeckel in I 866 (Goodland 1975). 
10 McCay has argued that the very notion of"adaptive strategy" has strong ties to "consumer choice 
theory" in microeconomics and tends to produce a very limited view of human beings. In place of this 
"systems ecology" she advocates a "people ecology" which would pay greater attention to "the role of 
individuals and other social units, rather than systems, in managing relations to resources and to 
environmental hazards (I 978: 403). 
11 This marked a depatture from the cultural ecology work carried out by Julian Steward and Leslie White 
between the I 930s and 1960s, which showed a greater interest in the dynamic relationship between 
environmental and social change (Orlove 1980; Netting 1982). 
379 
12 These authors were later critiqued for presenting virtually all cultural phenomena as adaptations to 
environmental forces. Repeated illustrations of seemingly maladaptive or environmentally destructive 
behaviour appeared to undermine their universalistic models (Orlove 1980; Netting 1982; Milton 1996). 
They were also challenged for presenting a relatively static and homogenous view of culture which 
downplayed social conflict, for failing to notice that local populations are embedded in larger social 
networks, and for reducing human beings to passive reactors to an external "nature," thereby ignoring the 
capacity for human practices to reshape the 'natural' world (Netting 1982; Milton 1996). The 1980s saw a 
gradual move within ecological anthropology toward descriptive and historically specific "processual" 
approaches, which sought to examine ecological relationships across space and time (Orlove 1980; Netting 
1982; Hvalkof and Escobar 1998; Little 1999; Scoones 1999). 
13 Ironically, this new humility has come into being at the same time as other developments in 
biotechnology and cybernetics have heightened optimism about the capacity to of human beings to reshape 
"natural laws," to suit their desires (Haraway 1991; Escobar 1994, 1999; Fischer 1999). 
14 The concept of "government at a distance" was first developed by Bruno Latour ( 1987) and was 
subsequently explored in depth by Miller and Rose (1990). 
15 This view has deep roots in "Game Theory," which became highly influential in economics, biology, 
psychology and other disciplines during this period (Lansing 2003). It is rooted in the idea that individuals 
will tend to try to maximize their own advantage in their interactions with other people. 
16 Similar arguments have been made by a range of other anthropologists, geographers and political 
scientists (Storper 1997; Bebbington 1999; Hecth 2004) 
17 The word "upstream" is typically used to refer to activities associated with the production of crude oil 
reserves, whereas the word "downstream" refers to the refining of crude and the production and distribution 
of petroleum products. 
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18 Fife (2005) has argued convincingly that these non-traditional sources of data have emerged as a critical 
component of contemporary ethnographic research. 
19 The vast majority of the industry's local employees work in more "operational" jobs. 
20 The Eastport Peninsula project has subsequently received formal designation as an MPA under the 
Oceans Act (Davis et al. 2006). 
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21 Very little seabed mining has taken place to this point, since the discovery of new land-based deposits has 
reduced demand and kept prices relatively low (Huebert 1996-7). 
22 At the time, fish stocks beyond 200 nautical miles were not thought to be in need of regulation, because 
they were largely beyond the reach of existing fishing technologies (Holland and Bernal 2002). 
23 In addition to conventional oil and natural gas resources, there is tremendous interest in the potential 
wealth to be gained from gas hydrates or "clathrates," ice-like crystals formed by pressurized gas molecules, 
usually methane (Calvert 1998). Some estimates have suggested that methane clathrates contain "more than 
two to three times the energy potential of all known global reserves of gas, oil, and coal combined" (Swing 
2003: 4). In 1995, the US Geological Survey estimated that "methane clathrates under US jurisdiction 
contain enough gas to supply the country's energy needs for two millennia at current consumption rates" 
(ibid.). Significant exploitation of gas hydrates is unlikely to occur for at least two decades, however (ibid.). 
There are still concerns that extracting gas hydrates could cause undersea landslides and could "trigger a 
dramatic acceleration in global warming if their trapped methane was released" (Innovations Report 2005). 
In 2003, Canadian scientists "made the world' s first successful production of natural gas from frozen 
methane ... " in the Mackenzie Delta in the Northwest Arctic (Spears 2003). 
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24 The question of what constitutes a "sedentary species" was at the root of a highly publicized dispute 
between Canada and the US over whether or not Canada had the right to manage fishing for Icelandic 
Scallops beyond its 200 mile exclusive economic zone. Although the scallops rarely move, they do have the 
ability to propel themselves as much as 20 or 30 metres to escape predators. Doing so requires them to 
expend a great deal of energy, however, and they must rest for at least a day before they can move again 
(Van Dyke 1995). 
25 The technical rules for continental shelf claims were released in 1999. Russia submitted the first claim in 
2002, a lthough it was promptly rejected, due to insufficient data. The country has subsequently resubmitted 
its claim, but no decision has yet been reached (Stonehouse 2003). 
26 Developments beyond the EEZ become subject to a tax of one percent of the value of production in their 
fifth year of operation, and this rises by one percent per annum to a maximum of seven percent in the 
twelfth year and in each year that follows (Chircop and Marchand 2000: 7). 
27 At this time, three new agencies were created to oversee the implementation of the agreement. The 
International Seabed Authority was charged with the task of developing regulations for deep sea mining. 
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf was given the job of overseeing and evaluating the 
efforts made by countries to delineate their continental margins. The International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (ITLOS) was created to develop mechanisms for resolving disputes that arose between nations as 
~art of these processes (Lane and McConnell 2003). 
8 Some recent evidence has suggested that the removal of cod from the ecosystem may have permanently 
altered its very structure, thereby making it very difficult for cod to recover (Auld 2005). 
29 One striking illustration of the impact that human waste disposal practices have had on the ocean 
environment is the so-called "Great Pacific Garbage Patch," a one hundred million ton collection of 
~arbage that has been trapped in the central pacific by the currents of the North Pacific Gyre (Marks 2008). 
0 Strong is also famous for coining the phrase "ecodevelopment," in the early 1980s, which was a 
forerunner to the WCED's "sustainable development" concept (Bernstein 2001: 43). 
3 1 One of the most recent of these studies identified the cod collapse as a model case of what it calls "non-
linear degradation." This refers to a situation in which "a problem that has been going downhill gradually 
reaches a 'tipping point,' and changes begin to happen very suddenly (Cairns 2004). Cod was also cited as 
the paradigmatic case of fisheries management failure in the World Resources Institute's 2005 Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (World Resources Institute 2005). 
32 Prior to that point, Canada had unilaterally declared a 12 mile territorial sea under the Territorial Sea Act 
in 1964 and had claimed the fishing powers associated with an EEZ in 1977 with the Fishing Zones Act, but 
had not declared a 24 mile continguous zone. The relevant provisions of these acts were later incorporated 
into the Oceans Act (Huebert 1996-7). 
33 One of these AOI's, "Gabriola Passage," on the British Columbia coast, was eventually abandoned, due 
in part to unresolved questions about how it would be reconciled with outstanding Aboriginal land claims in 
the region. 
34 The other specific commitments made under the Oceans Action Plan are: to develop ballast water 
exchange regulations to defend against invasive species; to strengthen marine pollution regulations; to 
enhance aerial surveillance in an effort to crack down on sea-based sources of pollution, such as oily bilge 
water dumping; to support newly passed legislation to protect birds oiled at sea; and to support seabed 
mapping as a way to " increase scientific understanding of the physical environment and associated 
habitats" and identify "areas in need of protection" (ibid.). 
35 The United States is the last of the world' s major economic powers to have not yet ratified the agreement. 
36 Among the other countries expected to make extended continental shelf claims under UNCLOS are: 
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Iceland, India, Ireland, Madigascar, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, The United 
Kingdom, and the United States (Bedi 1999). 
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37 At present, the area of the continental shelf under Canadian jurisdiction is about 4.5 million square 
kilometres. 
38 The shelf on the Pacific Coast extends significantly less than 200 nautical miles, and would not be 
affected by this provision. 
39 These potential riches would, however, likely be subject to the "common heritage" principle of UNCLOS, 
and taxed accordingly (Chircop and Marchand 2000). 
40 An emphasis on maritime sovereignty and security has continued to form the core of the ocean policy 
approach emphasized by the Conservative Government under Prime Minister Steven Harper, which 
assumed power in 2006. 
Chapter 4 
41 The exact location of Cabot's landing place remains a mystery, although several different hypotheses 
have been considered. There are even some that have argued that Cabot did not land in Newfoundland at all, 
but on Cape Breton Island, in what is now Nova Scotia (Pope 1997). While Cabot is believed to have been 
the first European to stake a formal claim in Newfoundland, another group of European voyagers preceded 
his arrival on the island by more than four centuries. Archaeologists have found evidence of a Norse 
settlement at l'Anse aux Meadows on the northwest coast ofNewfoundland, dating from as early as 1000 
A.D. The settlement persisted for about ten years before eventually being abandoned, probably due to harsh 
weather and violent encounters with indigenous peoples (lngstad and lngstad 200 l ) . 
42 The term "discovery" is perhaps somewhat misleading, since the island had already inhabited by 
indigenous peoples for millennia prior to Cabot's arrival. While relatively little is known about the Beothuk 
people who were living in Newfoundland when Cabot' s crew arrived, archaeological and ethnohistoric 
evidence suggests that they lived a nomadic existence, following caribou herds into the interior of the island 
during the winter and migrating to the coast during the spring and summer to harvest salmon, shellfish, 
seals, seabirds and their eggs, berries, and other vegetation. Most estimates suggest that, when Europeans 
arrived in Newfoundland at the turn of the sixteenth century, there were fewer than two thousand Beothuk 
people Jiving in small bands across the island. As the numbers of European fishers visiting the 
Newfoundland coast each year increased, the Beothuk people retreated farther inland, choosing to have 
very little contact with the new arrivals. By the dawn of the nineteenth century, however, very few 
remained. For the most part, this was due to the introduction of European diseases, starvation and 
malnutrition resulting from the Joss of access to vital harvesting locations along the coast, and sporadic 
attacks by English settlers, particularly along the northeast coast of the island. The last known Beothuk 
survivor was a young woman named Shawnadithit, who died of tuberculosis in St. John's in 1829 (Marshall 
1989; Pastore 1992, 1998). 
43 Some residents of the Cupids site went on to found a colony in present-day New Hampshire, while John 
Calvert (Lord Baltimore), the founder of the Ferryland Colony, opted to divert his efforts to the Chesapeake 
Bay in present-day Maryland (Cell 1982; Lahey 1982) 
44 These boundaries were shifted slightly in the 1783 Treaty of Versailles, but otherwise remained 
unchanged through until 1904, when they were finally extinguished. 
45 Immigration to Newfoundland came to a virtual halt during the following century, as most new North 
American settlers opted instead for more fertile land and better employment prospects in Canada and the 
United States. The "founder effect" that ensued has made some parts of the province havens for human 
genetics research in recent years (Atkinson 2000; Staples 2000; Industrial Research Assistance Program 
n.d.). 
46More extensive descriptions of the history ofthe Newfoundland inshore cod fishery are provided by Wade 
( 1973); Alexander (1977); Ryan (1980); Sider ( 1985); and Sinclair (1985). 
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47 Most came from Conception, Trinity, Bonavista, and Notre Dame Bays on the north coast of 
Newfoundland, but some people from the less prosperous areas closer to the head of Placentia Bay took 
£art as well. 
8 One ofthe clearest illustrations of this perspective was provided by economist W.W. Rostow (1960) in 
his book The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Rostow took the position that all 
economies must pass through a series of stages in order to become modem and industrial societies. He 
argued that development and modernization were inevitable and that traditional modes of subsistence were 
backward and should not be encouraged. 
49 The Newfoundland government had itself constructed a fisheries science centre in 1931, but it burned 
down soon thereafter (Wright 2001). 
50 A previous referendum on whether to join Canada had failed by a convincing margin in an 1869 general 
election. A second vote held earlier in 1948 saw independence win by a narrow margin over the other two 
options of Confederation with Canada and continued rule by Britain. On the second referendum, the least 
popular British option was dropped from the ballot, and most of its supporters sided with the Confederation 
side, giving them the narrow majority. To this day, some Newfoundland nationalists insist that the 1948 
vote was tampered with. Another common suggestion is that Britain made a secret deal to transfer 
Newfoundland, with its rich resources and strategic position (both from a military and a trans-Atlantic 
aviation perspective), to Canada in exchange for the forgiveness of some 8 billion in loans that Britain had 
borrowed to finance the war effort (MacGregor 2003b). 
51 The one exception to this rule was the schooner fishery, which operated out of St. John's and several ice 
free ports on Newfoundland's south coast, such as Burin and Grand Bank in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The large vessels would carry smaller ones (dories) aboard them. Those dories would 
be launched each day to do the fishing, and would return their catches to the larger vessels to be stored in 
their cargo holds (Andersen 1999). 
52 The majority of the resettled communities were located on islands in Placentia, Bonavista, and Notre 
Dame Bays, and as well as on the south coast of Newfoundland and the coast of Labrador. 
53 Interestingly, a similar vision was employed by the federal government in the aftermath of the groundfish 
moratorium in the early 1990s, as individuals were provided with incentives to resettle to larger centres in 
Newfoundland or, more commonly, in mainland Canada. The restructuring programs that followed the 
f,roundfish moratorium are case is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
4 It should, however, be noted that the 1961 figure is somewhat misleading because it does not reflect the 
many "part-time" harvesters who were not registered. 
Chapter 5 
55 Most experienced workers in eastern Newfoundland qualified for between four and five years of 
~ayments, due to the region' s heavy reliance on the cod fishery. 
6 All three countries made ITQs a central component of their fisheries policies during the 1980s (McCay 
1999). Advocates of the further privatization of fisheries resources have long held up these examples as 
models of efficient and sustainable fisheries, although critics have highlighted the negative social and 
ecological consequences that have sometimes resulted (Copes and Charles ; Palsson 2006; Ommer 2007) 
57 The most notable exception to this rule was the lobster fishery, where fishers were regulated only by the 
length of the fishing season and the number of traps allocated to each harvester (Davis et a!. 2006). 
58 Similar positions have been articulated by a variety ofNGOs in Atlantic Canada, most notably the 
Coastal Communities Network. 
59 The term "part-time" was introduced by DFO in 1991 and was restricted to those working as crew 
members on the vessels of other harvesters who did not have licences of their own. By 1992, however, it 
was announced that the concept of part-time status would be phased out entirely (Schrank eta!. 1992: 351 ). 
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60 Some have noted that female fish harvesters were disproportionately represented in the apprentice 
category, since many entered the fishery later than their male counterparts. This put them in a much more 
vulnerable position moving forward (Neis and Grzetic 200 I; Grzetic 2004; Power 2005). 
61 Very similar findings were reported by Power (2005) 
62 Dan and many others in Canada still use the abbreviation "DFO" (Department of Fisheries and Oceans) 
to refer to Fisheries and Oceans Canada, even though the agency has used its new name "Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada" since the early 1990s. Thus, the abbreviation "DFO" will continue to appear in this and 
other quotations. 
63 This practice is by no means new, as some women have worked on fishing boats for two or more decades 
(Porter eta!. 1990, Grzetic 2004) 
64 In 2006, a court concluded that it was illegal for DFO to require harvesters to fund scientific studies and 
it remains to be seen what impact this decision will have on established practices. 
65 Some fishers were fearful that this uncertainty could be magnified by the ongoing impacts of climate 
change. The Northwest North Atlantic ecosystem is said to be highly vulnerable to changes in ocean 
temperature, salinity, and currents that may result from the increased fresh water content caused by melting 
~olar ice caps (Hami lton and Seyfirt 1994). 
6As part of the AFPR process, however, DFO and the FF A W did organize a series of consultation sessions 
in 2004 to address the issue of trust agreements in the industry and the future of the Owner-Operator and 
Fleet Separation Policies. 
67 A series of protests, which appeared to be modeled on those carried out in Newfoundland, broke out in 
Cape Breton, Nova Scotia later that summer to oppose a proposed cut to crab quotas in that area. Between 
July 4°' and July II tl', crab fishers blocked a tour boat, a shipping lane and access to the Louisbourg 
National Historic Site, which is a major tourist attraction (Grant 2005, Shannon 2005, The Canadian Press 
2005b). 
Chapter 6 
68 Salmon and herring were generally cured locally and sold to American buyers who frequently visited 
Placentia Bay and often paid for the fish with gold coins. The bay soon became renowned for having one 
of the strongest herring fisheries on the island. At the tum of the century, one American company went as 
far as to "set up a business on Sound Island to purchase and 'Scotch cure' herring" on site" (Tulk 1997: 29). 
The commercial lobster fishery in Placentia Bay became active in the 1870s, making it the first area of the 
province to process lobster. By the turn of the century, the inner part of Placentia Bay was dotted with 
dozens of small lobster canneries, many of which persisted until the resource declined suddenly in the 
1930s (ibid.) 
69 Biological studies of the fishery in Placentia Bay have been carried out by Hutchings eta!. (2002) and 
Windle and Rose (2007) 
70 This was likely a result of the fact that the bay is very deep and has a particularly rocky ocean floor, both 
of which make trawling more difficult. The one exception to this rule was the extremely bountiful cod 
fishing area around Cape St. Mary's, in the southeastern part of the bay, which was a major focus of 
attention for both foreign and Newfoundland-based trawlers. 
71 They do, however, note that work stoppages could prove much more costly to processing companies in a 
more capital intensive industry (Fishery Research Group 1986: 55). 
72 The fish is beheaded, gutted and frozen at sea before being shipped in standard ten pound blocks to 
Newfoundland where it is processed into fillets. 
73 Species processed at the plant at that time, included cod, redfish, American plaice, yellowtail flounder, 
and grey sole. 
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74 Research carried out through this partnership was responsible for leading the North Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization (NAFO) to recommend reopening the commercial yellowtail flounder fishery in international 
waters 1998 (DFO 2000: II). 
75 A similar endeavour has been undertaken by Clearwater Fine Foods, Inc., another processing company 
based in Nova Scotia. The company has formed a partnership with Fisheries and Oceans Canada to fund 
extensive multi-beam mapping in order to produce three-dimensional maps of the Brown's Bank area, 
where they harvest large quantities of scallops (Pickrill and Todd 2003). In exchange for sharing their data 
with DFO and entering into a co-management agreement, they have been granted exclusive harvesting 
rights in that area. These mapping efforts have proven to be very profitable for the company, as they have 
led to the discovery of significant beds of mature scallops, which were previously unknown (Tutton 2006). 
76 Most of the research on the Arnold's Cove plant that was carried out as part of this study was carried out 
bf Anna Kay Buckley (Fishery Research Group 1986). 
7 In the first half of the twentieth century, the Wareham family operated two of the largest and most 
successful fish merchant operations on the south coast of Newfoundland, located in the communities of 
Spencer's Cove and Harbour Buffett. Both towns were located on Long Island, in the middle of Placentia 
Bay. Alberto Wareham had established a firm in Spencer's Cove in the early 1900s and soon took over the 
already existing Harbour Buffett operation, which had been operating under different ownership since the 
1850s (Tulk 1997: 120). Together the two businesses became very important power brokers on the south 
coast, playing a key role in the salt cod, herring and live lobster trades. The company also owned and 
operated a fleet of schooners, which would regularly fish in the extremely rich Golden Bay off Cape St. 
Mary's. They also operated a number of coastal boats that would travel along the south coast of the island 
collecting fish and bringing it back to Long Island for processing. Over time, this trade gradually displaced 
many of the older and more established merchant operations in the area. The Warehams owned several 
larger ocean-going vessels as well, which would regularly travel to Spain, Portugal, the West Indies, Brazil, 
the United States, and the Canadian mainland selling fish and collecting a variety of other goods to be sold 
in Newfoundland, such as salt, coal, flour, fruits and vegetables, molasses and rum (Tulk 1997). By the 
1920s, Harbour Buffett had a bank, a nursing station, a post office, a customs office, a fisheries office, a 
telegraph office, a police station, and eight large oil tanks which supplied electricity. It was home to 
"fishermen, seamen, coopers, blacksmiths, tinsmiths, boat builders, sail makers, carpenters, labourers, and 
clerical and business staff' (Tulk 1997: 140). As a result of their strong links with places within and beyond 
Newfoundland, people living in Harbour Buffett and Spencer's Cove felt far from remote. A resident of 
Arnold' s Cove who had spent his youth in Harbour Buffett told me that he was regularly exposed to a wide 
range of imported food items, including fresh fruit (apples, oranges, and bananas), and was quite 
accustomed to meeting people who had come from distant places. Over time, a fierce rivalry developed 
between Alberto Wareham's two sons, who had taken over the two merchant operations on the island. 
Several interviewees said that this stemmed from a fierce competition to gain control of the bay's rich 
herring fishery. Despite these squabbles, both operations continued to prosper. By the 1950s, a major 
herring processing factory had been built in Spencer's Cove. They had also built a lobster processing and 
canning facility and had developed a lucrative trade shipping live lobsters directly to the Boston market. 
The Harbour Buffett operation also collected live lobsters, but these were generally sold to Maritime 
Packers in Nova Scotia and transhipped from there. They also had a smaller herring factory and had built a 
large mechanical fish drying facility to accelerate the production of dried and salted cod and other fish. It 
was reportedly one of the most advanced facilities of its kind anywhere in North America at that time. Both 
businesses had also established a variety of smaller stores in various towns around the bay. The Wareham' s 
stronghold on the area was, however, significantly weakened by new federal and provincial economic 
development programs in the post-Confederation era. Spencer's Cove, Harbour Buffett, and all other island 
communities in Placentia Bay were resettled during the 1960s because of their " remote" location from the 
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point of view of planners who sought to develop land-based industries, build new infrastructure, and 
administer new social programs. 
78 The fish that High Liner does not purchase is generally either: sold to other North American buyers and 
used in the restaurant trade; shipped to other buyers in England or France; or sold in bulk to major retail 
chains, most notably Sam's Club, a subsidiary of Walmart. 
79 In many respects, this situation resembles that described by Kondo ( 1990) in her book Crafting Selves: 
Power, Gender and Discourses of identity in a Japanese Workplace. Kondo examined the ways in which 
workers at a large Japanese company were required to go through a series of team-building activities in 
order to increase their loyalty and commitment to their place of work. 
80 The trawler also harvests some flatfish (flounder and halibut) which are filleted at the plant using its one 
flatfish processing machine and then smoked in the smoke room on site. The smoke room was historically 
used mostly for herring (Fishery Research Group 1986), but its usage has changed over time. 
81 While Buffett's family has apparently traced his roots to the community of Rose Blanche on the 
southwest coast of the island (Smith 2005), it seems safe to assume that he is also a distant relative of those 
that first established the community of Harbour Buffett in Placentia Bay. 
Chapter 7 
82 In recent years, these federal-provincial tensions have flared up again. The current Premier of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Danny Williams, has been successful in pressuring the federal government to 
allow the province to keep a greater share of oil revenues. Williams, who swept to power in 2004, 
immediately launched a highly publicized campaign to revisit the Atlantic Accord in order to ensure that 
Newfoundland was the "primary beneficiary" of petroleum development, as was promised in the original 
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord implementation Act. To that point, the province had, in effect, been 
penalized 70 cents in federal equalization payments for every dollar that it made from offshore oil, resulting 
in a net gain of only 30 cents. Williams argued that this was an unfair arrangement which, if left unchanged, 
would leave the province with no hope of prospering economically and shedding its status as a "have not" 
province. Williams' decision to remove all Canadian flags from government buildings in protest raised the 
ire of many journalists in major Canadian newspapers, but was successful in drawing a great deal of 
attention to the case during a closely contested federal election. It added fuel to the longstanding arguments 
of many national columnists that the province was biting the hand that feeds it and failing to acknowledge 
the benevolent investments made by the federal government in: social programs, healthcare, social welfare, 
employment programs, pensions, infrastructure (national parks, roads, wharves, etc.), and in providing 
compensation for displaced fishery workers after the moratorium and seed funding to get the oil industry 
off the ground in the first place (Keller 2005 ; Simpson 2005 ; Wente 2005). In St. John's and elsewhere in 
Newfoundland, the Premier's actions were generally well-received. His hard line stance was portrayed by 
many Newfoundland writers as a long-overdue attempt to rectify the ' raw deal ' that the province had 
received in Confederation (Riche 2005). Increased oil revenues were seen as providing a possible redress 
for the myriad of misguided resource development deals that had been made by previous provincial and 
federal administrations, which had left the province with a poor return on the sale of its natural resources 
and kept it in a disadvantaged state relative to other Canadian provinces. Williams' actions sparked a 
resurgence of nationalist sentiment in some parts of the province, and the long-abandoned pink, white and 
green flags of the Republic ofNewfoundland soon began flying off the shelves (Quinn 2005). Many were 
optimistic that the new deal struck by Williams will enable Newfoundland gain a greater share of the wealth 
from existing projects and put it in a good position to capitalize on any future discoveries, but this 
enthusiasm has been dampened somewhat by a decision by the new Conservative government to renege on 
their campaign promise to honour the offshore petroleum revenues deal that had been struck by the 
outgoing Liberals. Williams has demanded a better deal from oil companies as well, although this move has 
386 
drawn criticism from many in the industry and, in some cases, provoked threats to halt plans for future 
developments, including the Hebron-Ben Nevis and Hibernia South projects (Cattaneo 2005, Park 2005, 
Ebner 2007). 
83 A parallel board, called the Canada-Nova Scotia offshore Petroleum Board (C-NSOPB) was established 
to regulate the Nova Scotia offshore area. 
84 Biotechnology companies in the province include: those working on "isolating antifreeze proteins from 
the blood plasma of cold water fish species" for use in medicine (preserving tissue and other organic 
materials), food technology (keeping ice cream and vegetables from spoiling) and cosmetics"; developing 
vaccines and isolating fish growth genes for use in the aquaculture industry; and manufacturing 
neutraceuticals from kelp, seal oil, berries, and crab and shrimp shells (Industrial Research Assistance 
Program, no date). 
85 de Ia Mare (2005) argues that the distinction between the "Precautionary Principle" and the 
"Precautionary Approach" is not merely semantic. Discussing the case of Canadian fisheries management, 
he writes: "While the precautionary principle has been adopted by a number of international and national 
fisheries management organizations, it has mainly been implemented as the precautionary approach ... The 
precautionary principle places the burden of proof on development proponents to prove that any harm 
resulting from their operations will be reversible, placing the emphasis on proponents to develop safefail 
systems where unexpected outcomes will not lead to catastrophic ecological effects ... Fisheries managers 
are not to delay cost effective conservation measures simply because they lack defmitive scientific evidence 
or undisputed data on damaging fishing practices and other economic activities in the marine environment. 
The precautionary approach places the burden of proof on regulators to calculate cost benefit analyses 
illustrating that restrictions on fishing and other marine development activities do not, on balance, 
irrevocably or unnecessarily harm the economy. While the precautionary principle implies a deontological 
ethical framework that places strict limits on human activity, the subtle shift in terminology from the 
precautionary principle to the approach, promotes a permissive utilitarian ethical stance focused on 
maximizing the greatest good for the greatest number of human or corporate economic actors. DFO's 
precautionary approach provides the very ethical framework and burden of proof requirement which the 
precautionary principle was designed to avoid and eliminate" (Holling 1976; VanDeVeer and Pierce 1998; 
Coward eta/. 2000, referenced in de Ia Mare 2005, emphasis in original). 
86 A similar movement has developed in the fish processing industry through the Marine Stewardship 
Council, "an independent, non-profit and non-governmental organization" formed through a partnership 
between the World Wildlife Fund and Unilever, which is one of the world's largest seafood buyers. The 
agency has developed a code of conduct, and seeks "to define principles and criteria for sustainable fishing 
and to enforce these by issuing accreditation certificates to the fisheries or management regimes - that meet 
them and ask for accreditation" (Mikalsen and Jentoft 200 I: 288). In August, 2008, it was announced that 
the Newfoundland-based trawl fishery for northern shrimp had been certified as a "sustainable fishery" by 
the MSC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2008). 
87 In practice very few of these birds survive. Seabirds have an undercoating of feathers that insulates them 
from the cold water of the North Atlantic and once this layer has been damaged by oil the birds often die of 
hypothermia. While some birds have been successfully cleaned and reintroduced into the wild, critics have 
pointed out that survival rates remain very low and success stories are few and far between. 
Chapter 8 
88 For more than a century Botwood has served as the point of export for the newsprint produced at the 
large paper mill in Grand Falls to the south. It has subsequently become the point of import for a variety of 
products, including gasoline, asphalt, and road salt. The town also played a key role during the Second 
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World War, serving as a vital seaplane base for the Canadian Air Force. While many complain that the port 
has fallen into disrepair, it continues to be a key piece of infrastructure in central Newfoundland. 
89 Some in the town would also board northbound schooners each spring to take part in the Labrador fishery, 
but this practice had largely come to a halt by the beginning of the twentieth century. 
90 By catch is fish that is caught in the nets of vessels that are actually targeting other species. 
91 While most of those involved were impressed with the results of the endeavour, it did not develop into a 
commercial operation due to the high cost of feed and the lack of a reliable supply of wild cod. 
92 Lien notes that Bill C-98, which was introduced in the mid 1990s faced "a very rough ride" in 
Parliamentary Hearings and this delayed the establishment of the NMCA Act considerably (1999: 3). 
93 In many respects, the criticisms levelled against the NMCA echo the critiques of national parks and other 
"conservation enclosures" that have been articulated by many critical anthropologists and environmental 
historians (Hecht 2004; Kosek 2004; Neumann 2004). These scholars have argued that efforts to set aside 
particular areas as pristine "wilderness" have served to obscure the human history that has helped to shape 
theses spaces and this has frequently been used to undermine longstanding livelihood strategies. 
94 For the two years pr ior to that point, the task of developing new Oceans Act programs had been overseen 
by various individuals in the agency's Habitat Management Branch. When the Oceans and Environment 
Branch was created, most of these individuals assumed leadership positions within it. 
95 In between each of these exclusive zones was a buffer zone, in which both groups could fish (Davis et al. 
2006). 
96 This unique colour is believed to be caused by "their carotenoid-rich diet of invertebrates" (The Coastal 
Current 2007) 
Chapter 9 
97 Because Placentia Bay had a longer fishing season and historically had access to strong inshore cod 
stocks, very few fishers chose to train out of the fishery at the time of the moratorium. This meant that 
many got core status and were granted crab permits. While inshore crab stocks in Placentia Bay have been 
relatively abundant as compared with many other areas, the wealth derived from that fishery has had to be 
shared between many more hands, At the time of research·, there were three major processing plants 
operating in the bay (Arnold' s Cove, Marystown, and St. Lawrence), along with several much smaller 
subsidiary plants in other communities, including St. Brides and Baine Harbour, and the secondary 
£rocessing plant in Burin. 
8 The mining industry did have a significant presence in Placentia Bay prior to this point, but this had more 
to do with the availability of mineral deposits and less to do with the advantages that the bay offered in 
terms of marine transportation. In 1858, the La Manche galena (lead) and zinc mine near Southern Harbour 
came into production and, by the tum of the century, it had blossomed into a significant operation before 
eventually being abandoned. A second deposit near Argentia containing silver, zinc and lead was 
discovered in 1882 and worked steadily until 1898, when it too was shut down. The third significant mining 
operation in the bay was the flourspar mine in St. Lawrence. The deposit was first discovered in 1933 and 
was mined intermittently until the 1 980s. The mine had tragic consequences for people in the region, as it 
was later found to have caused very high rates of cancer and lung disease among its workers, resulting in 
hundreds of premature deaths and many other health complications (Leyton 1975; Rennie 2001). 
99 This had enormous consequences for the town's residents. It ultimately resulted in the destruction of 350 
homes and buildings and the relocation of 160 families. It also required that all of the occupants ofthe 
town's cemetery be exhumed and reinterred elsewhere (Houlihan 1992: 53). While this process was 
undoubtedly very unsettling for the relatives of the deceased, this course of action only came about as a 
result of fierce negotiations with the US Navy, which had originally planned to simply pave over the 
cemetery (ibid: 53). As disruptive as the construction of the base at Argentia was, it did bring 
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unprecedented prosperity to many area residents. The base employed approximately 15,000 
Newfoundlanders and provided many with training in various skilled trades (Matthews 1987; Town of 
Placentia 1994; Argentia Management Authority n.d.). While operations at the base were reduced following 
the war, the American military presence at Argentia persisted for several decades before the base was 
finally closed down in 1994 (Smith and Joy 1992). The base has also left behind a very negative 
environmental legacy, and there are growing concerns about damage to the marine environment stemming 
from contaminated waste leaching into the sea from the base. In recent years a remediation project has been 
ongoing at the site, receiving some funding from the Canadian and US goverrunent. 
100 Thirty-one small communities were resettled under the Centralization Program in the 1950s and this was 
followed by an even greater displacement under the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program. Between 
1968 and 1969 alone, about one thousand families from twenty-nine different communities in Placentia Bay 
were resettled (Tulk 1997: 91). Most moved to designated resettlement centres in the bay, such as: Placentia, 
Burin, Marystown, Arnold's Cove, Lawn and Long Harbour (Tu lk 1997). While most people ultimately 
agreed to resettle, some families fought it vociferously (Matthews 1976; Thurston 1982). Resettlement was 
also opposed by many of the merchants who had businesses on the islands, because they would receive 
nothing as compensation for their lost customers, buildings and infrastructure (Matthews 1987). In spite of 
this resistance, all residents of the islands were eventually moved and only a few mainland communities 
were successful in lobbying to have the goverrunent' s decision reversed. 
101 Within months of its opening, large quantities of phosphorous from the mine leaked into the ocean, 
causing thousands of herring and other fish to turn up dead. Many of the fish had red around their gills as a 
result of phosphorous poisoning, leading the media to dub the event: "The Red Herring Scare." In the 
aftermath of the incident, the fishery was closed down in the inner part of the bay. Although there were 
serious concerns that it would have to remain closed for several more years and may never fully recover, it 
was ultimately decided to reopen it later that year (Legge 1982). The ERCO plant went on to operate 
successfully for the next twenty-one years, but when it finally closed down in 1989, it left the town scarred 
by numerous toxic slag heaps and put more than three hundred people out of work. While there have been 
longstanding accusations that pollution at the site has impacted negatively on area residents in the form of 
cancers and blood abnormalities, studies have failed to prove that these ailments are correlated with the 
presence of the mining complex (Strawbridge 1989; Jackson 1992). 
102 Today, all that remains are the ruins of two large cement buildings, which lie at the end of a long dirt 
road behind the Come by Chance oil refinery. The mill had been built as an incentive to lure entrepreneurs 
to invest in the site. This proved a difficult sell, however, due in large measure to the relative shortage of 
useable wood in eastern Newfoundland, and the already voracious demand for trees in central and western 
Newfoundland by the province's two other paper mills in Grand Falls and Corner Brook. The 
Newfoundland government had speculated that the mill could succeed despite the wood shortage, by 
importing wood from Labrador. It was also suggested that it would benefit from the fact that, unlike the 
other two mills in the province which were sometimes encumbered by winter ice, the Come by Chance site 
had the advantage of being able to ship products to market year round. Despite Smallwood's proposal to 
give the new buildings to any company willing to operate the mill, in the end, none deemed it to be 
economically feasible. 
103 The refinery was started by John Shaheen of Shaheen Natural Resources Company, Inc., an American 
industrialist with close ties to US President Richard Nixon (McGrath 2002). Shaheen' s intention was to 
take advantage of Newfoundland's strategic location close to major shipping routes by purchasing heavy oil 
from the Middle East and elsewhere and refining it for sale in the US and Canadian markets. In 
Smallwood's eagerness to get the project off the ground, his government agreed to provide Shaheen's group 
with an unsecured loan of approximately $30 mill on to build the facility . This was supplemented by 
additional grants from the federal government (McNight 1986). The refinery opened with a great deal of 
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fanfare in 1973, including a visit from the QEII cruise ship, then the "largest and most opulent ocean liner 
in the world" (McGrath 2002). 
104 In the 1980s, construction began on a new steel fabrication and construction platform at Cow Head, 
which was essentially an extension of the shipyard at Marystown. This enabled the site to play a major role 
in servicing the drilling rigs and supply vessels that were being used in the oil exploration boom that was 
taking place on the Grand Banks. The Marystown shipyard and the Cow Head industrial fabrication facility 
went on to play important roles in various construction and maintenance projects associated with the 
Hibernia, Terra Nova White Rose platforms as well as functioning as a construction and service centre for 
supply vessels that are used in the industry (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2003 ; Westcott and Chafe 2005; 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005). The towns of Arnold's Cove and Come by Chance at the head 
of Placentia Bay have also benefited from the petroleum industry. The Bull Arm construction site, just a 
short drive away from the communities played a central role in the construction of the Hibernia platform in 
the 1990s, employing close to 6,000 workers at its peak (Jang 1995). Bull Arm also handled some of the 
secondary work on the Terra Nova platform, which was primarily built in South Korea. This created 
approximately I 000 more full-time jobs (Jang 1998). While these developments brought significant 
employment benefits for people living in the surrounding area, some of those interviewed complained that 
trade union hiring practices severely curtailed the extent to which area residents were able to benefit from 
these projects. 
105 As of2005, the site employed about 21 people and considerably more jobs were created aboard the large 
shuttle tankers that service the site (The Oil & Gas Magazine 2005a). The facility is managed and operated 
by International-Matex Tank Terminals (IMTT) ofNew Orleans, LA and owned by Newfoundland 
Transshipment Limited (NTL), which is jointly funded by various oil companies that own a stake in either 
the Hibernia or the Terra Nova project, including Petro-Canada, Norsk Hydro, Exxon-Mobil, Chevron-
Texaco, and Murphy Oil Co. (Newfoundland Transhipment Ltd. 2004; The Oil & Gas Magazine 2005a; 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2005f). 
106 The vessels, which are named the Komatik, the Mattea, and the Yinland, are all registered in 
Newfoundland. Each is capable of carrying about 860,000 barrels of oil (The Oil & Gas Magazine 2005c). 
Shuttle tankers will occasionally take extraordinary large loads directly to their destination, but this not very 
common. As of 2005, the Whiffen Head facility received about 300 tanker visits annually, including about 
130 shuttle tankers and about 170 second leg tankers (The Oil & Gas Magazine 2005a). 
107 Interviews indicated that second leg tankers were most commonly registered in either Monrovia, Panama, 
the Bahamas, or Liberia. 
108 On occasion, crude has been shipped to farther destinations, such as Texas or even to sites on the west 
coast of North America, via the Panama Canal. In some cases, oil may also be shipped directly to market, 
bypassing the IMTT facility altogether. The White Rose platform in particular has opted for this approach, 
and is designed to ship oil directly to market using specialized tankers (The Oil & Gas Magazine 2005a). 
109 The company was a subsidiary of Cumberland Farms, a large Massachusetts-based gasoline retailer 
(McNight 1996). 
110 The refmery had previously been purchased in 1980 by the Canadian company Petro-Canada, although it 
was never operated during Petro Canada's tenure. It reopened shortly after the sale to Cumberland Farms, 
creating 500 hundred jobs (Flanagan 1998). 
111 Despite these transactions, employment has remained relatively stable and the refmery now employs 
about 550 people (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2006j). 
112 Despite the fact that it is less efficient to do so, Come by Chance has processed some Grand Banks oil in 
years past. 
113 Bay d'Espoir and Fortune Bay to the west of Placentia Bay already contain extensive salmon and cod 
aquaculture development and plans are underway to expand the presence of the industry in these areas 
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considerably. Interviews with development board officials in Placentia Bay indicated that several large 
European and Canadian aquaculture companies had expressed a strong interest in developing cod 
aquaculture operations in Placentia Bay as well, particularly in areas on the western side of the bay, which 
have less direct exposure to strong ocean currents. Placentia Bay also has the strongest remaining wild cod 
population in the province and has been identified as an area with a strong potential for cod growout 
programs, in which fish born in the wild are captured and fed so that they will grow faster than they would 
if left to their own devices. 
114 This route has operated regularly since .1968. 
115 Large container ships operated by Icelandic shipping giant Eimskip visit the port on a regular basis, 
carrying everything from frozen fish to cement to cars. The town also houses a large cold storage facility, 
which serves as the main landing point for a wide variety of fish species, which are caught by international 
fleets on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap. 
116 Perhaps the most revolutionary change in ocean science and technology in recent years has been the 
advent of"multi-beam bathymetric mapping" or "3-D seismic" as it is more conventionally known 
(Boswell 2003). The process makes use of devices which are carried over a particular area of the sea by 
specialized vessels. As the vessel moves, the device deploys "dozens, even hundreds of pulsating sound 
signals that are bounced off the seabed in a fan-shaped array" (ibid: AS). The data this generates is then 
processed by a computer system aboard the vessel, which generates a highly detailed 3-dimensional image 
of the shape and elevation of the ocean floor. These images are far superior to those created by "echo 
sounders" in previous eras (ibid.) . This new technology has led to dramatic advances in a variety of fields, 
including underwater archaeology, the identification of navigational hazards, the laying of deep sea cables 
and pipelines, and the mapping of continental shelves (Boswell 2003; Pickrill and Todd 2003). A secondary 
product of this work is what is commonly called "backscatter." For each sonic beam created, the computer 
also records its "backscattered acoustic imagery." This "shows how hard or soft the scanned surface is" and 
can be used to "more easily classify the kinds of rocks and sediments on the sea floor' ' (ibid: AS). This has 
immediate applications in the offshore petroleum sector because it can help to identify areas of high 
promise for drilling. Backscatter data can also be overlaid with other sources of data, such as information 
on local flora and fauna, salinity, and currents, to produce more detailed habitat maps. 
117 It would, of course, also allow investors to remove their money quickly in the event of an environmental 
disaster or another unforeseen event. 
118 The Automatic Identification System (AIS), which is now installed on most large vessels, automatically 
transfers information about that vessel, such as its name, function , country of ownership, direction and 
speed to other boats and to monitoring stations based on land. 
119 The capacity of historically and geographically rooted communities to speak with a single voice will be 
tested in the years ahead by the indigenous people of Newfoundland and Labrador. Although they were 
excluded from Canada's Indian Act due to the fact that the province joined Canada much later than other 
provinces and did not wish to have the legislation apply, recent years have witnessed the emergence of 
several large aboriginal land claims in the province. This includes those made by the Innu Nation, the 
Labrador Inuit Association and the newly formed Labrador Metis Nation in Labrador (Burke 2003). The 
Labrador Inuit Association claim, which was settled in 200S, is particularly interesting, because it is one of 
the first in Canada to include a significant marine component (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2004). 
In each of these cases, new co-management agreements are being developed, which demand that these 
groups develop a unified perspective on how they wish to move forward . Although no active land claims 
negotiations are ongoing on the island ofNewfoundland, the Mi 'kmaw people living in Newfoundland have 
long argued that their ancestors arrived prior to the arrival of the first permanent European settlers and, as a 
result, they should be allowed to make claims as well. This assertion has long been disputed by the 
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provincial and federal governments, on the grounds that no physical evidence has been found to prove that 
they arrived when they say they did (Wetzel 1995). 
120 The pilot boats operating in Placentia Bay are operated by a Halifax-based crown corporation called the 
Atlantic Pilotage Authority. 
121 Tankers must also be accompanied by a tug boat during the final leg of their journey, to assist them with 
docking. 
122 For many, these concerns were amplified by their knowledge of the events that followed the major oil 
spill caused by the Prestige, a large oil tanker that sunk offthe Galician coast of Spain in 2002. The spill 
caused tremendous environmental damage and had a major economic impact on the fishing industry, both 
through direct contamination of the surrounding area and through the loss of market share that followed 
(Garza-Gil et al. 2006). The problem was made worse by a legal environment which made it very difficult 
to hold the petroleum industry accountable for absorbing the costs associated with cleanup operations 
(Garcia Perez 2003). This situation resulted in the formation of"Nunca Mais" (Never Again), a broad-
based social movement that organized a series of popular demonstrations aimed at achieving policy reforms 
which would eliminate the possibility for this sort of"delinquent capitalism" to be allowed to occur in the 
future (ibid: 220). 
123 A number of other mechanisms have also been put in place to improve communication and reduce 
conflict between the various maritime users of the bay. Since the 1970s, the Canadian Coast Guard has 
chaired a Placentia Bay Traffic Committee with representation from : the oil industry, the pilotage authority, 
shipping agents, the Newfoundland Aquaculture Association, and other key users of the bay. It also chairs a 
Regional Advisory Council on Oil Spill Response which invites public input into issues relevant to oil spill 
response in the region. Several private-sector initiatives have been introduced as well. These include: a 
Come by Chance community liaison committee and IMTT committees dealing with both "community 
relations" and "fishery relations." 
124 In 2006, Transport Canada began a series of public consultations with a view to updating this framework 
and reassessing the risk of an oil spill on Newfoundland's south coast during the next decade 
125 There are further concerns about the effectiveness of response measures in containing spills that occur in 
the rough water that is typical off the Newfoundland coast. This was very much apparent in the case of an 
oil spill that occurred offshore at the Terra Nova Rig in 2004, in which very little of the oil was deemed to 
be recoverable (Baird 2004). 
126 While inshore crab stocks in Placentia Bay have been relatively abundant as compared with many other 
areas, the wealth derived from that fishery has had to be shared between many more hands. 
127 Tensions between the commercial fishery and the offshore petroleum industry are, of course, not unique 
to Newfoundland. Conflicts between the two industries in the North Sea during the 1980s were well 
documented and, more recently, discussions about possible offshore drilling off the coasts of Florida and 
British Columbia as well as in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and on George's Bank have sparked vocal protests 
from fishers, many of whom have expressed concern that oil pollution, seismic testing and/or offshore 
pifelines could have a negative impact on their industry (Cox 2000; Meissner 2004; Morton 2006). 
12 The new refinery is slated to employ about 3000 people during the construction phase and create 750 
permanent full-time jobs once it is up and running (Daly 2006). 
129 There has, however, been some speculation that these expansion plans may have been derailed by the 
recent sale of the refmery to a new ownership group that has yet to make its intentions clear (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2006i). 
130 The project is predicted to create 300 jobs in the construction phase and another I 00 full-time jobs upon 
completion (Squires 2006d, 2007). 
131 The original plan was to build the smelter in Argentia, but the company eventually decided on Long 
Harbour instead. While there are some concerns about negative health and environmental outcomes that 
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may result from the smelter, the economic boost it will provide has come as welcome news to many in 
Long Harbour, which has struggled to attract new employers after the ERCO phosphorous plant closed 
down in 1989, resulting in the loss of about 400 jobs. A proposal to build an incinerator in the town to bum 
imported garbage from the United States was eventually abandoned due to public opposition to the idea. 
Instead, many people in the town have instead opted to commute an hour each way to work in St. John's 
where employment is more plentiful. The smelter has already encountered some public opposition, however, 
due to the refusal of the provincial and federal governments to force the company to not dump waste 
material into the surrounding watershed and instead create a designated tailings pond which is reinforced to 
prevent leakage into the water table. 
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